165 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kenyon v. Hammergreen2 sentences2013Id. at 585-86 , 570 P.2d at 753-54 . ¶ 44 In Kenyon , however, the Court held that the right to bring an action to recover damages is fundamental under the Arizona Constitution and applied strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to a medical malpractice statute. 142 Ariz. at 83 , 688 P.2d at 975 . 2013Id. at 585-86 , 570 P.2d at 753-54 . ¶ 44 In Kenyon , however, the Court held that the right to bring an action to recover damages is fundamental under the Arizona Constitution and applied strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to a medical malpractice statute. 142 Ariz. at 83 , 688 P.2d at 975 . | 4 | 6 |
Aegis of Arizona, L.L.C. v. Town of Maranagreen2 sentences2020Faraji also argues that the City's actions violated A.R.S. § 28-142 and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ¶7 "A threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the constitution." Aegis of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Town of Marana, 206 Ariz. 557 , 568, ¶ 44 (App. 2003) (quoting Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994)). 2016See Crerand v. State, 176 Ariz. 149, 151 , 859 P.2d 772, 774 (App. 1993); see also Aegis of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Town of Marana, 206 Ariz. 557 , 570, ¶ 54, 81 P.3d 1016 , 1029 (App. 2003) (“To establish an equal protection violation, a party must . . . show that it was treated differently than other people in the same ‘similarly situated’ class.” (citation omitted)). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences2021In State v. Cuen, 158 Ariz. 86 (App. 1988), we explained that § 13-712(B) is based on the equal-protection principle that a defendant who cannot afford bail may not be made to “serve longer in custody through presentence incarceration than similarly sentenced defendants able to post bail.” Id. at 88 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245 (App. 1987)). 1992“Credit for presentence incarceration is rooted in the equal protection principle that defendants unable to make bail should not serve longer in custody than those financially able to make bail.” Clements, 161 Ariz. at 126 , 776 P.2d at 804 (citing State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245 , 735 P.2d 854, 855 (App.1987)). | 3 | 3 |
Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Foundationgreen2 sentences1999Strict scrutiny is the standard applied to an equal protection challenge of a statute that “is aimed at limiting a fundamental right” or “discriminates among individuals based on a ‘suspect class.’ ” Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen’s Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 555 , 637 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1981). 1999Strict scrutiny is the standard applied to an equal protection challenge of a statute that “is aimed at limiting a fundamental right” or “discriminates among individuals based on a ‘suspect class.’ ” Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen’s Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 555 , 637 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1981). | 3 | 3 |
McCleskey v. Kempgreen2 sentences2017See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 ; Ovante, 231 Ariz. at 186 ¶ 21, 291 P.3d at 980 (holding that showing defendants in Marico-pa County are more likely to receive the death penalty than defendants in other counties does not establish an Equal Protection Clause violation). ¶ 31 On appeal, Hidalgo disclaims relying on the Equal Protection Clause, but instead argues that the inter-county disparity violates the “equal protection component implicit in the Eighth Amendment,” which does not require a showing of purposeful discrimination. 2017See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 ; Ovante, 231 Ariz. at 186 ¶ 21, 291 P.3d at 980 (holding that showing defendants in Marico-pa County are more likely to receive the death penalty than defendants in other counties does not establish an Equal Protection Clause violation). ¶ 31 On appeal, Hidalgo disclaims relying on the Equal Protection Clause, but instead argues that the inter-county disparity violates the “equal protection component implicit in the Eighth Amendment,” which does not require a showing of purposeful discrimination. | 2 | 3 |
Findley v. Industrial Com'n of Arizonagreen2 sentences1999We agree that the two classes are treated differently, but disagree that the differing treatment violates equal protection. ¶ 15 The equal protection clause is satisfied if “all persons within a class are treated'alike, and ... reasonable grounds for the classification exist.” 1 Hart v. Industrial Comm’n, 180 Ariz. 307, 310 , 884 P.2d 193, 196 (App.1994); see also Findley v. Industrial Comm’n, 135 Ariz. 273, 276 , 660 P.2d 874, 877 (App.1983). 1999We agree that the two classes are treated differently, but disagree that the differing treatment violates equal protection. ¶ 15 The equal protection clause is satisfied if “all persons within a class are treated'alike, and ... reasonable grounds for the classification exist.” 1 Hart v. Industrial Comm’n, 180 Ariz. 307, 310 , 884 P.2d 193, 196 (App.1994); see also Findley v. Industrial Comm’n, 135 Ariz. 273, 276 , 660 P.2d 874, 877 (App.1983). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Graygreen2 sentences2026But equal protection is only implicated if “the statutory maximum is exceeded when the presentence incarceration time is added to the sentence imposed.” State v. Mathieu, 165 Ariz. 20, 22 (App. 1990); see also State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. 