equal protection clause in New Mexico

1994The plaintiff brought an equal protection claim because, while "victims of government negligence must give notice of their tort claim ... [t]here is no such requirement for victims of `private' negligence." Day, 844 F.2d at 730.

1994The plaintiff brought an equal protection claim because, while “victims of government negligence must give notice of their tort claim ... [tjhere is no such requirement for victims of ‘private’ negligence.” Day, 844 F.2d at 730.

2018Equal Protection {11} We begin by applying the two-step equal protection analysis adopted in Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools , 2005-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 331 , 120 P.3d 413 .

2018Equal Protection {11} We begin by applying the two-step equal protection analysis adopted in Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools , 2005-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 331 , 120 P.3d 413 .

2016Wagner did not apply the heightened standard to invalidate legislation; instead, Wagner upheld the WCA’s attorney fee limitation from an equal protection challenge. 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 32 .

2016Wagner did not apply the heightened standard to invalidate legislation; instead, Wagner upheld the WCA’s attorney fee limitation from an equal protection challenge. 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 32 .

2021Wilschinsky, 1989-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 25-26; see also Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 26 (rejecting a patient’s equal protection challenge to the MMA in part because the MMA does not make “a classification based upon the character of plaintiff-patients . . . it is a classification based upon the character of defendant-health-care providers” (citation omitted)); Garcia v. La Farge, 1995-NMSC-019 , ¶ 17, 119 N.M. 532 , 893 P.2d 428 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the MMA’s statute of repose because the statute “classifies claims not according to the status or character of the plaintiff but acc

2021Wilschinsky, 1989-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 25-26; see also Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 26 (rejecting a patient’s equal protection challenge to the MMA in part because the MMA does not make “a classification based upon the character of plaintiff-patients . . . it is a classification based upon the character of defendant-health-care providers” (citation omitted)); Garcia v. La Farge, 1995-NMSC-019 , ¶ 17, 119 N.M. 532 , 893 P.2d 428 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the MMA’s statute of repose because the statute “classifies claims not according to the status or character of the plaintiff but acc

2013This is the same analysis that we performed above under Plaintiffs equal protection argument, and “}s]ince no clear due process argument is raised, we will simply restate the idea that analysis under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is identical to that used under the due process clauses.” Marrujo, 118 N.M. at 760 , 887 P.2d at 754 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93 (noting that “equal protection arguments largely track and duplicate those made in support of the due process claim”).

2013This is the same analysis that we performed above under Plaintiffs equal protection argument, and “}s]ince no clear due process argument is raised, we will simply restate the idea that analysis under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is identical to that used under the due process clauses.” Marrujo, 118 N.M. at 760 , 887 P.2d at 754 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93 (noting that “equal protection arguments largely track and duplicate those made in support of the due process claim”).

1994For example, in City of Cleburne, which involved an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for a proposed home for persons who are mentally retarded, a plurality of the Court stated that the lower court “erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation.” 473 U.S. at 442 , 105 S.Ct. at 3255 .

1994For example, in City of Cleburne, which involved an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for a proposed home for persons who are mentally retarded, a plurality of the Court stated that the lower court “erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation.” 473 U.S. at 442 , 105 S.Ct. at 3255 .

2021See Rodriguez, 2016-NMSC-029 , ¶ 9. 4The equal protection case law cited by Defendant references legislative, not judicial, classifications; and Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a jury instruction can serve as the basis of an equal protection claim.

2018See Griego v. Oliver , 2014-NMSC-003 , ¶¶ 4, 27, 316 P.3d 865 (applying the two-part test and determining that same-sex couples were similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with respect to marriage); see also Rodriguez , 2016-NMSC-029 , ¶ 2, 378 P.3d 13 (applying the two-part test and determining that farm workers were similarly situated to other agricultural workers).

2013This is the same analysis that we performed above under Plaintiffs equal protection argument, and “}s]ince no clear due process argument is raised, we will simply restate the idea that analysis under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is identical to that used under the due process clauses.” Marrujo, 118 N.M. at 760 , 887 P.2d at 754 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93 (noting that “equal protection arguments largely track and duplicate those made in support of the due process claim”).

2013This is the same analysis that we performed above under Plaintiff’s equal protection argument, and “[s]ince no clear due process argument is raised, we will simply restate the idea that analysis under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is identical to that used under the due process clauses.” Marrujo, 118 N.M. at 760 , 887 P.2d at 754 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93 (noting that “equal protection arguments largely track and duplicate those made in support of the due process claim”).

1984The Court stated in Espanola Housing Authority v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787 , 568 P.2d 1233 (1977): When an equal protection challenge is leveled against a legislative classification, this Court considers the guidelines set forth in Davy v. McNeill, 31 N.M. 7, 14 , 240 P. 482, 486 (1925): If the classification is reasonable, it is valid.

