equal protection clause in North Carolina

2021Dep’t of Corr., 345 N.C. 128, 134 , 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996) (applying “the same test as federal courts” to determine whether limiting working prisoners’ remedy to workers’ compensation violates their right to equal protection). ¶ 43 A typical equal protection claim alleges that the plaintiff was treated differently by legislation or a state actor due to their membership in a suspect class: race, color, religion, national origin, etc. See Engquist v. Or.

2021Dep’t of Corr., 345 N.C. 128, 134 , 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996) (applying “the same test as federal courts” to determine whether limiting working prisoners’ remedy to workers’ compensation violates their right to equal protection). ¶ 43 A typical equal protection claim alleges that the plaintiff was treated differently by legislation or a state actor due to their membership in a suspect class: race, color, religion, national origin, etc. See Engquist v. Or.

2022As such, read in harmony with Article II, Sections 3 and 5, Article I, Section 19 only prohibits redistricting plans that fail to “bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate governmental interest.” Texfi, 301 N.C. at 11 , 269 S.E.2d at 149 .15 Our understanding of the equal protection clause has been informed by federal case law interpreting the Federal Equal Protection Clause.

2022As such, read in harmony with Article II, Sections 3 and 5, Article I, Section 19 only prohibits redistricting plans that fail to “bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate governmental interest.” Texfi, 301 N.C. at 11 , 269 S.E.2d at 149 .15 Our understanding of the equal protection clause has been informed by federal case law interpreting the Federal Equal Protection Clause.

2024“Before embarking upon an equal protection analysis, we must first determine the level of scrutiny to apply.” Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377 , 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002).

2024“Before embarking upon an equal protection analysis, we must first determine the level of scrutiny to apply.” Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377 , 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002).

2011Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir.2003) (stating that "[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself); see also State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 490 , 701 S.E.2d 615, 645 (2010) (holding that a prosecutor's decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where *659 the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated); Grace Baptist Chu

2011Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir.2003) (stating that "[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself); see also State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 490 , 701 S.E.2d 615, 645 (2010) (holding that a prosecutor's decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where *659 the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated); Grace Baptist Chu

2022And contrary to a previous ruling suggesting that proof of repeated strikes of Black prospective jurors over a number of cases was necessary to establish an equal protection violation, the Batson Court held that “a defendant may [show] purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.” Id. at 95 ; cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965) (establishing the systematic discrimination requirement overruled in Batson).

2022CLEGG 2022-NCSC-11 Opinion of the Court 95; cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965) (establishing the systematic discrimination requirement overruled in Batson). ¶ 43 The Batson Court further established a three-step process by which courts analyze claims of racially motivated peremptory strikes, now called “Batson challenges.” First, a defendant bringing a Batson challenge must “make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94.

2024The equal protection clause “‘requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike.’” Holmes, 384 N.C. at 437, 886 S.E.2d at 130 (quoting Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 521 , 681 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2009)).

2024The equal protection clause “‘requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike.’” Holmes, 384 N.C. at 437, 886 S.E.2d at 130 (quoting Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 521 , 681 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2009)).

2018"The Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbid North Carolina [or its political subdivisions] from denying any person *101 the equal protection of the laws." Department of Transp. v. Rowe , 353 N.C. 671 , 675, 549 S.E.2d 203 , 207 (2001) (citations omitted). "[T]o state an equal protection claim, a claimant must allege (1) the government (2) arbitrarily (3) treated them differently (4) than those similarly situated." Lea v. Grier , 156 N.C.

2014“Accordingly, to state an equal protection claim, a claimant must allege (1) the government (2) arbitrarily (3) treated them differently (4) than those similarly situated.” Lea v. Grier, 156 N.C.

2021App. 266, 274 , 620 S.E.2d 873, 880 (2005)). ¶ 19 Here, the complaint alleges that “Lauren, as a female, is a member of a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” However, because the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations sufficient to establish that Lauren was treated differently from similarly situated male students, it fails to state the first element of an equal protection violation based on Lauren’s gender.

2021App. 266, 274 , 620 S.E.2d 873, 880 (2005)). ¶ 19 Here, the complaint alleges that “Lauren, as a female, is a member of a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” However, because the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations sufficient to establish that Lauren was treated differently from similarly situated male students, it fails to state the first element of an equal protection violation based on Lauren’s gender.

2011Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that “[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself”); see also State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 490 , 701 S.E.2d 615, 645 (2010) (holding that a prosecutor’s decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated); Grace Baptist Church

2011Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir.2003) (stating that "[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself); see also State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 490 , 701 S.E.2d 615, 645 (2010) (holding that a prosecutor's decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where *659 the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated); Grace Baptist Chu

2017Rational Basis Assuming, arguendo , that the Estates had survived the "similarly situated" prong of an Equal Protection Clause analysis, we further hold that the challenged legislation demonstrates a "rational relationship between the disparate treatment and 'a conceivable, legitimate interest of government.' " Beech Mountain , 91 N.C.App. at 90 -91 , 370 S.E.2d at 454-55 (citation omitted).

2017Rational Basis Assuming, arguendo , that the Estates had survived the "similarly situated" prong of an Equal Protection Clause analysis, we further hold that the challenged legislation demonstrates a "rational relationship between the disparate treatment and 'a conceivable, legitimate interest of government.' " Beech Mountain , 91 N.C.App. at 90 -91 , 370 S.E.2d at 454-55 (citation omitted).

2005Equal Protection The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The United States Supreme Court has “explained that ‘the purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’ ” Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 , 145 L.

2005Equal Protection The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The United States Supreme Court has “explained that ‘the purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’ ” Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 , 145 L.

2022See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644 , 653–54, 503 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1998) (choosing to analyze a confrontation claim under the North Carolina Constitution in the same way as a Confrontation Clause claim under the United States Constitution); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 646 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 502 (1984) (stating that the Court was not inclined to interpret the state and federal constitutions differently in the context of an equal protection challenge to the death penalty statute). ¶ 123 Historically, this Court has consistently deferred to the legislature’s criminal policymaking authorit

2022See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644 , 653–54, 503 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1998) (choosing to analyze a confrontation claim under the North Carolina Constitution in the same way as a Confrontation Clause claim under the United States Constitution); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 646 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 502 (1984) (stating that the Court was not inclined to interpret the state and federal constitutions differently in the context of an equal protection challenge to the death penalty statute). ¶ 123 Historically, this Court has consistently deferred to the legislature’s criminal policymaking authorit

2022See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644 , 653–54, 503 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1998) (choosing to analyze a confrontation claim under the North Carolina Constitution in the same way as a Confrontation Clause claim under the United States Constitution); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 646 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 502 (1984) (stating that the Court was not inclined to interpret the state and federal constitutions differently in the context of an equal protection challenge to the death penalty statute). ¶ 123 Historically, this Court has consistently deferred to the legislature’s criminal policymaking authorit

2022See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644 , 653–54, 503 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1998) (choosing to analyze a confrontation claim under the North Carolina Constitution in the same way as a Confrontation Clause claim under the United States Constitution); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 646 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 502 (1984) (stating that the Court was not inclined to interpret the state and federal constitutions differently in the context of an equal protection challenge to the death penalty statute). ¶ 123 Historically, this Court has consistently deferred to the legislature’s criminal policymaking authorit

2021See Miller v. State of N.C., 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 494 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has long made clear that statements that are capable of inflaming jurors’ racial or ethnic prejudices ‘degrade the administration of justice.’ Where such references are legally irrelevant, they violate a defendant’s

2021See Miller v. State of N.C., 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 494 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has long made clear that statements that are capable of inflaming jurors’ racial or ethnic prejudices ‘degrade the administration of justice.’ Where such references are legally irrelevant, they violate a defendant’s

2008Id. at 274 , 620 S.E.2d at 880 . "`To state an equal protection claim, [plaintiffs] must plead sufficient facts to satisfy each requirement. . . .'" Id., 620 S.E.2d at 880 -81 (quoting Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th Cir.2002)).

2008Id. at 274, 620 S.E.2d at 880 . “ ‘To state an equal protection claim, [plaintiffs] must plead sufficient facts to satisfy each requirement....’” Id., 620 S.E.2d at 880 -81 (quoting Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th Cir. 2002)).

2017Equal Protection Claim "To establish an equal protection violation, [a plaintiff] must identify a class of similarly situated persons who are treated dissimilarly." Wang v. UNC-CH Sch. of Med. , 216 N.C.

2017App. 185 , 204, 716 S.E.2d 646 , 658 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. Hansen , 326 F.3d 569 , 576 (4th Cir.) ("[T]o succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." (citation and quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied , 540 U.S. 1089 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 794 (2003).

2023In Batson, the United States “Supreme Court deemed purposeful discrimination in jury selection to be an equal protection violation.” State v. Bennett, 374 N.C. 579 , 592 (2020) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 88–89).

2023In Batson, the United States “Supreme Court deemed purposeful discrimination in jury selection to be an equal protection violation.” State v. Bennett, 374 N.C. 579 , 592 (2020) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 88–89).

2001In order to prevail upon an equal protection violation claim under the North Carolina Constitution, “the burden is upon the complainant to show the intentional, purposeful discrimination upon which he relies.” Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 662 , 178 S.E.2d 382, 386 (1971).

2001In order to prevail upon an equal protection violation claim under the North Carolina Constitution, “the burden is upon the complainant to show the intentional, purposeful discrimination upon which he relies.” Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 662 , 178 S.E.2d 382, 386 (1971).

1987Citing State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 656 , 187 S.E. 2d 8, 11 (1972), U.S. Sprint contends that “[t]he equal protection clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions impose upon lawmaking bodies the requirement that any legislative classification ‘be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found.’ (Citation omitted.)” On review of the record below, we do not find that the Commission has violated the equal protection rule.

1987Citing State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 656 , 187 S.E. 2d 8, 11 (1972), U.S. Sprint contends that “[t]he equal protection clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions impose upon lawmaking bodies the requirement that any legislative classification ‘be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found.’ (Citation omitted.)” On review of the record below, we do not find that the Commission has violated the equal protection rule.

2022Under rational-basis review, “the party challenging the regulation must show that it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate government interest.” Id. ¶ 34 In Hohn, this Court heard a similar equal protection challenge to an earlier version of § 1-17, wherein the plaintiff argued § 1-17(b) “create[d] an arbitrary class and there is no rational basis for this distinction.” 48 N.C.

2022Under rational-basis review, “the party challenging the regulation must show that it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate government interest.” Id. ¶ 34 In Hohn, this Court heard a similar equal protection challenge to an earlier version of § 1-17, wherein the plaintiff argued § 1-17(b) “create[d] an arbitrary class and there is no rational basis for this distinction.” 48 N.C.

2020“Even a single act of invidious discrimination may form the basis for an equal protection violation.” State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 491 , 356 S.E.2d 279, 295 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 , 98 L.

2020“Even a single act of invidious discrimination may form the basis for an equal protection violation.” State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 491 , 356 S.E.2d 279, 295 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 , 98 L.

1995Both the test set forth in Batson and the underlying reasoning of that case were later substantially modified, however, by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), which rejected the first part of the Batson test quoted above and held that a white defendant has standing to assert an equal protection claim when a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to exclude black potential jurors solely by reason of their race.

1995Both the test set forth in Batson and the underlying reasoning of that case were later substantially modified, however, by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), which rejected the first part of the Batson test quoted above and held that a white defendant has standing to assert an equal protection claim when a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to exclude black potential jurors solely by reason of their race.

1998Our Supreme Court in White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766-67 , 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983) set out the governing principles in determining whether a legislative classification violates the equal protection clause as follows: When a governmental classification does not burden the exercise of a fundamental right or operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, the lower tier of equal protection analysis requiring that the classification be made upon a rational basis must be applied.

1998Our Supreme Court in White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766-67 , 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983) set out the governing principles in determining whether a legislative classification violates the equal protection clause as follows: When a governmental classification does not burden the exercise of a fundamental right or operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, the lower tier of equal protection analysis requiring that the classification be made upon a rational basis must be applied.

2021Id. at 457-58, 323 S.E.2d at 337-38 . ¶ 15 Defendant’s claimed equal protection violation here is based on the same principle as the claimed equal protection violation our Supreme Court rejected in Howren—that treating the same group of people differently at different times constitutes an equal protection violation.

2021Id. at 457-58, 323 S.E.2d at 337-38 . ¶ 15 Defendant’s claimed equal protection violation here is based on the same principle as the claimed equal protection violation our Supreme Court rejected in Howren—that treating the same group of people differently at different times constitutes an equal protection violation.

1994“The North Carolina cases applying the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions to challenged classifications have used the same test the federal courts *681 use[] . . . .” Duggins v. North Carolina State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners, 294 N.C. 120, 131 , 240 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1978).

1994“The North Carolina cases applying the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions to challenged classifications have used the same test the federal courts *681 use[] . . . .” Duggins v. North Carolina State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners, 294 N.C. 120, 131 , 240 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1978).