equal protection clause in Oregon

1980Drake Co., 212 Or 430, 437 , 320 P2d 245 (1958), the court said: " The controlling principles which guide the courts in determining questions of alleged unconstitutional discrimination or class legislation are the same whether it is the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which is invoked, or the privileges and immunities provision in Art.

1980Drake Co., 212 Or 430, 437 , 320 P2d 245 (1958), the court said: " The controlling principles which guide the courts in determining questions of alleged unconstitutional discrimination or class legislation are the same whether it is the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which is invoked, or the privileges and immunities provision in Art.

1997Strict scrutiny is appropriate under the equal protection clause if a law “operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.” San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 17 , 93 S Ct 1278 , 36 L Ed 2d 16 (1973). 25 Under either a free speech or equal protection theory, if the fundamental right involved is freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny when the law in question is content based.

1997Strict scrutiny is appropriate under the equal protection clause if a law “operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.” San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 17 , 93 S Ct 1278 , 36 L Ed 2d 16 (1973). 25 Under either a free speech or equal protection theory, if the fundamental right involved is freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny when the law in question is content based.

2025Defendant also raised an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that ORS 166.090(3) irrationally exempts debt collectors without a sufficient justification and impermissibly limits the defense based on the content of their speech. 1 Article I, section 8, provides that, “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” 2 The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish

2025Defendant also raised an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that ORS 166.090(3) irrationally exempts debt collectors without a sufficient justification and impermissibly limits the defense based on the content of their speech. 1 Article I, section 8, provides that, “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” 2 The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish

2025State v. Anderson, 6 Or App 22, 23-24 , 485 P2d 446 (1971), cert den sub nom, Atkison v. Oregon, 406 US 973 (1972), appeal dismissed sub nom, Anderson v. Oregon, 410 US 920 (1973).

2025State v. Anderson, 6 Or App 22, 23-24 , 485 P2d 446 (1971), cert den sub nom, Atkison v. Oregon, 406 US 973 (1972), appeal dismissed sub nom, Anderson v. Oregon, 410 US 920 (1973).

2025State v. Anderson, 6 Or App 22, 23-24 , 485 P2d 446 (1971), cert den sub nom, Atkison v. Oregon, 406 US 973 (1972), appeal dismissed sub nom, Anderson v. Oregon, 410 US 920 (1973).

2025State v. Anderson, 6 Or App 22, 23-24 , 485 P2d 446 (1971), cert den sub nom, Atkison v. Oregon, 406 US 973 (1972), appeal dismissed sub nom, Anderson v. Oregon, 410 US 920 (1973).

2025State v. Anderson, 6 Or App 22, 23-24 , 485 P2d 446 (1971), cert den sub nom, Atkison v. Oregon, 406 US 973 (1972), appeal dismissed sub nom, Anderson v. Oregon, 410 US 920 (1973).

2025State v. Anderson, 6 Or App 22, 23-24 , 485 P2d 446 (1971), cert den sub nom, Atkison v. Oregon, 406 US 973 (1972), appeal dismissed sub nom, Anderson v. Oregon, 410 US 920 (1973).

2024See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 289 Or 533, 537 , 614 P2d 1158 (1980) (rejecting an equal protection challenge based on the different punishments for aggravated murder and felony murder); State v. Sparklin, 61 Or App 608, 611 , 658 P2d 571 , aff’d on other grounds, 296 Or 85 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (rejecting a disproportionality challenge based on the lesser mens rea requirement for felony murder relative to intentional murder).

2024See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 289 Or 533, 537 , 614 P2d 1158 (1980) (rejecting an equal protection challenge based on the different punishments for aggravated murder and felony murder); State v. Sparklin, 61 Or App 608, 611 , 658 P2d 571 , aff’d on other grounds, 296 Or 85 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (rejecting a disproportionality challenge based on the lesser mens rea requirement for felony murder relative to intentional murder).

1981Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups. 7 See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757 , 619 P2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or 411, 417 , 600 P2d 387 (1979). 8 The original concern of Article I, section 20, with special privileges or “monopolies” was the basis of early decisions concerning the licensing of

1981Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups. [7] See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757 , 619 P.2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel.

1981Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups. 7 See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757 , 619 P2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or 411, 417 , 600 P2d 387 (1979). 8 The original concern of Article I, section 20, with special privileges or “monopolies” was the basis of early decisions concerning the licensing of

1981Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups. [7] See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757 , 619 P.2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel.

