equal protection clause in Illinois

2023In an equal protection challenge, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might 8 support it.’ ” Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 117 Ill. 2d 454, 465 (1987) (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1939)). ¶ 23 The rational basis test does not require that the legislature ever state the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.

2020The standards for evaluating a challenge to a statute based on the uniformity clause are well established: To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a “ ‘nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.’ ” Marks v. Vanderventer, 2015 IL 116226, ¶ 19 (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003)). ¶ 35 The uniformity clause was intended to be a broader limitation on legislative power to classif

2017Id. at 513 (if a movant cannot meet this preliminary threshold in showing that she is similarly situated to the comparison group, the equal protection claim fails). ¶ 39 Second, assuming Mitchell had properly presented her equal protection argument and shown that she is similarly situated to sworn firefighter/paramedics who receive enhanced health insurance benefits under the Act, we find that there is a rational basis for the Village to -9- treat civilian paramedics like Mitchell differently than full-time firefighters and sworn firefighter/paramedics for purposes of providing health care ben

2016Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d at 513 (if a movant cannot meet this preliminary threshold in showing that she is similarly situated to the comparison group, the equal protection claim fails). ¶ 39 Second, assuming Mitchell had properly presented her equal protection argument and shown that she is similarly situated to sworn firefighter/paramedics who receive enhanced health insurance benefits under the Act, we find that there is a rational basis for the Village to treat civilian paramedics like Mitchell differently than full-time firefighters and sworn firefighter/paramedics for purposes of providing

2025In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause (U.S. Const., amend.

2024In a prior appeal, we reversed the circuit court’s finding that Wright failed to make a prima facie showing of an equal protection violation at the first stage proceeding established by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); remanded the case for second and third stage proceedings under Batson; and Nos. 1-16-1404 & 1-22-1242 retained jurisdiction to resolve any further matters following the remand hearing.

2022Dist. v. Stonewall Orchards, LLP, 214 Ill. 2d 417, 434 (2005). ¶ 76 When undertaking an equal protection analysis there is a strong presumption, absent the presence of an inherently suspect classification or of a fundamental right, that a classification scheme established either by statute or by ordinance is valid.

2017Wauconda Fire Protection District , 214 Ill. 2d at 434 , 293 Ill.Dec. 246 , 828 N.E.2d 216 . ¶ 15 As we explained in In re M.A. , 2015 IL 118049 , ¶ 25, 397 Ill.Dec. 759 , 43 N.E.3d 86 , a threshold matter in addressing an equal protection claim is ascertaining whether the individual is similarly situated to the comparison group. " 'Evidence of different treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim.' " Id. (quoting In re Derrico G. , 2014 IL 114463 , ¶ 92, 383 Ill.Dec. 679 , 15 N.E.3d 457 ).

2023Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). ¶ 47 The threshold question in the equal protection analysis is whether the claimant is “similarly situated” to the comparison group. “ ‘Evidence of different treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim.’ ” M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 25 (quoting In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 92 ).

2023Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). ¶ 47 The threshold question in the equal protection analysis is whether the claimant is “similarly situated” to the comparison group. “ ‘Evidence of different treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim.’ ” M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 25 (quoting In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 92 ).

2018The uniformity clause "was intended to encompass the equal protection clause and add to it even more limitations on government." Id. at 247 , 180 Ill.Dec. 135 , 606 N.E.2d 1212 .

2018The uniformity clause "was intended to encompass the equal protection clause and add to it even more limitations on government." Id. at 247 , 180 Ill.Dec. 135 , 606 N.E.2d 1212 .

2019“However, the equal protection clause does not forbid the legislature from drawing proper distinctions in legislation among different categories of people.” Id. ¶ 110 Here, the legislative intent to allow for expedited termination proceedings in aggravated cases is appropriate.

2003"However, the equal protection clause does not forbid the legislature from drawing proper distinctions in legislation among different categories of people." R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 309, 253 Ill.Dec. 699 , 745 N.E.2d 1233 .

2025For example, our supreme court found that juvenile sex offenders were not similarly situated to juvenile violent offenders and rejected an equal protection claim on that basis, declaring that “[s]imply declaring a group similarly situated does not make it so absent some evidence that the individuals are in all respects alike.” In re M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 33 .

2025“The equal protection clause guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated in a similar manner ***.” In re M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 24 .

1995I, § 2.) In resolving challenges brought under that provision of the Illinois Constitution, we apply the same standards that govern equal protection claims made under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 124 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; People v. Reed (1992), 148 Ill.2d 1, 7 , 169 Ill.Dec. 282 , 591 N.E.2d 455 .) The heart of the equal protection guarantee is that persons similarly situated shall be treated similarly. ( In re Marriage of Diehl (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 410, 427 , 164 Ill.Dec. 73 , 582 N.E.2d 281 .) The equal

1995I, § 2.) In resolving challenges brought under that provision of the Illinois Constitution, we apply the same standards that govern equal protection claims made under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 124 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; People v. Reed (1992), 148 Ill.2d 1, 7 , 169 Ill.Dec. 282 , 591 N.E.2d 455 .) The heart of the equal protection guarantee is that persons similarly situated shall be treated similarly. ( In re Marriage of Diehl (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 410, 427 , 164 Ill.Dec. 73 , 582 N.E.2d 281 .) The equal

1999In Adams, the supreme court explained equal protection analysis as follows: “A claim that a statute violates the principles of equal protection requires an analysis of whether a substantial right is involved, or whether the statute discriminates against a suspect class. [Citation.] When neither of these factors comes into play, the equal protection standard, like due process, utilizes a rational basis test, which prevents the implementation of a statute if it irrationally differentiates between persons similarly situated.” Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 391 .

1999In Adams , the supreme court explained equal protection analysis as follows: *590 "A claim that a statute violates the principles of equal protection requires an analysis of whether a substantial right is involved, or whether the statute discriminates against a suspect class. [Citation.] When neither of these factors comes into play, the equal protection standard, like due process, utilizes a rational basis test, which prevents the implementation of a statute if it irrationally differentiates between persons similarly situated." Adams, 144 Ill.2d at 391 , 163 Ill.Dec. 483 , 581 N.E.2d 637 .

2014Reed, 148 Ill. 2d at 7-8 . ¶ 68 However, before we can reach the ultimate question of whether the complained of statute violates the equal protection clause, we must first determine whether respondent is similarly situated to the comparison group.

2014Reed, 148 Ill. 2d at 7-8 . ¶ 68 However, before we can reach the ultimate question of whether the complained of statute violates the equal protection clause, we must first determine whether respondent is similarly situated to the comparison group.

2011“Although the uniformity clause imposes a more stringent standard than the equal protection clause, the scope of a court’s inquiry under the uniformity clause remains relatively narrow.” Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 172 Ill. 2d 243, 250 (1996).

2008We further explained the nature of the uniformity clause in Arangold Corp.: “The uniformity clause was intended to be a broader limitation on legislative power to classify for nonproperty tax purposes than the limitation of the equal protection clause (Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 117 Ill. 2d 454, 469 (1987)) and was meant to insure that taxpayers would receive added protection in the state constitution based upon a standard of reasonableness that is more rigorous than that contained in the federal constitution (Milwaukee Safeguard, 179 Ill. 2d at 102). *** Despite th

1997A special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge. *1071 Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill.2d at 123 , 212 Ill.Dec. 883 , 658 N.E.2d 365 .

1997A special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge. *1071 Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill.2d at 123 , 212 Ill.Dec. 883 , 658 N.E.2d 365 .

2016This court noted that the equal protection clause forbids disparate treatment of persons who are “ ‘in all relevant respects alike’ ” (emphasis omitted) (id. ¶ 92 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992))) and then explained that juvenile proceedings are “fundamentally different from criminal proceedings” (id. ¶ 103) and that the reason the Act exists separate and apart from the Criminal Code and the Unified Code of Corrections is that the “legislature has recognized that juveniles are not similarly situated to adults” (id. ¶ 101).

2015This court noted that the equal protection clause forbids disparate treatment of persons who are “ ‘in all relevant respects alike’ ” (emphasis omitted) (id. ¶ 92 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992))), and then explained that juvenile proceedings are “fundamentally different from criminal proceedings” (id. ¶ 103) and that the reason the Act exists separate and apart from the Criminal Code and the Code of Corrections is that the “legislature has recognized that juveniles are not similarly situated to adults” (id. ¶ 101).