1984The Court stated in Espanola Housing Authority v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787 , 568 P.2d 1233 (1977): When an equal protection challenge is leveled against a legislative classification, this Court considers the guidelines set forth in Davy v. McNeill, 31 N.M. 7, 14 , 240 P. 482, 486 (1925): If the classification is reasonable, it is valid.

2018See Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 4, 27 , 316 P.3d 865 (applying the two-part test and determining that same-sex couples were similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with respect to marriage); see also Rodriguez, 2016-NMSC-029 , ¶ 2 (applying the two-part test and determining that farm workers were similarly situated to other agricultural workers).

2018See Griego v. Oliver , 2014-NMSC-003 , ¶¶ 4, 27, 316 P.3d 865 (applying the two-part test and determining that same-sex couples were similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with respect to marriage); see also Rodriguez , 2016-NMSC-029 , ¶ 2, 378 P.3d 13 (applying the two-part test and determining that farm workers were similarly situated to other agricultural workers).

2016State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (rejecting an equal protection challenge because “[e]ven if the classification involved here is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this ‘perfection is by no means required’” (internal citation omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Legislatures may implement their program step by step, in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially amelio

2016State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (rejecting an equal protection challenge because “[ejven if the classification involved here is to some extent both undcrinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this ‘perfection is by no means required’” (internal citation omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Legislatures may implement their program stop by step, in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially amelio

1997See Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 108 N.M. 752, 755 , 779 P.2d 129, 132 (Ct.App.1989) (holding that interim partial disability statute did not raise an equal protection claim because “[a]ll workers injured during the effective period ... were subject to the same [requirements for] partial disability”); Madrid, 1996 NMSC 064, ¶¶ 32-37, 122 N.M. 524 , 928 P.2d 250 (holding that different criterion for impairment evaluation did not result in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals).

1997See Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 108 N.M. 752, 755 , 779 P.2d 129, 132 (Ct.App.1989) (holding that interim partial disability statute did not raise an equal protection claim because “[a]ll workers injured during the effective period ... were subject to the same [requirements for] partial disability”); Madrid, 1996 NMSC 064, ¶¶ 32-37, 122 N.M. 524 , 928 P.2d 250 (holding that different criterion for impairment evaluation did not result in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals).

2025See id. at 11 (“[S]tate action, even though illegal under state law, can be no more and no less constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment than if it were sanctioned by the state legislature.”); State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 26 , 148 N.M. 391 , 237 P.3d 693 (reviewing a defendant’s equal protection challenge under rational basis and holding that a defendant’s equal protection rights were not violated when the sentencing court modified his eligibility for good time credit because the court’s discretion “is rationally related to the goals of punishment as well as rehabilitation”); see als

2012See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (rejecting equal protection challenge to time-of-acquisition value system of valuing property for taxation as having rational basis).

2016See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ; Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 . 37 {92} Further, the majority opinion’s explanation of the “evidence in the record” condition is in tension with its requirement for a “firm legal rationale.” By permitting a court to consider sua sponte legislative facts outside of the record, the so-called heightened standard suggests that a court may, in fact, attempt to conceive of any permissible legislative purpose that the statute under review rationally serves.

2016See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ; Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 . {92} Further, the majority opinion’s explanation of the “evidence in the record” condition is in tension with its requirement for a “firm legal rationale.” By permitting a court to consider sua sponte legislative facts outside of the record, the so-called heightened standard suggests that a court may, in fact, attempt to conceive of any permissible legislative purpose that the statute under review rationally serves.

2016Therefore, an equal protection claim is not properly before us on appeal. 11 assisted suicide and other similar issues,” id. at 719 , noting that many states permitted “ ‘living wills,’ surrogate health-care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal or refusal of life- sustaining medical treatment,” id. at 716 (citation omitted). {22} The Glucksberg Court next turned to the Due Process Clause, inventorying the fundamental rights and liberties not enumerated in the Bill of Rights that are still entitled to heightened protection against government interference: In a long line of cases, we have held tha

2016Therefore, an equal protection claim is not properly before us on appeal. 11 assisted suicide and other similar issues,” id. at 719 , noting that many states permitted “ ‘living wills,’ surrogate health-care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal or refusal of life- sustaining medical treatment,” id. at 716 (citation omitted). {22} The Glucksberg Court next turned to the Due Process Clause, inventorying the fundamental rights and liberties not enumerated in the Bill of Rights that are still entitled to heightened protection against government interference: In a long line of cases, we have held tha

2016Dep’t of Env’t, 978 A.2d 702, 713 (Md. 2009) (“Underinclusiveness does not create an equal protection violation under the rational basis test.”). 39 holding.

2016Dep’t of Env’t, 978 A.2d 702, 713 (Md. 2009) (“Underinclusiveness does not create an equal protection violation under the rational basis test.”).

