equal protection clause in Utah

2010I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution has long been considered the state's equal protection clause; the two "'embody the same general principle."" Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 31 , 54 P.3d 1069 (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984)); see also Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med.

2007This provision of the Utah Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different cireumstances should not be treated as if their cireumstances were the same." However, ... "[the different language of Article I, [Section] 24, the different constitutional contexts of the two provisions, and different jurisprudential considerations may lead to a different result in applying equal protection principles under Article I, [Section] 24 than might be reached under fede

2014When subsequently pressed by the court, counsel appeared to concede that he was unaware of any legal prohibition on striking potential jurors on the basis of gender, but insisted he had not done so. {11 The trial court concluded that Sessions had challenged jurors 19 and 23 in a manner inconsistent with the equal protection standard recognized in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and stated that it would be willing to entertain a motion for mistrial or alternative relief, The State declined to request a mistrial, but suggested instead that the court reins

2014When subsequently pressed by the court, counsel appeared to concede that he was unaware of any legal prohibition on striking potential jurors on the basis of gender, but insisted he had not done so. {11 The trial court concluded that Sessions had challenged jurors 19 and 23 in a manner inconsistent with the equal protection standard recognized in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and stated that it would be willing to entertain a motion for mistrial or alternative relief, The State declined to request a mistrial, but suggested instead that the court reins

2025Indeed, those three justices each wrote an opinion. ¶22 Justice Durham, who authored the lead opinion, found the recovery limits statutes “wanting under both a due process and an equal protection analysis,” id.; see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 348– 66 (lead opinion), while Justices Zimmerman and Stewart each authored separate opinions expressing disparate views, Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366–69 (Zimmerman, J., writing separately); id. at 369–75 (Stewart, J., writing separately).

2025Indeed, those three justices each wrote an opinion. ¶22 Justice Durham, who authored the lead opinion, found the recovery limits statutes “wanting under both a due process and an equal protection analysis,” id.; see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 348– 66 (lead opinion), while Justices Zimmerman and Stewart each authored separate opinions expressing disparate views, Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366–69 (Zimmerman, J., writing separately); id. at 369–75 (Stewart, J., writing separately).

2014Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725 , 729-30 & n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 3331 (striking down a nursing school's policy of excluding men from admission under both parts of the equal protection test: (1) because the "actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification" was based on an archaic and overbroad stereotype and (2) "also because," in any event, the classification was not "substantially and directly relat-14 an ed" to the state's "proposed" objective). .

2014Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725 , 729-30 & n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 3331 (striking down a nursing school's policy of excluding men from admission under both parts of the equal protection test: (1) because the "actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification" was based on an archaic and overbroad stereotype and (2) "also because," in any event, the classification was not "substantially and directly relat-14 an ed" to the state's "proposed" objective). .

2007This provision of the Utah Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different cireumstances should not be treated as if their cireumstances were the same." However, ... "[the different language of Article I, [Section] 24, the different constitutional contexts of the two provisions, and different jurisprudential considerations may lead to a different result in applying equal protection principles under Article I, [Section] 24 than might be reached under fede

2002See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1388-89 (Utah 1993) (treating article I, section 24 and Equal Protection Clause as the same); Greenwood v. North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991) ("[Article I, section 24] of the Utah Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment `embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.'") (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984)); Condemarin v. Univ

2008See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 99 , 137 P.3d 726 (“Where no suspect classification or violation of a fundamental right is involved, a difference in treatment need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose to withstand equal protection scrutiny.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

1992The equal protection provision of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: “All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” The supreme court’s most recent formulation of the equal protection test is as follows: “ ‘[The] test to be applied under article I, section 24 is whether the classification of those subject to the legislation is a reasonable one and bears a reasonable relationship to an achievement of the legitimate legislative purpose.’ ” Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752

2019The equal protection claim arises under the United States Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote precedents, such as Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), and our analysis of these cases in Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89 , 54 P.3d 1069 .

2019The equal protection claim arises under the United States Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote precedents, such as Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), and our analysis of these cases in Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89 , 54 P.3d 1069 .

