equal protection clause in Delaware

2024The healthcare providers regulated 76 See Pls.’ Mot. at 21. 77 Burroughs, 304 A.3d at 544 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 319–20 (1993)). 78 Id. (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ). 79 See Topolski, 303 A.3d at 365 (“The Third Circuit . . . has ‘repeatedly warned that rational basis review is by no means toothless—a necessary corollary to and implication of rationality as a test is that there will be situations where proffered reasons are not rational.’” (cleaned up) (quoting Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014))). 80 Id. 17 by Title 24 include: podiatrists, 81 chiropractors

2023Due Process142 While the equal protection violation is alone sufficient to warrant relief, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson separately held that due process “requires that the 139 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 140 Stradford v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67 , 79 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 ). 141 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9); see also Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9 (“An undercurrent to our dissenting colleague’s argument

1994The trial judge denied the motion, noting that such a challenge would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (“[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury panel solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges ... ”).

1994The trial judge denied the motion, noting that such a challenge would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (“[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury panel solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges ... ”).

2024The healthcare providers regulated 76 See Pls.’ Mot. at 21. 77 Burroughs, 304 A.3d at 544 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 319–20 (1993)). 78 Id. (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ). 79 See Topolski, 303 A.3d at 365 (“The Third Circuit . . . has ‘repeatedly warned that rational basis review is by no means toothless—a necessary corollary to and implication of rationality as a test is that there will be situations where proffered reasons are not rational.’” (cleaned up) (quoting Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014))). 80 Id. 17 by Title 24 include: podiatrists, 81 chiropractors

2023Due Process142 While the equal protection violation is alone sufficient to warrant relief, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson separately held that due process “requires that the 139 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 140 Stradford v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67 , 79 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 ). 141 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9); see also Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9 (“An undercurrent to our dissenting colleague’s argument

2019Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that “[d]epriving victims of gun industry negligent and criminal conduct of remedies also violates the Equal Protection clause of the 100 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 , 88 n.32 (1978) (quoting Second Employers ’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 , 50 (1912)). 101 Cheswold, 489 A.2d at 417 (citing Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929); Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44, 47 (Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1061 (1980); Gallegher, 183 A. a

1987Cheswold Volunteer Fire Company v. Lambertson Construction Company, Del.Supr., 489 A.2d 413, 415 (1984).

1993See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997 (1985).

1986See Riley, 496 A.2d at 1012 .

1983In Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170 (1983), this Court concluded that this classification scheme “was reasonably related to suppression of the drug traffic, thereby satisfying the demands of the equal protection clause”. 458 A.2d at 1173 .

1983In Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170 (1983), this Court concluded that this classification scheme “was reasonably related to suppression of the drug traffic, thereby satisfying the demands of the equal protection clause”. 458 A.2d at 1173 .

1983Justice v. Gatchell, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 97, 102 (1974).

1979The respondent also cites the cogent language of Chief Justice Herrmann in Justice v. Gatchell, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 97 (1974) in support of his argument that courts are self-restrained when testing the constitutionality of legislative actions, that such acts cannot be disturbed except in “clear cases”, upon “weighty considerations”, and that their invalidity must be “beyond doubt.” Justice was an attack upon the Delaware Guest Statute under the equal protection clause and it barely survived that attack!— if I accurately assess the contents of that opinion.

2026There, the New York Court of Appeals followed Shields in (1) confirming that the provisions of its state constitution were “presumptively self-executing,”102 (2) cautioning that a violation of a self-executing provision “will not always support a claim for damages,”103 then (3) recognizing a damages remedy for violations of the state’s equal protection clause and its search and seizure clause.104 Federal case law supports the concept of self-executing provisions, and an early decision from the Supreme Court of the United States deployed the term.105 Although the Supreme Court of the United Sta

2026There, the New York Court of Appeals followed Shields in (1) confirming that the provisions of its state constitution were “presumptively self-executing,”102 (2) cautioning that a violation of a self-executing provision “will not always support a claim for damages,”103 then (3) recognizing a damages remedy for violations of the state’s equal protection clause and its search and seizure clause.104 Federal case law supports the concept of self-executing provisions, and an early decision from the Supreme Court of the United States deployed the term.105 Although the Supreme Court of the United Sta

