equal protection clause in Iowa

2024Under rational basis review, a statute survives an equal protection challenge “so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Id. (quoting Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 879 ).

2022See Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Instances of disparate treatment can support a claim of pretext, but [the plaintiff] has the burden of proving that he and the disparately treated . . . were ‘similarly situated in all relevant respects.’” (citation omitted)); cf. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009) (“[I]f plaintiffs cannot show as a preliminary matter that they are similarly situated, courts do not further consider whether their different treatment under a statute is permitted under the equal protection clause.”).

2008“This result is particularly possible in view of ‘the ill-defined parameters of the equal protection clause.’ ” Id. (quoting Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986)).

2008“This result is particularly possible in view of ‘the ill-defined parameters of the equal protection clause.’ ” Id. (quoting Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986)).

2019The RACI II majority, purporting to apply the federal rational basis test, held that a tax differential for land- based and riverboat casino slot machine revenue violated the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution on remand after the unanimous United States Supreme Court held the differential did not violate the Federal Equal Protection Clause. 675 N.W.2d at 3 .

2019The RACI II majority, purporting to apply the federal rational basis test, held that a tax differential for land-based and riverboat casino slot machine revenue violated the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution on remand after the unanimous United States Supreme Court held the differential did not violate the Federal Equal Protection Clause. 675 N.W.2d at 3 .

2018"The first step of [analyzing] an equal protection claim is to identify the classes of similarly situated persons singled out for differential treatment." LSCP, LLLP , 861 N.W.2d at 859 (alteration in original) (quoting Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc. , 643 N.W.2d 200 , 204 (Iowa 2002) ). " 'If a plaintiff fails to articulate, and the court is unable to identify, a class of similarly situated individuals who are allegedly treated differently under the challenged statute,' our analysis ends ...." Id. (quoting Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 757 N.W.2d 172 , 175 (Iowa 2008) ).

2018"The first step of [analyzing] an equal protection claim is to identify the classes of similarly situated persons singled out for differential treatment." LSCP, LLLP , 861 N.W.2d at 859 (alteration in original) (quoting Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc. , 643 N.W.2d 200 , 204 (Iowa 2002) ). " 'If a plaintiff fails to articulate, and the court is unable to identify, a class of similarly situated individuals who are allegedly treated differently under the challenged statute,' our analysis ends ...." Id. (quoting Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 757 N.W.2d 172 , 175 (Iowa 2008) ).

2021To begin the equal protection inquiry, “plaintiffs must allege that the defendants are treating similarly situated persons differently.” State v. Doe, 927 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Iowa 2019) (quoting King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 24 (Iowa 2012)).

2021To begin the equal protection inquiry, “plaintiffs must allege that the defendants are treating similarly situated persons differently.” State v. Doe, 927 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Iowa 2019) (quoting King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 24 (Iowa 2012)).

2018"The first step of [analyzing] an equal protection claim is to identify the classes of similarly situated persons singled out for differential treatment." LSCP, LLLP , 861 N.W.2d at 859 (alteration in original) (quoting Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc. , 643 N.W.2d 200 , 204 (Iowa 2002) ). " 'If a plaintiff fails to articulate, and the court is unable to identify, a class of similarly situated individuals who are allegedly treated differently under the challenged statute,' our analysis ends ...." Id. (quoting Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 757 N.W.2d 172 , 175 (Iowa 2008) ).

2017“The first step of [analyzing] an equal protection claim is to identify the classes of similarly situated persons singled out for differential treatment.” Id. at 859 (alteration in original) (quoting Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2002)). “‘If a plaintiff fails to articulate, and the court is unable to identify, a class of similarly situated individuals who are allegedly treated differently under the challenged [rule],’ our analysis ends and we need not consider whether the ends are legitimate and the means rationally related.” Id. (quoting Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v.

2013See, e.g., Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 878, 907 (holding Iowa’s Defense of 21 Marriage Act violates the equal protection clause of article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 585 (Iowa 1980) (holding the guest statue violates the equal protection clause of article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution).

2013See, e.g., Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 878, 907 (holding Iowa’s Defense of Marriage Act violates the equal protection clause of article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 585 (Iowa 1980) (holding the guest statute violates the equal protection clause of article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution).

