equal protection clause in Virginia

2002“To withstand an equal protection challenge, a classification that neither infringes upon á fundamental right nor creates a suspect class must satisfy the rational basis test.” Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87,103-04 , 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195-96 (1983).

2002The rational basis test is satisfied “if the legislature could have reasonably concluded that the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state purpose.” Etheridge at. 104 (citing Eagerton, 462 U.S. at 196 ).

1994In this appeal, we decide whether a litigant exercised his peremptory strikes to exclude African-Americans from the jury in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the rule pronounced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), extended to civil actions in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), and applied in Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397 , 417 S.E.2d 305 (1992).

1994The Supreme Court held in Batson that the equal protection clause does not permit a prosecutor to exercise a peremptory strike to remove a prospective juror solely on account of the prospective juror’s race. 476 U.S. at 89 .

2012The first step is to identify precisely the constitutional right at issue. “ ‘[Classifications not involving fundamental rights or inherently suspect classifications will survive an equal protection challenge if they bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental objective.’ ” Lockett v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 488, 491 , 438 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1993) (quoting Salama v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 320, 323 , 380 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1989)).

2012The first step is to identify precisely the constitutional right at issue. “ ‘[Classifications not involving fundamental rights or inherently suspect classifications will survive an equal protection challenge if they bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental objective.’ ” Lockett v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 488, 491 , 438 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1993) (quoting Salama v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 320, 323 , 380 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1989)).

2002Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides in pertinent part that “the right to be free from any governmental dis crimination upon the basis of . . . race . . . shall not be abridged.” In Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638 , 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973), we held that this provision was “no broader” than the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied the federal rational basis standard of constitutionality in considering the challenge under the Virginia provision, even though the Virginia provision, unlike the federal equal prote

2002Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides in pertinent part that “the right to be free from any governmental dis crimination upon the basis of . . . race . . . shall not be abridged.” In Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638 , 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973), we held that this provision was “no broader” than the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied the federal rational basis standard of constitutionality in considering the challenge under the Virginia provision, even though the Virginia provision, unlike the federal equal prote

2000Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195-96 (1983); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981); Pulliam, 257 Va. at 20-21 , 509 S.E.2d at 318 ; King, 242 Va. at 411 , 410 S.E.2d at 661 .

1991Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195-96 (1983); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981); Etheridge, 237 Va. at 103 , 376 S.E.2d at 534 .

2019The right target is the "credibility of the prosecutor's explanation" because that credibility determination "goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis." Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322 , 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ). "[O]nce that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review." Id. (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ).

2019The right target is the "credibility of the prosecutor's explanation" because that credibility determination "goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis." Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322 , 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ). "[O]nce that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review." Id. (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ).

2012The first step is to identify precisely the constitutional right at issue. “ ‘[Classifications not involving fundamental rights or inherently suspect classifications will survive an equal protection challenge if they bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental objective.’ ” Lockett v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 488, 491 , 438 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1993) (quoting Salama v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 320, 323 , 380 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1989)).

2012The first step is to identify precisely the constitutional right at issue. “ ‘[Classifications not involving fundamental rights or inherently suspect classifications will survive an equal protection challenge if they bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental objective.’ ” Lockett v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 488, 491 , 438 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1993) (quoting Salama v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 320, 323 , 380 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1989)).

2001Heller v. Doe , at 319-21 (1993).

2000Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195-96 (1983); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981); Pulliam, 257 Va. at 20-21 , 509 S.E.2d at 318 ; King, 242 Va. at 411 , 410 S.E.2d at 661 .

1994The classification which is the subject of and which gives rise to this appeal does not violate the equal protection requirement so long as it bears a “ ‘reasonable’ relation to a ‘legitimate’ governmental objective.” New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

1989New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

1989Clemons, 843 F.2d at 748 . "`A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not `immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, n. 14 , 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, n. 14 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)); see also Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 72-73 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1278 (1988) ("question is whether the state exercised any of its strikes for a racially discriminatory reason, for if it did, Batson was violated").

1989Clemons, 843 F.2d at 748 . "`A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not `immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, n. 14 , 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, n. 14 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)); see also Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 72-73 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1278 (1988) ("question is whether the state exercised any of its strikes for a racially discriminatory reason, for if it did, Batson was violated").

1989Clemons, 843 F.2d at 748 . "`A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not `immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, n. 14 , 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, n. 14 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)); see also Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 72-73 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1278 (1988) ("question is whether the state exercised any of its strikes for a racially discriminatory reason, for if it did, Batson was violated").

1989Clemons, 843 F.2d at 748 . "`A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not `immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, n. 14 , 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, n. 14 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)); see also Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 72-73 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1278 (1988) ("question is whether the state exercised any of its strikes for a racially discriminatory reason, for if it did, Batson was violated").

2016In addition to adopting the injury in fact requirement, the Court in Wilkins expressly rejected the proposition that “any citizen of a state would have standing to challenge a redistricting statute on an equal protection claim regardless of whether such citizen was personally denied equal treatment.” Id. at 459 , 571 S.E.2d at 106-07 .

