equal protection clause in Maryland

2013Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002) (emphasis in original); see also Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714 , 426 A.2d 929, 946 (1981) (citation omitted) (“Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal protection principle embodied in Article 24 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] are ‘in pari materia,’ and decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.”); Green v

2013Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002) (emphasis in original); see also Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714 , 426 A.2d 929, 946 (1981) (citation omitted) (“Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal protection principle embodied in Article 24 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] are ‘in pari materia,’ and decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.”); Green v

2023We may consider direct and circumstantial evidence, including “the historical background of the decision under [legislative] challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by the members of the decisionmaking body.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (describing the standard of review in an equal protection challenge).

2023We may consider direct and circumstantial evidence, including “the historical background of the decision under [legislative] challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by the members of the decisionmaking body.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (describing the standard of review in an equal protection challenge).

2023Rylyns, 372 Md. at 593 (Cathell, J., dissenting) (quoting Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (R.I. 1976)) (establishing, in a conditional use challenge, that “[o]wners of property in the same land-use category are not necessarily ‘similarly situated’ so that they must be 37 treated identically under the equal protection clause. . . . [T]wo parcels may have been classified at different times when the needs of the municipality differed.

2023Rylyns, 372 Md. at 593 (Cathell, J., dissenting) (quoting Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (R.I. 1976)) (establishing, in a conditional use challenge, that “[o]wners of property in the same land-use category are not necessarily ‘similarly situated’ so that they must be 37 treated identically under the equal protection clause. . . . [T]wo parcels may have been classified at different times when the needs of the municipality differed.

2023Hegeman Co. v. Mayor of River Edge, 69 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1949), where the setback requirement that was invalidated applied to only one block of a business district without any apparent reason for disparate treatment); id. at 715 (discussing Veseskis v. Bristol Zoning Comm’n, 362 A.2d 538 (Conn. 1975), where the invalidated ordinance applied only in one specific instance, but not in other instances presenting the same circumstances); see also Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (invoking the concept of “similarly situated” in an equal protection claim).

2023Hegeman Co. v. Mayor of River Edge, 69 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1949), where the setback requirement that was invalidated applied to only one block of a business district without any apparent reason for disparate treatment); id. at 715 (discussing Veseskis v. Bristol Zoning Comm’n, 362 A.2d 538 (Conn. 1975), where the invalidated ordinance applied only in one specific instance, but not in other instances presenting the same circumstances); see also Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (invoking the concept of “similarly situated” in an equal protection claim).

2023Courts have also described improper discrimination as “unfair,” Anderson House, 402 Md. at 720 , “unequal,” id., “ad hoc,” id. at 714 , and “unreasonable,” Rylyns, 372 Md. at 546 (describing illegal spot zoning). 22 Zoning and Planning § 4:8 (4th ed. rev. 2023) (“Rathkopf”) (citing Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 686 ); see also Anderson House, 402 Md. at 719 n.23 (comparing the Equal Protection clause analysis to uniformity analysis).

2023Rylyns, 372 Md. at 593 (Cathell, J., dissenting) (quoting Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (R.I. 1976)) (establishing, in a conditional use challenge, that “[o]wners of property in the same land-use category are not necessarily ‘similarly situated’ so that they must be 37 treated identically under the equal protection clause. . . . [T]wo parcels may have been classified at different times when the needs of the municipality differed.

2023Courts have also described improper discrimination as “unfair,” Anderson House, 402 Md. at 720 , “unequal,” id., “ad hoc,” id. at 714 , and “unreasonable,” Rylyns, 372 Md. at 546 (describing illegal spot zoning). 22 Zoning and Planning § 4:8 (4th ed. rev. 2023) (“Rathkopf”) (citing Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 686 ); see also Anderson House, 402 Md. at 719 n.23 (comparing the Equal Protection clause analysis to uniformity analysis).

2023Courts have also described improper discrimination as “unfair,” Anderson House, 402 Md. at 720 , “unequal,” id., “ad hoc,” id. at 714 , and “unreasonable,” Rylyns, 372 Md. at 546 (describing illegal spot zoning). 22 Zoning and Planning § 4:8 (4th ed. rev. 2023) (“Rathkopf”) (citing Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 686 ); see also Anderson House, 402 Md. at 719 n.23 (comparing the Equal Protection clause analysis to uniformity analysis).