2016In State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597 , 932 P2d 1145 , cert den, 522 US 994 (1997), in rejecting a federal equal protection challenge to ORS 137.700, the Supreme Court emphasized that, even if a statute is ostensibly underinclusive because it does not include all violent felonies, the United States Supreme Court “ordinarily does not strike down criminal laws on that ground under the rational-basis test used for Equal Protection analysis.” Id. at 629 (citing Romer, 517 US at 631 , and Jones v. Helms, 452 US 412, 426 , 101 S Ct 2434 , 69 L Ed 2d 118 (1981)).

2007As this court recently explained, “[a] classification that ‘neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class’ will satisfy the Equal Protections clause ‘so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.’ ” State v. Orueta, 343 Or 118, 127 , 164 P3d 267 (2007) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620, 631 , 116 S Ct 1620 , 134 L Ed 2d 855 (1996)).

2016In State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597 , 932 P2d 1145 , cert den, 522 US 994 (1997), in rejecting a federal equal protection challenge to ORS 137.700, the Supreme Court emphasized that, even if a statute is ostensibly underinclusive because it does not include all violent felonies, the United States Supreme Court “ordinarily does not strike down criminal laws on that ground under the rational-basis test used for Equal Protection analysis.” Id. at 629 (citing Romer, 517 US at 631 , and Jones v. Helms, 452 US 412, 426 , 101 S Ct 2434 , 69 L Ed 2d 118 (1981)).

2016In State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597 , 932 P2d 1145 , cert den, 522 US 994 (1997), in rejecting a federal equal protection challenge to ORS 137.700, the Supreme Court emphasized that, even if a statute is ostensibly underinclusive because it does not include all violent felonies, the United States Supreme Court “ordinarily does not strike down criminal laws on that ground under the rational-basis test used for Equal Protection analysis.” Id. at 629 (citing Romer, 517 US at 631 , and Jones v. Helms, 452 US 412, 426 , 101 S Ct 2434 , 69 L Ed 2d 118 (1981)).

1981Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups. 7 See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757 , 619 P2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or 411, 417 , 600 P2d 387 (1979). 8 The original concern of Article I, section 20, with special privileges or “monopolies” was the basis of early decisions concerning the licensing of

1981Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups. 7 See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757 , 619 P2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or 411, 417 , 600 P2d 387 (1979). 8 The original concern of Article I, section 20, with special privileges or “monopolies” was the basis of early decisions concerning the licensing of

1981Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson, 276 Or 9, 17 , 554 P2d 139 (1976).

1981Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson, 276 Or 9, 17 , 554 P2d 139 (1976).

1980Other cases holding that different appeal rights pass equal protection scrutiny include Appeal of O'Rourke, 220 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1974) (appeal with leave of court only); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz. App. 560 , 504 P.2d 501 (1973) (different procedures provided in juvenile cases as opposed to appeals in adult cases); Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697 , 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974) (different appeal rights for misdemeanors tried in courts not of record and felonies tried in courts of record).

1980Other cases holding that different appeal rights pass equal protection scrutiny include Appeal of O’Rourke, 220 NW 2d 811 (Minn 1974)(appeal with leave of court only); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz App 560, 504 P2d 501 (1973) (different procedures provided in juvenile cases as opposed to appeals in adult cases); Saunders v. Reynolds, 204 SE 2d 421 (Va 1974)(different appeal rights for misdemeanors tried in courts not of record and felonies tried in courts of record).

1980As defendants contend, however, and as stated in Lindsey v. Normet, supra (at 77, 92 S.Ct. at 876 ): "When an appeal is afforded, however, it cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause." As previously stated, the Court of Appeals held that: "* * * ORS 221.360, to the extent that it provides for a reduced scope of appellate court review for municipal offenders tried in cities where the initial trial is in the city's municipal court rather than a district court, violates the equal protection clause of the Fou

1980As defendants contend, however, and as stated in Lindsey v. Normet, supra (at 77): "When an appeal is afforded, however, it cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause.” As previously stated, the Court of Appeals held that: "* * * ORS 221.360, to the extent that it provides for a reduced scope of appellate court review for municipal offenders tried in cities where the initial trial is in the city’s municipal court rather than a district court, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

1980Other cases holding that different appeal rights pass equal protection scrutiny include Appeal of O'Rourke, 220 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1974) (appeal with leave of court only); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz. App. 560 , 504 P.2d 501 (1973) (different procedures provided in juvenile cases as opposed to appeals in adult cases); Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697 , 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974) (different appeal rights for misdemeanors tried in courts not of record and felonies tried in courts of record).

