equal protection challenge in Colorado

2026Claim Appeals Off. v. Romero , 912 P.2d 62, 66 ( Colo. 1996 ) ) .

2021See id. at 66 ( " [D] issimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals" is a "threshold issue" ) ; see also People v. Black , 915 P.2d 1257, 1260 ( Colo. 1996 ) ( "An equal protection challenge must fail if persons alleging disparate treatment are not similarly situated." ) .

2025II, [§] 25, and that its substantive application is the same insofar as equal 7 protection analysis is concerned.” Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo. 1982). ¶ 13 “The threshold inquiry in an equal protection analysis is whether persons who are similarly situated are subjected to disparate treatment by a governmental act.” Movitz v. Div. of Emp. & Training, 820 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Colo. App. 1991).

2016Taxation , 2013 CO 39, ¶22 (quoting Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ. , 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo. 1982)). ¶20 Both parties agree that the rational basis test applies to an equal protection challenge of economic legislation such as the net worth provision.

2016City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc, 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 (Colo.1988); People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 126 (Colo.1986). 112 Where a party raises an equal protection challenge, the level of judicial serutiny varies with the type of classification used and the nature of the right affected.

2016City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 (Colo. 1988); People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 126 (Colo. 1986). ¶12 Where a party raises an equal protection challenge, the level of judicial scrutiny varies with the type of classification used and the nature of the right affected.

2026Accordingly, we have observed that "to overcome an equal protection challenge, 'a person of average intelligence' must be able to distinguish the conduct proscribed by one offense from the conduct proscribed by another." Id. (quoting People v. Griego , 2018 CO 5, ¶ 36 , 409 P.3d 338, 344 ).

2022Thus, to overcome an equal protection challenge to a statute , "the statutory classification must turn on ‘reasonably intelligible standards of criminal culpability,’ and any definition of a crime must be ‘sufficiently coherent and discrete that a person of average intelligence can reasonably distinguish it from conduct proscribed by other offenses.’ " People v. Griego , 2018 CO 5 , ¶ 36 , 409 P.3d 338, 344 ( quoting Marcy , 628 P.2d at 80 -81 ) . ¶84 Here, the definition of "harm" that the majority adopts creates substantial vagueness and equal protection problems.

1996"The Equal Protection Clause comes into question only when a law `has a special impact on less than all the persons subject to its jurisdiction.'" People in Interest of C.B., 740 P.2d 11 , 17 (Colo.1987) (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 982 (Colo.1984)).

1996E.g., C.B., 740 P.2d at 17; Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 982 .

2026See People v. Hoggard, 2017 COA 88, ¶ 34 (“To reverse a conviction for plain error, we must find that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was obvious; and (3) the error so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast doubt on the judgment’s reliability.”), aff’d on other grounds, 2020 CO 54 . 33 COA 171M , ¶¶ 59-62 (SOLSA does not violate due process rights, the equal protection clause, or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 88 (same); People v. Firth, 205 P.3d 445, 452 (Colo. App. 2008) (SOLSA does not violate equal protectio

2015See People v. Firth , 205 P.3d 445, 452 (Colo. App. 2008); People v. Lehmkuhl , 117 P.3d 98, 108 (Colo. App. 2004); People v. Dash , 104 P.3d 286, 290 (Colo. App. 2004); People v. Oglethorpe , 87 P.3d 129, 134 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Strean , 74 P.3d 387, 395 (Colo. App. 2002). ¶60 To the extent defendant argues that SOLSA violates substantive or procedural due process, the equal protection clause, or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, we reject his arguments for the reasons set forth in Dash , 104 P.3d at 290­93, Oglethorpe , 87 P.3d at 134-35 , and Strean , 74 P.3d at

2026Id. ¶31 In light of the foregoing principles, the threshold question in the equal protection challenge before us is whether the classes allegedly created by the statute at issue are similarly situated.

2026Id. ¶31 In light of the foregoing principles, the threshold question in the equal protection challenge before us is whether the classes allegedly created by the statute at issue are similarly situated.

2016City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc, 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 (Colo.1988); People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 126 (Colo.1986). 112 Where a party raises an equal protection challenge, the level of judicial serutiny varies with the type of classification used and the nature of the right affected.

2016City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 (Colo. 1988); People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 126 (Colo. 1986). ¶12 Where a party raises an equal protection challenge, the level of judicial scrutiny varies with the type of classification used and the nature of the right affected.

2016Seg, e.g., Goodale, 78 P.3d at 1103 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a statute that permitted a court to order treatment for users of controlled substances other than marijuana and required the court to dismiss further proceedings upon the defendant's successful completion of the program, reasoning that there are legitimate differences between marijuana and other more dangerous drugs); People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 705 (Colo.1990) (concluding that the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision in section 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1986), did not violate equal protection because "[the Gene

2016See, e.g., Goodale, 78 P.3d at 1103 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a statute that permitted a court to order treatment for users of controlled substances other than marijuana and required the court to dismiss further proceedings upon the defendant’s successful completion of the program, reasoning that there are legitimate differences between marijuana and other more dangerous drugs); People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 705 (Colo. 1990) (concluding that the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision in section 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1986), did not violate equal protection because “[t]he Ge

2026People v. Black , 915 P.2d 1257, 1260 ( Colo. 1996 ) . ¶32 Here, notwithstanding Lawrence's assertion to the contrary, he and Martinez were not similarly situated. ¶33 When Martinez was seventeen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding in Montezuma County , No. 24JD54 .

