equal protection clause in South Carolina

2018Coastal Council , 319 S.C. 348 , 354, 461 S.E.2d 388 , 391 (1995) ; see also Bodman v. State , 403 S.C. 60 , 74, 742 S.E.2d 363 , 370 (2013) (stating the first step of an equal protection analysis is "whether the law treats 'similarly situated' entities differently"); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd , 403 S.C. 466 , 480, 744 S.E.2d 161 , 168 (2013) (stating "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances").

2018Coastal Council , 319 S.C. 348 , 354, 461 S.E.2d 388 , 391 (1995) ; see also Bodman v. State , 403 S.C. 60 , 74, 742 S.E.2d 363 , 370 (2013) (stating the first step of an equal protection analysis is "whether the law treats 'similarly situated' entities differently"); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd , 403 S.C. 466 , 480, 744 S.E.2d 161 , 168 (2013) (stating "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances").

2025Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 626 , 503 S.E.2d 471, 479 (1998) ("In order to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that similarly situated persons received disparate treatment."); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) ("Where an alleged equal protection violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental right, the rational basis test is used."); id. at 480 , 744 S.E.2d at 168 ("To prevail under the rational basis standard, a claimant must show similarly situated persons received disparate treatment, and that the dis

2025Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 626 , 503 S.E.2d 471, 479 (1998) ("In order to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that similarly situated persons received disparate treatment."); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) ("Where an alleged equal protection violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental right, the rational basis test is used."); id. at 480 , 744 S.E.2d at 168 ("To prevail under the rational basis standard, a claimant must show similarly situated persons received disparate treatment, and that the dis

2025Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 626 , 503 S.E.2d 471, 479 (1998) ("In order to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that similarly situated persons received disparate treatment."); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) ("Where an alleged equal protection violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental right, the rational basis test is used."); id. at 480 , 744 S.E.2d at 168 ("To prevail under the rational basis standard, a claimant must show similarly situated persons received disparate treatment, and that the dis

2025Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 626 , 503 S.E.2d 471, 479 (1998) ("In order to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that similarly situated persons received disparate treatment."); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) ("Where an alleged equal protection violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental right, the rational basis test is used."); id. at 480 , 744 S.E.2d at 168 ("To prevail under the rational basis standard, a claimant must show similarly situated persons received disparate treatment, and that the dis

2018Coastal Council , 319 S.C. 348 , 354, 461 S.E.2d 388 , 391 (1995) ; see also Bodman v. State , 403 S.C. 60 , 74, 742 S.E.2d 363 , 370 (2013) (stating the first step of an equal protection analysis is "whether the law treats 'similarly situated' entities differently"); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd , 403 S.C. 466 , 480, 744 S.E.2d 161 , 168 (2013) (stating "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances").

2018Coastal Council , 319 S.C. 348 , 354, 461 S.E.2d 388 , 391 (1995) ; see also Bodman v. State , 403 S.C. 60 , 74, 742 S.E.2d 363 , 370 (2013) (stating the first step of an equal protection analysis is "whether the law treats 'similarly situated' entities differently"); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd , 403 S.C. 466 , 480, 744 S.E.2d 161 , 168 (2013) (stating "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances").

2017I, § 3 (“nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”); Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 428 , 593 S.E.2d 462, 469 (2004) (“To satisfy the equal protection clause, a classification must ... rest on some rational basis.”).

2017I, § 3 (“nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”); Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 428 , 593 S.E.2d 462, 469 (2004) (“To satisfy the equal protection clause, a classification must ... rest on some rational basis.”).

2025See Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. at 149 , 568 S.E.2d at 351 ("A classification does not violate the equal protection clause if: (1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis."); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 574 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001) ("The determination of whether a classification is reasonable is initially one for the legislative body and will be sustained if it is not plainly arbitrary and t

2025See Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. at 149 , 568 S.E.2d at 351 ("A classification does not violate the equal protection clause if: (1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis."); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 574 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001) ("The determination of whether a classification is reasonable is initially one for the legislative body and will be sustained if it is not plainly arbitrary and t

2015Golf Club, LLC, 401 S.C. at 293, 737 S.E.2d at 608; see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 , 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000); Sunset Cay, 357 S.C. at 428-29 , 593 S.E.2d at 469 .

2012Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 368 , 423 S.E.2d 340 (1992) (finding an equal protection violation where a dock permit was granted for two docks over a public oyster ground, but the respondent's dock permit was denied on the basis that it would extend over the public oyster ground); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that a party establishes an equal protection violation where he shows that he "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment"); TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C.

2025See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2025See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2025Dep't of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 432 , 574 S.E.2d 717, 723 (2002) ("For tax statutes, 'the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.'" (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))); Amazon Servs., LLC v. S.C.

2024Dep't of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 432 , 574 S.E.2d 717, 723 (2002) ("For tax statutes, 'the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.'" (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))); Amazon Servs., LLC v. S.C.

2025See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2025See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2025Dep't of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 432 , 574 S.E.2d 717, 723 (2002) ("For tax statutes, 'the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.'" (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))); Amazon Servs., LLC v. S.C.

2025Dep't of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 432 , 574 S.E.2d 717, 723 (2002) ("For tax statutes, 'the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.'" (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))); Amazon Servs., LLC v. S.C.

