equal protection clause in North Dakota

2000Statute of limitation and repose. 1.Except as provided in subsections 4 and 5, there may be no recovery of damages in a products liability action unless the injury, death, or property damage occurs within ten years of the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or within eleven years of the date of manufacture of a product. [¶ 5] This Court, in Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D.1986), declared unconstitutional a substantively identical statute of repose, enacted by the 1979 legislature and codified at N.D.C.C. § 28-01.1-02. 1 In Hanson we applied an equal protection

1996In Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D.1986), we concluded the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right, and we used an intermediate standard of review for an equal protection challenge to a statute of repose which precluded an injured party from seeking redress in the courts after a specified lapse of time.

2008See Hudson v. State , 825 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla. Dist.

2008See Hudson v. State, 825 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002); In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill.2d 548 , 244 Ill.Dec. 929 , 727 N.E.2d 228, 236 (2000); In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Iowa 2001); In re Detention of Petersen v. State, 104 Wash.App. 283 , 36 P.3d 1053, 1057 (2000).

1999As Kavadas, 448 N.W.2d at 223 , explained in the context of an equal protection challenge, N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 does not infringe upon important substantive rights and is rationally related to the legitimate legislative goal of improving the method of determining and fixing responsibility for fault and damages.

1999As Kavadas, 448 N.W.2d at 223 , explained in the context of an equal protection challenge, N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 does not infringe upon important substantive rights and is rationally related to the legitimate legislative goal of improving the method of determining and fixing responsibility for fault and damages.

2011See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 607 , 128 S.Ct. 2146 , 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008).

2011See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 607 , 128 S.Ct. 2146 , 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008).

2008Nording , at 784.

2008Nording , at 784.

2006J.E.B. , 511 U.S. at 130-31; Batson , 476 U.S. at 89 ; Fern , 501 N.W.2d at 746-47. “‘The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.’” Batson , at 86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia , 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). [¶21] In a post-conviction proceeding challenging trial counsel’s method of jury selection, we have said counsel’s actions during voir dire involve matters of trial strategy

2006J.E.B. , 511 U.S. at 130-31; Batson , 476 U.S. at 89 ; Fern , 501 N.W.2d at 746-47. “‘The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.’” Batson , at 86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia , 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). [¶21] In a post-conviction proceeding challenging trial counsel’s method of jury selection, we have said counsel’s actions during voir dire involve matters of trial strategy

2006T.B. , 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and City of Mandan v. Fern , 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993). [¶20] The equal protection clause forbids any use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis of their gender or race.

2006T.B., 511 U.S. 127 , 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), and City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D.1993). [¶ 20] The equal protection clause forbids any use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis of their gender or race.

2003Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D.1996) (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm’r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D.1993)); accord Haney, at 202; Leppert , at ¶ 18; State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D.1982). “‘The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’ ” NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16 , 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)).

1998When no suspect class, fundamental right, or important substantive right is involved, we apply a rational basis standard and sustain the legislative classification unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” [¶ 10] In Baldock , at 446, we considered an equal protection challenge to the seventy-five percent income classification in N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-01(3).

2003Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D. 1996) (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm'r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D.1993)); accord Haney, at 202; Leppert , at ¶ 18; State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D.1982). "`The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decision-maker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.'" NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16 , 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)).

2003Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D.1996) (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm’r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D.1993)); accord Haney, at 202; Leppert , at ¶ 18; State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D.1982). “‘The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’ ” NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16 , 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)).

1994A classification with a reasonable basis does not violate the equal protection clause merely ‘because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 491 , 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1909 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513, 528 (1977) [quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 , 31 S.Ct. 337, 340 , 55 L.Ed. 369, 377 (1911) ].” Reform may take one step at a time.

1994A classification with a reasonable basis does not violate the equal protection clause merely ‘because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 491 , 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1909 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513, 528 (1977) [quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 , 31 S.Ct. 337, 340 , 55 L.Ed. 369, 377 (1911) ].” Reform may take one step at a time.

1994A classification with a reasonable basis does not violate the equal protection clause merely ‘because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 491 , 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1909 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513, 528 (1977) [quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 , 31 S.Ct. 337, 340 , 55 L.Ed. 369, 377 (1911) ].” Reform may take one step at a time.

1994A classification with a reasonable basis does not violate the equal protection clause merely ‘because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 491 , 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1909 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513, 528 (1977) [quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 , 31 S.Ct. 337, 340 , 55 L.Ed. 369, 377 (1911) ].” Reform may take one step at a time.

1994Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D.1974); State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749, 760 (N.D.1966). "[A] court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the policy is one within the power of the legislature to pursue, and so long as the classification bears a reasonable relation to those reasons, motives, or policies." Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75, 83 (N.D. 1973). "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purpose

1994Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D.1974); State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749, 760 (N.D.1966). “[A] court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the policy is one within the power of the legislature to pursue, and so long as the classification bears a reasonable relation to those reasons, motives, or policies.” Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75, 83 (N.D.1973). “[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes

2011O’Kelly, supra note 50, at 235. [¶ 43] But the legal landscape changed in 1971, when the United States Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), “decided for the first time that the equal protection clause of the Constitution significantly limits the power of government to differentiate treatment, entitlements, or duties on the basis of gender.” O’Kelly, supra, at 240.

