345 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1938–2025 24 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gethersgreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 7 | 7 |
Doe v. Mahergreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 7 | 7 |
State v. Jewettgreen2 sentences1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. 1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. | 6 | 6 |
State v. Bartongreen2 sentences1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. 1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. | 6 | 6 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2023Our Supreme Court often has commenced an equal protection analysis ‘‘by [a]ssuming arguendo that the two categories of defendants identified by the [acquittee] are similarly situated with respect to the [statutory scheme] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 143 , 716 A.2d 870 (1998). 2023Our Supreme Court often has commenced an equal protection analysis ‘‘by [a]ssuming arguendo that the two categories of defendants identified by the [acquittee] are similarly situated with respect to the [statutory scheme] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 143 , 716 A.2d 870 (1998). | 5 | 11 |
Stuart v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, 266 Conn. 596, 602 , 834 A.2d 52 (2003). “[I]t is only after this threshold requirement is met that the court will consider whether the statute survives scrutiny under the equal protection clause.” Id., 602 n.10. 2011See, e.g., Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, 266 Conn. 596, 602 , 834 A.2d 52 (2003). “[I]t is only after this threshold requirement is met that the court will consider whether the statute survives scrutiny under the equal protection clause.” Id., 602 n.10. | 4 | 5 |
| State v. Lammegreen | 4 | 5 |
| The Dartmouth Review, on Behalf of Its Officers, Staff and Subscribers v. Dartmouth Collegegreen | 4 | 4 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2016Because the exercise of peremptory challenges is "subject to the commands of the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause"; id., at 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; the underlying rationale of Batson has been extended to other group classifications that trigger heightened scrutiny under a traditional equal protection analysis, including ancestry or national origin. 2016Because the exercise of peremptory challenges is "subject to the commands of the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause"; id., at 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; the underlying rationale of Batson has been extended to other group classifications that trigger heightened scrutiny under a traditional equal protection analysis, including ancestry or national origin. | 3 | 11 |
Horton v. Meskillgreen2 sentences2004The habeas court may have confused inadvertently the release date established for the Manchester n sentence, April 27, 2002, with the adjusted release date for the Hartford II sentence, had that sentence been reduced by 751 days of presentence confinement. 11 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, §1, provides in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut provides in relevant part: 2004Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run\ (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.” (Emphasis added.) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, §1, provides in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any pers | 3 | 9 |
| Laden v. Wardengreen | 3 | 4 |
| State v. Angel C.green | 3 | 3 |
| Westchester County Independence Party v. Astorinogreen | 3 | 3 |
| Verena Rivera-Powell, Francesca Castellanos, Georgina Sanchez, and Marie Sierra v. New York City Board of Elections, Docket No. 06-4665-Cvgreen | 3 | 3 |
State v. Doschergreen2 sentences2004The habeas court may have confused inadvertently the release date established for the Manchester n sentence, April 27, 2002, with the adjusted release date for the Hartford II sentence, had that sentence been reduced by 751 days of presentence confinement. 11 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, §1, provides in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut provides in relevant part: 2004Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run\ (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.” (Emphasis added.) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, §1, provides in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any pers | 2 | 8 |
Zapata v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , 2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , | 2 | 5 |
| F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginiagreen | 2 | 5 |
| United States v. Jerry Thornton, United States of America v. Frederick Jones, AKA Freddy Earl Jonesgreen | 2 | 4 |
| Craig v. Borengreen | 2 | 3 |
| Buckley v. Valeogreen | 2 | 3 |
Ross v. Moffittgreen2 sentences2001"The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages CT Page 12280 [between such similarly situated persons]. . . ." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 , 612 , 94 S.Ct. 2437 , 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); State v. Wright, supra, 246 Conn. 139 . 2001"The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages CT Page 12280 [between such similarly situated persons]. . . ." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 , 612 , 94 S.Ct. 2437 , 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); State v. Wright, supra, 246 Conn. 139 . | 1 | 10 |
Nordlinger v. Hahngreen2 sentences2008For purposes of an equal protection analysis, however, groups that are treated differently by a statute are not similarly situated unless they “are in all relevant respects alike.” (Emphasis added.) Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 , 112 S. Ct. 2326 , 120 L. 2008For purposes of an equal protection analysis, however, groups that are treated differently by a statute are not similarly situated unless they “are in all relevant respects alike.” (Emphasis added.) Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 , 112 S. Ct. 2326 , 120 L. | 1 | 8 |
City Recycling, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Thus, the analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 448 , 778 A.2d 77 (2001). 2006Thus, the analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 448 , 778 A.2d 77 (2001). | 1 | 7 |
Daly v. DelPontegreen2 sentences2004Id., 513-14 . 2001(Plaintiff's November 2, 2000 Brief, pp. 9 et seq.; Defendants' December 18, 2000 Brief, pp. 6 et seq.) "[S]tate action concerning social and economic regulation will survive an equal protection challenge if it satisfies a rational basis test." Daly v. DelPonte , 225 Conn. 499 , 513 (1993). | 1 | 7 |
Darak v. Darakgreen2 sentences1998Thus, the analytical “predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 473 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989). 1998Thus, the analytical “predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 473 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Jason B.green2 sentences2001Thus, the analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543, 558-59 , 729 A.2d 760 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 967 , 120 S. Ct. 406 , 145 L. 2001Thus, the analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543, 558-59 , 729 A.2d 760 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 967 , 120 S. Ct. 406 , 145 L. | 1 | 6 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.green2 sentences2006Independent of his claim of evidential insufficiency, *384 the defendant alleges that § 53a-72a (a)(2) violates his right to equal protection under the law. [7] The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution demands that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is "essentially a direction that all persons situated similarly should be treated alike." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). 2006Independent of his claim of evidential insufficiency, *384 the defendant alleges that § 53a-72a (a)(2) violates his right to equal protection under the law. [7] The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution demands that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is "essentially a direction that all persons situated similarly should be treated alike." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). | 1 | 6 |