2023See Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 157 (“Although the equal protection clause creates a constitutionally protected right, it is not self-enforcing.”); Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 222 N.W. 438, 440 (Iowa 1928) (“Clearly the power of the courts to restrain state officials from violating plain provisions of the statute and Constitution is in no way derogatory to the general and well-recognized rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent.”); Lough v. City of Estherville, 98 N.W. 308, 310 (Iowa 1904) (“While a 15 violation of the Constitution in the respect in question is to be condem

2023See Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 157 (“Although the equal protection clause creates a constitutionally protected right, it is not self-enforcing.”); Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 222 N.W. 438, 440 (Iowa 1928) (“Clearly the power of the courts to restrain state officials from violating plain provisions of the statute and Constitution is in no way derogatory to the general and well-recognized rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent.”); Lough v. City of Estherville, 98 N.W. 308, 310 (Iowa 1904) (“While a 15 violation of the Constitution in the respect in question is to be condem

2021“In Batson the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents a prosecutor from using peremptory strikes to challenge potential jurors ‘solely on account of their race.’” State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 ).

2021“In Batson the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents a prosecutor from using peremptory strikes to challenge potential jurors ‘solely on account of their race.’” State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 ).

2012But see Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 757 N.W.2d 172, 175-77 (Iowa 2008) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to an administrative rule providing that apartments would be taxed at a higher commercial rate and condominiums at a lower residential rate even if both were used for the same commercial purposes); State v. Willard, 756 N.W.2d 207, 213-14 (Iowa 2008) (finding residency restrictions for convicted sex offenders do not violate equal protection); City of Coralville, 750 N.W.2d at 530-31 (Iowa 2008) (rejecting equal protection challenge to a tariff system); In r

2012But see Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 757 N.W.2d 172 , 175–77 (Iowa 2008) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to an administrative rule providing that apartments would be taxed at a higher commercial rate and condominiums at a lower residential rate even if both were used for the same commercial purposes); State v. Willard, 756 N.W.2d 207 , 213–14 (Iowa 2008) (finding residency restrictions for convicted sex offenders do not violate equal protection); City of Coralville, 750 N.W.2d at 530–31 (Iowa 2008) (rejecting equal protection challenge to a tariff system); In

2020See State v. Kout, 854 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“A demonstration that people are similarly situated is a threshold test; failure to make this showing requires no further consideration of the alleged equal protection violation.”).

2017See, e.g., State v. Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1998) (stating “once it is established that the crimes treated differently address different criminal conduct, it is for the legislature to decide how the differing conduct will be punished” (quoting Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 199 )); Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 196 (“[I]f elements of the offenses are not the same, persons committing the crimes are not similarly situated and, therefore, may be treated differently for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.”); State v. Kout, 854 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“A demonstration that people are

2018"The first step of [analyzing] an equal protection claim is to identify the classes of similarly situated persons singled out for differential treatment." LSCP, LLLP , 861 N.W.2d at 859 (alteration in original) (quoting Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc. , 643 N.W.2d 200 , 204 (Iowa 2002) ). " 'If a plaintiff fails to articulate, and the court is unable to identify, a class of similarly situated individuals who are allegedly treated differently under the challenged statute,' our analysis ends ...." Id. (quoting Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 757 N.W.2d 172 , 175 (Iowa 2008) ).

2017See LSCP, 861 N.W.2d at 859 ; see also Estate of Kunkel, 689 F.2d at 417 (“[I]t is for the legislature, and not the courts, to decide how much weight, if any, to place on factors, such as blood relationship and family ties in determining which relatives should be included in ‘Class A’ and which in ‘Class B.’ The exact point at which the lines are drawn inevitably will have a degree of arbitrariness; yet as one court has noted, ‘{l legislative line drawing ... may produce different tax consequences in nearly identical situations, but such lines must be drawn to make a tax system workable and al

2017We said, in dicta, that the equal protection clause was not self- enforcing, citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 , 86 S. Ct. 1717, 1722 (1966).

2017We said, in dicta, that the equal protection clause was not self- enforcing, citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 , 86 S. Ct. 1717, 1722 (1966).