2023For example, as we cited in Anderson House, 402 Md. at 715 n.21, a Wisconsin court struck down, on uniformity grounds, an ordinance exempting one of four parcels in the same zone from obtaining a permit for a rendering plant because the exemption was “not based upon substantial distinctions which make the operation of a rendering plant and packing plant in one area of the industrial district different from any other areas in the industrial district,” Boerschinger v. Elkay Enters., Inc., 145 N.W.2d 108, 110-11 (Wis. 1966). 28 Conversely, just because properties are zoned differently does not pe

2023For example, as we cited in Anderson House, 402 Md. at 715 n.21, a Wisconsin court struck down, on uniformity grounds, an ordinance exempting one of four parcels in the same zone from obtaining a permit for a rendering plant because the exemption was “not based upon substantial distinctions which make the operation of a rendering plant and packing plant in one area of the industrial district different from any other areas in the industrial district,” Boerschinger v. Elkay Enters., Inc., 145 N.W.2d 108, 110-11 (Wis. 1966). 28 Conversely, just because properties are zoned differently does not pe

2007We stated as follows: ‘We have not hesitated to carefully examine a statute and declare it invalid if we .cannot discern a rational basis for its enactment. ‘The vitality of this State’s equal protection doctrine is demonstrated by our decisions which, although applying the deferential standard embodied in the rational basis test, have nevertheless invalidated many legislative classifications which impinged on privileges cherished by our citizens.’ ” 6 Id., at 315 , 761 A.2d at 333 (quoting Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 419 , 635 A.2d 967, 971 (1994)).

2007We stated as follows: ‘We have not hesitated to carefully examine a statute and declare it invalid if we .cannot discern a rational basis for its enactment. ‘The vitality of this State’s equal protection doctrine is demonstrated by our decisions which, although applying the deferential standard embodied in the rational basis test, have nevertheless invalidated many legislative classifications which impinged on privileges cherished by our citizens.’ ” 6 Id., at 315 , 761 A.2d at 333 (quoting Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 419 , 635 A.2d 967, 971 (1994)).

2003See also Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., supra, 370 Md. at 621 , 805 A.2d at 1071 (“[W]e have also emphasized that, simply because a Maryland constitutional provision is in pari materia with a federal one or has a federal counterpart, does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart”); Verzi v. Baltimore County, supra, 333 Md. at 417 , 635 A.2d at 970 (“We have consistently recognized that the federal Equal Protection Clause and the Article 24 guarantee of equal protection of the laws are complementary but independent, and

2003See also Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., supra, 370 Md. at 621 , 805 A.2d at 1071 (“[W]e have also emphasized that, simply because a Maryland constitutional provision is in pari materia with a federal one or has a federal counterpart, does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart”); Verzi v. Baltimore County, supra, 333 Md. at 417 , 635 A.2d at 970 (“We have consistently recognized that the federal Equal Protection Clause and the Article 24 guarantee of equal protection of the laws are complementary but independent, and

2017Maryland courts turn to “decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the equal protection clause of the federal constitution [as] persuasive authority in cases involving the equal treatment provisions of Article 24.” Id. at 640 (citations omitted).

2009Although the two are capable of divergent application, ‘[w]e have, however, long recognized that decisions of the [U.S.] Supreme Court interpreting the equal protection clause of the federal constitution are persuasive authority in cases involving the equal treatment provisions of Article 24.’ ”) (Quoting Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 640 , 458 A.2d 758 (1983)) (some citations omitted). *412 Frankel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Maryland Sys., 361 Md. 298 , 761 A.2d 324 (2000), involved the residency classification of a student, Frankel, at the University of Mary

1990Under that test, the law would survive an equal protection analysis unless it was “wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 707 , 426 *151 A.2d 929 (1981) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 , 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)).

1990Under that test, the law would survive an equal protection analysis unless it was “wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 707 , 426 *151 A.2d 929 (1981) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 , 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)).

2013Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002) (emphasis in original); see also Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714 , 426 A.2d 929, 946 (1981) (citation omitted) (“Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal protection principle embodied in Article 24 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] are ‘in pari materia,’ and decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.”); Green v

2013Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002) (emphasis in original); see also Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714 , 426 A.2d 929, 946 (1981) (citation omitted) (“Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal protection principle embodied in Article 24 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] are ‘in pari materia,’ and decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.”); Green v

1975While the cases applying the equal protection clause have indicated that there is a wide toleration for territorial distinctions within a state, nevertheless the state’s authority is limited to drawing “reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions within its borders.” San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28, n. 66 , 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294, n. 66 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (emphasis supplied).

