equal protection clause in Vermont

2016See In re Estate of Eddy, 135 Vt. 468, 472 , 380 A.2d 530, 534 (1977) (“[A]s far as [tax] classifications are concerned, our proportional contribution clause is the practical equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).

2016See In re Estate of Eddy, 135 Vt. 468, 472 , 380 A.2d 530, 534 (1977) (“[A]s far as [tax] classifications are concerned, our proportional contribution clause is the practical equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).

2009No. 2 v. Sharrow, 145 Vt. 195, 198 (1984) (citing Pabst v. Comm’r of Taxes, 136 Vt. 126 , 132–33 (1978)).

1984Pabst v. Commissioner of Taxes, 136 Vt. 126, 132-33 , 388 A.2d 1181, 1185 (1978) (citing Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 259 , 315 A.2d 860, 862 (1974)).

2010We emphasized in Baker that the Common Benefits Clause is distinct from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and that it requires a far more rigorous review than the highly deferential rational-basis standard applied under an equal protection analysis not involving fundamental rights. 170 Vt. at 202 , 744 A.2d at 870 (stating that Common Benefits Clause “differs markedly from the federal Equal Protection Clause in its language, historical origins, purpose, and development”). ¶ 51.

2010We emphasized in Baker that the Common Benefits Clause is distinct from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and that it requires a far more rigorous review than the highly deferential rational-basis standard applied under an equal protection analysis not involving fundamental rights. 170 Vt. at 202 , 744 A.2d at 870 (stating that Common Benefits Clause “differs markedly from the federal Equal Protection Clause in its language, historical origins, purpose, and development”). ¶ 51.

1972The burden of proof the defendant must meet if it is to successfully challenge the ordinance for being beyond those classes allowed by the equal protection clause is set forth in State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 160 , 4 A.2d 107 (1939): “The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislative classification and the imposition of statutory restraints on one class which are not imposed on another.

1972The burden of proof the defendant must meet if it is to successfully challenge the ordinance for being beyond those classes allowed by the equal protection clause is set forth in State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 160 , 4 A.2d 107 (1939): “The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislative classification and the imposition of statutory restraints on one class which are not imposed on another.

1987Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. at 259 , 315 A.2d at 863 .

1987Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. at 259 , 315 A.2d at 863 .

1984In reviewing tax schemes challenged under the equal protection clause, “ [o] ur cases require ‘only that the classification or distinction rest on a real, unfeigned difference; have some relevance to the legislative purposes; and lead to a difference *200 in treatment which is not so disparate as to be wholly arbitrary.’ ” Governor Clinton Council, supra, 137 Vt. at 246 , 403 A.2d at 693 (quoting Vermont Motor Inns, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 134 Vt. 52, 55 , 350 A.2d 369, 371 (1975)) (emphasis added).

1984In reviewing tax schemes challenged under the equal protection clause, “ [o] ur cases require ‘only that the classification or distinction rest on a real, unfeigned difference; have some relevance to the legislative purposes; and lead to a difference *200 in treatment which is not so disparate as to be wholly arbitrary.’ ” Governor Clinton Council, supra, 137 Vt. at 246 , 403 A.2d at 693 (quoting Vermont Motor Inns, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 134 Vt. 52, 55 , 350 A.2d 369, 371 (1975)) (emphasis added).

2024Once this showing is made, the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).

2017Once this showing is made, the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).

2000“Claims of ‘unjust discrimination’ in eases involving the provision or cost of municipal services have been analyzed under the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.” Colchester Fire District No. 2 v. Sharrow, 145 Vt. 195, 198 , 485 A.2d 134, 136 (1984).

2000“Claims of ‘unjust discrimination’ in eases involving the provision or cost of municipal services have been analyzed under the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.” Colchester Fire District No. 2 v. Sharrow, 145 Vt. 195, 198 , 485 A.2d 134, 136 (1984).

1978In re Estate of Eddy, 135 Vt. 468, 472 , 380 A.2d 530, 534 (1977); State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 161 , 4 A.2d 107, 114 (1939); Clark v. City of Burlington, 101 Vt. 391, 405 , 143 A. 677, 683 (1928). 3 In the years with which we are concerned, the amount of the exemption was $30,000. 26 U.S.C. § 2521 (1970) (repealed 1977). 4 Although federal law on the subject is not conclusive, it appears that the taxpayer could apply the $30,000 lifetime exemption whenever he chose.

1978In re Estate of Eddy, 135 Vt. 468, 472 , 380 A.2d 530, 534 (1977); State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 161 , 4 A.2d 107, 114 (1939); Clark v. City of Burlington, 101 Vt. 391, 405 , 143 A. 677, 683 (1928). 3 In the years with which we are concerned, the amount of the exemption was $30,000. 26 U.S.C. § 2521 (1970) (repealed 1977). 4 Although federal law on the subject is not conclusive, it appears that the taxpayer could apply the $30,000 lifetime exemption whenever he chose.