2021See id. at 66 ( " [D] issimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals" is a "threshold issue" ) ; see also People v. Black , 915 P.2d 1257, 1260 ( Colo. 1996 ) ( "An equal protection challenge must fail if persons alleging disparate treatment are not similarly situated." ) .

2015See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any reason at all ... the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir.1987) (finding an Equal Protection violation where the government exercised peremptory challenges again

2015See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any reason at all ... the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir.1987) (finding an Equal Protection violation where the government exercised peremptory challenges again

2013See People v. Watkins, 126 P.3d 309, 311 (Colo.App.2005). ¶ 71 In presenting his as-applied challenge, defendant does not articulate a constitutional argument separate from his eviden-tiary argument.

2012To state a claim for an equal protection violation, a defendant must establish that he or she is treated differently from similarly situated individuals Mendoza, -- P.3d at --; Watkins, 126 P.3d at 311 .

2009See Norsby v. Jensen, 916 P.2d 555, 563 (Colo.App.1995) ("in the area of economics and social welfare, a statutory classification does not violate the equal protection clause merely because the classification is imperfect, and, if the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because 'in practice, it results in some inequality'" (quoting Dendridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)) ).

2009See Norsby v. Jensen, 916 P.2d 555, 563 (Colo.App.1995) ("in the area of economics and social welfare, a statutory classification does not violate the equal protection clause merely because the classification is imperfect, and, if the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because 'in practice, it results in some inequality'" (quoting Dendridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)) ).

2006Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 674 (Colo.1987). *217 To state an equal protection violation, a person must establish that he or she received treatment different from that afforded to similarly situated persons.

2006Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 674 (Colo.1987). *217 To state an equal protection violation, a person must establish that he or she received treatment different from that afforded to similarly situated persons.

2026See People v. Young , 859 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo. 1993). 16 To establish an equal protection violation, "the classification must 'arbitrarily single out a group of persons for disparate treatment,' without singling out others who are similarly situated." People v. Hernandez , 2021 CO 45, ¶ 38, 488 P.3d 1055, 1064 (quoting Indus.

2021People v. Young , 859 P.2d 814, 816 ( Colo. 1993 ) . ¶38 The level of judicial scrutiny applied when a defendant raises an equal protection challenge depends on the type of classification identified and the nature of the right affected.

2024Equal protection, in this context, requires “that a decision to prosecute not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” People in Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M , ¶ 66 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 , (1996)), aff’d, 2019 CO 53 .

2016See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 , 464–65 (1996) (equal protection requires that a decision to prosecute may not be based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” (internal citation omitted)). 14 The People do not seek reinstatement of the charges; therefore, remand is unnecessary.

2007The trial court's proceeding on the basis of service by publication is "the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, supra, 717 P.2d at 495 ; see People in Interest of R.J.A., supra, 994 P.2d at 473 (where mother brought an equal protection challenge to a statute providing a limited time to comply with a treatment plan, legal interest was in the amount of time to determine compliance and not mother's ultimate loss of parental rights).

2007See Ainscough v. Owens, supra. The trial court's proceeding on the basis of service by publication is "the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, supra, 717 P.2d at 495 ; see People in Interest of R.J.A., supra, 994 P.2d at 473 (where mother brought an equal protection challenge to a statute providing a limited time to comply with a treatment plan, legal interest was in the amount of time to determine compliance and not mother's ultimate loss of parental rights).

2004See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 439 (Colo.1993).

2004See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 439 (Colo.1993).

2013The trial court later entered a directed verdict in favor of Summit County on three of the four challenged acts because plaintiffs did not present evidence that, even when taken in the light most favorable to them, could have established an equal protection claim. c ¶ 56 The majority does not address the issue of similarly situated comparators, and instead concludes that the jury must determine whether Summit County's actions, taken as a whole, constitute a pattern of discriminatory conduct. ¶ 57 The question of similarly situated comparators is a threshold question in any section 1983 claim,

2000Board of County Commissioners v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo.1984); People in Interest of C.G., 885 P.2d 355 (Colo.App. 1994).

2010Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1996); Harris v. Ark, 810 P.2d 226, 229 (Colo.1991) ("Equal protection of the laws guarantees that persons who are similarly situated will receive like treatment by the law.").

2000Harris v. The Ark, supra. The trial court correctly held that the Academy and the Association, if persons, *447 are not protected persons under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, cannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

1987Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 , 86 S.Ct. 760, 762 , 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966). 4 When governmental action is subjected to an equal protection challenge, the level of judicial scrutiny varies with the type of classification employed and the nature of the right affected.

1987Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 , 86 S.Ct. 760, 762 , 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966). 4 When governmental action is subjected to an equal protection challenge, the level of judicial scrutiny varies with the type of classification employed and the nature of the right affected.

1991Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 , 96 S.Ct. 1440, 1445-46 , 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49 (Colo.1984).

1987Persichini relies on Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo.1984), which considered an equal protection challenge to the medical malpractice statute of limitations, for his rational basis argument.

2025“That is all that is necessary to distinguish the statutes in the wake of an equal protection challenge.” Grudznske, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223, 1233 (Colo. 1988)).

2019After striking down a predecessor version of extreme indifference murder as being indistinguishable from, but nevertheless punished more severely than, the knowing homicide offense of second degree murder, see People v. Marcy , 628 P.2d 69 , 71-72 (Colo. 1981), this court upheld the amended statute defining extreme indifference murder against a similar equal protection challenge, Jefferson , 748 P.2d at 1233 .