1980Other cases holding that different appeal rights pass equal protection scrutiny include Appeal of O’Rourke, 220 NW 2d 811 (Minn 1974)(appeal with leave of court only); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz App 560, 504 P2d 501 (1973) (different procedures provided in juvenile cases as opposed to appeals in adult cases); Saunders v. Reynolds, 204 SE 2d 421 (Va 1974)(different appeal rights for misdemeanors tried in courts not of record and felonies tried in courts of record).

1980Other cases holding that different appeal rights pass equal protection scrutiny include Appeal of O'Rourke, 220 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1974) (appeal with leave of court only); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz. App. 560 , 504 P.2d 501 (1973) (different procedures provided in juvenile cases as opposed to appeals in adult cases); Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697 , 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974) (different appeal rights for misdemeanors tried in courts not of record and felonies tried in courts of record).

1980Other cases holding that different appeal rights pass equal protection scrutiny include Appeal of O’Rourke, 220 NW 2d 811 (Minn 1974)(appeal with leave of court only); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz App 560, 504 P2d 501 (1973) (different procedures provided in juvenile cases as opposed to appeals in adult cases); Saunders v. Reynolds, 204 SE 2d 421 (Va 1974)(different appeal rights for misdemeanors tried in courts not of record and felonies tried in courts of record).

1978With respect to the claim to uniformity or equality of taxation, this court has stated on past occasions that for practical purposes the concept is the same under the relevant provisions of the Oregon Constitution as under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 See In re Estate of Heck, 120 Or 80, 86 , 250 P 735 (1926), citing Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 112 Or 314, 333 , 228 P 812 (1924).

1978With respect to the claim to uniformity or equality of taxation, this court has stated on past occasions that for practical purposes the concept is the same under the relevant provisions of the Oregon Constitution as under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 See In re Estate of Heck, 120 Or 80, 86 , 250 P 735 (1926), citing Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 112 Or 314, 333 , 228 P 812 (1924).

1977See, State v. Howell, 240 Or. 558 , 402 P.2d 89 (1965), cert denied 383 U.S. 922 , 86 S.Ct. 898 , 15 L.Ed.2d 676 (1966) (Selective enforcement of Habitual Criminal Act not an equal protection violation); Bailleaux v. Gladden, 230 Or. 606 , 370 P.2d 722 (1961), cert denied 371 U.S. 848 , 83 S.Ct. 86 , 9 L.Ed.2d 84 (1962) (No defense that Habitual Criminal Statute is applied only to whites); State v. Hicks, 213 Or. 619 , 325 P.2d 794 (1958), cert denied 359 U.S. 917 , 79 S.Ct. 594 , 3 L.Ed.2d 579 (1959) (Mere laxity in enforcement of Habitual Criminal Statute by district attorney not an unconsti

1977See, State v. Howell, 240 Or 558 , 402 P2d 89 (1965), cert denied 383 US 922 (1966) (Selective enforcement of Habitual Criminal Act not an equal protection violation); Bailleaux v. Gladden, 230 Or 606 , 370 P2d 722 (1961), cert denied371 US 848 (1962) (No defense that Habitual Criminal Statute is applied only to whites); State v. Hicks, 213 Or 619 , 325 P2d 794 (1958), cert denied 359 US 917 (1959) (Mere laxity in enforcement of Habitual Criminal Statute by district attorney not an unconstitutional violation of equal protection); State v. Campbell/Campf/Collins, 10 Or App 255 , 498 P2d 836 (19

1977See, State v. Howell, 240 Or. 558 , 402 P.2d 89 (1965), cert denied 383 U.S. 922 , 86 S.Ct. 898 , 15 L.Ed.2d 676 (1966) (Selective enforcement of Habitual Criminal Act not an equal protection violation); Bailleaux v. Gladden, 230 Or. 606 , 370 P.2d 722 (1961), cert denied 371 U.S. 848 , 83 S.Ct. 86 , 9 L.Ed.2d 84 (1962) (No defense that Habitual Criminal Statute is applied only to whites); State v. Hicks, 213 Or. 619 , 325 P.2d 794 (1958), cert denied 359 U.S. 917 , 79 S.Ct. 594 , 3 L.Ed.2d 579 (1959) (Mere laxity in enforcement of Habitual Criminal Statute by district attorney not an unconsti

1970He points out that the Supreme Court in State v. Hicks, 213 Or 619 , 325 P2d 794 (1958), cert den 359 US 917 , 79 S Ct 594 , 3 L Ed 2d 579 (1959), did on direct appeal consider— and deny — that the application of the Habitual Criminal Act to some offenders and not to others was in violation of the equal protection clause. ① We note first that Hicks was an appeal following a not guilty plea, and second thát it was decided before the Post-Conviction Relief Act was adopted by the legislature.