2025See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2025See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2025See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2024See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73 , 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74 , 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131 , 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to the case); W

2017See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (recognizing that an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the disposition of an independent issue is dispositive); Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 307 S.C. 143 , 414 S.E.2d 127 (1992) (concluding that appellate courts will not issue advisory opinions that are purely academic and do not affect the outcome of the case). 15 .

2017See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (recognizing that an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the disposition of an independent issue is dispositive); Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 307 S.C. 143 , 414 S.E.2d 127 (1992) (concluding that appellate courts will not issue advisory opinions that are purely academic and do not affect the outcome of the case). 15 .

2016Denene, Inc. v. City of Charleston, 359 S.C. 85, 91 , 596 S.E.2d 917, 920 (2004) (citation omitted).

2016Denene, Inc. v. City of Charleston, 359 S.C. 85, 91 , 596 S.E.2d 917, 920 (2004) (citation omitted).

2015Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, our supreme court clarified that "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances under the law.” 401 S.C. 280, 294-95 , 737 S.E.2d 601, 608-09 (2013) (quoting Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 396 , 675 S.E.2d 776, 782-83 (Ct.App.2009)); see also Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480-81 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) (recognizing clarification).

2015Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, our supreme court clarified that "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances under the law.” 401 S.C. 280, 294-95 , 737 S.E.2d 601, 608-09 (2013) (quoting Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 396 , 675 S.E.2d 776, 782-83 (Ct.App.2009)); see also Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480-81 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) (recognizing clarification).

2013A violation is established only if the plaintiff can prove that the state intended to discriminate.” (emphasis in original)); Butler v. Town of Edgefield, 328 S.C. 238, 250-51 , 493 S.E.2d 838, 845 (1997) (plaintiff did not establish Equal Protection claim where he failed to allege or set forth any facts which could establish purposeful or intentional discrimination).

2013A violation is established only if the plaintiff can prove that the state intended to discriminate.” (emphasis in original)); Butler v. Town of Edgefield, 328 S.C. 238, 250-51 , 493 S.E.2d 838, 845 (1997) (plaintiff did not establish Equal Protection claim where he failed to allege or set forth any facts which could establish purposeful or intentional discrimination).

2006Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 428 , 593 S.E.2d 462, 469 (2004); Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142, 146-47 , 394 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1990).

2006Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 428 , 593 S.E.2d 462, 469 (2004); Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142, 146-47 , 394 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1990).

2012Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 368 , 423 S.E.2d 340 (1992) (finding an equal protection violation where a dock permit was granted for two docks over a public oyster ground, but the respondent's dock permit was denied on the basis that it would extend over the public oyster ground); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that a party establishes an equal protection violation where he shows that he "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment"); TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C.

2012Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 368 , 423 S.E.2d 340 (1992) (finding an equal protection violation where a dock permit was granted for two docks over a public oyster ground, but the respondent's dock permit was denied on the basis that it would extend over the public oyster ground); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that a party establishes an equal protection violation where he shows that he "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment"); TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C.

2007In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court, through the Equal Protection clause, forbade prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike jurors because of their race.

2007In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court, through the Equal Protection clause, forbade prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike jurors because of their race.

2025See Major, 384 S.C. at 464 , 682 S.E.2d at 799 ("The decision of the ALC should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by some error of law."); Olson, 379 S.C. at 63, 663 S.E.2d at 501 (holding an appellate court should affirm the ALC's order if it finds substantial evidence in the record to support the ALC's findings).

2025See Major, 384 S.C. at 464 , 682 S.E.2d at 799 ("The decision of the ALC should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by some error of law."); Olson, 379 S.C. at 63, 663 S.E.2d at 501 (holding an appellate court should affirm the ALC's order if it finds substantial evidence in the record to support the ALC's findings).

2017Res., 339 S.C. 463 , 470 n.4, 530 S.E.2d 112 , 115 n.4 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 53 , 504 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1998)); cf. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (noting that when considering an equal protection challenge to a statutory classification subject to rational basis review, "because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motiv

2017Res., 339 S.C. 463 , 470 n.4, 530 S.E.2d 112 , 115 n.4 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 53 , 504 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1998)); cf. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (noting that when considering an equal protection challenge to a statutory classification subject to rational basis review, "because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motiv

2017Res., 339 S.C. 463 , 470 n.4, 530 S.E.2d 112 , 115 n.4 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 53 , 504 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1998)); cf. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (noting that when considering an equal protection challenge to a statutory classification subject to rational basis review, "because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motiv

2017Res., 339 S.C. 463 , 470 n.4, 530 S.E.2d 112 , 115 n.4 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 53 , 504 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1998)); cf. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (noting that when considering an equal protection challenge to a statutory classification subject to rational basis review, "because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motiv

2015Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, our supreme court clarified that "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances under the law.” 401 S.C. 280, 294-95 , 737 S.E.2d 601, 608-09 (2013) (quoting Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 396 , 675 S.E.2d 776, 782-83 (Ct.App.2009)); see also Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480-81 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) (recognizing clarification).

2015Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, our supreme court clarified that "the equal protection clause does not prohibit different treatment of people in different circumstances under the law.” 401 S.C. 280, 294-95 , 737 S.E.2d 601, 608-09 (2013) (quoting Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 396 , 675 S.E.2d 776, 782-83 (Ct.App.2009)); see also Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480-81 , 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) (recognizing clarification).