2016Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the sentencing statute ―need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose.‖ See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (reviewing an equal protection challenge to a sentencing statute for ―a rational basis‖); United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357 , 1359 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (―Our cases also support rational basis review of equal protection challenges in the sentencing context.‖); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that in the face of an equal protection challenge, a review of a sentenc

2016Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the sentencing statute ―need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose.‖ See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (reviewing an equal protection challenge to a sentencing statute for ―a rational basis‖); United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357 , 1359 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (―Our cases also support rational basis review of equal protection challenges in the sentencing context.‖); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that in the face of an equal protection challenge, a review of a sentenc

2016Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the sentencing statute ―need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose.‖ See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (reviewing an equal protection challenge to a sentencing statute for ―a rational basis‖); United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357 , 1359 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (―Our cases also support rational basis review of equal protection challenges in the sentencing context.‖); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that in the face of an equal protection challenge, a review of a sentenc

2016Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the sentencing statute ―need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose.‖ See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (reviewing an equal protection challenge to a sentencing statute for ―a rational basis‖); United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357 , 1359 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (―Our cases also support rational basis review of equal protection challenges in the sentencing context.‖); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that in the face of an equal protection challenge, a review of a sentenc

2016Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 123 (―Not all those found guilty of aggravated murder are similarly situated.‖).

2016Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 123 (―Not all those found guilty of aggravated murder are similarly situated.‖).

2010Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 33 , 67 P.3d 436 (stating that the uniform operation of laws provision is Utah's "analogue to the federal due process guarantee"); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) (stating the provisions are substantially similar).

1992Finally, Horton argues that the Board’s application of the law deprived him equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 2 of the Utah Constitution. 3 Specifically, he claims that he should not be treated differently for retirement purposes simply because he left the County for employment with the State. *934 In analyzing an equal protection claim, “all statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its invalidity.” Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634

1991Subsequently, in State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1987), the supreme court held that the equal protection clause requires that a defendant receive sentence credit for pretrial incarceration resulting from the inability to post bail.

1987However, Board of Pardons Policy No. 4.06, adopted seven months before appellant filed his brief, specifically credits "any time that an offender was incarcerated prior to commitment unless it was as a result of abscond-ing_” Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court recently held that, under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, credit against any sentence must be given for all pre-sentence incarceration imposed because of a defendant’s inability to post bail, State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1987), which appellant asserts is the reason for his pretrial incarceration.

2003In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 , 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff property owner had stated an equal protection claim in alleging that a municipality had "irrational[ly]l and wholly arbitrarfily]" refused to connect the plaintiffs property to the city's water system unless plaintiff agreed to grant the city a thirty-three foot easement to install and maintain the connection rather than the fifteen foot easement required of other similarly situated residents.

2003In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 , 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff property owner had stated an equal protection claim in alleging that a municipality had "irrational[ly]l and wholly arbitrarfily]" refused to connect the plaintiffs property to the city's water system unless plaintiff agreed to grant the city a thirty-three foot easement to install and maintain the connection rather than the fifteen foot easement required of other similarly situated residents.

2017But "[w]here no suspect classification or violation of a fundamental right is involved, a difference in treatment 'need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose' to withstand equal protection scrutiny." State v. Holm , 2006 UT 31 , ¶ 99, 137 P.3d 726 (citation omitted). ¶ 81 Rose fails to explain her equal protection argument and simply asserts that "[t]here is no governmental interest in removing the three branch safeguards on lawyers' interests, over say medical doctors, or dentists, or others dealing with the most personal aspects of Utah citizens." It should go without saying t

2017But "[w]here no suspect classification or violation of a fundamental right is involved, a difference in treatment 'need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose' to withstand equal protection scrutiny." State v. Holm , 2006 UT 31 , ¶ 99, 137 P.3d 726 (citation omitted). ¶ 81 Rose fails to explain her equal protection argument and simply asserts that "[t]here is no governmental interest in removing the three branch safeguards on lawyers' interests, over say medical doctors, or dentists, or others dealing with the most personal aspects of Utah citizens." It should go without saying t

1993This claim of error demonstrates confusion between an equal protection challenge based upon Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and a Sixth Amendment challenge based on Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990).

1993This claim of error demonstrates confusion between an equal protection challenge based upon Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and a Sixth Amendment challenge based on Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990).

2026First, they claim that the “comparator evidence required a ‘fact-bound inquiry’ and the City never argued otherwise, so the issue was properly submitted to the jury.” In fact, after the plaintiffs rested (continued…) 20240498-CA 24 2026 UT App 82 Mountain West Towing v. West Jordan City ¶49 A plaintiff asserting an equal protection claim in the land- use context must “identify comparators that are similarly situated in all material respects,” a tall task because property, by its very nature, is “unique.” Moulding Invs., LLC, 2024 UT App 23, ¶ 27 (cleaned up).

2024Moulding timely appealed. 20220433-CA 8 2024 UT App 23 Moulding Inv. v. Box Elder County ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶21 Moulding appeals the district court’s dismissal of its complaint, challenging the court’s conclusions relating to both the “similarly situated” and “animus” elements of the equal protection claim.

2016Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the sentencing statute ―need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose.‖ See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (reviewing an equal protection challenge to a sentencing statute for ―a rational basis‖); United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357 , 1359 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (―Our cases also support rational basis review of equal protection challenges in the sentencing context.‖); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that in the face of an equal protection challenge, a review of a sentenc

2016Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the sentencing statute ―need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose.‖ See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (reviewing an equal protection challenge to a sentencing statute for ―a rational basis‖); United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357 , 1359 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (―Our cases also support rational basis review of equal protection challenges in the sentencing context.‖); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that in the face of an equal protection challenge, a review of a sentenc

2015A person may raise an equal protection claim as a "class of one" by presenting "evidence that the defendant deliberately sought to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant's position." Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ¶ 33 , 67 P.3d 466 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2015A person may raise an equal protection claim as a "class of one" by presenting "evidence that the defendant deliberately sought to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant's position." Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ¶ 33 , 67 P.3d 466 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2010Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 643 (Utah 1990) ("`[T]he state has a strong interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume the parental role over [illegitimate] children....'") (quoting Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984) (second alteration in original)). [57] In the context of an equal protection challenge based on the statutory distinctions made between mothers and fathers, we have thoroughly examined this state interest: "It is and should be the policy of the law to so operate as to encourage the finding of suitable homes and parents for children in th

1990In our decisions in Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), and Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), we held that the equal protection clause was not offended by this statute.

1988The elements of a prima facie case under an equal protection claim were discussed in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 , 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977).

1988The elements of a prima facie case under an equal protection claim were discussed in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 , 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977).

2026This is fatal for the plaintiffs’ argument because establishing an equal protection claim in this context requires “evidence sufficient to establish factual as well as regulatory similarity” in order “to show that other parties were similarly situated to them.” Id. at 252 ; see also Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 144 (1st Cir. 2016) (making clear 20240498-CA 26 2026 UT App 82 Mountain West Towing v. West Jordan City that a land use’s potential environmental effect is material in a similarly situated inquiry). ¶52 On this point, we think the Eleventh Circuit’s decision

2026Id. at 263 .

2026See, e.g., Moulding Invs., LLC v. Box Elder County, 2024 UT App 23, ¶ 26 , 545 P.3d 781 (resolving plaintiff’s equal protection claim on the similarly situated inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage); see also, e.g., SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Tippins, 31 F.4th 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2022) (not reaching rational basis issue when the plaintiff could not establish that it was similarly situated to other comparators). 18.

2026This is fatal for the plaintiffs’ argument because establishing an equal protection claim in this context requires “evidence sufficient to establish factual as well as regulatory similarity” in order “to show that other parties were similarly situated to them.” Id. at 252 ; see also Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 144 (1st Cir. 2016) (making clear 20240498-CA 26 2026 UT App 82 Mountain West Towing v. West Jordan City that a land use’s potential environmental effect is material in a similarly situated inquiry). ¶52 On this point, we think the Eleventh Circuit’s decision

2026First, they claim that the “comparator evidence required a ‘fact-bound inquiry’ and the City never argued otherwise, so the issue was properly submitted to the jury.” In fact, after the plaintiffs rested (continued…) 20240498-CA 24 2026 UT App 82 Mountain West Towing v. West Jordan City ¶49 A plaintiff asserting an equal protection claim in the land- use context must “identify comparators that are similarly situated in all material respects,” a tall task because property, by its very nature, is “unique.” Moulding Invs., LLC, 2024 UT App 23, ¶ 27 (cleaned up).

2026This is fatal for the plaintiffs’ argument because establishing an equal protection claim in this context requires “evidence sufficient to establish factual as well as regulatory similarity” in order “to show that other parties were similarly situated to them.” Id. at 252 ; see also Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 144 (1st Cir. 2016) (making clear 20240498-CA 26 2026 UT App 82 Mountain West Towing v. West Jordan City that a land use’s potential environmental effect is material in a similarly situated inquiry). ¶52 On this point, we think the Eleventh Circuit’s decision