equal protection clause in Maine

2017See 4 M.R.S. § 807(3)(M); TriState Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993). [¶ 8] Because Rupert has not identified any federal or State constitutional provision, statute, or common law authority contravened by the court when it denied his request to be represented by a person not authorized to practice law in Maine, we' affirm the judgment.

2017See 4 M.R.S. § 807(3)(M); TriState Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993). [¶ 8] Because Rupert has not identified any federal or State constitutional provision, statute, or common law authority contravened by the court when it denied his request to be represented by a person not authorized to practice law in Maine, we' affirm the judgment.

1989“Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions ..., [the Supreme Court’s] decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264, 268 (Me.1978) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976)).

1981The law need not operate uniformly on all individuals “as long as those affected are reasonably different from those excluded and there is a rational basis for treating them differently.” Nadeau, 395 A.2d at 113 ; McNicholas v. York Village Corp., Me., 394 A.2d 264, 269 (1978).

1990Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 338 (Me.1982); see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 238-39 , 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080, 1084-85 , 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981).

1989The Club next contends that by exempting several other health professionals from the coverage of the Ordinance it, in effect, singles out massage parlors for restrictive treatment. 1 Such a distinction, the Club contends, is arbitrary and irrational. 2 To prove that the Ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions by reason of an illegal classification, the Club must show “‘by clear and irrefutable evidence its arbitrariness and irrationally discriminatory nature.’ ” Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291, 295 (Me.1988) (quoting Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 44

2007"Before the court can find an equal protection violation, it must at least have some indication that there exist similarly situated persons who have not been treated equally." Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 703 (Me. 1991).

1985“Unlike the equal protection clause, the special legislation clause does not call for inquiry into the rights or the existence of similarly situated persons.” Brann v. State, 424 A.2d at 704 .

2022Equal Protection To prevail on a§ 1983 claim for the violation of equal protection rights, the plaintiff must be able to prove that "compared with others similarly situated, the [plaintiff] was selectively treated based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to 41 inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Marshall v. Town of Dexter, 2015 ME 135 , ,r,r 30-31, 125 A.3d 1141 (discussing the elements that must be alleged in a complaint seeking relief on an equal protection claim); Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F

2015Rather, the complaint must allege facts that could demonstrate “that the challenged decision ... had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Polk, 2000 ME 152, ¶ 14 , 756 A.2d 510 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 32] Marshall’s coipplaint fails altogether to include allegations concerning how similarly situated property owners were treated by the Town, and his complaint does not report any “gross abuse of power,” Tapalian, 377 F.3d at 6 (quotation marks omitted), that could demonstrate malicious or bad faith intent to injure him, id. at 5 .

2019Such a remedy corrects the equal protection violation by putting the Taxpayers in the 16 position they would have occupied had all taxpayers been treated equally.8 See MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 494 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (Neb. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993) (approving such a remedy in a similar case of tax discrimination); Keniston v. Bd. of Assessors, 407 N.E.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Mass. 1980) (holding that abatements limited to the difference between the amount a taxpayer actually paid and what he or she “should have paid had a municipality followed l

2019Such a remedy corrects the equal protection violation by putting the Taxpayers in the 16 position they would have occupied had all taxpayers been treated equally.8 See MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 494 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (Neb. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993) (approving such a remedy in a similar case of tax discrimination); Keniston v. Bd. of Assessors, 407 N.E.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Mass. 1980) (holding that abatements limited to the difference between the amount a taxpayer actually paid and what he or she “should have paid had a municipality followed l

2019Such a remedy corrects the equal protection violation by putting the Taxpayers in the 16 position they would have occupied had all taxpayers been treated equally.8 See MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 494 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (Neb. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993) (approving such a remedy in a similar case of tax discrimination); Keniston v. Bd. of Assessors, 407 N.E.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Mass. 1980) (holding that abatements limited to the difference between the amount a taxpayer actually paid and what he or she “should have paid had a municipality followed l

2019Such a remedy corrects the equal protection violation by putting the Taxpayers in the 16 position they would have occupied had all taxpayers been treated equally.8 See MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 494 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (Neb. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993) (approving such a remedy in a similar case of tax discrimination); Keniston v. Bd. of Assessors, 407 N.E.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Mass. 1980) (holding that abatements limited to the difference between the amount a taxpayer actually paid and what he or she “should have paid had a municipality followed l

2019See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31 .

2019See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31 .

2016See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 20.

2007The Supreme Court has stated that "'the purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents."' Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)(citationsomitted).

2012I, § 6-A; State v. Poole, 2012 ME 92, ¶¶ 5, 8 , 46 A.3d 1129 (holding that an equal protection violation may occur when “similarly situated persons are not treated equally under the law” (quotation marks omitted)).

2012I, § 6-A; State v. Poole, 2012 ME 92, ¶¶ 5, 8 , 46 A.3d 1129 (holding that an equal protection violation may occur when “similarly situated persons are not treated equally under the law” (quotation marks omitted)).

2006See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 271 ... (1981) (agreeing that compliance with constitutional obligations “may be characterized as compelling.”).

2006See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 271 ... (1981) (agreeing that compliance with constitutional obligations “may be characterized as compelling.”).

1995See Whyy, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 120 , 89 S.Ct. 286, 287-88 , 21 L.Ed.2d 242 (1968) (stating that it is permissible for states to engage in local benefit analysis); Lambert v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 531 (Me.1980) (stating that not all burdens on the right to travel implicate strict scrutiny analysis).

1989The Club next contends that by exempting several other health professionals from the coverage of the Ordinance it, in effect, singles out massage parlors for restrictive treatment. 1 Such a distinction, the Club contends, is arbitrary and irrational. 2 To prove that the Ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions by reason of an illegal classification, the Club must show “‘by clear and irrefutable evidence its arbitrariness and irrationally discriminatory nature.’ ” Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291, 295 (Me.1988) (quoting Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 44

2020Cf. Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 17 , 940 A.2d 1065 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a statute exempting MSAD 6 from a statutory cost-sharing formula because not exempting MSAD 6 could cause a shortfall in the district’s budget).

2020Cf. Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 17 , 940 A.2d 1065 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a statute exempting MSAD 6 from a statutory cost-sharing formula because not exempting MSAD 6 could cause a shortfall in the district’s budget).

2022Marshall, 2015 ME 135 , ,r 31, 125 A.3d 1141 ; Polk, 2000 ME 152 , ,r,r 15-16, 756 A.2d 510 ("vague allegations" about a municipal code enforcement officer's "impermissible reason" for opposing a plaintiff's permit application were insufficient to support an equal protection claim); see also Gianfrancesco, 712 F.3d at 640 .

2022Marshall, 2015 ME 135 , ,r 31, 125 A.3d 1141 ; Polk, 2000 ME 152 , ,r,r 15-16, 756 A.2d 510 ("vague allegations" about a municipal code enforcement officer's "impermissible reason" for opposing a plaintiff's permit application were insufficient to support an equal protection claim); see also Gianfrancesco, 712 F.3d at 640 .

2022Marshall, 2015 ME 135 , ,r 31, 125 A.3d 1141 ; Polk, 2000 ME 152 , ,r,r 15-16, 756 A.2d 510 ("vague allegations" about a municipal code enforcement officer's "impermissible reason" for opposing a plaintiff's permit application were insufficient to support an equal protection claim); see also Gianfrancesco, 712 F.3d at 640 .

2015Gianfrancesco, 712 F.3d at 640 ; see Polk, 2000 ME 152, ¶¶ 15-16 , 756 A.2d 510 (holding that vague allegations about a CEO’s reasons for opposing a permit application were insufficient to support an equal protection claim).

2013I, § 6-A (“No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws . . . .”). [¶54] In an equal protection challenge, a state law is subject to strict scrutiny analysis if it “infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, or involves . . . a suspect classification.” Anderson, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 29 , 895 A.2d 944 .

2013I, § 6-A (“No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws . . . .”). [¶54] In an equal protection challenge, a state law is subject to strict scrutiny analysis if it “infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, or involves . . . a suspect classification.” Anderson, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 29 , 895 A.2d 944 .

2006In Bagley , because the case presented "an important issue worthy of evaluation,” we reconfigured the parents’ equal protection claim from one asserting the rights of the schools to the argument "that the parents’ lack of opportunity to have the State pay the tuition for their children to attend a private religious school results in their own disparate treatment on the basis of their religion.” 1999 ME 60, ¶ 26 , 728 A.2d at 136 (emphasis omitted).

2006In Bagley , because the case presented "an important issue worthy of evaluation,” we reconfigured the parents’ equal protection claim from one asserting the rights of the schools to the argument "that the parents’ lack of opportunity to have the State pay the tuition for their children to attend a private religious school results in their own disparate treatment on the basis of their religion.” 1999 ME 60, ¶ 26 , 728 A.2d at 136 (emphasis omitted).

1989The Club next contends that by exempting several other health professionals from the coverage of the Ordinance it, in effect, singles out massage parlors for restrictive treatment. 1 Such a distinction, the Club contends, is arbitrary and irrational. 2 To prove that the Ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions by reason of an illegal classification, the Club must show “‘by clear and irrefutable evidence its arbitrariness and irrationally discriminatory nature.’ ” Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291, 295 (Me.1988) (quoting Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 44

1989The Club next contends that by exempting several other health professionals from the coverage of the Ordinance it, in effect, singles out massage parlors for restrictive treatment. 1 Such a distinction, the Club contends, is arbitrary and irrational. 2 To prove that the Ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions by reason of an illegal classification, the Club must show “‘by clear and irrefutable evidence its arbitrariness and irrationally discriminatory nature.’ ” Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291, 295 (Me.1988) (quoting Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 44

1988See Beaulieu, 440 A.2d at 339 (analyzing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)).

1988See Beaulieu, 440 A.2d at 339 (analyzing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)).

2023Doe v. Farino, 2020 ME 135 , ~ 7 n.4, 242 A.3d 1098 ("issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived" (quoting Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, 1 [ 11, 905 A.2d 290 )).

2023Doe v. Farino, 2020 ME 135 , ~ 7 n.4, 242 A.3d 1098 ("issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived" (quoting Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, 1 [ 11, 905 A.2d 290 )).

2022Marshall, 2015 ME 135 , ,r 30, 125 A.3d 1141 ; Polk v. Town ofLubec, 2000 ME 152 , ,r 14, 756 A.2d 510 ("In order to establish a constitutional equal protection violation based on selective prosecution or selective enforcement, a plaintiff must at a minimum establish 'that the challenged decision ... had a 'discriminatory effect and that 42 it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 1" ) ; see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,608 (1985).

2019Chestnt1t v. State, 524 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Me. 1987).

2019Id.