2016See, e.g., In re Vincent, 2007-NMSC-056, ¶ 15 , 143 N.M. 56 , 172 P.3d 605 (“[F]or a challenged provision to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis, it must not be under-inclusive.”). {95} To be sure, a tailoring analysis can be useful to discern whether the Legislature created a discriminatory classification with animus toward a particular, discrete group and disguised that animus with a socioeconomic rationale.

2016See, e.g., In re Vincent, 2007-NMSC-056, ¶ 15 , 143 N.M. 56 , 172 P.3d 605 (“[F]or a challenged provision to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis, it must not be under-inclusive.”). {95} To be sure, a tailoring analysis can be useful to discern whether the Legislature created a discriminatory classification with animus toward a particular, discrete group and disguised that animus with a socioeconomic rationale.

2016State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (rejecting an equal protection challenge because “[e]ven if the classification involved here is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this ‘perfection is by no means required’” (internal citation omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Legislatures may implement their program step by step, in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially amelio

2016State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (rejecting an equal protection challenge because “[ejven if the classification involved here is to some extent both undcrinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this ‘perfection is by no means required’” (internal citation omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Legislatures may implement their program stop by step, in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially amelio

2016See Coleman v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 1994-NMSC-074 , ¶ 10, 118 N.M. 47 , 878 P.2d 996 (upholding a 10-year statute of repose from an equal-protection challenge); Terry, 1982-NMSC-047 , ¶ 8 (same).

2016See Coleman v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 1994-NMSC-074 , ¶ 10, 118 N.M. 47 , 878 P.2d 996 (upholding a 10-year statute of repose from an equal-protection challenge); Terry, 1982-NMSC-047 , ¶ 8 (same).

2016But, again assuming the majority opinion’s statutory interpretation arguendo, such underinclusiveness does not call into question the constitutionality of the statute. {94} It is the longstanding law of rational basis scrutiny—both in the federal and state constitutional context—that a legislative body, when enacting socioeconomic legislation, can solve a problem piecemeal and that such underinclusiveness with respect to that purpose poses no constitutional flaw.6 By contrast, when applying intermediate scrutiny and strict 6 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (

2016See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (rejecting an equal protection challenge because “a legislature need not ‘strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way’” (quoting Semler v. Or.

2016Auth. v. Atencio, 1977-NMSC-074 , 90 N.M. 787 , 568 P.2d 1233 ). 6 Given that the Court of Appeals not only properly rejected a workers’ compensation 7 claim but also upheld the statute from an equal protection challenge, it is uncertain 8 why the Legislature would have felt pressed to clarify its already unambiguous 9 exclusion for employers of farm and ranch laborers. 10 B.

2016Auth. v. Atencio, 1977-NMSC-074 , 90 N.M. 787 , 568 P.2d 1233 ). 6 Given that the Court of Appeals not only properly rejected a workers’ compensation 7 claim but also upheld the statute from an equal protection challenge, it is uncertain 8 why the Legislature would have felt pressed to clarify its already unambiguous 9 exclusion for employers of farm and ranch laborers. 10 B.

1988That rule is found in Gruschus v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M. 775 , 399 P.2d 105 (1965), an opinion often cited for its explication of the rational basis standard of review, wherein it was said that the equal protection clause "does not prohibit classification for legislative purposes, provided that there is a rational and natural basis therefor, that it is based on a substantial difference between those to whom it does and those to whom it does not apply * * *." Id. at 778 , 399 P.2d at 107 .

1988That rule is found in Gruschus v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M. 775 , 399 P.2d 105 (1965), an opinion often cited for its explication of the rational basis standard of review, wherein it was said that the equal protection clause "does not prohibit classification for legislative purposes, provided that there is a rational and natural basis therefor, that it is based on a substantial difference between those to whom it does and those to whom it does not apply * * *." Id. at 778 , 399 P.2d at 107 .

2023Among other claims, the Real Parties quoted Maestas v. Hall, 9 2012-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 25, 34 , 274 P.3d 66 , for the proposition that “[w]hen drafters 10 of congressional maps use ‘illegitimate reasons’ to discriminate against regions at 11 the expense of others, including failing to adhere to New Mexico’s ‘traditional 12 districting principles,’ aggrieved voters may seek redress of this constitutional injury 13 in the courts through an equal protection challenge.” The Real Parties further alleged 3 See Citizen Redistricting Committee, CRC District Plans & Evaluations (reissued Nov. 8, 2021) at 4,

2023Among other claims, the Real Parties quoted Maestas v. Hall, 9 2012-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 25, 34 , 274 P.3d 66 , for the proposition that “[w]hen drafters 10 of congressional maps use ‘illegitimate reasons’ to discriminate against regions at 11 the expense of others, including failing to adhere to New Mexico’s ‘traditional 12 districting principles,’ aggrieved voters may seek redress of this constitutional injury 13 in the courts through an equal protection challenge.” The Real Parties further alleged 3 See Citizen Redistricting Committee, CRC District Plans & Evaluations (reissued Nov. 8, 2021) at 4,