445, 449 (1979) (“Even assuming [defendant] was incarcerated for [inability to post bond], we do not believe the court is required to credit the time to the shorter of the two sentences[,] [s]ince [it] was less than the statutory maximum.”); State v. Warde, 116 Ariz. 598, 600- 01 (1977) (“[A] defendant, as a matter of equal protection, must be credited with prese 2023See State v. Mathieu, 165 Ariz. 20, 22 (App. 1990) (appellate court “bound by the supreme court’s implied holding that the equal protection clause does not require credit unless the statutory maximum is exceeded when the presentence incarceration time is added to the sentence imposed” (citing State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. 445 (1979))). 8 SHIFFLETTE v. HON. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mathieugreen2 sentences2026But equal protection is only implicated if “the statutory maximum is exceeded when the presentence incarceration time is added to the sentence imposed.” State v. Mathieu, 165 Ariz. 20, 22 (App. 1990); see also State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. 445, 449 (1979) (“Even assuming [defendant] was incarcerated for [inability to post bond], we do not believe the court is required to credit the time to the shorter of the two sentences[,] [s]ince [it] was less than the statutory maximum.”); State v. Warde, 116 Ariz. 598, 600- 01 (1977) (“[A] defendant, as a matter of equal protection, must be credited with prese 2023See State v. Mathieu, 165 Ariz. 20, 22 (App. 1990) (appellate court “bound by the supreme court’s implied holding that the equal protection clause does not require credit unless the statutory maximum is exceeded when the presentence incarceration time is added to the sentence imposed” (citing State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. 445 (1979))). 8 SHIFFLETTE v. HON. | 2 | 2 |
Wedges/ledges of California, Inc. A California Corporation v. City of Phoenix, Arizona, a Municipalitygreen2 sentences2020Faraji also argues that the City's actions violated A.R.S. § 28-142 and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ¶7 "A threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the constitution." Aegis of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Town of Marana, 206 Ariz. 557 , 568, ¶ 44 (App. 2003) (quoting Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994)). 2016See Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994) ("A threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution."). ¶6 Additionally, Backus has not established an equal protection violation. | 2 | 2 |
Curtis v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2018"To establish an equal protection violation, a party must establish (1) that it was treated differently than those who are similarly situated, and (2) when disparate treatment does not implicate fundamental rights or suspect classification, that the classification bears no rational relation to a legitimate state interest." Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308, 313, ¶ 18 (App. 2006). ¶25 Waltz did not raise equal protection in the administrative hearing, so the ALJ did not make a finding on whether the Department treated Waltz differently than it treated other similarly situated applicants. 2016See Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308, 313, ¶ 18 (App. 2006) ("To establish an equal protection violation, a party must establish (1) that it was treated differently than those who are similarly situated, and (2) when disparate treatment does not implicate fundamental rights or suspect classification, that the classification bears no rational relation to a legitimate state interest"). ¶7 Nevertheless, Backus correctly asserts that the superior court provided no reason for denying his application. | 2 | 2 |
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community School v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Salt River Rima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. Sch., 200 Ariz. at 112, ¶ 13 , 23 P.3d at 107 (deeming it unnecessary to decide whether strict scrutiny or rational basis standard applied to charter school funding challenge when, as a matter of law, statutes did not infringe on challengers’ rights). 2014See, e.g., Salt River Rima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. Sch., 200 Ariz. at 112, ¶ 13 , 23 P.3d at 107 (deeming it unnecessary to decide whether strict scrutiny or rational basis standard applied to charter school funding challenge when, as a matter of law, statutes did not infringe on challengers’ rights). | 2 | 2 |
Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co.green2 sentences2014Although conceptually simi *123 lar, “[t]he due process clause protects liberty and property interests while the equal protection clause protects against discriminatory classifications.” Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 173 Ariz. 342, 348 , 842 P.2d 1355, 1361 (App.1992). ¶32 “The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions generally require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar circumstances.” Wigglesworth v. Maul-din, 195 Ariz. 432, 438, ¶ 19 , 990 P.2d 26, 32 (App.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2014Although conceptually simi *123 lar, “[t]he due process clause protects liberty and property interests while the equal protection clause protects against discriminatory classifications.” Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 173 Ariz. 342, 348 , 842 P.2d 1355, 1361 (App.1992). ¶32 “The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions generally require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar circumstances.” Wigglesworth v. Maul-din, 195 Ariz. 432, 438, ¶ 19 , 990 P.2d 26, 32 (App.