equal protection clause in Nevada

2021We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments.2 See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981) (explaining that an equal-protection claim not involving a suspect class requires "a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality"); Zarnora v. Price, 125 Nev. 388 , 2Because appellant fails to demonstrate that the State lacked a rational basis, we need not address appellant's remaining arguments.

2020But neither argument proves that the State lacked a rational basis, so we cannot conclude that the district 3 court improperly denied appellants petitions.' See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981) (explaining that an equal-protection claim not involving a suspect class requires "a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality"); Zamora v. Price, 125 Nev. 388, 392 , 213 P.3d 490, 493 (2009) (explaining that the party challenging constitutionality bears the burden of proof).

2021We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments.2 See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981) (explaining that an equal-protection claim not involving a suspect class requires "a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality"); Zarnora v. Price, 125 Nev. 388 , 2Because appellant fails to demonstrate that the State lacked a rational basis, we need not address appellant's remaining arguments.

2020But neither argument proves that the State lacked a rational basis, so we cannot conclude that the district 3 court improperly denied appellants petitions.' See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981) (explaining that an equal-protection claim not involving a suspect class requires "a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality"); Zamora v. Price, 125 Nev. 388, 392 , 213 P.3d 490, 493 (2009) (explaining that the party challenging constitutionality bears the burden of proof).

2017Op. 20, 371 P.3d 1002 , 1007 (2016); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 , 767- 68 (1995) (summarizing the three-step Batson analysis).

2016Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332, 91 P.3d 16, 29 (2004); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (1995) (summarizing the three-step Batson analysis).

2016Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332, 91 P.3d 16, 29 (2004); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (1995) (summarizing the three-step Batson analysis).

2016Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332, 91 P.3d 16, 29 (2004); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (1995) (summarizing the three-step Batson analysis).

2016Court, 117 Nev. 892, 902-03 , 34 P.3d 509, 516-17 (2001) ("selective prosecution" may violate the equal protection clause).

2016Court, 117 Nev. 892, 902-03 , 34 P.3d 509, 516-17 (2001) ("selective prosecution" may violate the equal protection clause).

2018And the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held that "Where is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before [a specific date] and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Foster v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms et Paroles, 878 F.2d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Leigh v. United States, 586 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1978) COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA KO) 19478 7 (denying an equal-protection claim challenging differe

2018And the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held that "[t]here is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before [a specific date] and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829 , 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Foster v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 878 F.2d 1233 , 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) ); see also Leigh v. United States, 586 F.2d 121 , 123 (9th Cir. 1978) (denying an equal-protection claim challenging different laws that were in effect depend

2021Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 224-25, 660 P.2d 995, 997 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988) ("[T]he standard for testing . . . legislation under the equal protection clause of the state constitution is the same as the federal standard.").

2021Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 224-25, 660 P.2d 995, 997 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988) ("[T]he standard for testing . . . legislation under the equal protection clause of the state constitution is the same as the federal standard.").

2018And the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held that "Where is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before [a specific date] and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Foster v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms et Paroles, 878 F.2d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Leigh v. United States, 586 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1978) COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA KO) 19478 7 (denying an equal-protection claim challenging differe

2018And the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held that "[t]here is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before [a specific date] and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829 , 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Foster v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 878 F.2d 1233 , 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) ); see also Leigh v. United States, 586 F.2d 121 , 123 (9th Cir. 1978) (denying an equal-protection claim challenging different laws that were in effect depend

2018And the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held that "Where is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before [a specific date] and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Foster v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms et Paroles, 878 F.2d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Leigh v. United States, 586 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1978) COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA KO) 19478 7 (denying an equal-protection claim challenging differe

2018And the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held that "[t]here is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before [a specific date] and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829 , 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Foster v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 878 F.2d 1233 , 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) ); see also Leigh v. United States, 586 F.2d 121 , 123 (9th Cir. 1978) (denying an equal-protection claim challenging different laws that were in effect depend

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A ) Diomampo v. State, 124 Nev. 414, 422 , 185 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2008) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 )).

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A ) Diomampo v. State, 124 Nev. 414, 422 , 185 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2008) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 )).

