equal protection clause in Rhode Island

2008Therefore, "the equal protection clause is violated `only if the [legislative] classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective.'" Power , 582 A.2d at 902 (citing McGowan v. Maryland , 366 U.S. 420 , 425-26 (1961)).

2005In an equal protection challenge, the burden is more than nominal: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 426 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 1105 , 6 L.Ed.2d. 393, 399 (1961).

1984This is not surprising in light of our holding in Boucher v. Sayeed, R.I., 459 A.2d 87 (1983), where we refused to expand the list of fundamental rights protected by the equal-protection clause in a case challenging the constitutionality of our medical-malpractice reform act. .

1984Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983); and Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364 , 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982). [3] This is not surprising in light of our holding in Boucher v. Sayeed, R.I., 459 A.2d 87 (1983), where we refused to expand the list of fundamental rights protected by the equal-protection clause in a case challenging the constitutionality of our medical-malpractice reform act. [4] Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 S.Ct. 539 , 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905). [5] The New Hampshir

2019In Engquist , the Supreme Court discussed the case of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 , 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam), in which a property owner had been properly considered a class of one when she pursued a claim for an equal protection violation after her municipality conditioned approval for a connection to reach a municipal water supply on the grant of a larger easement than that required for other similarly situated property owners.

2019In Engquist , the Supreme Court discussed the case of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 , 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam), in which a property owner had been properly considered a class of one when she pursued a claim for an equal protection violation after her municipality conditioned approval for a connection to reach a municipal water supply on the grant of a larger easement than that required for other similarly situated property owners.

2001The Fourteen Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge. . .nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty and property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A statute violates the equal protection clause "only if it rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. . . ." Kennedy v. State 654 A.2d 708 , 712 (R.I. 1995) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 , 425-26 (1962)).

1998Thus with respect to economic legislation it is only when the classification created by the statute is determined to be “wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective,” Kennedy v. State, 654 A.2d 708, 712 (R.I.1995) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 , 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (1961)), that the equal-protection clause will be impaired.

2013See Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 941 A.2d 198, 211 (R.I.2008) (“It is well settled that under the equal protection clause, legislative classifications that do not affect a fundamental right or a suspect class such as race, alienage, or national origin, are examined under a minimal-scrutiny analysis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2008Under minimal scrutiny the Legislature has a wide scope of discretion to enact laws which will be upheld as long as they bear a reasonable relationship to public health, safety or welfare." Riley , at 211.

1991City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511, 516-17 (1976).

1991City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511, 516-17 (1976).

2005The Court further stated that "the equal protection clause does not demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons. . . . [Or] require [that] things which are different in fact . . . be treated in law as though they were the same." Kleczek, 612 A.2d at 737 (citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 , 309 (1966)) (internal quotations omitted).

1992Moreover the equal protection clause does not “demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons. ‘[Or] require [that] things which are different in fact * * * to be treated in law as though they were the same.’ ” Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 , 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1499 , 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580 (1966).

2005In Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734 , 737 (R.I. 1992), the Supreme Court "note[d] that the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is implicated only when a classification treats persons similarly situated in different ways." (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 75-76 (1971)).

2005The Court further stated that "the equal protection clause does not demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons. . . . [Or] require [that] things which are different in fact . . . be treated in law as though they were the same." Kleczek, 612 A.2d at 737 (citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 , 309 (1966)) (internal quotations omitted).

2005In Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734 , 737 (R.I. 1992), the Supreme Court "note[d] that the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is implicated only when a classification treats persons similarly situated in different ways." (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 75-76 (1971)).

1977As the 'Court stated in Geduldig *461 v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 , 94 S.Ct. 2485 , 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974), where the exclusion of pregnancy from a state disability program was held not to be sex discrimination within the meaning of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution: “[T]his case is thus a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), involving discrimination based upon gender as such.

2003Ibid., (citing Felice v. Rhode Island Board of Election, 781 F. Supp. 100 , 105 (D.R.I. 1991)).

1995Felice v. Rhode Island Board of Elections, 781 F.Supp. 100, 105 (D.R.I.1991).