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Martin v. Reinsteingreen2 sentences2011Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 309, ¶ 51 , 987 P.2d 779, 795 (App. 1999) (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 , 114 n. 6, 117 S.Ct. 555 , 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996)). ¶ 27 The Colemans sufficiently state a claim for an equal protection violation by asserting that Mesa disparately treats tattoo parlors based on unfounded perceptions and stereotypes. 2011Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 309, ¶ 51 , 987 P.2d 779, 795 (App. 1999) (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 , 114 n. 6, 117 S.Ct. 555 , 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996)). ¶ 27 The Colemans sufficiently state a claim for an equal protection violation by asserting that Mesa disparately treats tattoo parlors based on unfounded perceptions and stereotypes. | 2 | 2 |
Goodyear Farms v. City of Avondalegreen2 sentences1999However, “[ejqual protection is not violated ‘if any set of facts can be reasonably perceived to sustain the classification.’ ” Id. (quoting Goodyear Farms v. City of Avondale, 148 Ariz. 216, 222 , 714 P.2d 386, 392 (1986)). ¶ 10 We hold that requiring juvenile to wait until his eighteenth birthday to obtain a driver’s license does not violate the equal protection clause. 1999However, “[ejqual protection is not violated ‘if any set of facts can be reasonably perceived to sustain the classification.’ ” Id. (quoting Goodyear Farms v. City of Avondale, 148 Ariz. 216, 222 , 714 P.2d 386, 392 (1986)). ¶ 10 We hold that requiring juvenile to wait until his eighteenth birthday to obtain a driver’s license does not violate the equal protection clause. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Baileygreen2 sentences1992Our supreme court has stated that “[a] defendant alleging a Batson violation must make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.” State v. Bailey, 160 Ariz. 277, 281 , 772 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1989) . 1992Our supreme court has stated that “[a] defendant alleging a Batson violation must make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.” State v. Bailey, 160 Ariz. 277, 281 , 772 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1989) . | 2 | 2 |
| Shapiro v. Thompsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Carlesi v. New Yorkgreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Salinasgreen2 sentences2026See Mathieu, 165 Ariz. at 23; Shifflette, 255 Ariz. at 543 n.3; Gray, 122 Ariz. at 449; State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz. App. 232, 234 (1975) (holding the defendant was entitled to credit for 93 days of presentence incarceration because without it, the total time served would exceed the five-year statutory maximum for second-degree burglary); see also A.R.S. § 13-901(F), (G) (allowing the court to impose probationary jail time up to the shorter of one year or “the maximum period of imprisonment allowed under chapter 7”). ¶15 The statutory maximum was not exceeded here because if the superior court h 1982The rationale of denial of equal protection to mandate credit for presentence incarceration was relied upon in State v. Prevost, 118 Ariz. 100 , 574 P.2d 1319 (App.1977); State v. Maese, 27 Ariz.App. 379 , 555 P.2d 348 (1976); State v. Salazar, 24 Ariz.App. 472 , 539 P.2d 946 (1975); and State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz.App. 232 , 532 P.2d 174 (1975). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Clementsgreen2 sentences2026Presentence incarceration credit is based on “the equal protection principle that defendants unable to make bail should not serve longer in custody than those financially able to make bail.” State v. Clements, 161 Ariz. 123, 126 (App. 1989). 1992“Credit for presentence incarceration is rooted in the equal protection principle that defendants unable to make bail should not serve longer in custody than those financially able to make bail.” Clements, 161 Ariz. at 126 , 776 P.2d at 804 (citing State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245 , 735 P.2d 854, 855 (App.1987)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Levy'sgreen2 sentences2020Valley Nat’l Bank of Phx. v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538, 554 (1945). ¶33 A tax statute is not unconstitutional simply because it does not impose an identical burden on all taxpayers; “if there is a rational basis for the classification, there is no constitutional infirmity.” State v. Levy’s, 119 Ariz. 191, 192 (1978). 1980State v. Levy’s, 119 Ariz. 191 , 580 P.2d 329 (1978); Flagstaff Vending Co. v. City of Flagstaff, 118 Ariz. 556 , 578 P.2d 985 (1978). | 1 | 2 |
J. C. Penney Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1992Penney Co., Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 125 Ariz. 469, 472 , 610 P.2d 471, 474 (App.1980), and measure the legislation against an equal protection challenge with several basic principles in mind: “Classifications embodied in municipal licensing legislation must be based upon intrinsic, natural and reasonable distinctions germane to the police or revenue purpose of the law. 1992Penney Co., Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 125 Ariz. 469, 472 , 610 P.2d 471, 474 (App.1980), and measure the legislation against an equal protection challenge with several basic principles in mind: “Classifications embodied in municipal licensing legislation must be based upon intrinsic, natural and reasonable distinctions germane to the police or revenue purpose of the law. | 1 | 2 |