Cologne v. Westfarms Associatesgreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 1 | 6 |
Ramos v. Town of Vernongreen2 sentences2006If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 829 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000). 2006If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 829 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000). | 1 | 5 |
Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protectiongreen2 sentences2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma 2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma | 1 | 5 |
Hurley v. Motor Coach Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma 2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma | 1 | 5 |
Brass v. GDQ Corp.green2 sentences2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma 2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma | 1 | 5 |
| Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britaingreen | 1 | 5 |
| Keane v. Fischettigreen | 1 | 4 |
| Johnson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Willett v. City University of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Liggins v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.green | 1 | 4 |
| Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Healthgreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Castonguaygreen | 1 | 4 |
| Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc.green | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Id., 757 . 2001If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge." (Citations omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) Id. 756-57 . | 14 | 1997–2002 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences2001The court reasoned: “In order to determine whether a statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause, a court must consider three factors: ‘the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.’ Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 , 92 S. Ct. 995 , 31 L. 2001The court reasoned: “In order to determine whether a statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause, a court must consider three factors: ‘the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.’ Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 , 92 S. Ct. 995 , 31 L. | 8 | 1977–2001 |
Palka v. Walker
green
2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 7 | 1992–1999 |
Castaneda v. Partida
green
2 sentences2021The court found, on the basis of the record before it, that ‘‘that assump- tion [was] unwarranted and unproven.’’ Turning to the equal protection claim, the court applied the three part test set forth in State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 578 , which requires, as proof of an equal protection violation in jury selection ‘‘(1) under- representation of a recognizable group; (2) substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) a selection procedure susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 594 , citing Castaneda v. Partida, 4 2021The court found, on the basis of the record before it, that ‘‘that assump- tion [was] unwarranted and unproven.’’ Turning to the equal protection claim, the court applied the three part test set forth in State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 578 , which requires, as proof of an equal protection violation in jury selection ‘‘(1) under- representation of a recognizable group; (2) substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) a selection procedure susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 594 , citing Castaneda v. Partida, 4 | 6 | 1985–2021 |
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2014On appeal, the defendant recognizes that he may not have raised the equal protection claim clearly at the hearing on the second petition for his continued com- mitment, and he seeks reversal of his commitment pur- suant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 2014On appeal, the defendant recognizes that he may not have raised the equal protection claim clearly at the hearing on the second petition for his continued com- mitment, and he seeks reversal of his commitment pur- suant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). | 6 | 1992–2014 |
State v. Long
green
2 sentences2021Held that the defendant lacked standing to assert his claim that § 21a-277 (b) violated the equal protection rights of African Americans and Mexican Americans, as the defendant, a Caucasian, was not aggrieved by the legislature’s enactment of a law that allegedly discriminated against other racial and ethnic groups: the defendant failed to demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest, rather than a general interest shared by the community, in the underlying equal protection challenge to Connecticut’s criminaliza- tion of the sale of marijuana, as the defendant did not claim that he was 2021Held that the defendant lacked standing to assert his claim that § 21a-277 (b) violated the equal protection rights of African Americans and Mexican Americans, as the defendant, a Caucasian, was not aggrieved by the legislature’s enactment of a law that allegedly discriminated against other racial and ethnic groups: the defendant failed to demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest, rather than a general interest shared by the community, in the underlying equal protection challenge to Connecticut’s criminaliza- tion of the sale of marijuana, as the defendant did not claim that he was | 5 | 2004–2025 |
Keogh v. City of Bridgeport
green
2 sentences2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , 2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , | 5 | 1986–2010 |
In re Disbarment of Nunes
green
2 sentences2008LaTrieste Restaurant v. Village of Port Chester, 188 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S. Ct. 1240 , 146 L. 2004“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 392 , 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S. Ct. 1239 , 146 L. | 5 | 2002–2008 |
| CSC Consulting, Inc. v. Tingley Systems, Inc. green | 5 | 2002–2008 |
| Daily v. New Britain Machine Co. green | 5 | 1992–2007 |
| Bruno v. Civil Service Commission green | 5 | 1985–2000 |
| Trimble v. Gordon green | 5 | 1984–1997 |
| Harris v. Commissioner of Correction green | 4 | 2007–2017 |
| Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. green | 4 | 1991–2010 |
| Golab v. City of New Britain green | 4 | 1995–2005 |
| Thomas v. City of West Haven green | 4 | 2002–2004 |
| Ferguson v. City of Charleston green | 4 | 2002–2004 |
| Benjamin v. Bailey green | 4 | 1996–2001 |
| State v. Dukes green | 4 | 1994–1999 |
| Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank green | 4 | 1989–1999 |
| Karp v. Zoning Board green | 4 | 1974–1999 |
| State v. Metz green | 3 | 1996–2025 |
| Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction green | 3 | 2004–2022 |
| State v. Geisler green | 3 | 2006–2019 |
| United Illuminating Co. v. City of New Haven green | 3 | 1997–2011 |
| Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture green | 3 | 2009–2009 |
| Carini v. Zoning Board of Appeals green | 3 | 1983–2008 |
| State v. Moran green | 3 | 2004–2007 |
| State v. Gonzalez green | 3 | 1995–2006 |
| Snowden v. Hughes green | 3 | 1975–2002 |
| Bianco v. Town of Darien green | 3 | 1983–2001 |
| State v. Holloway green | 3 | 1992–1998 |
| Circuit-Wise, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services green | 3 | 1992–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.