equal protection clause in Pennsylvania

2020The court further observed that “[a] classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary or in violation of the equal protection clause if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain that classification.” Id. (quoting Curtis, 666 A.2d at 268 (citations omitted)).

2020The court further observed that “[a] classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary or in violation of the equal protection clause if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain that classification.” Id. (quoting Curtis, 666 A.2d at 268 (citations omitted)).

2025Further, Gurdine has not alleged any manner in which he has “receiv[ed] different treatment from that received by other similarly[]situated individuals due to his membership in a particular class” to establish an equal protection claim.11 Mobley v. Coleman, 110 A.3d 216, 222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

2024Critically, to make out an equal protection claim, a petitioner “must allege that he is receiving different treatment from that received by other similarly[]situated individuals due to his membership in a particular class and his assertions of intentional disparate treatment must be supported by specific factual allegations.” Mobley v. Coleman, 110 A.3d 216, 222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Myers v. Ridge, 712 A.2d 791, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)).

2023On February 8, 2019, Appellant filed a counseled, amended PCRA petition, raising, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel claims in terms of Batson,7 Brady,8 prosecutorial misconduct, defective jury instructions, ____________________________________________ 7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (holding the exclusion of jurors based on race is a violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution). 8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process whe

2023On February 8, 2019, Appellant filed a counseled, amended PCRA petition, raising, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel claims in terms of Batson,7 Brady,8 prosecutorial misconduct, defective jury instructions, ____________________________________________ 7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (holding the exclusion of jurors based on race is a violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution). 8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process whe

2020In Commonwealth v. Albert, 563 Pa 133, 758 A.2d 1149 (2000), we noted that the essence of the equal protection doctrine is that "'like persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly [X" but recognized that the right to equal protection "'does not absolutely prohibit the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purposes of receiving equal treatment [.]'" Id. at 1151 {citations omitted).

2020In Commonwealth v. Albert, 563 Pa 133, 758 A.2d 1149 (2000), we noted that the essence of the equal protection doctrine is that "'like persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly [X" but recognized that the right to equal protection "'does not absolutely prohibit the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purposes of receiving equal treatment [.]'" Id. at 1151 {citations omitted).

2024Thus, we do not further explore Section 32. 147 See, e.g., James, 477 A.2d at 1305 (“James’ challenge ... is also grounded on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art.

2024James, 477 A.2d at 1305; see also Astemborski v. Susmarski, 466 A.2d 1018 (Pa. 1983). 155 Accordingly, we reasoned that Section 26 is subject to the same equal protection framework for analyzing government classifications as employed by the High Court under the Fourteenth Amendment.

2024In upholding the severance pay offset against an equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court found the Section 204(a) amendments to advance “[r]easonable workers’ compensation cost containment for employers, and the concomitant competitive benefit such cost containment offers for Pennsylvania’s businesses[.]” Kramer, 883 A.2d at 535 .

2024The Erfer Court arrived at this holding because, in its view, any claim predicated on equal protections of our Charter, such as the right to 158 See Kramer, 883 A.2d 518 (refusing to consider separate Article I, Section 26 claims for lack of developed argument, holding instead that challenged provision in the Workers’ Compensation Act did not violate federal equal protection guarantee because classification regarding receipt of severance benefits did not implicate fundamental property right or create a suspect classification); Probst, 849 A.2d at 1142 n.14 (citing Fischer’s articulation of the

2025To state an equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must allege that he is receiving different treatment from that received by other similarly situated individuals.” Myers v. Ridge, 712 A.2d 791, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).

2024Critically, to make out an equal protection claim, a petitioner “must allege that he is receiving different treatment from that received by other similarly[]situated individuals due to his membership in a particular class and his assertions of intentional disparate treatment must be supported by specific factual allegations.” Mobley v. Coleman, 110 A.3d 216, 222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Myers v. Ridge, 712 A.2d 791, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)).

2024The Erfer Court arrived at this holding because, in its view, any claim predicated on equal protections of our Charter, such as the right to 158 See Kramer, 883 A.2d 518 (refusing to consider separate Article I, Section 26 claims for lack of developed argument, holding instead that challenged provision in the Workers’ Compensation Act did not violate federal equal protection guarantee because classification regarding receipt of severance benefits did not implicate fundamental property right or create a suspect classification); Probst, 849 A.2d at 1142 n.14 (citing Fischer’s articulation of the

2020“Therefore, the rational basis test is the equal protection standard against which [the ignition interlock requirements of the Vehicle Code are] to be measured.” Id.

2006The analysis under the Uniformity Clause is “generally the same as that under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 589, 862 A.2d at 1249 (quoting Wilson Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 558 Pa. 462, 471 , 737 A.2d 1215 , 1220 n. 11 (1999) (citing Leonard, 507 Pa. at 320 , 489 A.2d at 1351 )).

2006The analysis under the Uniformity Clause is “generally the same as that under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 589, 862 A.2d at 1249 (quoting Wilson Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 558 Pa. 462, 471 , 737 A.2d 1215 , 1220 n. 11 (1999) (citing Leonard, 507 Pa. at 320 , 489 A.2d at 1351 )).

2003With respect to the constitutionality of the provision, this court held in Wallace v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 342 , 393 A.2d 43 (1978), that section 402(b)(2) violated the equal protection and due process rights of "family obligation" claimants. [6] This court explained that the provision violated the equal protection clause because it singled out "family obligation" claimants for separate treatment without any rational justification.

2003With respect to the constitutionality of the provision, this court held in Wallace v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 342 , 393 A.2d 43 (1978), that section 402(b)(2) violated the equal protection and due process rights of "family obligation" claimants. [6] This court explained that the provision violated the equal protection clause because it singled out "family obligation" claimants for separate treatment without any rational justification.

2026Grove, 170 A.3d at 1146 (quoting Correll v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 726 A.2d 427, 431 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (en banc)). - 11 - J-S34005-25 At the outset, we observe that Appellant has not established the threshold requirement of showing that the different groups cited in his claim are similarly situated to him for purposes of equal protection.

2003The equal protection clause “protects an individual from state action that selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to a provision in the law not imposed on others of the same class.” Correll v. Dep’t of Transp., 726 A.2d 427 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), aff'd, 564 Pa. 470 , 769 A.2d 442 (2001).

1986See generally Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387 , 346 A.2d 897 (1975) (The starting points of an equal protection analysis in respect to particular legislation is a determination as to whether the *120 state has created a classification for unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens.) Therefore, the judgment of sentence in this case will be affirmed. 1 .

1986See generally Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387 , 346 A.2d 897 (1975) (The starting points of an equal protection analysis in respect to particular legislation is a determination as to whether the *120 state has created a classification for unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens.) Therefore, the judgment of sentence in this case will be affirmed. 1 .

2006See Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1088 ; DeFazio, 756 A.2d at 1105-06. 14 The common constitutional principle at the heart of the special legislation proscription and the equal protection clause is that like persons in like circumstances should be treated similarly by the sovereign.

2006See Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1088 ; DeFazio, 756 A.2d at 1105-06. [14] The common constitutional principle at the heart of the special legislation proscription and the equal protection clause is that like persons in like circumstances should be treated similarly by the sovereign.

1994Furthermore, “under the equal protection clause, and under the uniformity clause, absolute equality and perfect uniformity in taxation are not required.” City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 522 Pa. 20, 24-25 , 559 A.2d 513, 515 (1989) quoting Columbia Gas Corp. v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 145, 151 , 360 A.2d 592, 595 (1976).

1994Furthermore, “under the equal protection clause, and under the uniformity clause, absolute equality and perfect uniformity in taxation are not required.” City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 522 Pa. 20, 24-25 , 559 A.2d 513, 515 (1989) quoting Columbia Gas Corp. v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 145, 151 , 360 A.2d 592, 595 (1976).

2006We continued in addressing a substantive due process challenge by reasoning that “the application of the equal protection standard to Rule 238 requires that the substance of the Rule bear a rational relation to the goal of encouraging settlement offers in tort litigation.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

2006We continued in addressing a substantive due process challenge by reasoning that "the application of the equal protection standard to Rule 238 requires that the substance of the Rule bear a rational relation to the goal of encouraging settlement offers in tort litigation." Id. (emphasis supplied).

2023Thus, to evaluate an equal protection claim, a court must first determine “the type of interest at issue.” Love, 597 A.2d at 1139 . “[T]here are three different types of classifications calling for three different standards of judicial review.” James v. Se.

2017Should the statutory classification in question fall into the first category, the statute is strictly construed in light of a “compelling” governmental purpose; if the classification falls into the second category, a heightened standard of scrutiny is applied to an “important” governmental purpose; and if the statutory scheme falls into the third category, the statute is upheld if there is any rational basis for the classification. 8 Although Petitioner does not make it clear whether he is pursuing an equal protection claim under the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution,

2019See Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94 ; Secreti, 134 A.3d at 79-80 ; Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding a defendant must comply with the PCRA’s timeliness requirements to raise an equal protection claim).

2018Moreover, we have previously rejected an equal protection claim identical to that proffered by Faulcon, concluding that a “contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be extended to others does not render [a] petition timely pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(iii).” Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2014But, we have recognized that the “common constitutional principle at the heart of the special legislation proscription [of Section 32] and the equal protection clause is that like persons in like circumstances should be treated similarly by the sovereign.” Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm’n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1094 (Pa. 2006). [J-39-2014] - 29 authorizes the General Assembly “to regulate the manner, the courts and the cases in which suits may be brought against the Commonwealth” and that “the Framers intended that the legislature have complete control over suits brought against the Commo

2014But, we have recognized that the "common constitutional principle at the heart of the special legislation proscription [of Section 32] and the equal protection clause is that like persons in like circumstances should be treated similarly by the sovereign.” Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 587 Pa. 347 , 899 A.2d 1085, 1094 (2006). .

2019Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 458 (Pa. 2017) (“If the rational basis test applies, then the classification in question must be ‘reasonable rather than arbitrary and bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Albert, 758 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Pa. 2000)); Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1365 (Pa. 1986) (explaining rational basis analyzes the legislation’s reasonableness, arbitrariness, and relation to its objective). 15We recognize James involved an equal protection challenge invoking the right to a remedy, and we fi

2016Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986).

1991Similarly, under the equal protection clause, a classification “which does not implicate ‘fundamental interests’ or affect with particularity a 'suspect class’ ” will be upheld so long as it “bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 347 , 466 A.2d 613, 615 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984).

1991Similarly, under the equal protection clause, a classification “which does not implicate ‘fundamental interests’ or affect with particularity a 'suspect class’ ” will be upheld so long as it “bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 347 , 466 A.2d 613, 615 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984).

1992Moreover, the fact that an attempted murder committed with a firearm is not included within section 9712, while seemingly illogical, is of no consequence. 12 As this Court has stated, “This argument fails because the equal protection clause does not force the legislature to choose between attacking all aspects of a problem or not at all.” Commonwealth v. Hoover, 343 Pa.Super. 372, 376 , 494 A.2d 1131, 1134 (1985) (citing Dan dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)).

1992Moreover, the fact that an attempted murder committed with a firearm is not included within section 9712, while seemingly illogical, is of no consequence. 12 As this Court has stated, “This argument fails because the equal protection clause does not force the legislature to choose between attacking all aspects of a problem or not at all.” Commonwealth v. Hoover, 343 Pa.Super. 372, 376 , 494 A.2d 1131, 1134 (1985) (citing Dan dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)).

1981Rule 238 is also challenged on the ground that it violates both equal protection and substantive due process under the Constitutions of Pennsylvania and the United States. 13 The requirements of the Equal Protection clause dictate that: “A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ ” Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 , 92 S.Ct. 251, 254 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), quoting Royston Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U

1981Rule 238 is also challenged on the ground that it violates both equal protection and substantive due process under the Constitutions of Pennsylvania and the United States. 13 The requirements of the Equal Protection clause dictate that: “A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ ” Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 , 92 S.Ct. 251, 254 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), quoting Royston Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U

2004The only caveat is that no license may be reinstated following revocation for crimes enumerated in this Section, such as forgery, embezzlement, extortion, obtaining money under false pretenses, criminal conspiracy to defraud, and like offenses. 63 P.S. § 734.28(b). [6] "Virtually every state statute affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (Harlan, J. dissenting). [7] The requirement that enactments have a real and substantial relationship to the object sought to be obtained is a stronger test than the rational basis test employe

2004The only caveat is that no license may be reinstated following revocation for crimes enumerated in this Section, such as forgery, embezzlement, extortion, obtaining money under false pretenses, criminal conspiracy to defraud, and like offenses. 63 P.S. § 734.28(b). [6] "Virtually every state statute affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (Harlan, J. dissenting). [7] The requirement that enactments have a real and substantial relationship to the object sought to be obtained is a stronger test than the rational basis test employe

2001See Eicher, 605 A.2d at 352 ; see also Plass, 636 A.2d at 641 (holding 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508 effectuates the legislative purpose of reducing drug crimes); Commonwealth v. Jones, 374 Pa.Super. 431 , 543 A.2d 548 (1988) (finding the mandatory minimum sentencing for offenses on or near public transportation does not violate the equal protection clause because the statute furthers the legislative goals of protecting operators, municipal interests, and public safety); Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. 334 , 516 A.2d 1172 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentencing applicable t

2001See Eicher, 605 A.2d at 352 ; see also Plass, 636 A.2d at 641 (holding 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508 effectuates the legislative purpose of reducing drug crimes); Commonwealth v. Jones, 374 Pa.Super. 431 , 543 A.2d 548 (1988) (finding the mandatory minimum sentencing for offenses on or near public transportation does not violate the equal protection clause because the statute furthers the legislative goals of protecting operators, municipal interests, and public safety); Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. 334 , 516 A.2d 1172 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentencing applicable t