2026There, the New York Court of Appeals followed Shields in (1) confirming that the provisions of its state constitution were “presumptively self-executing,”102 (2) cautioning that a violation of a self-executing provision “will not always support a claim for damages,”103 then (3) recognizing a damages remedy for violations of the state’s equal protection clause and its search and seizure clause.104 Federal case law supports the concept of self-executing provisions, and an early decision from the Supreme Court of the United States deployed the term.105 Although the Supreme Court of the United Sta

2026There, the New York Court of Appeals followed Shields in (1) confirming that the provisions of its state constitution were “presumptively self-executing,”102 (2) cautioning that a violation of a self-executing provision “will not always support a claim for damages,”103 then (3) recognizing a damages remedy for violations of the state’s equal protection clause and its search and seizure clause.104 Federal case law supports the concept of self-executing provisions, and an early decision from the Supreme Court of the United States deployed the term.105 Although the Supreme Court of the United Sta

2026There, the New York Court of Appeals followed Shields in (1) confirming that the provisions of its state constitution were “presumptively self-executing,”102 (2) cautioning that a violation of a self-executing provision “will not always support a claim for damages,”103 then (3) recognizing a damages remedy for violations of the state’s equal protection clause and its search and seizure clause.104 Federal case law supports the concept of self-executing provisions, and an early decision from the Supreme Court of the United States deployed the term.105 Although the Supreme Court of the United Sta

2026There, the New York Court of Appeals followed Shields in (1) confirming that the provisions of its state constitution were “presumptively self-executing,”102 (2) cautioning that a violation of a self-executing provision “will not always support a claim for damages,”103 then (3) recognizing a damages remedy for violations of the state’s equal protection clause and its search and seizure clause.104 Federal case law supports the concept of self-executing provisions, and an early decision from the Supreme Court of the United States deployed the term.105 Although the Supreme Court of the United Sta

2026Bjornestad v. Hulse, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1568, 1580, 1585-86 (Ct. App. Cal. 1991). 17 prevention or hindering of voting by force, threat, menace, or intimidation.

2023The only mention of strict scrutiny, however, appeared in the dissent, which noted that the U.S. Supreme Court “has never applied strict scrutiny to the substance of state laws involving involuntary confinement of the mentally ill, much less to laws involving the confinement of insanity acquittees.” Id. at 118-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 96 See, e.g., Rotherham, 923 P.2d at 1139-40 (applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to the involuntary commitment of incompetent and dangerous defendants because such commitment “impinges on that person’s constitutional guarantee of libert

2023While the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits arbitrary distinctions amongst citizens that are of no legitimate governmental interest it “does not deny a state the power to treat different classes of people in different ways as long as the classification is reasonable.”33 Here, the governmental interest in prohibiting prisoners from accessing medical marijuana while incarcerated is both legitimate and reasonable. 31 Blackston v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 2d 601, 605 (D.

2023The only mention of strict scrutiny, however, appeared in the dissent, which noted that the U.S. Supreme Court “has never applied strict scrutiny to the substance of state laws involving involuntary confinement of the mentally ill, much less to laws involving the confinement of insanity acquittees.” Id. at 118-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 96 See, e.g., Rotherham, 923 P.2d at 1139-40 (applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to the involuntary commitment of incompetent and dangerous defendants because such commitment “impinges on that person’s constitutional guarantee of libert

2023Due Process142 While the equal protection violation is alone sufficient to warrant relief, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson separately held that due process “requires that the 139 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 140 Stradford v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67 , 79 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 ). 141 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9); see also Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9 (“An undercurrent to our dissenting colleague’s argument

2023Due Process142 While the equal protection violation is alone sufficient to warrant relief, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson separately held that due process “requires that the 139 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 140 Stradford v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67 , 79 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 ). 141 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9); see also Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9 (“An undercurrent to our dissenting colleague’s argument

2023The equal protection violation in Jackson, however, was not just the detention itself—it was “condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release.”116 As explained in Jackson, “the State cannot withhold 113 See Lewis, 403 A.2d at 1119 (“Unlike the involuntary civil committee who generally denies the existence of the mental condition for which he is committed, the insanity acquitee has been provided a judicial hearing at which he has alleged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence the very mental condition w

2023Due Process142 While the equal protection violation is alone sufficient to warrant relief, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson separately held that due process “requires that the 139 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 140 Stradford v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67 , 79 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 ). 141 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9); see also Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9 (“An undercurrent to our dissenting colleague’s argument