2012Ass’n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa 2007) (plaintiffs met this threshold by alleging that tenants who were related and tenants who were unrelated received differential treatment); Montoy v. State, 278 Kan. 769 , 120 P.3d 306, 308 (2005) (holding that “disparate impact” of Kansas’s school financing scheme on minorities and other classes could not establish an equal protection violation).

2012Ass’n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa 2007) (plaintiffs met this threshold by alleging that tenants who were related and tenants who were unrelated received differential treatment); Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 308 (Kan. 2005) (holding that “disparate impact” of Kansas’s school financing scheme on minorities and other classes could not establish an equal protection violation).

2004See Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at ___ , 123 S.Ct. at 2158-59 , 156 L.Ed.2d at 102 ("We have previously held that, [in circumstances in which a state court states that it applies the same equal protection analysis in considering federal and state equal protection claims], we shall consider a state-court decision as resting upon federal grounds sufficient to support this Court's jurisdiction."); see also Westling, 63 Tul.

2004See Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at ___ , 123 S.Ct. at 2158-59 , 156 L.Ed.2d at 102 ("We have previously held that, [in circumstances in which a state court states that it applies the same equal protection analysis in considering federal and state equal protection claims], we shall consider a state-court decision as resting upon federal grounds sufficient to support this Court's jurisdiction."); see also Westling, 63 Tul.

2020If a party cannot make such a showing, “courts do not further consider whether their different treatment under [law] is permitted under the equal protection clause.” Id. (quoting Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009)). 4 Iowa Code section 911.3 mandates the imposition of a $125 surcharge following judgment of conviction of certain offenses.1 Thompson argues “he is similarly situated with other criminal defendants who are treated differently by virtue of the fact that they are not assessed the LEI surcharge.” In other words, he argues all individuals convicted of crimes are similarly

2019In any event, our supreme court has stated in another context that “the distinction between direct review and collateral review applications does not violate the equal protection clause.” Cf. Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 758 (Iowa 2016) (concerning non-retroactivity of State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006)) (discussing Everett v. Brewer, 215 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1974)). 3 State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 855 (Iowa 2019) (internal citations omitted).

2008Land Bank v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Iowa 1988) (holding discrimination in redemption periods violated the equal protection clause where class membership did not correlate with purported class distinctions drawn by legislature); Chicago & N.W.

2008Land Bank v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Iowa 1988) (holding discrimination in redemption periods violated the equal protection clause where class membership did not correlate with purported class distinctions drawn by legislature); Chicago & N.W.

1989City of Waterloo v. Selden, 251 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Iowa 1977).

1983City of Waterloo v. Selden, 251 N.W.2d at 509 .

2022PPH II also found that the 72-hour waiting period violated the equal protection clause in article I, section 6. 915 N.W.2d at 244–46.23 Our treatment 22See PPH II, 915 N.W.2d at 254 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“Yet a crucial distinction is that those states typically have explicit guarantees of privacy in their constitutions.

2022PPH II also found that the 72-hour waiting period violated the equal protection clause in article I, section 6. 915 N.W.2d at 244–46.23 Our treatment 22See PPH II, 915 N.W.2d at 254 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“Yet a crucial distinction is that those states typically have explicit guarantees of privacy in their constitutions.

2017See, e.g., State v. Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1998) (stating “once it is established that the crimes treated differently address different criminal conduct, it is for the legislature to decide how the differing conduct will be punished” (quoting Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 199 )); Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 196 (“[I]f elements of the offenses are not the same, persons committing the crimes are not similarly situated and, therefore, may be treated differently for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.”); State v. Kout, 854 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“A demonstration that people are

2017See, e.g., State v. Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1998) (stating “once it is established that the crimes treated differently address different criminal conduct, it is for the legislature to decide how the differing conduct will be punished” (quoting Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 199 )); Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 196 (“[I]f elements of the offenses are not the same, persons committing the crimes are not similarly situated and, therefore, may be treated differently for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.”); State v. Kout, 854 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“A demonstration that people are

2008Therefore, we need not address whether the classification meets “the rational basis prong of the equal protection analysis.” Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 690 .

2008Therefore, we need not address whether the classification meets “the rational basis prong of the equal protection analysis.” Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 690 .