1975While the cases applying the equal protection clause have indicated that there is a wide toleration for territorial distinctions within a state, nevertheless the state’s authority is limited to drawing “reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions within its borders.” San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28, n. 66 , 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294, n. 66 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (emphasis supplied).

1975Almost forty years ago this Court stated with respect to the requirements of the equal protection clause, Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 269-270 , 183 A. 534 (1935): “Nor, apart from any other consideration, is there any rational basis for the territorial classification made by the act, for there is no such difference in the conditions existing within the state outside of Baltimore City and those within its limits, in reference to the business of paper hanging, which would make the pursuit of it in the city a menace to the public health and safety but harmless beyond its limits.

1975Almost forty years ago this Court stated with respect to the requirements of the equal protection clause, Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 269-270 , 183 A. 534 (1935): “Nor, apart from any other consideration, is there any rational basis for the territorial classification made by the act, for there is no such difference in the conditions existing within the state outside of Baltimore City and those within its limits, in reference to the business of paper hanging, which would make the pursuit of it in the city a menace to the public health and safety but harmless beyond its limits.

1980If diversities of laws and judicial proceedings may exist in the several States without violating the equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no solid reason why there may not be such diversities in different parts of the same State. [Missouri v, Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).] Since Lewis the Supreme Court has given continued recognition to the principle that uniformity throughout the limits of a state is not in and of itself a prerequisite to meeting the requirements of the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause.

1979It would *407 be an unfortunate restriction of the powers of the State Government if it could not, in its discretion, provide for these various exigencies. [ 101 U. S. at 30-32 .] As we further observed in Davidson , since Lewis the Supreme Court has given continued recognition to the principle that uniformity throughout the limits of a state is not in and of itself a prerequisite to meeting the requirements of the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause.

2013For example, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), several plaintiffs mounted an equal protection challenge to a Tennessee statute that provided for apportionment of seats in the state legislature, alleging that it impaired their voting rights.

2013For example, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), several plaintiffs mounted an equal protection challenge to a Tennessee statute that provided for apportionment of seats in the state legislature, alleging that it impaired their voting rights.

2011We further note that, under rational basis review of an equal protection challenge, "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [a challenged legislative classification], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.” *279 Montgomery County v. Fields Road Corp., 282 Md. 575, 580 , 386 A.2d 344 (1978) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 , 31 S.Ct. 337 , 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911)). 15 .

2011We further note that, under rational basis review of an equal protection challenge, "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [a challenged legislative classification], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.” *279 Montgomery County v. Fields Road Corp., 282 Md. 575, 580 , 386 A.2d 344 (1978) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 , 31 S.Ct. 337 , 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911)). 15 .

1984Due regard shall be given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions.” The Plan is also required to comply with federal constitutional constraints imposed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), 1 and with the fifteenth amendment, see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 , 81 S.Ct. 125 , 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (I960). 2 Following completion of the 1980 federal census, Governor Harry Hughes, on April 13, 1981, appointed a five-member Advisory Committee on Reapportionment and Redistrict

1984Due regard shall be given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions.” The Plan is also required to comply with federal constitutional constraints imposed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), 1 and with the fifteenth amendment, see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 , 81 S.Ct. 125 , 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (I960). 2 Following completion of the 1980 federal census, Governor Harry Hughes, on April 13, 1981, appointed a five-member Advisory Committee on Reapportionment and Redistrict

1991With respect to appellant’s equal protection challenge, the Court of Appeals determined in Matter of Trader, 272 Md. 364, 399 , 325 A.2d 398 (1974): [I]n evaluating challenges under the equal protection clause, we do not sit as a “super legislature or a censor.” (Citations omitted.) “To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity.

1991With respect to appellant’s equal protection challenge, the Court of Appeals determined in Matter of Trader, 272 Md. 364, 399 , 325 A.2d 398 (1974): [I]n evaluating challenges under the equal protection clause, we do not sit as a “super legislature or a censor.” (Citations omitted.) “To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity.