equal protection clause in New Jersey

2009As the Supreme Court held in New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n, Inc. v. Holderman, 24 N.J. 295, 300 , 131 A. 2d 773 (1957): *323 The burden of demonstrating that a statute contravenes the equal protection clause is extremely formidable, as is attested by the long trail of failure.

2009As the Supreme Court held in New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n, Inc. v. Holderman, 24 N.J. 295, 300 , 131 A. 2d 773 (1957): *323 The burden of demonstrating that a statute contravenes the equal protection clause is extremely formidable, as is attested by the long trail of failure.

2022Callen, 92 N.J. at 134 (citing Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 202-05 (1969) (extending the ability to recover under the wrongful death statute to illegitimate children in order to comport with the equal protection clause)); State v. De Santis, 65 N.J. 462, 472-73 (1974) (noting that, because the obscenity statute did not satisfy the constitutional standard set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), “we now judicially salvage [the statute] by incorporating the Miller requirements” rather than nullify the law and leave a void); see also State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 31-32 (1992) (s

2022Callen, 92 N.J. at 134 (citing Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 202-05 (1969) (extending the ability to recover under the wrongful death statute to illegitimate children in order to comport with the equal protection clause)); State v. De Santis, 65 N.J. 462, 472-73 (1974) (noting that, because the obscenity statute did not satisfy the constitutional standard set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), “we now judicially salvage [the statute] by incorporating the Miller requirements” rather than nullify the law and leave a void); see also State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 31-32 (1992) (s

2025"That test weighs 'the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction.'" Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 473 (2004) (quoting Greenberg, 99 N.J. at 567 ). "'Although . . . consideration of an equal protection claim under New Jersey's balancing test differs analytically from the rational basis test, 'the two approaches are substantially the same and will often yield the same result."' N.J.

2024To state an equal protection claim, a claimant must show that the challenged governmental action does not apply "evenhandedly to similarly situated people." Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 472 (2004) (recognizing that a governmental action is invalid on equal protection grounds A-0356-22 21 when it does not apply "evenhandedly to similarly situated people"); Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 568 (1985) (explaining that Article I, Paragraph 1 protects "against the unequal treatment of those who should be treated alike"); see also Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 443 (2006) (recog

2026David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 315 (1985) (holding that "the equal protection clause forbids only invidious discrimination").

2017In short, the equal protection clause forbids only invidious discrimination. [Pleasure Bay Apartments v. City of Long Branch, 66 N.J. 79, 93 (1974) (quoting David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 314-15 (1965)).] In Property Owners Association v. Township of North Bergen, 74 N.J. 327, 330-32 (1977), a case plaintiffs cite, the owners of rental properties challenged an ordinance that created a special class of tenants, i.e., those over the age of sixty-five whose income did not exceed $5000.

1973"The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures equality of right by forbidding arbitrary discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced * * *." Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 418 (1952); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 , 88 S.Ct. 1509, 1511 , 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); see also 101 C.J.S.

1963The equal protection clause secures equality of right by forbidding arbitrary discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced, Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of City of Newark, 9 N.J. 405 (1952), but a statutory classification will not be found unconstitutional where it bears a reasonable and just relation to either the object of legislation or some substantial consideration affecting the general welfare.

1982The principles of statutory interpretation applicable to a municipal ordinance were described by the Supreme Court in Guill v. Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574 (1956), especially relevant because of the equal protection challenge there interposed.

1973Washington National Insurance Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N.J. 545 (1948). [ Guill v. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 582-583 (1956); emphasis added] See also Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17 (1955) *177 * * * The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures equality of right by forbidding arbitrary discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced.

2022Callen, 92 N.J. at 134 (citing Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 202-05 (1969) (extending the ability to recover under the wrongful death statute to illegitimate children in order to comport with the equal protection clause)); State v. De Santis, 65 N.J. 462, 472-73 (1974) (noting that, because the obscenity statute did not satisfy the constitutional standard set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), “we now judicially salvage [the statute] by incorporating the Miller requirements” rather than nullify the law and leave a void); see also State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 31-32 (1992) (s

2022Callen, 92 N.J. at 134 (citing Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 202-05 (1969) (extending the ability to recover under the wrongful death statute to illegitimate children in order to comport with the equal protection clause)); State v. De Santis, 65 N.J. 462, 472-73 (1974) (noting that, because the obscenity statute did not satisfy the constitutional standard set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), “we now judicially salvage [the statute] by incorporating the Miller requirements” rather than nullify the law and leave a void); see also State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 31-32 (1992) (s

2012It is well-settled that “the equal protection clause does not require the state to treat all persons alike.” Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 , 60 S.Ct. 879, 882 , 84 L.Ed. 1124, 1128 (1940)).

2012It is well-settled that “the equal protection clause does not require the state to treat all persons alike.” Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 , 60 S.Ct. 879, 882 , 84 L.Ed. 1124, 1128 (1940)).

1980In Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed. 2d 491 (1970), the court explains the test to be used: In the areas of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the equal protection clause merely because of the classification made by its laws are imperfect.

1980In Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed. 2d 491 (1970), the court explains the test to be used: In the areas of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the equal protection clause merely because of the classification made by its laws are imperfect.

2026Lewis, 188 N.J. at 450 . 31 The court stated in its opinion that it "[did] not believe further discovery would provide a legal basis for recovery regarding the special laws claim and a right to safety." The opinion notably did not address, at least explicitly, why discovery on the equal protection claim would be unhelpful.

2026Lewis, 188 N.J. at 450. 31 The court stated in its opinion that it "[did] not believe further discovery would provide a legal basis for recovery regarding the special laws claim and a right to safety." The opinion notably did not address, at least explicitly, why discovery on the equal protection claim would be unhelpful.

2006In fact, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “the equal protection clause does not prohibit the legislature from recognizing ‘degrees of evil’ ” and differentiating between crimes or offenders, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 , 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113 , 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1659-60 (1942), and our Supreme Court has stated, in upholding Megan’s Law, that “[i]t is well settled that classifying offenders according to the offense committed is subjected to rational basis analysis.” Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 92 , 662 A.2d 367 .

2006In fact, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “the equal protection clause does not prohibit the legislature from recognizing ‘degrees of evil’ ” and differentiating between crimes or offenders, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 , 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113 , 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1659-60 (1942), and our Supreme Court has stated, in upholding Megan’s Law, that “[i]t is well settled that classifying offenders according to the offense committed is subjected to rational basis analysis.” Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 92 , 662 A.2d 367 .

1999Co., 252 N.J.Super. 280, 286 , 599 A. 2d 916 (App.Div. 1991) ("Imperfect classifications that are part of a reasonable legislative scheme do not violate the equal protection clause").

1999Co., 252 N.J.Super. 280, 286 , 599 A. 2d 916 (App.Div. 1991) ("Imperfect classifications that are part of a reasonable legislative scheme do not violate the equal protection clause").

2022Further, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution "protects the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class." Id. at 362-63 (quoting Baldwin Constr.

2003See, e.g., Van Decker, supra, 120 N.J. at 362 , 576 A.2d at 885 (“West Milford’s practices also violated the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.”).

2002Farmer, 165 N.J. at 629 , 762 A. 2d 620 (stating that the language of the State Constitution's equal protection provision is "more expansive" than that of the Federal Constitution and "incorporates within its terms the right of privacy and its concomitant rights, including a woman's right to make certain fundamental choices"); Byrne, 91 N.J. at 292-93, 310 , 450 A. 2d 925 (holding the equal protection clause of the State Constitution prohibited restricting state Medicaid funding of abortions to only those abortions necessary to preserve the life of the mother, in spite of the United States Sup

2002Farmer, 165 N.J. at 629 , 762 A. 2d 620 (stating that the language of the State Constitution's equal protection provision is "more expansive" than that of the Federal Constitution and "incorporates within its terms the right of privacy and its concomitant rights, including a woman's right to make certain fundamental choices"); Byrne, 91 N.J. at 292-93, 310 , 450 A. 2d 925 (holding the equal protection clause of the State Constitution prohibited restricting state Medicaid funding of abortions to only those abortions necessary to preserve the life of the mother, in spite of the United States Sup

1981Cf. Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268 , 39 S.Ct. 273, 274 , 63 L.Ed.2d 597 , 598 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (In enacting legislation, a legislative body does not violate the equal protection clause by refusing to cover all eventualities in that it may refuse to act where “the harm to the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact”); Accord, Vornado Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 353 (1978), app. dism. 439 U.S. 1123 , 99 S.Ct. 1037 , 59 L.Ed.2d 84 (1979); Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N

1981Cf. Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268 , 39 S.Ct. 273, 274 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 597 , 598 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (In enacting legislation, a legislative body does not violate the equal protection clause by refusing to cover all eventualities in that it may refuse to act where "the harm to the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact"); Accord, Vornado Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 353 (1978), app. dism. 439 U.S. 1123 , 99 S.Ct. 1037 , 59 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1979); Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32

2002Under the New Jersey Constitution, the equal protection analysis may differ somewhat from the federal standard, but the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that the two approaches are "substantially the same" and "will often yield the same result." Drew Assoc. of N.J., L.P. v. Travisano, 122 N.J. 249, 259 , 584 A. 2d 807 (1991) (citations omitted); Barone, supra, 107 N.J. at 368 , 526 A. 2d 1055 .

2002Under the New Jersey Constitution, the equal protection analysis may differ somewhat from the federal standard, but the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that the two approaches are "substantially the same" and "will often yield the same result." Drew Assoc. of N.J., L.P. v. Travisano, 122 N.J. 249, 259 , 584 A. 2d 807 (1991) (citations omitted); Barone, supra, 107 N.J. at 368 , 526 A. 2d 1055 .

2010Plaintiffs further contend that the ninety percent provision presents a viable equal protection claim because it is "not the result of any municipality's tax capacities or decisions, but is a statutory fiat by the State, which requires drastically unequal expenditures per pupil for Newark public charter school students." Thus, plaintiffs contend that deciding this case on equal protection grounds will not run afoul of the reason expressed by the Court in Robinson I for not applying the equal protection clause in this context, namely, "that the equal protection clause may be unmanageable if it

2010Plaintiffs further contend that the ninety percent provision presents a viable equal protection claim because it is "not the result of any municipality's tax capacities or decisions, but is a statutory fiat by the State, which requires drastically unequal expenditures per pupil for Newark public charter school students." Thus, plaintiffs contend that deciding this case on equal protection grounds will not run afoul of the reason expressed by the Court in Robinson I for not applying the equal protection clause in this context, namely, "that the equal protection clause may be unmanageable if it

1974Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N.J. 545 (1949), where the court said: The equal protection clause means that the right of all persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances, and that it applies to the exercise of all the powers of the state which can affect the individual or his property, including the power of taxation. * * * While the due process and equal protection guarant[ees] are not coterminous in their spheres of protection, equality of right is fundamental in both.

1973Washington National Insurance Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N.J. 545 (1948). [ Guill v. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 582-583 (1956); emphasis added] See also Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17 (1955) *177 * * * The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures equality of right by forbidding arbitrary discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced.

2025State Bar Ass'n v. State, 387 N.J.

2012State Bar Assn. v. State, 387 N.J.Super. 24, 43 , 902 A. 2d 944 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 491 , 909 A. 2d 726 (2006) (citations omitted).

2021The ALJ noted the Court's caution against "the monumental governmental upheaval that would result if the equal protection doctrine were held applicable to the financing of education . . . ." Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 390 (1990) (Abbott II).

2021Super. at 53 (holding that Constitution does not guarantee taxpayers in various districts bear the burden of financing education equally); Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 390 (holding that an equal protection analysis is inapplicable to funding claims under the Thorough and Efficient Clause).

1986Although the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US.-, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1986), was rooted in Equal Protection Clause analysis, the Court’s overriding emphasis on the central position the jury occupies in our system of justice was consistent with this Court’s analysis: “The very idea of a jury is a body ... composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.” [Id. at-, 106 S.Ct

1986Although the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US.-, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1986), was rooted in Equal Protection Clause analysis, the Court’s overriding emphasis on the central position the jury occupies in our system of justice was consistent with this Court’s analysis: “The very idea of a jury is a body ... composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.” [Id. at-, 106 S.Ct

1971II While a State has broad classification power, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 , 83 S.Ct. 1028, 1032 , 10 L.Ed. 2 d 93, 98 (1963), the United States Supreme Court has said that the equal protection clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes.

1971II While a State has broad classification power, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 , 83 S.Ct. 1028, 1032 , 10 L.Ed. 2 d 93, 98 (1963), the United States Supreme Court has said that the equal protection clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes.

2020As 31 long as ‘the bounds of reasonable choice,’ are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment”) (quoting Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. at 40 ); Piscopo v. Lemi Excavating Co., 215 N.J.

1984Planners, 48 N.J. 581, 601-603 (1967), app. dism. and cert. den., 389 U.S. 8 , 88 S.Ct. 70 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 8 (1967); nor is there a suspect classification which could give rise to an equal protection claim, Taxpayers Assn. of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6, 40 (1976), app. dism. 430 U.S. 977 , 97 S.Ct. 1672 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 373 (1977).