2023See In re C.L.S., 2021 VT 25, ¶ 29 , 214 Vt. 379 , 253 A.3d 433 (emphasis added).

2015To trigger an equal-protection analysis, mother must demonstrate that she “was treated differently as a member of one class from treatment of members of another class similarly situated.” State v. George, 157 Vt. 580, 585 (1991) (emphasis added).

2013See Puppolo v. Donovan & O’Connor, LLC, 2011 VT 119, ¶ 13 , 191 Vt. 535 (mem.) (refusing to consider constitutional due process argument because plaintiff failed to properly preserve issue by presenting it to trial court with specificity and clarity in manner giving court fair opportunity to rule on it).

2013See Puppolo v. Donovan & O’Connor, LLC, 2011 VT 119, ¶ 13 , 191 Vt. 535 (mem.) (refusing to consider constitutional due process argument because plaintiff failed to properly preserve issue by presenting it to trial court with specificity and clarity in manner giving court fair opportunity to rule on it).

2010See Galvin v. Vermont, 598 F.Supp. 144, 151 (D.Vt. 1984).

2010See Galvin v. Vermont, 598 F. Supp. 144, 151 (D.

2004Plaintiff must show “selective treatment... based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious intent to injure.” Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 81 , 726 A.2d 477, 482 (1998).

2004Plaintiff must show “selective treatment... based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious intent to injure.” Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 81 , 726 A.2d 477, 482 (1998).

2000See Burlington Electric Dep’t v. Vermont Dep’t of Taxes, 154 Vt. 332, 337 , 576 A.2d 450, 453 (1990).

2000See Burlington Electric Dep’t v. Vermont Dep’t of Taxes, 154 Vt. 332, 337 , 576 A.2d 450, 453 (1990).

1999The Oregon Supreme Court has described that provision precisely how we today have described Chapter I, Article 7: “Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups.” State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 814 (Or. 1981).

1999The Oregon Supreme Court has described that provision precisely how we today have described Chapter I, Article 7: "Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups." State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231 , 630 P.2d 810, 814 (1981).

1999See Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212 , 628 A.2d 543, 550 (1993) (when no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, test under Vermont Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause is whether law is reasonably related to promotion of valid public purpose); see also Baumann, 754 F.2d at 846 (legitimate interest in deterrence and public perception of fair administration of justice allows states to base early release decisions on type of offense); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (state’s decision to exclude sex offenders from work release program is rationally related to legi

1999See Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212 , 628 A.2d 543, 550 (1993) (when no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, test under Vermont Constitution's Common Benefits Clause is whether law is reasonably related to promotion of valid public purpose); see also Baumann, 754 F.2d at 846 (legitimate interest in deterrence and public perception of fair administration of justice allows states to base early release decisions on type of offense); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir.1987) (state's decision to exclude sex offenders from work release program is rationally related to legit

1999See Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212 , 628 A.2d 543, 550 (1993) (when no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, test under Vermont Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause is whether law is reasonably related to promotion of valid public purpose); see also Baumann, 754 F.2d at 846 (legitimate interest in deterrence and public perception of fair administration of justice allows states to base early release decisions on type of offense); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (state’s decision to exclude sex offenders from work release program is rationally related to legi

1999See Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212 , 628 A.2d 543, 550 (1993) (when no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, test under Vermont Constitution's Common Benefits Clause is whether law is reasonably related to promotion of valid public purpose); see also Baumann, 754 F.2d at 846 (legitimate interest in deterrence and public perception of fair administration of justice allows states to base early release decisions on type of offense); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir.1987) (state's decision to exclude sex offenders from work release program is rationally related to legit

1999See id. at 86, 97 S.Ct. 911 .

1999See Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212 , 628 A.2d 543, 550 (1993) (when no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, test under Vermont Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause is whether law is reasonably related to promotion of valid public purpose); see also Baumann, 754 F.2d at 846 (legitimate interest in deterrence and public perception of fair administration of justice allows states to base early release decisions on type of offense); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (state’s decision to exclude sex offenders from work release program is rationally related to legi

1999See Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212 , 628 A.2d 543, 550 (1993) (when no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, test under Vermont Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause is whether law is reasonably related to promotion of valid public purpose); see also Baumann, 754 F.2d at 846 (legitimate interest in deterrence and public perception of fair administration of justice allows states to base early release decisions on type of offense); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (state’s decision to exclude sex offenders from work release program is rationally related to legi