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343 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1938–2025 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Mahergreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 7 | 7 |
State v. Gethersgreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 7 | 7 |
State v. Bartongreen2 sentences1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. 1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. | 6 | 6 |
State v. Jewettgreen2 sentences1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. 1999See State v. Barton, [ 219 Conn. 529, 546 , 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 115 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988)]; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221 , 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. | 6 | 6 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2023Our Supreme Court often has commenced an equal protection analysis ‘‘by [a]ssuming arguendo that the two categories of defendants identified by the [acquittee] are similarly situated with respect to the [statutory scheme] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 143 , 716 A.2d 870 (1998). 2023Our Supreme Court often has commenced an equal protection analysis ‘‘by [a]ssuming arguendo that the two categories of defendants identified by the [acquittee] are similarly situated with respect to the [statutory scheme] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 143 , 716 A.2d 870 (1998). | 5 | 11 |
Stuart v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, 266 Conn. 596, 602 , 834 A.2d 52 (2003). “[I]t is only after this threshold requirement is met that the court will consider whether the statute survives scrutiny under the equal protection clause.” Id., 602 n.10. 2011See, e.g., Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, 266 Conn. 596, 602 , 834 A.2d 52 (2003). “[I]t is only after this threshold requirement is met that the court will consider whether the statute survives scrutiny under the equal protection clause.” Id., 602 n.10. | 4 | 5 |
State v. Lammegreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 4 | 5 |
| The Dartmouth Review, on Behalf of Its Officers, Staff and Subscribers v. Dartmouth Collegered | 4 | 4 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2016Because the exercise of peremptory challenges is "subject to the commands of the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause"; id., at 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; the underlying rationale of Batson has been extended to other group classifications that trigger heightened scrutiny under a traditional equal protection analysis, including ancestry or national origin. 2016Because the exercise of peremptory challenges is "subject to the commands of the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause"; id., at 89 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; the underlying rationale of Batson has been extended to other group classifications that trigger heightened scrutiny under a traditional equal protection analysis, including ancestry or national origin. | 3 | 11 |
Horton v. Meskillgreen2 sentences2004Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied, by discharge of the term which has the longest term, to run-, (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.” (Emphasis added.) 7 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, §1, provides in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any 2004Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run\ (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.” (Emphasis added.) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, §1, provides in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any pers | 3 | 9 |
| Laden v. Wardengreen | 3 | 4 |
| State v. Angel C.green | 3 | 3 |
| Verena Rivera-Powell, Francesca Castellanos, Georgina Sanchez, and Marie Sierra v. New York City Board of Elections, Docket No. 06-4665-Cvgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Westchester County Independence Party v. Astorinogreen | 3 | 3 |
Zapata v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , 2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , | 2 | 5 |
| F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginiagreen | 2 | 5 |
| Craig v. Borengreen | 2 | 3 |
| Buckley v. Valeored | 2 | 3 |
| Locke v. Daveygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Saunders v. KDFBS, LLCgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Rodriguezgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Higginsgreen | 2 | 2 |
Ross v. Moffittgreen2 sentences2001"The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages CT Page 12280 [between such similarly situated persons]. . . ." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 , 612 , 94 S.Ct. 2437 , 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); State v. Wright, supra, 246 Conn. 139 . 2001"The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages CT Page 12280 [between such similarly situated persons]. . . ." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 , 612 , 94 S.Ct. 2437 , 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); State v. Wright, supra, 246 Conn. 139 . | 1 | 10 |
Nordlinger v. Hahngreen2 sentences2008For purposes of an equal protection analysis, however, groups that are treated differently by a statute are not similarly situated unless they “are in all relevant respects alike.” (Emphasis added.) Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 , 112 S. Ct. 2326 , 120 L. 2008For purposes of an equal protection analysis, however, groups that are treated differently by a statute are not similarly situated unless they “are in all relevant respects alike.” (Emphasis added.) Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 , 112 S. Ct. 2326 , 120 L. | 1 | 9 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.red2 sentences2006Independent of his claim of evidential insufficiency, the defendant alleges that § 53a-72a (a) (2) violates his right to equal protection under the law. 7 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution demands that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is “essentially a direction that all persons situated similarly should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S. Ct. 3249 , 87 L. 2006Independent of his claim of evidential insufficiency, the defendant alleges that § 53a-72a (a) (2) violates his right to equal protection under the law. 7 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution demands that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is “essentially a direction that all persons situated similarly should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S. Ct. 3249 , 87 L. | 1 | 9 |
City Recycling, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Thus, the analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 448 , 778 A.2d 77 (2001). 2006Thus, the analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 448 , 778 A.2d 77 (2001). | 1 | 7 |
Daly v. DelPontegreen2 sentences2004Id., 513-14 . 2001(Plaintiff's November 2, 2000 Brief, pp. 9 et seq.; Defendants' December 18, 2000 Brief, pp. 6 et seq.) "[S]tate action concerning social and economic regulation will survive an equal protection challenge if it satisfies a rational basis test." Daly v. DelPonte , 225 Conn. 499 , 513 (1993). | 1 | 7 |
Darak v. Darakyellow2 sentences1998Thus, the analytical “predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 473 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989). 1998Thus, the analytical “predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 473 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Longgreen2 sentences2023Next, I conclude that, pursuant to the binding precedent of our Supreme Court in State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 540 , 847 A.2d 862 (Long I), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969 , 125 S. Ct. 424 , 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004), rational basis review applies to the acquittee’s equal protection claim. 2023Next, I conclude that, pursuant to the binding precedent of our Supreme Court in State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 540 , 847 A.2d 862 (Long I), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969 , 125 S. Ct. 424 , 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004), rational basis review applies to the acquittee’s equal protection claim. | 1 | 6 |
State v. Jason B.green2 sentences2022See State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543 , 558 n.12, 729 A.2d 760 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 967 , 120 S. Ct. 406 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1999). 20 To the extent that the respondent argues that the petitioner is not being treated differently than similarly situated inmates, namely, those inmates also with detainers lodged against them, we emphasize that this argument goes to whether the petitioner can prove his claim rather than whether he has sufficiently alleged an equal protection claim. 21 Also of import, we acknowledge that the detainer itself does not make the petitioner ineligible for rehabilita 2022See State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543 , 558 n.12, 729 A.2d 760 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 967 , 120 S. Ct. 406 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1999). 20 To the extent that the respondent argues that the petitioner is not being treated differently than similarly situated inmates, namely, those inmates also with detainers lodged against them, we emphasize that this argument goes to whether the petitioner can prove his claim rather than whether he has sufficiently alleged an equal protection claim. 21 Also of import, we acknowledge that the detainer itself does not make the petitioner ineligible for rehabilita | 1 | 6 |
Cologne v. Westfarms Associatesgreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 1 | 6 |
Ramos v. Town of Vernongreen2 sentences2006If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 829 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000). 2006If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 829 , 761 A.2d 705 (2000). | 1 | 5 |
Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protectiongreen2 sentences2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma 2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma | 1 | 5 |
| Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britaingreen | 1 | 5 |
| Keane v. Fischettigreen | 1 | 4 |
| Jason B. v. Connecticutgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Healthgreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Castonguaygreen | 1 | 4 |
| Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc.green | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Id., 757 . 2001If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge." (Citations omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) Id. 756-57 . | 14 | 1997–2002 |
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2021The plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that § 46b-16a violated the equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution insofar as that statute had a disparate impact on women failed under the first prong of State v. Golding ( 213 Conn. 233 ), as the plaintiff failed to introduce at trial any evidence regarding this alleged disparate impact, and, therefore, the record was inadequate to review her claim. 2021The plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that § 46b-16a violated the equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution insofar as that statute had a disparate impact on women failed under the first prong of State v. Golding ( 213 Conn. 233 ), as the plaintiff failed to introduce at trial any evidence regarding this alleged disparate impact, and, therefore, the record was inadequate to review her claim. | 8 | 1992–2021 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences2001The court reasoned: “In order to determine whether a statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause, a court must consider three factors: ‘the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.’ Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 , 92 S. Ct. 995 , 31 L. 2001The court reasoned: “In order to determine whether a statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause, a court must consider three factors: ‘the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.’ Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 , 92 S. Ct. 995 , 31 L. | 8 | 1977–2001 |