1992Section 2-622 does not "implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and accordingly the appropriate standard for determining the plaintiff's equal protection challenge[] under the Illinois and Federal constitutions is whether the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. ( McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners (1969), 394 U.S. 802, 809 , 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745 , 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408 ; Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill.2d 116, 119-20 [ 45 Ill.Dec. 18 , 412 N.E.2d 151 ].) This standard applies as well to the addit

1992Section 2-622 does not "implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and accordingly the appropriate standard for determining the plaintiff's equal protection challenge[] under the Illinois and Federal constitutions is whether the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. ( McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners (1969), 394 U.S. 802, 809 , 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745 , 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408 ; Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill.2d 116, 119-20 [ 45 Ill.Dec. 18 , 412 N.E.2d 151 ].) This standard applies as well to the addit

1992Section 2-622 does not "implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and accordingly the appropriate standard for determining the plaintiff's equal protection challenge[] under the Illinois and Federal constitutions is whether the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. ( McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners (1969), 394 U.S. 802, 809 , 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745 , 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408 ; Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill.2d 116, 119-20 [ 45 Ill.Dec. 18 , 412 N.E.2d 151 ].) This standard applies as well to the addit

1992Moreover, our supreme court has recently summarized the relevant inquiry applicable to judge the merits of an equal protection claim raised in a State forum: “As stated in Jenkins v. Wu (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 468, 477 , ‘[t]he fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution requires equality between groups of persons “similarly situated.” It does not deny a State the power to treat different classes of persons differently.’ (Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 , 31 L.

2002Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid , 171 Ill. 2d 314, 324 , 664 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (1996). "'The equal protection clause does not deny [s]tates the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.'" People v. Mathey , 99 Ill. 2d 292, 296 , 458 N.E.2d 499, 501 (1983), quoting People v. Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d 410, 416 , 403 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (1980).

2002Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid , 171 Ill. 2d 314, 324 , 664 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (1996). "'The equal protection clause does not deny [s]tates the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.'" People v. Mathey , 99 Ill. 2d 292, 296 , 458 N.E.2d 499, 501 (1983), quoting People v. Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d 410, 416 , 403 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (1980).

2014Since marijuana was closer in character to the substances contained in the Drug Abuse Control Act and “dissimilar from drugs under the Narcotic Drug Act,” the supreme court ruled that the inclusion of marijuana in the Narcotic Drug Act was “arbitrary” and “offends the equal-protection clause of the United States [C]onstitution.” Id. at 349-50 . ¶ 21 Unlike the statute at issue in McCabe, which grouped marijuana only with “hard drugs” like heroin and cocaine, the DUI statute groups marijuana with all other drugs and intoxicating compounds.

2014Since marijuana was closer in character to the substances contained in the Drug Abuse Control Act and “dissimilar from drugs under the Narcotic Drug Act,” the supreme court ruled that the inclusion of marijuana in the Narcotic Drug Act was “arbitrary” and “offends the equal- protection clause of the United States [C]onstitution.” Id. at 349-50 . ¶ 21 Unlike the statute at issue in McCabe, which grouped marijuana only with "hard drugs" like heroin and cocaine, the DUI statute groups marijuana with all other drugs and intoxicating 6 compounds.

2018“A special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge.” Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 393 (1997).

2017"A special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge." Best v. Taylor Machine Works , 179 Ill. 2d 367 , 393, 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997).

2006The equal protection clause is triggered when the law “lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense.” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 , 86 L.

2006The equal protection clause is triggered when the law “lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense.” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 , 86 L.

2025Finally, intermediate scrutiny “applies to classifications based on gender, illegitimacy, and content-neutral incidental burdens to speech” and requires a showing that “the statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.” Id. ¶ 42 However, as a threshold matter, an equal protection claim “requires a showing that the individual raising it is similarly situated to the comparison group.” Id. ¶ 25.

2024Id. ¶ 53 As a threshold matter, though, the party raising an equal protection claim must show that he is similarly situated to the comparison group.

2015When an equal protection claim challenges a legislative classification, such as the saving clause here, that classification “ ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d 62, 67 (1987) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (collecting cases)).

2015When an equal protection claim challenges a legislative classification, such as the saving clause here, that classification “ ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d 62, 67 (1987) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (collecting cases)).

2024Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 177 . ¶ 64 Our first step in the equal protection analysis is to determine if defendant, as an individual charged under subsection (a)(7) who used cannabis without a valid registry card, is similarly situated to the comparison group, cannabis users with a valid registry cards.

2012According to defendant, it is not reasonable or fair for the legislature to prohibit the sex partners of such people from photographing such otherwise lawful, private, sexual activity. ¶ 40 “The court applies the same equal protection analysis under both the United States and -11- Illinois Constitutions.” Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 176 .