2005A court may not "overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 , 97 , 99 S.Ct. 939 , 943 , 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979).

2005A court may not "overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 , 97 , 99 S.Ct. 939 , 943 , 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979).

2004Mill Realty has not asserted a violation of its right to substantive due process, see Brunette v. Town of South Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075, 1084 (R.I.1997) (proof of a violation of substantive due process requires proof “that the government’s action was ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare’”), nor has it asserted an equal protection violation, see Sweetman v. Town of Cumber land, 117 R.I. 134 -151, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (1976) (municipal action that affects a “fundamental right” or sets up a suspect classificat

2004Mill Realty has not asserted a violation of its right to substantive due process, see Brunette v. Town of South Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075, 1084 (R.I.1997) (proof of a violation of substantive due process requires proof “that the government’s action was ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare’”), nor has it asserted an equal protection violation, see Sweetman v. Town of Cumber land, 117 R.I. 134 -151, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (1976) (municipal action that affects a “fundamental right” or sets up a suspect classificat

2003Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n. 26; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493 (substantial underrepresentation of a group is impermissible "if it results from purposeful discrimination") (emph. added); Royal, 174 F.3d at 6 n. 2 (explicitly noting that a defendant who asserts an equal protection claim must demonstrate, in prima facie fashion, the necessary element of intentional discrimination); Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1225-26 .

1984In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 , 97 S.Ct. 1272 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that “in order to show that an equal-protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs.” Id. at 494 , 97 S.Ct. at 1280 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 510 ; see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 , 99 S.Ct. 2993 , 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979).

1998Furthermore, "`discriminatory purpose'. . . implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256 , 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)).

1998Furthermore, "`discriminatory purpose'. . . implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256 , 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)).

1993Even if this were a narrower ballot-access restriction, the one-year waiting period dictated by the revolving-door legislation places a “de minimis burden on the political aspirations of a current office holder. * * * A ‘waiting period’ is hardly a significant barrier to candidacy.” (Emphasis added.) Clements, 457 U.S. at 967 , 102 S.Ct. at 2846 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 518 (holding that a two-year waiting period was insignificant and required only a rational predicate to survive an equal-protection challenge).

1993Even if this were a narrower ballot-access restriction, the one-year waiting period dictated by the revolving-door legislation places a “de minimis burden on the political aspirations of a current office holder. * * * A ‘waiting period’ is hardly a significant barrier to candidacy.” (Emphasis added.) Clements, 457 U.S. at 967 , 102 S.Ct. at 2846 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 518 (holding that a two-year waiting period was insignificant and required only a rational predicate to survive an equal-protection challenge).

1979The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been characterized as “undoubtedly one of the majestic generalities of the Constitution.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 , 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1468 , 52 L.

1979The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been characterized as “undoubtedly one of the majestic generalities of the Constitution.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 , 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1468 , 52 L.

1973I. 650, 654, 262 A.2d 625, 627 (1970), it “* * * permits a classification which is reasonable and hot arbitrary, and which is based upon substantial differences having'a reasonable relation to the objects or persons dealt with and to the public purposes sought to be achieved by the legislation under scrutiny.

1970I. 650, 262 A.2d 625 , we observed that the equal protection clause doe's not require that all persons be dealt with identically.

1970I. 236, 160 A. 75 , citing City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 , 43 S.Ct. 534 , 67 L.Ed. 937 , which latter case has been consistently followed and cited with approval in Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 , this court held that the equal protection clause of article XIV, section 1, of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, cannot be invoked by a city against its state.

1970I. 236, 160 A. 75 , citing City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 , 43 S.Ct. 534 , 67 L.Ed. 937 , which latter case has been consistently followed and cited with approval in Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 , this court held that the equal protection clause of article XIV, section 1, of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, cannot be invoked by a city against its state.

2019Id. at 601-02 , 128 S.Ct. 2146 ; see Olech , 528 U.S. at 563 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 .

2019See Engquist , 553 U.S. at 605 , 128 S.Ct. 2146 ("To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns.