equal protection clause in Ohio

2020State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), citing Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (“The state does not bear the burden of proving that some rational basis justifies the challenged legislation; rather, the challenger must negative every conceivable basis before an equal protection challenge will be upheld.”).

2020State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), citing Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (“The state does not bear the burden of proving that some rational basis justifies the challenged legislation; rather, the challenger must negative every conceivable basis before an equal protection challenge will be upheld.”).

2020But it does prohibit different treatment based on criteria that are unrelated to the purpose of the law.” Id. citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374 (1974); Doersam at 119-120 . 11 {¶27} “The preliminary step in conducting an equal protection analysis regarding a particular statute is to examine the classifications created by the statute in question.” Burnett at ¶ 31, citing McCrone at ¶ 11 ; Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 290 (1992).

2008Furthermore, “where there is no classification, there is no discrimination which would offend the Equal Protection Clauses.” Id. {¶ 32} The conclusion reached by the court of appeals in Burnett II that an equal protection violation is present in the situation here directly conflicts with the holding of the Fourth District in Morris , which involved a situation both factually and legally on point in all relevant respects with this case.

1996See, generally, Denicola v. Providence Hosp. (1979), 57 Oho St.2d 115, 119, 11 O.O.3d 290, 293 , 387 N.E. 2d 231, 234 . {¶ 26} We hold that R.C. 5735.23(C) and 5735.27, which establish formulas by which motor vehicle tax revenues are allocated and distributed to municipalities, counties, and townships, do not violate the Uniformity Clause of Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

1996See, generally, Denicola v. Providence Hosp. (1979), 57 Oho St.2d 115, 119, 11 O.O.3d 290, 293 , 387 N.E. 2d 231, 234 . {¶ 26} We hold that R.C. 5735.23(C) and 5735.27, which establish formulas by which motor vehicle tax revenues are allocated and distributed to municipalities, counties, and townships, do not violate the Uniformity Clause of Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

2024“We use the same analytic approach in determining whether a statutory classification violates Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.” Id., citing State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 530 (2000). {¶10} “The first step in an equal-protection analysis is to determine the proper standard of review.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 2007- Ohio-6948, ¶ 64.

2022“The state does not bear the burden of proving that some rational basis justifies the challenged legislation; rather, the challenger must negative every conceivable basis before an equal protection challenge will be upheld.” (Citation omitted) State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000). {¶ 8} In considering an equal-protection challenge, the level of scrutiny depends on the rights at issue.

2019Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , 500 U.S. 614 , 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (holding state action is a precondition of invoking the equal protection clause). {¶23} Further, "equal protection of the laws" means that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. , 473 U.S. 432 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

2019Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , 500 U.S. 614 , 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (holding state action is a precondition of invoking the equal protection clause). {¶23} Further, "equal protection of the laws" means that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. , 473 U.S. 432 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

2026State v. Lawson, 2013-Ohio-2111 , ¶ 18 (10th Dist.); see GTE North, Inc. v. Zaino, 2002-Ohio-2984, ¶ 22 (“The comparison of only similarly situated entities is integral to an equal protection analysis.”).

2024“The comparison of only similarly situated entities is integral to an equal protection analysis.” GTE North, Inc. v. Ziano, 2002-Ohio-2984, ¶22 .

1987The Ohio Supreme Court, in Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 376 , 12 O.O. 3d 327, 332, 390 N.E. 2d 813, 819 , citing Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers (1959), 358 U.S. 522, 530 , 9 O.O. 2d 321, 326, stated that under a rational basis analysis, any classification based “* * * ‘upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or differences in state policy * * *' will be upheld * * Only if the classifications are wholly unrelated to the accomplishment of a legitimate state objective will there be an equal protection violation.

1967In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v. Bowers, Tax Commr., 358 U. S. 522, at 528 , the court says: “ * * * Similarly, it has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain There, of course, is nothing in the charter which indicates the reasons for excluding public employees from membership on the council.

2011Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 123 , 322 N.E.2d 880 . {¶25} Although the trial court found that R.C. 923.52 was constitutional on its face it determined that ODA’s interpretation of the ordinance, and its subsequent application of that interpretation, or stated another way, policy of selective enforcement, rose to the level of an equal protection violation.

2011Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 123 , 322 N.E.2d 880 . {¶25} Although the trial court found that R.C. 923.52 was constitutional on its face it determined that ODA’s interpretation of the ordinance, and its subsequent application of that interpretation, or stated another way, policy of selective enforcement, rose to the level of an equal protection violation.

2024See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (discussing the “class-of- one theory” of equal protection as an application of the principle that equal protection is concerned with arbitrary government classification); Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 1981) (addressing an equal-protection challenge of an election scheme that required a major-party candidate in a primary election to gather a different number of signatures than an independent candidate seeking a place on the general-election ballot by petition).

2024See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (discussing the “class-of- one theory” of equal protection as an application of the principle that equal protection is concerned with arbitrary government classification); Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 1981) (addressing an equal-protection challenge of an election scheme that required a major-party candidate in a primary election to gather a different number of signatures than an independent candidate seeking a place on the general-election ballot by petition).

2016Rather, they “‘simply keep[] governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’” Id., quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). {¶28} When assessing an equal protection challenge, a court must “apply varying levels of scrutiny * * * depending on the rights at issue and the purportedly discriminatory classifications created by law.” Pickaway Cty.

2013Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 493 , 2008-Ohio-2751 , ¶ 30; Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 , 112 S.Ct. 2326 (1992). - 45 - Warren CA2012-02-008 Thus, the comparison of only similarly situated persons or groups is integral to an equal protection analysis.

2018"When suspect classes are not involved, the equal-protection clause permits class distinctions in legislation if the distinctions bear some rational relationship to a legitimate government objective." Id., citing State ex rel.

2016See McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2005-Ohio- 6505, ¶6. {¶15} An equal protection violation requires a showing that similarly situated individuals are treated differently.

2021"The comparison of only similarly situated entities is integral to an equal protection analysis." GTE N., Inc. v. Zaino, 96 Ohio St.3d 9 , 2002-Ohio-2984, ¶ 22 .

2020“The comparison of only similarly situated entities is integral to an equal protection analysis,” GTE N., Inc. v. Zaino, 96 Ohio St.3d 9 , 2002-Ohio-2984 , 770 N.E.2d 65 , ¶ 22, as equal protection does not “ ‘require things which are different in fact * * * to be treated in law as though they were the same,’ ” (ellipsis added in T.

2015In other words, “[u]nder the rational-basis test, a statute survives if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 18 . {¶ 10} Similarly, under a traditional equal protection analysis, “ ‘[a] statutory classification which involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio or United States Constitutions if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.’ ” McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 27

2015In other words, “[u]nder the rational-basis test, a statute survives if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 18 . {¶ 10} Similarly, under a traditional equal protection analysis, “ ‘[a] statutory classification which involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio or United States Constitutions if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.’ ” McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 27

2014Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d at ¶ 7 (applying rational basis review in an analysis of judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 as applied to offenders sentenced to five-year prison terms). {¶ 46} Under a rational basis review, a statute violates the equal protection clause only if the classifications it creates "'are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the [s]tate's goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.'" Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d at 530 , quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 , 102 S.Ct. 2836 (1982).

2014Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d at ¶ 7 (applying rational basis review in an analysis of judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 as applied to offenders sentenced to five-year prison terms). {¶ 46} Under a rational basis review, a statute violates the equal protection clause only if the classifications it creates "'are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the [s]tate's goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.'" Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d at 530 , quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 , 102 S.Ct. 2836 (1982).

2008See, also, Conley v. Shearer , 64 Ohio St.3d 284 , 290 , 1992-Ohio-133 ("[W]here there is no classification, there is no discrimination which would offend the Equal Protection Clauses of either the United States or Ohio Constitutions."); In the Matter of B.L. , Franklin App. No. 04AP-1108, 2005-Ohio-1151 , at ¶ 16 ("A law that operates identically on all people under like circumstances will not give rise to an equal protection violation."). {¶ 21} In the case at bar, appellant contends that R.C. 2125.03 (A)(1) impermissibly favors his wife over him.

2005So long as the laws are applicable to all persons under like circumstances and do not subject individuals to an arbitrary exercise of power and operate alike upon all persons similarly situated, it suffices the constitutional prohibition against the denial of equal protection of the laws. * * *"' Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284 , 288-289 , 1992-Ohio-133 , quoting Dayton v. Keys (1969), 21 Ohio Misc. 105 , 114 . {¶ 8} Section 2 , Article I of the Ohio Constitution contains a similar equal protection clause as the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the standard for determini

2025See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2008-Ohio-2670, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.) (distinguishing 6 In United States v. Avery, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an Equal Protection challenge to a traffic stop, stating “In order ‘to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [a defendant] must prove the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.’” 137 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Cir.), quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987)(additional citation omitted.).

2025See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2008-Ohio-2670, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.) (distinguishing 6 In United States v. Avery, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an Equal Protection challenge to a traffic stop, stating “In order ‘to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [a defendant] must prove the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.’” 137 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Cir.), quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987)(additional citation omitted.).

2014State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 561 , 664 N.E.2d 926 (1996).

1999State v. Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 561 , 664 N.E.2d 926, 929 . “ ‘Under a traditional equal protection analysis, class distinctions in legislation are permissible if they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.

2003Williams at 531 . {¶ 38} As stated in Williams: Under the rational basis standard, we are to grant substantial deference to the predictive judgment of the General Assembly. * * * The state does not bear the burden of proving that some rational basis justifies the challenged legislation; rather, the challenger must negative every conceivable basis before an equal protection challenge will be upheld. * * * Id. at 531 . {¶ 39} In support of his contention that his classification as a sexually oriented offender violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, defendant cites to State v.

1994Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 312 [ 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524 ].

2026Retirement Sys., 2019-Ohio-278, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach, 1994-Ohio-489 . {¶ 13} Thus, to prove an equal protection violation, the plaintiff first must establish that it was treated differently than another person similarly situated.

2024“Thus, to state an equal protection claim, a party must claim that the government treated similarly situated persons differently.” Sherman v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, 2019-Ohio-278 (10th Dist.). {¶28} The appellant’s primary argument is that their Delaware County property is similarly situated to Appellee Northpark’s Delaware County property and is receiving disparate treatment.

2025Relying on Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St.3d 300 (1983), the Morris court explained that, where there is an equal protection challenge reviewed under the rational-basis test, “the statute must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate legislative objective.” Morris at 689, 692 .

1994See Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 300, 301 , 6 OBR 361, 362-363, 452 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 .

2024Nonetheless, we do not find an equal protection violation. {¶21} Equal protection “analysis begins with the rebuttable presumption that statutes are constitutional.” State v. Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d 460 , 2004-Ohio-3923 , 812 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 5 .

2024Nonetheless, we do not find an equal protection violation. {¶21} Equal protection “analysis begins with the rebuttable presumption that statutes are constitutional.” State v. Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d 460 , 2004-Ohio-3923 , 812 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 5 .