2011O’Kelly, supra note 50, at 235. [¶ 43] But the legal landscape changed in 1971, when the United States Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), “decided for the first time that the equal protection clause of the Constitution significantly limits the power of government to differentiate treatment, entitlements, or duties on the basis of gender.” O’Kelly, supra, at 240.

1994Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D.1974); State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749, 760 (N.D.1966). “[A] court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the policy is one within the power of the legislature to pursue, and so long as the classification bears a reasonable relation to those reasons, motives, or policies.” Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75, 83 (N.D.1973). “[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes

1994Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 (N.D.1973).

2018Id. at 88 . [¶ 41] In Herman , 277 N.W.2d at 450 -54 , we considered an equal protection challenge to a statute requiring the timely filing of claims against a municipality as a condition precedent to instituting a tort action against the municipality.

1986In Herman, supra, we were presented with the question of whether or not the 90-day notice requirement regarding actions against municipalities for defective streets and bridges was violative of the equal protection clause of our State Constitution.

2008In State v. Leppert, 2003 ND 15, ¶ 7 , 656 N.W.2d 718 , this Court recognized the equal protection clause does not prohibit legislative classifications or require identical treatment of different groups of people and stated legislative classifications are subject to different levels of scrutiny depending on the right infringed by the challenged classification.

2008In State v. Leppert, 2003 ND 15, ¶ 7 , 656 N.W.2d 718 , this Court recognized the equal protection clause does not prohibit legislative classifications or require identical treatment of different groups of people and stated legislative classifications are subject to different levels of scrutiny depending on the right infringed by the challenged classification.

2003For the proposition that any conceivable purpose can be used in an equal protection analysis under the intermediate standard of review, the majority opinion cites to two cases, Olson, 2002 ND 61, ¶ 11 , 642 N.W.2d 864 , and Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738 .

2003For the proposition that any conceivable purpose can be used in an equal protection analysis under the intermediate standard of review, the majority opinion cites to two cases, Olson, 2002 ND 61, ¶ 11 , 642 N.W.2d 864 , and Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738 , Although Olson is a case in which we apply an intermediate standard of review, the cases cited for the proposition that we may consider unarticulated legislative purposes are both cases in which we apply the rational-basis standard of review.

1986Shortly after our decision in Johnson, supra, we were again faced with an equal protection question in Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.1974). 11 When analyzing the equal protection claim, we refrained from applying the intermediate standard of review adopted in Johnson, supra, and, instead, applied the lower rational basis test.

1986Shortly after our decision in Johnson v. Hassett, we were again faced with an equal protection question in Snyder’s Drug Store, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.1974). 7 When analyzing the equal protection claim, we refrained from applying the intermediate standard of scrutiny adopted in Johnson v. Hassett, and instead applied the lower rational relationship standard.

2012He cited no persuasive authority or argument to elevate his claims to a taking action or to support an equal protection claim. [¶ 39] Hale’s reliance on Teigen v. State, 2008 ND 88, 749 N.W.2d 505 , and State v. Blunt, 2008 ND 135 , 751 N.W.2d 692 , also is misplaced.

2012He cited no persuasive authority or argument to elevate his claims to a taking action or to support an equal protection claim. [¶ 39] Hale’s reliance on Teigen v. State, 2008 ND 88, 749 N.W.2d 505 , and State v. Blunt, 2008 ND 135 , 751 N.W.2d 692 , also is misplaced.

2006J.E.B. , 511 U.S. at 130-31; Batson , 476 U.S. at 89 ; Fern , 501 N.W.2d at 746-47. “‘The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.’” Batson , at 86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia , 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). [¶21] In a post-conviction proceeding challenging trial counsel’s method of jury selection, we have said counsel’s actions during voir dire involve matters of trial strategy

2006J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31, 114 S.Ct. 1419 ; Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 746-47 . “ ‘The very idea of a jury is a body ... composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.’ ” Batson, at 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 , 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879)). [¶ 21] In a post-conviction proceeding challenging trial counsel’s method of jury selection, we have said counse

2006T.B. , 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and City of Mandan v. Fern , 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993). [¶20] The equal protection clause forbids any use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis of their gender or race.

2006T.B., 511 U.S. 127 , 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), and City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D.1993). [¶ 20] The equal protection clause forbids any use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis of their gender or race.

2003Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D.1996) (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm’r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D.1993)); accord Haney, at 202; Leppert , at ¶ 18; State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D.1982). “‘The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’ ” NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16 , 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)).

2003Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D.1996) (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm’r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D.1993)); accord Haney, at 202; Leppert , at ¶ 18; State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D.1982). “‘The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’ ” NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16 , 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)).

1979Since the classification here is not based upon sex, race, alienage or national origin and does not involve fundamental rights, it is subject to the traditional equal protection standard. [See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 , 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1768 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 (1973).] Under that test the classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.

1979Since the classification here is not based upon sex, race, alienage or national origin and does not involve fundamental rights, it is subject to the traditional equal protection standard. [See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 , 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1768 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 (1973).] Under that test the classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.