2023Due Process142 While the equal protection violation is alone sufficient to warrant relief, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson separately held that due process “requires that the 139 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 140 Stradford v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67 , 79 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 ). 141 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9); see also Doe, 513 F.3d at 112 n.9 (“An undercurrent to our dissenting colleague’s argument

2023We believe this provides a rational basis for the insanity acquitee’s immediate commitment.” (emphasis supplied)); Witherup, 1996 WL 527284 , at *1-2 (explicitly applying rational basis review to an equal protection challenge to the release procedures under 11 Del. C. § 403); cf. Mills, 256 A.2d at 757 (“Because we find no rational justification for withholding from a s 4702 patient the safeguard of jury trial of the issue of present mental illness, we construe s 4702(c) to require jury trial of that issue.” (emphasis supplied)). 26 by a preponderance of the evidence.100 Second, whereas an ind

2023Following Baxstrom, the Delaware Supreme Court in Mills found an equal protection violation where Delaware law afforded a jury trial to civil committees on the issue of present mental illness but denied that same protection to insanity acquittees petitioning for release. 256 A.2d at 757 (“In the absence of a reasonable basis for distinction, we hold that it is a denial of equal protection of the laws to deprive a s 4702 patient of the substantial safeguards provided by s 5126 for a s 5125 patient as to release from the Hospital.”).

2023The equal protection violation in Jackson, however, was not just the detention itself—it was “condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release.”116 As explained in Jackson, “the State cannot withhold 113 See Lewis, 403 A.2d at 1119 (“Unlike the involuntary civil committee who generally denies the existence of the mental condition for which he is committed, the insanity acquitee has been provided a judicial hearing at which he has alleged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence the very mental condition w

2023First, the Supreme Court held that “due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.”75 More specifically, the Supreme Court held that “a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time 73 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 724 . 74 Id. at 730 . 75 Id. at 738 . 20 necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable f

2023Del. 2007). 32 Price v. Centurion of Delaware, LLC, 2022 WL 16945692 , at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2022). 33 State v. Brothers, 384 A.2d 402, 404 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 (1972)). -7- Claims Under Section 1981 and Section 1985 13.

2023The equal protection violation in Jackson, however, was not just the detention itself—it was “condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release.”116 As explained in Jackson, “the State cannot withhold 113 See Lewis, 403 A.2d at 1119 (“Unlike the involuntary civil committee who generally denies the existence of the mental condition for which he is committed, the insanity acquitee has been provided a judicial hearing at which he has alleged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence the very mental condition w

2023Del. 2007). 32 Price v. Centurion of Delaware, LLC, 2022 WL 16945692 , at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2022). 33 State v. Brothers, 384 A.2d 402, 404 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 (1972)). -7- Claims Under Section 1981 and Section 1985 13.

2023The only mention of strict scrutiny, however, appeared in the dissent, which noted that the U.S. Supreme Court “has never applied strict scrutiny to the substance of state laws involving involuntary confinement of the mentally ill, much less to laws involving the confinement of insanity acquittees.” Id. at 118-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 96 See, e.g., Rotherham, 923 P.2d at 1139-40 (applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to the involuntary commitment of incompetent and dangerous defendants because such commitment “impinges on that person’s constitutional guarantee of libert

2023The due process analysis turns on the reasonableness of a person’s commitment and the basis for it in more absolute terms, whereas the equal protection analysis evaluates the reasonableness of commitment relative to the civil commitment process as an alternative, i.e., requiring an analysis of the reasonableness of deviating from the 80 Id. at 362 n.10. 81 504 U.S. 71 , 77-78 (1992). 82 Id. at 78 . 83 See id. at 84-86. 84 Id. at 88 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 22 state’s generally applicable civil commitment statute.85 While Jackson’s equal protection and due process analyses were “clos

2023The due process analysis turns on the reasonableness of a person’s commitment and the basis for it in more absolute terms, whereas the equal protection analysis evaluates the reasonableness of commitment relative to the civil commitment process as an alternative, i.e., requiring an analysis of the reasonableness of deviating from the 80 Id. at 362 n.10. 81 504 U.S. 71 , 77-78 (1992). 82 Id. at 78 . 83 See id. at 84-86. 84 Id. at 88 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 22 state’s generally applicable civil commitment statute.85 While Jackson’s equal protection and due process analyses were “clos