equal protection clause in Oklahoma

1998The court in Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 1980 OK 95 , 613 P.2d 1041 , found that the attorney fee provision in the Small Claims Procedure Act did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1998The court in Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 1980 OK 95 , 613 P.2d 1041 , found that the attorney fee provision in the Small Claims Procedure Act did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

1995Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 , 88 S.Ct. 194, 196 , 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967).

1995Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 , 88 S.Ct. 194, 196 , 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967).

2016See , e.g. , Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) and its reliance, in part, upon Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in judgment in The Florida Star v. B.

2016See , e.g. , Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) and its reliance, in part, upon Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in judgment in The Florida Star v. B.

2014CDR timely appealed, and COCA found that CDR's Privileges and Immunities argument was without merit because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 720 (1978). ¶8 COCA also found that CDR's only contention regarding its Equal Protection claim was that "[i]n other decisions the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that states cannot discriminate against non-residents and based its decisions on violation of the Equal Protection Clause of

2014CDR timely appealed, and COCA found that CDR's Privileges and Immunities argument was without merit because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 720 (1978). ¶8 COCA also found that CDR's only contention regarding its Equal Protection claim was that "[i]n other decisions the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that states cannot discriminate against non-residents and based its decisions on violation of the Equal Protection Clause of

2009If the classification does not invoke analysis under the strict scrutiny tier, the legislation is then analyzed under the "rational relationship test." Under this approach, a legislative classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." In short, the challenged classification must be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Under this second tier, "a State does not violate the Equal Protection Cla

2009If the classification does not invoke analysis under the strict scrutiny tier, the legislation is then analyzed under the "rational relationship test." Under this approach, a legislative classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." In short, the challenged classification must be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Under this second tier, "a State does not violate the Equal Protection Cla

2006Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724 ; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 , 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1373 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)(extending Batson to include race-based exclusions even when the defendant and the potential juror are not of the same race).

1993The United States Supreme Court held in Batson that “a defendant can raise an equal protection challenge to the use of peremptories at his own trial by showing that the prosecutor used them for the purpose of excluding members of the defendant’s race.” Id. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 .

2004We said that unless a classification jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right or makes a classification on an inherently suspect characteristic, a classification that rationally furthers a legitimate state interest will withstand an equal protection challenge. 901 P.2d at 806 .

2004We said that unless a classification jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right or makes a classification on an inherently suspect characteristic, a classification that rationally furthers a legitimate state interest will withstand an equal protection challenge. 901 P.2d at 806 .

1999See also Ross, 846 P.2d at 1117 ("All that is required to satisfy minimal rationality is that "the legislature could conceivably have believed that such a . . . [statutory classification] would serve the legitimate purpose." ¶ 34 Having said this, this equal protection analysis can go no further.

1995In Ross v. Peters, 846 P.2d 1107 (Okla. 1993) the Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed the Equal Protection clause.

2019Const. art. 2, § 7 are generally coextensive with those of its federal counterpart. 24 Due process has a procedural component, which requires an inquiry into the constitutional adequacy of the State's procedural safeguards. 25 It also has a substantive component which bars certain governmental action despite the adequacy of procedural protections provided. 26 ¶25 Regarding legislative medical treatment regulations, we recently noted in Burns v. Cline , 2016 OK 121 , ¶¶ 8-9, 387 P.3d 348 : Every woman in this country has a constitutionally protected right to choose whether to terminate her preg

2019Const. art. 2, § 7 are generally coextensive with those of its federal counterpart. 24 Due process has a procedural component, which requires an inquiry into the constitutional adequacy of the State's procedural safeguards. 25 It also has a substantive component which bars certain governmental action despite the adequacy of procedural protections provided. 26 ¶25 Regarding legislative medical treatment regulations, we recently noted in Burns v. Cline , 2016 OK 121 , ¶¶ 8-9, 387 P.3d 348 : Every woman in this country has a constitutionally protected right to choose whether to terminate her preg

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

2016If a regulation does not serve a legitimate purpose -- and so violates substantive due process -- applying it to one group and not to another violates the equal protection requirement that a legitimate state purpose support a given classification.") (citations omitted). 60 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 466 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), (a legislature may make imperfect classifications which only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the

2016"The equal protection clause is satisfied if the statute applies alike or in reasonable degree to all parties in the same class." Daube v. Okla, Tax Comm'n, 1944 OK 218, ¶ 29 , 194 Okla. 487 , 152 P.2d 687 .

2016"The equal protection clause is satisfied if the statute applies alike or in reasonable degree to all parties in the same class." Daube v. Okla, Tax Comm'n, 1944 OK 218, ¶ 29 , 194 Okla. 487 , 152 P.2d 687 .