Palka v. Walker
green
2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see 1999Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49 , 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see | 7 | 1992–1999 |
Castaneda v. Partida
green
2 sentences2021The court found, on the basis of the record before it, that ‘‘that assumption [was] unwarranted and unproven.’’ Turning to the equal protection claim, the court applied the three part test set forth in State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 578 , which requires, as proof of an equal protection violation in jury selection ‘‘(1) underrepresentation of a recognizable group; (2) substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) a selection procedure susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 594 , citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S 2021The court found, on the basis of the record before it, that ‘‘that assumption [was] unwarranted and unproven.’’ Turning to the equal protection claim, the court applied the three part test set forth in State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 578 , which requires, as proof of an equal protection violation in jury selection ‘‘(1) underrepresentation of a recognizable group; (2) substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) a selection procedure susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 594 , citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S | 6 | 1985–2021 |
Keogh v. City of Bridgeport
green
2 sentences2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , 2010G Count Six of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint: Violations of the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Under the Connecticut Constitution Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions have the same meanings and the same limits.” Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75 , 82 n.4, 440 A.2d 792 (1981); see also Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 59-60 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314 , | 5 | 1986–2010 |
Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L. P. v. Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental Protection
green
2 sentences2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma 2010Partnership v. Stratford, 122 Conn. App. 198, 204 , 998 A.2d 833 (2010). “[T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 158 , 957 A.2d 407 (2008). “[T]he requirement imposed [on] [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances [in which] persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation ma | 5 | 2003–2010 |
Daily v. New Britain Machine Co.
green
2 sentences2007A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 577-78 , 512 A.2d 893 (1986). 2007A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 577-78 , 512 A.2d 893 (1986). | 5 | 1992–2007 |
Bruno v. Civil Service Commission
green
2 sentences2000In evaluating the constitutionality of statutes, we are mindful of the principle that [a] party mounting a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute must provide an adequate factual record in order to meet its burden of demonstrating the statute’s adverse impact on some protected interest of its own, in its own particular case, and not merely under some hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 800. 11 Similarly, in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 192 Conn. 335 , a case involving an equal protection challenge under the federal co 1997Ordinarily, in order to determine whether a statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause, "a court must consider three factors: `the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.' Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 335 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972)." Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335 , 345 , 472 A.2d 328 (1984). | 5 | 1985–2000 |
| Trimble v. Gordon green | 5 | 1984–1997 |
| Harris v. Commissioner of Correction green | 4 | 2007–2017 |
| Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. green | 4 | 1991–2010 |
| Golab v. City of New Britain green | 4 | 1995–2005 |
| City of West Haven v. Thomas green | 4 | 2002–2004 |
| Thomas v. City of West Haven green | 4 | 2002–2004 |
| Benjamin v. Bailey green | 4 | 1996–2001 |
| Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank green | 4 | 1989–1999 |
| Karp v. Zoning Board green | 4 | 1974–1999 |
| State v. Dukes green | 4 | 1994–1999 |
| State v. Metz green | 3 | 1996–2025 |
| Long v. Connecticut green | 3 | 2004–2025 |
| Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction green | 3 | 2004–2022 |
| State v. Geisler green | 3 | 2006–2019 |
| United Illuminating Co. v. City of New Haven green | 3 | 1997–2011 |
| Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture green | 3 | 2009–2009 |
| Carini v. Zoning Board of Appeals green | 3 | 1983–2008 |
| State v. Moran green | 3 | 2004–2007 |
| State v. Gonzalez green | 3 | 1995–2006 |
| Snowden v. Hughes green | 3 | 1975–2002 |
| Bianco v. Town of Darien green | 3 | 1983–2001 |
| State v. Holloway green | 3 | 1992–1998 |
| Circuit-Wise, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services green | 3 | 1992–1996 |
| State v. Foster green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.