2017Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 703 , 120 P.3d 812, 817 (2005) (stating strict scrutiny is warranted when the case involves a "judicially recognized suspect class or [a] fundamental right").

2017Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 703 , 120 P.3d 812, 817 (2005) (stating strict scrutiny is warranted when the case involves a "judicially recognized suspect class or [a] fundamental right").

2021Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 224-25, 660 P.2d 995, 997 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988) ("[T]he standard for testing . . . legislation under the equal protection clause of the state constitution is the same as the federal standard.").

2021Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 224-25, 660 P.2d 995, 997 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988) ("[T]he standard for testing . . . legislation under the equal protection clause of the state constitution is the same as the federal standard.").

2015To survive an equal protection challenge, NRS 41A.035 need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 5 See generally Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 520 , 217 P.3d 546, 559 (2009). "[T]he right of malpractice plaintiffs to sue for damages caused by medical professionals does not involve a fundamental constitutional right." Barrett, 111 Nev. at 1507 , 908 P.2d at 697 .

2015To survive an equal protection challenge, NRS 41A.035 need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 5 See generally Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 520 , 217 P.3d 546, 559 (2009). "[T]he right of malpractice plaintiffs to sue for damages caused by medical professionals does not involve a fundamental constitutional right." Barrett, 111 Nev. at 1507 , 908 P.2d at 697 .

2020See Round Hill, 97 Nev. at 604 , 637 P.2d at 536 (recognizing an exception to the general rule that mandamus may not be used to control a discretionary action for when "discretion is manifestly 3 abused or is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously"); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (requiring a prisoner to demonstrate that he or she has been incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that the prison official's state of mind was deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety); Butler v. Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 459 , 168 P.3d 1055, 1062 (200

2014See Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359 , 371, 998 P.2d 166, 173 (2000) (recognizing that the first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine the level of scrutiny to be applied, that strict scrutiny analysis is only applied in cases involving fundamental rights or suspect classes, and that under a lesser standard of review, legislation will be upheld "if the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest"); see also Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that prisoners, whether in the aggregate or specified by offense, are

2019"To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648 , 654 (4th Cir. 2001). "[W]hen the Government explicitly classifies or distinguishes among persons by reference to criteria—such as race, sex, religion, or ancestry—which have been determined improper bases for differentiation . . [s]uch governmental action is often termed 'facially' discriminatory." De La Cru

2019"To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648 , 654 (4th Cir. 2001). "[W]hen the Government explicitly classifies or distinguishes among persons by reference to criteria—such as race, sex, religion, or ancestry—which have been determined improper bases for differentiation . . [s]uch governmental action is often termed 'facially' discriminatory." De La Cru

2019While equal protection challenges to race- or ancestry-based discriminatory policies are typically evaluated under strict scrutiny, such policies in the prison context will be upheld if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interest' and not an exaggerated response to a particular concern." Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

2019While equal protection challenges to race- or ancestry-based discriminatory policies are typically evaluated under strict scrutiny, such policies in the prison context will be upheld if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interest' and not an exaggerated response to a particular concern." Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

2017Nothing in the definition of "subsequent" nor any other provision in NRS 174.085(5)(b) or (6)(a) prohibits a prosecutor from filing a subsequent complaint in the original case.' In fact, we have previously reviewed NRS 174.085(5)'s statutory language in the context of an equal protection violation argument and "recognize [(I] . the ability of a prosecutor to dismiss and reinstate a charge, known as a nolle prose qui order at common law." Sheriff Washoe Cty. v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 194, 995 P.2d 1016, 1020 (2000); see also Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386, 392 (1908) (seeing no violation of a "r

2017Nothing in the definition of "subsequent" nor any other provision in NRS 174.085(5)(b) or (6)(a) prohibits a prosecutor from filing a subsequent complaint in the original case.' In fact, we have previously reviewed NRS 174.085(5)'s statutory language in the context of an equal protection violation argument and "recognize [(I] . the ability of a prosecutor to dismiss and reinstate a charge, known as a nolle prose qui order at common law." Sheriff Washoe Cty. v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188, 194, 995 P.2d 1016, 1020 (2000); see also Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386, 392 (1908) (seeing no violation of a "ri

2017Nothing in the definition of "subsequent" nor any other provision in NRS 174.085(5)(b) or (6)(a) prohibits a prosecutor from filing a subsequent complaint in the original case.' In fact, we have previously reviewed NRS 174.085(5)'s statutory language in the context of an equal protection violation argument and "recognize [(I] . the ability of a prosecutor to dismiss and reinstate a charge, known as a nolle prose qui order at common law." Sheriff Washoe Cty. v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 194, 995 P.2d 1016, 1020 (2000); see also Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386, 392 (1908) (seeing no violation of a "r

2017Nothing in the definition of "subsequent" nor any other provision in NRS 174.085(5)(b) or (6)(a) prohibits a prosecutor from filing a subsequent complaint in the original case.' In fact, we have previously reviewed NRS 174.085(5)'s statutory language in the context of an equal protection violation argument and "recognize [(I] . the ability of a prosecutor to dismiss and reinstate a charge, known as a nolle prose qui order at common law." Sheriff Washoe Cty. v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188, 194, 995 P.2d 1016, 1020 (2000); see also Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386, 392 (1908) (seeing no violation of a "ri

2015Op. 69, 263 P.3d 235, 257-58 (2011).

2015Op. 69, 263 P.3d 235, 257-58 (2011).

2015To survive an equal protection challenge, NRS 41A.035 need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 5 See generally Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 520 , 217 P.3d 546, 559 (2009). "[T]he right of malpractice plaintiffs to sue for damages caused by medical professionals does not involve a fundamental constitutional right." Barrett, 111 Nev. at 1507 , 908 P.2d at 697 .

2015To survive an equal protection challenge, NRS 41A.035 need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 5 See generally Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 520 , 217 P.3d 546, 559 (2009). "[T]he right of malpractice plaintiffs to sue for damages caused by medical professionals does not involve a fundamental constitutional right." Barrett, 111 Nev. at 1507 , 908 P.2d at 697 .

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H. , 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H., 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H. , 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H., 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H. , 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H., 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H. , 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

2013See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 ; Doe v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H., 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 , 1077 (Wash. 1994); State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

1994Naturally, I understand that prosecutors consider other damning factors than past felonies in making the decision to seek the death penalty; still, on its face, it does not seem right or even statistically feasible that four times as many black defendants without felony records would be deserving of the death penalty. [4] In State Farm v. All Electric, Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 224-225 , 660 P.2d 995, 997 (1983), this *1373 court declared that "[w]e have previously held that the standard for testing the validity of legislation under the equal protection clause of the state constitution is the same as

1994Naturally, I understand that prosecutors consider other damning factors than past felonies in making the decision to seek the death penalty; still, on its face, it does not seem right or even statistically feasible that four times as many black defendants without felony records would be deserving of the death penalty. [4] In State Farm v. All Electric, Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 224-225 , 660 P.2d 995, 997 (1983), this *1373 court declared that "[w]e have previously held that the standard for testing the validity of legislation under the equal protection clause of the state constitution is the same as

2020See Round Hill, 97 Nev. at 604 , 637 P.2d at 536 (recognizing an exception to the general rule that mandamus may not be used to control a discretionary action for when "discretion is manifestly 3 abused or is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously"); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (requiring a prisoner to demonstrate that he or she has been incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that the prison official's state of mind was deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety); Butler v. Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 459 , 168 P.3d 1055, 1062 (200

2014See Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359 , 371, 998 P.2d 166, 173 (2000) (recognizing that the first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine the level of scrutiny to be applied, that strict scrutiny analysis is only applied in cases involving fundamental rights or suspect classes, and that under a lesser standard of review, legislation will be upheld "if the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest"); see also Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that prisoners, whether in the aggregate or specified by offense, are

2019"An equal protection challenge to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is evaluated using the three-step analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Batson." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 .

2014Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332, 91 P.3d 16, 29 (2004); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45.

2018"Mhe purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).

1972In Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), wherein a railroad bridge was assessed at 100 percent of its estimated value while property in the county averaged 55.70 percent for acreage and 49.29 percent for improved real estate, Chief Justice Taft said, at 445, 447: The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.