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220 Alabama opinions name it 4 courts 1901–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whitus v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2005See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. *Page 959 "As this Court stated in Deardorff v. State , [Ms. CR-01-0794, June 25, 2004] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2004): "`"Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving `the existence of purposeful discrimination.' Whitus v. Georgia , 385 U.S. 545 , 550 (1967). 2005“As this Court stated in Deardorff v. State, [Ms. CR-01-0794, June 25, 2004] — So.2d - (Ala.Crim.App.2004): “‘“Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence of purposeful discrimination.’ Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967). | 4 | 7 |
Lyng v. Castillogreen2 sentences2018See generally Lyng v. Castillo , 477 U.S. 635 , 106 S.Ct. 2727 , 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986) ; County Board v. Richards , 434 U.S. 5 , 98 S.Ct. 24 , 54 L.Ed.2d 4 (1977)." *740 Ex parte Robertson , 621 So.2d 1289 , 1291 (Ala. 1993). 2018See generally Lyng v. Castillo , 477 U.S. 635 , 106 S.Ct. 2727 , 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986) ; County Board v. Richards , 434 U.S. 5 , 98 S.Ct. 24 , 54 L.Ed.2d 4 (1977)." *740 Ex parte Robertson , 621 So.2d 1289 , 1291 (Ala. 1993). | 4 | 4 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1992Thus, any error in the original admission of the warrant and affidavit was harmless. *899 II The appellant contends that the State used its peremptory strikes to remove black jurors from the jury panel in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 1992Thus, any error in the original admission of the warrant and affidavit was harmless. *899 II The appellant contends that the State used its peremptory strikes to remove black jurors from the jury panel in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). | 3 | 12 |
Castaneda v. Partidagreen2 sentences1990The defendant has also failed to establish a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by proving that the jurors were selected in an intentionally discriminatory fashion, Castaneda v. Partida , 430 U.S. 482 , 97 S.Ct. 1272 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), or a prima facie violation of fundamental fairness under the due process clause, see Hobby v. United States , 468 U.S. 339 , 104 S.Ct. 3093 , 82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984). 1990The defendant has also failed to establish a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by proving that the jurors were selected in an intentionally discriminatory fashion, Castaneda v. Partida , 430 U.S. 482 , 97 S.Ct. 1272 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), or a prima facie violation of fundamental fairness under the due process clause, see Hobby v. United States , 468 U.S. 339 , 104 S.Ct. 3093 , 82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984). | 3 | 4 |
Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdorygreen2 sentences2014In addressing an equal-protection challenge, “this Court must presume that the Act is valid and construe the Act in favor of its constitutionality.” Id. at 565 (citing Mclnnish v. Riley, 925 So.2d 174 (Ala.2005)). “ ‘ “[I]t is the recognized duty of the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law.” ’ ” Id. at 564 (quoting Mclnnish, 925 So.2d at 178 , quoting in turn Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9 , 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944)). 2014In addressing an equal-protection challenge, “this Court must presume that the Act is valid and construe the Act in favor of its constitutionality.” Id. at 565 (citing Mclnnish v. Riley, 925 So.2d 174 (Ala.2005)). “ ‘ “[I]t is the recognized duty of the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law.” ’ ” Id. at 564 (quoting Mclnnish, 925 So.2d at 178 , quoting in turn Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9 , 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944)). | 3 | 3 |
Elisha Thomas, Jr. v. Lloyd Moore, Sheriff, Pontotoc County, Mississippi and Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Attorney General of the State of Mississippigreen2 sentences2013For this reason, the Court of Appeals concluded that ‘[t]he evidentiary rule established in Batson does not enter the analysis of a defendant’s equal protection claim unless a timely objection is made to the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory challenges.’ Id. at 804 (emphasis added). 2012For this reason, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he evidentiary rule established in Batson does not enter the analysis of a defendant’s equal protection claim unless a timely objection is made to the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory challenges.” Id. at 804 (emphasis added). | 3 | 3 |
| Smith v. Schultegreen | 3 | 3 |
Gideon v. ALABAMA STATE ETHICS COM'Ngreen2 sentences2014Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm’n, 379 So.2d 570 (Ala.1980). ‘Under the rational basis test the Court asks: (a) Whether the classification furthers a proper governmental purpose, and (b) whether the classification is rationally related to that purpose.’ 379 So.2d at 574 . 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 2 | 9 |
Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefieldgreen2 sentences2014A plain reading of the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, indicates that states have an affirmative constitutional duty to protect unborn persons within their jurisdiction to the same degree as born persons. 10 “The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 , 38 S.Ct. 495 , 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918) 2014A plain reading of the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, indicates that states have an affirmative constitutional duty to protect unborn persons within their jurisdiction to the same degree as born persons. 10 “The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 , 38 S.Ct. 495 , 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918) | 2 | 6 |
State v. Spurlockgreen2 sentences1995Constitutional Law, Section 564. “[T]he legislature may, without violating the equal protection clause, establish different punishments ... or it may provide a special punishment for a special class of offenders.” Section 564.’ ” Hardy v. State, 576 So.2d 685, 686 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), (quoting State v. Spurlock, 393 So.2d 1052, 1057 (Ala.Cr.App.1981)). 1991Constitutional Law, Section 564. '[T]he legislature may, without violating the equal protection clause, establish different punishments . . . or it may provide a special punishment for a special class of offenders.' Section 564." State v. Spurlock , 393 So.2d 1052 , 1057 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). | 2 | 6 |
Ex Parte Robertsongreen2 sentences1999Under this analysis, any law rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective will withstand an equal protection challenge." Ex parte Robertson, 621 So.2d 1289, 1291 (Ala.1993). 1994Under this analysis, any law rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective will withstand an equal protection challenge." Ex parte Robertson , 621 So.2d 1289 , 1291 (Ala. 1993). | 2 | 5 |
Wheatt v. Stategreen2 sentences2015That being said, to the extent that Tucker is attempting to argue that the Board’s decision to deny him parole denied him equal protection of the law because other inmates who had more disciplinary infractions than Tucker has have allegedly been granted parole, that argument is meritless. “ ‘The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally.’ Smith v. State, 518 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). ‘“[Separate treatment of defendants does not violate any constitutional guar- . an 2003"The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally." Smith v. State , 518 So.2d 174 , 176 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987). "`[S]eparate treatment of defendants does not violate any constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as that treatment is reasonable and founded on a rational basis.'" Carroll v. State , 599 So.2d 1243 , 1244 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992), quoting Wheatt v. State , 410 So.2d 479 , 484 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982). "`[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has | 2 | 4 |
Carroll v. Stategreen2 sentences2015That being said, to the extent that Tucker is attempting to argue that the Board’s decision to deny him parole denied him equal protection of the law because other inmates who had more disciplinary infractions than Tucker has have allegedly been granted parole, that argument is meritless. “ ‘The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally.’ Smith v. State, 518 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). ‘“[Separate treatment of defendants does not violate any constitutional guar- . an 2003"The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally." Smith v. State , 518 So.2d 174 , 176 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987). "`[S]eparate treatment of defendants does not violate any constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as that treatment is reasonable and founded on a rational basis.'" Carroll v. State , 599 So.2d 1243 , 1244 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992), quoting Wheatt v. State , 410 So.2d 479 , 484 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982). "`[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has | 2 | 3 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2015That being said, to the extent that Tucker is attempting to argue that the Board’s decision to deny him parole denied him equal protection of the law because other inmates who had more disciplinary infractions than Tucker has have allegedly been granted parole, that argument is meritless. “ ‘The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally.’ Smith v. State, 518 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). ‘“[Separate treatment of defendants does not violate any constitutional guar- . an 2013The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause guarantees that no state will “deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” “The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally.” Smith v. State, 518 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). “ ‘The equal protection clause does not mean that a state may not draw lines that treat one class of individuals differently from others. | 2 | 3 |
Craig v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See Craig v. State, 410 So.2d 449 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), for the test of an equal protection violation. 1990This court, in Craig v. State , 410 So.2d 449 , 453 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), cert. denied (Ala. 1982) (addressing an equal protection challenge to § 13A-8-4 (e)), addressed the differences between the forms of theft under § 13A-8-4 (a) and (e), Code of Alabama 1975: "Sections 13A-8-4 (e) and 13A-8-4 (a) proscribe different conduct. | 2 | 3 |
| John F. Wroblewski v. City of Washburngreen | 2 | 2 |
| cluster 72625green | 2 | 2 |
| Lightbourne v. Chiles, Governor of Floridagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Sanders v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiarygreen | 2 | 2 |
| cluster 606357green | 2 | 2 |
| Fowler v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Indiana Department of Correction v. Sampleygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Kittler v. Eckberg, Lammers, Briggs, Wolff & Vierlinggreen | 2 | 2 |
| Pierce v. Iowa-Missouri Conference of Seventh-day Adventistsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Craig v. Borengreen | 2 | 2 |
| Hardy v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
McCleskey v. Kempgreen2 sentences2015That being said, to the extent that Tucker is attempting to argue that the Board’s decision to deny him parole denied him equal protection of the law because other inmates who had more disciplinary infractions than Tucker has have allegedly been granted parole, that argument is meritless. “ ‘The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally.’ Smith v. State, 518 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). ‘“[Separate treatment of defendants does not violate any constitutional guar- . an 2015That being said, to the extent that Tucker is attempting to argue that the Board’s decision to deny him parole denied him equal protection of the law because other inmates who had more disciplinary infractions than Tucker has have allegedly been granted parole, that argument is meritless. “ ‘The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally.’ Smith v. State, 518 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). ‘“[Separate treatment of defendants does not violate any constitutional guar- . an | 1 | 12 |
McLendon v. Stategreen2 sentences1999The equal protection clause of the Constitution of 1875 was dropped from the Constitution of 1901. Hamilton v. Adkins, 250 Ala. 557 , 35 So.2d 183 [(1948)]; McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54, 58 , 60 So. 392 [(1912)], Ann. 1999The equal protection clause of the Constitution of 1875 was dropped from the Constitution of 1901. Hamilton v. Adkins, 250 Ala. 557 , 35 So.2d 183 [(1948)]; McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54, 58 , 60 So. 392 [(1912)], Ann. | 1 | 5 |
Eagerton v. Gulas Wrestling Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2001In Eagerton v. Gulas Wrestling Enterprises, Inc., 406 So.2d 366, at 370 (Ala.1981), this Court established *709 the fundamental issue in an equal-protection challenge to a license fee or a tax: "The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally." See F.S. 2001In Eagerton v. Gulas Wrestling Enterprises, Inc., 406 So.2d 366, at 370 (Ala.1981), this Court established *709 the fundamental issue in an equal-protection challenge to a license fee or a tax: "The basic tenet of the equal protection clause is not that all persons must be treated equally, but rather that all persons similarly situated must be treated equally." See F.S. | 1 | 4 |
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowersgreen2 sentences1984The equal protection clause "imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers , 358 U.S. 522 , 526 , 79 S.Ct. 437 , 440 , 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959). 1984The equal protection clause "imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers , 358 U.S. 522 , 526 , 79 S.Ct. 437 , 440 , 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959). | 1 | 4 |
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Countygreen2 sentences2004In so doing, we have explained that `"[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents."' Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, at 445, 43 S.Ct. 190 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 , 38 S.Ct. 495 , 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918)). ". . . 2004In so doing, we have explained that `"[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents."' Sioux City Bridge Co., supra , at 445, 43 S.Ct. 190 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield , 247 U.S. 350 , 352 , 38 S.Ct. 495 , 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918)). ". . . | 1 | 3 |
DeShazo v. City of Huntsvillegreen2 sentences2008It is insufficient merely to show that other violators have not been prosecuted, that there has been laxity in enforcement, or that there has been conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement. " "` DeShazo v. City of Huntsville, 416 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (emphasis added). 2008It is insufficient merely to show that other violators have not been prosecuted, that there has been laxity in enforcement, or that there has been conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement.'’ “ ‘DeShazo v. City of Huntsville, 416 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
McClendon v. Shelby Countygreen2 sentences2000McClendon v. Shelby County, 484 So.2d 459 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). 1994McClendon v. Shelby County, 484 So.2d 459 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). | 1 | 3 |
| Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospitalgreen | 1 | 3 |
| Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc.green | 1 | 3 |
| Snowden v. Hughesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Facion v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Strickland v. Aldermangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Powers v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Swain v. Alabama
red
2 sentences1987In Batson , the Supreme Court substantially changed the evidentiary burden, previously set forth in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 [ 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 ] (1965), placed on a criminal defendant who asserts an equal protection claim based on the prosecutor's alleged racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 1987In Batson , the Supreme Court substantially changed the evidentiary burden, previously set forth in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 [ 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 ] (1965), placed on a criminal defendant who asserts an equal protection claim based on the prosecutor's alleged racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. | 6 | 1980–1987 |
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech
green
2 sentences2025"Engquist correctly argues, however, that we recognized in [Village of Willowbrook v.] Olech[, 528 U.S. 562 (2000),] that an equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained even if the plaintiff has not alleged class-based discrimination, but instead claims that she has been irrationally singled out as a so-called 'class of one.' In Olech, a property owner had asked the village of Willowbrook to connect her property to the municipal water supply. 2014A plain reading of the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, indicates that states have an affirmative constitutional duty to protect unborn persons within their jurisdiction to the same degree as born persons. 10 “The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 , 38 S.Ct. 495 , 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918) | 4 | 2004–2025 |
County Board of Arlington County v. Richards
green
2 sentences2018See generally Lyng v. Castillo , 477 U.S. 635 , 106 S.Ct. 2727 , 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986) ; County Board v. Richards , 434 U.S. 5 , 98 S.Ct. 24 , 54 L.Ed.2d 4 (1977)." *740 Ex parte Robertson , 621 So.2d 1289 , 1291 (Ala. 1993). 2018See generally Lyng v. Castillo , 477 U.S. 635 , 106 S.Ct. 2727 , 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986) ; County Board v. Richards , 434 U.S. 5 , 98 S.Ct. 24 , 54 L.Ed.2d 4 (1977)." *740 Ex parte Robertson , 621 So.2d 1289 , 1291 (Ala. 1993). | 4 | 1993–2018 |
Williams v. Rhodes
green
2 sentences2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 4 | 1980–2011 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 4 | 1980–2011 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 4 | 1980–2011 |
Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
green
2 sentences1995As this Court recently held in Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 399 So.2d 263 (Ala. 1981): "`A statutory discrimination between classes is held to be relevant to a permissible legislative purpose if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' "The Medical Liability Act was the legislature's response to a crisis which developed nationwide in the 1970's. 1991As this Court recently held in Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 399 So.2d 263 (Ala.1981): "A statutory discrimination between classes is held to be relevant to a permissible legislative purpose if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 403 So.2d at 161 . | 4 | 1981–1995 |
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1984Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. , 220 U.S. 61 , 31 S.Ct. 337 , 55 L.Ed. 369 . 1984Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. , 220 U.S. 61 , 31 S.Ct. 337 , 55 L.Ed. 369 . | 4 | 1973–1984 |
Ex Parte Melof
green
2 sentences2017Our determination that the Alabama Constitution forms the basis of Brazelton's equal-protection claim is bolstered by our review of the argument portion of its appellate brief, a substantial portion of which is devoted to a discussion regarding our supreme court's decision in Ex parte Melof , 735 So.2d 1172 (Ala. 1999), namely whether that case is stare decisis for the proposition that the Alabama Constitution does not guarantee equal protection under the laws. 2002In Ex parte Melof, 735 So.2d 1172 (Ala.1999),. this Court determined that an equal protection clause does not exist and has never existed in a combination of §§ 1, 6, and 22, Ala. Const. 1901. | 3 | 2002–2017 |
| Hamilton v. Adkins green | 3 | 1949–1999 |
| Peddy v. Montgomery green | 3 | 1977–1995 |
| Oyler v. Boles green | 3 | 1977–1994 |
| Stanton v. Stanton green | 3 | 1977–1993 |
| Ex Parte Quang Ngoc Bui green | 3 | 1990–1991 |
| Bui v. State green | 3 | 1990–1991 |
| Ex Parte Bankhead green | 3 | 1991–1991 |
| Buckley v. Valeo green | 3 | 1980–1990 |
| Reed v. Reed green | 3 | 1977–1986 |
| Northington v. Alabama Department of Conservation & Natural Resources green | 2 | 2011–2014 |
| United States v. MacCollom green | 2 | 2010–2013 |
| Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. green | 2 | 1979–2013 |
| Trimble v. Gordon green | 2 | 1989–2013 |
| Bearden v. Georgia green | 2 | 2010–2013 |
| Plyler v. Doe green | 2 | 2001–2012 |
| Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney green | 2 | 2002–2004 |
| Harris v. Alabama green | 2 | 2001–2003 |
| Roe v. Wade red | 2 | 1981–2003 |
| Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss. green | 2 | 1957–2001 |
| Bessemer Theatres, Inc. v. City of Bessemer green | 2 | 1999–2001 |
| State v. Kimpel green | 2 | 1998–2000 |
| Lee v. State green | 2 | 1997–1998 |
| Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U. S. A., Ltd. v. Morts green | 2 | 1997–1998 |
| Puckett v. Johnson green | 2 | 1997–1998 |
| Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S. E. Johnson Co. green | 2 | 1997–1998 |
| Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| City of Hueytown v. Jiffy Chek Co. green | 2 | 1991–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.