2016In addition to adopting the injury in fact requirement, the Court in Wilkins expressly rejected the proposition that “any citizen of a state would have standing to challenge a redistricting statute on an equal protection claim regardless of whether such citizen was personally denied equal treatment.” Id. at 459 , 571 S.E.2d at 106-07 .

2019The right target is the "credibility of the prosecutor's explanation" because that credibility determination "goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis." Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322 , 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ). "[O]nce that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review." Id. (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ).

2019The right target is the "credibility of the prosecutor's explanation" because that credibility determination "goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis." Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322 , 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ). "[O]nce that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review." Id. (quoting Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ).

2011Hays, 515 U.S. at 743-44 (citations omitted).

2002Hays , 515 at 743-44, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (citations omitted).

2010Likewise, we declared in Bell v. City Council of Charlottesville, 224 Va. 490, 496-97 , 297 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1982) that the uniformity requirement "is in reality a statutory reaffirmation of the equal protection of the law guaranteed to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Generally, under an equal protection analysis, "[w]hen a land use permitted to one landowner is restricted to another similarly situated, the restriction is discriminatory, and, if not substantially related to the public health, safety, or welfare, constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws

2010Likewise, we declared in Bell v. City Council of Charlottesville, 224 Va. 490, 496-97 , 297 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1982) that the uniformity requirement "is in reality a statutory reaffirmation of the equal protection of the law guaranteed to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Generally, under an equal protection analysis, "[w]hen a land use permitted to one landowner is restricted to another similarly situated, the restriction is discriminatory, and, if not substantially related to the public health, safety, or welfare, constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws

2007Cox Cable Hampton Roads v. City of Norfolk, 247 Va. 64 , 67, 439 S.E.2d 366 , 367-68 (1994) (reviewing an equal protection challenge under rational basis review); see City of Portsmouth v. Citizens Trust Co., 216 Va. 695, 698, 222 S.E.2d 532 , 534 (1976) ("It is not necessary that legislative classifications be perfect, and a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").

2007Cox Cable Hampton Roads v. City of Norfolk, 247 Va. 64 , 67, 439 S.E.2d 366 , 367-68 (1994) (reviewing an equal protection challenge under rational basis review); see City of Portsmouth v. Citizens Trust Co., 216 Va. 695, 698, 222 S.E.2d 532 , 534 (1976) ("It is not necessary that legislative classifications be perfect, and a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").

2007See Singson, 46 Va. App. at 734 , 621 S.E.2d at 686 (sodomy statute survives due process challenge); Tjan, 46 Va. App. at 712-13 , 621 S.E.2d at 676 (sodomy statute survives due process and Equal Protection Clause challenge); see also Paris v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 377, 384 , 545 S.E.2d 557, 560 (2001) (homosexual sodomy, consensual or not, with a fifteen year old is not a constitutionally protected right); Santillo v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 470, 481 , 517 S.E.2d 733, 739 (1999) (nonconsensual sodomy between adult defendant and sixteen-year-old female is not constitutionally protected c

2007See Singson, 46 Va. App. at 734 , 621 S.E.2d at 686 (sodomy statute survives due process challenge); Tjan, 46 Va. App. at 712-13 , 621 S.E.2d at 676 (sodomy statute survives due process and Equal Protection Clause challenge); see also Paris v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 377, 384 , 545 S.E.2d 557, 560 (2001) (homosexual sodomy, consensual or not, with a fifteen year old is not a constitutionally protected right); Santillo v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 470, 481 , 517 S.E.2d 733, 739 (1999) (nonconsensual sodomy between adult defendant and sixteen-year-old female is not constitutionally protected c

1994Since the challenged classification does not infringe upon a fundamental right or create a suspect class, we apply the rational basis test in deciding whether Norfolk’s tax ordinance survives an Equal Protection challenge. 3 King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program, 242 Va. 404, 411 , 410 S.E.2d 656, 661 (1991).

1994Since the challenged classification does not infringe upon a fundamental right or create a suspect class, we apply the rational basis test in deciding whether Norfolk’s tax ordinance survives an Equal Protection challenge. 3 King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program, 242 Va. 404, 411 , 410 S.E.2d 656, 661 (1991).

1996Under the equal protection clause, “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).

1996However, the clause does not mandate that “things which are different in fact or opinion be treated in law as though they were the same.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).

1993Although the act of striking from the venire the only person of the same race as the defendant does not always, standing alone, establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, see id. at 183 , 380 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 , 106 S.Ct. at 1725 (White, J., concurring)), "a single act of invidious discrimination may form the basis for an equal protection violation." Id. 8 Va.App. at 183 , 380 S.E.2d at 5 .

1993Although the act of striking from the venire the only person of the same race as the defendant does not always, standing alone, establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, see id. at 183 , 380 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 , 106 S.Ct. at 1725 (White, J., concurring)), "a single act of invidious discrimination may form the basis for an equal protection violation." Id. 8 Va.App. at 183 , 380 S.E.2d at 5 .