| Dandridge v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Reed v. Reedgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Wardegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vong v. Aunegreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. Batemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Carvergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Arizona v. Piercegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burney v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Valley Nat. Bank of Phoenix v. Glovergreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeGroot v. Arizona Racing Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crerand v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Toccogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Arizona v. Kwame Roy Lowerygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shelby School v. Arizona State Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wigglesworth v. Mauldingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nguyengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Albright v. Olivergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Connorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2000If the prosecutor could do so, the Equal Protection clause “would be but a vain and illusory requirement.” Id. (citation omitted). 1992THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court outlined a three-step process for evaluating a claim that the state has used a peremptory challenge in a manner which violates the equal protection clause. | 6 | 1989–2014 |
Bryant v. Continental Conveyor & Equipment Co.
red
2 sentences1991Under the rational basis test, the equal protection clause “is only violated if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objectives.” Bryant, 156 Ariz. at 196 , 751 P.2d at 512 . 1991Under the rational basis test, the equal protection clause “is only violated if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objectives.” Bryant, 156 Ariz. at 196 , 751 P.2d at 512 . | 3 | 1988–1991 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences1988He relies on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee residency requirement, that a person could not register to vote unless he had been a state resident for at least one year, violated the equal protection clause because it was unnecessary to promote any compelling state interest. 1988He relies on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee residency requirement, that a person could not register to vote unless he had been a state resident for at least one year, violated the equal protection clause because it was unnecessary to promote any compelling state interest. | 3 | 1972–1988 |
Castaneda v. Partida
green
2 sentences2018Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying Decoufle as an expert, this contention is moot. 9 STATE v. WOOTEN Decision of the Court ¶30 Wooten has failed to establish the prima facie case of an equal protection violation associated with jury selection process because he failed to assert how Arizona law has singled out a distinct class to which he belongs and failed to prove the degree of underrepresentation by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called as jurors, “over a significant period of time.” Id. (emphasis added). ¶31 1980As pointed out in Castaneda , in order to make a prima facie case of an equal protection violation, the defendant must show that (1) the group under-represented “is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied” and (2) “the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time.” 430 U.S. at 494 , 97 S.Ct. at 1280 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 510 . | 2 | 1980–2018 |
Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe
green
2 sentences2014The equal protection clause does not provide “a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Beach Comm’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 . “[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 . ¶ 33 Vong argued in the superior court that “by singling out this specific practice for prohibition, while permitting and regulating other cosmetology practices that are demonstrably dangerous to the public, the Board ha 2014The equal protection clause does not provide “a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Beach Comm’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 . “[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 . ¶ 33 Vong argued in the superior court that “by singling out this specific practice for prohibition, while permitting and regulating other cosmetology practices that are demonstrably dangerous to the public, the Board ha | 2 | 1995–2014 |
Brown v. City of Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences2013Id. at ¶ 42 (quoting Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263 , 283 n. 22 (3d Cir.2009)). ¶ 47 Similarly, we see no reason to apply a higher level of scrutiny to an equal protection claim involving non-suspect classifications grounded in the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution than to the abrogation claim itself. 2012Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263 , 283 n. 22 (3d Cir.2009); see also Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 394 (3d Cir.2010) (noting that “where the state shows a satisfactory rationale for a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, that regulation necessarily survives scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause”) (internal quotation omitted); Jones Intercable of San Diego, Inc. v. City of Chula Vista, 80 F.3d 320, 327 (9th Cir.1996) (recognizing that content-neutral restrictions are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny for either First Amendment or equal protec | 2 | 2012–2013 |
McGowan v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2011The federal district court, applying the rational basis test, reasoned that it is “[well-documented,] the existence of a sound hydrological basis for the boundaries which establish AMA’s,” and concluded that “the equal protection clause does not apply to the differing treatment accorded geographical areas.” Id. at 1280 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)). *507 ¶ 37 Because the issue in this case is not access to the courts, but instead the internal water usage management of an AMA, we find the YAN’s attempt to distinguish Cherry unpersuasive. 2011The federal district court, applying the rational basis test, reasoned that it is “[well-documented,] the existence of a sound hydrological basis for the boundaries which establish AMA’s,” and concluded that “the equal protection clause does not apply to the differing treatment accorded geographical areas.” Id. at 1280 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)). *507 ¶ 37 Because the issue in this case is not access to the courts, but instead the internal water usage management of an AMA, we find the YAN’s attempt to distinguish Cherry unpersuasive. | 2 | 2002–2011 |
Big D Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals
green
2 sentences2001Thus, because the government “may direct its laws against problems it perceives without covering the entire field of possible abuses,” an ordinance “does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.” Id. ¶ 19 Contrary to Grezaffi’s contention, we have no difficulty concluding that the ordinance is “rationally and reasonably related to furthering some legitimate governmental interest.” Big D Constr., 163 Ariz. at 566 , 789 P.2d at 1067 . 2001Thus, because the government “may direct its laws against problems it perceives without covering the entire field of possible abuses,” an ordinance “does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.” Id. ¶ 19 Contrary to Grezaffi’s contention, we have no difficulty concluding that the ordinance is “rationally and reasonably related to furthering some legitimate governmental interest.” Big D Constr., 163 Ariz. at 566 , 789 P.2d at 1067 . | 2 | 1996–2001 |
Anson v. American Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1998Anson held that a statute abrogating the discovery rule in wrongful death cases was “not rationally related to important state interests,” was “unreasonable and arbitrary,” and was “violative of the equal protection clause of the Arizona Constitution.” 155 Ariz. at 424 , 747 P.2d at 585 . 1998Anson held that a statute abrogating the discovery rule in wrongful death cases was “not rationally related to important state interests,” was “unreasonable and arbitrary,” and was “violative of the equal protection clause of the Arizona Constitution.” 155 Ariz. at 424 , 747 P.2d at 585 . | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Shofstall v. Hollins
green
2 sentences1994In Shofstall , this court, in a unanimous opinion, held that our school financing scheme did not violate the equal protection clause of our state constitution. 110 Ariz. at 90 , 515 P.2d at 592 . 1994In Shofstall , this court, in a unanimous opinion, held that our school financing scheme did not violate the equal protection clause of our state constitution. 110 Ariz. at 90 , 515 P.2d at 592 . | 2 | 1983–1994 |
State v. Bean
green
2 sentences1994In State v. Bean, the state faced an equal protection challenge to the custodial interference statute, A.R.S. § 13-1302, which grants to the mother sole legal custody of a child born out of wedlock, until paternity is established and custody is determined. 174 Ariz. 544 , 851 P.2d 843 (Ct.App. 1992). 1994In State v. Bean, the state faced an equal protection challenge to the custodial interference statute, A.R.S. § 13-1302, which grants to the mother sole legal custody of a child born out of wedlock, until paternity is established and custody is determined. 174 Ariz. 544 , 851 P.2d 843 (Ct.App. 1992). | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Swain v. Alabama red | 2 | 1985–1987 |
| City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski green | 2 | 1971–1986 |
| McDonald v. Commonwealth green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| McDonald v. Massachusetts green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| Cross v. State green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Birdsall neutral | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Birdsall green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Le Pitre green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| Lindsey v. Normet green | 2 | 1976–1980 |
| Uhlmann v. Wren green | 2 | 1973–1980 |
| Eisenstadt v. Baird green | 2 | 1973–1976 |
| Khristina Lyn Shifflette v. Hon. Marner green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Hammonds green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State of Arizona Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Hrach Shilgevorkyan green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Cuen green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Watahomigie v. BD. OF WATER QUALITY APP. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State of Arizona v. Manuel Ovante, Jr. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.) green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Lucas green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Eastin v. Broomfield green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Coleman v. City of Mesa green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Governale v. Lieberman green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Department of Revenue green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.