equal protection clause in Georgia

2012See Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 (2), 418 S.E.2d 27 (1992) (interpreting the equal protection clause).

2012See Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 (2), 418 S.E.2d 27 (1992) (interpreting the equal protection clause).

2009More specifically, the defendants argue that there is no rational basis for each co-defendant in a joint trial to receive fewer peremptory strikes than a defendant in a solo trial. *316 As we pointed out in Rodriguez v. State, 275 Ga. 283, 284-285 (1) ( 565 SE2d 458 ) (2002), [t]he person who is asserting the equal protection claim has the burden to establish that he is similarly situated to members of the class who are treated differently from him.

2009More specifically, the defendants argue that there is no rational basis for each co-defendant in a joint trial to receive fewer peremptory strikes than a defendant in a solo trial. *316 As we pointed out in Rodriguez v. State, 275 Ga. 283, 284-285 (1) ( 565 SE2d 458 ) (2002), [t]he person who is asserting the equal protection claim has the burden to establish that he is similarly situated to members of the class who are treated differently from him.

2023Accord Jones v. State, 307 Ga. 505, 507-508 ( 837 SE2d 288 ) (2019) (analyzing only the “first prong” of the equal protection analysis); Reed v. State, 264 Ga. 466, 466-467 ( 488 SE2d 189 ) (1994) (“Since Reed failed to satisfy the 32 With this understanding, I join the Court’s opinion.

2023Accord Jones v. State, 307 Ga. 505, 507-508 (837 SE2d 288) (2019) (analyzing only the “first prong” of the equal protection analysis); Reed v. State, 264 Ga. 466, 466-467 (488 SE2d 189) (1998) (“Since Reed failed to satisfy the threshold obligation in his equal protection challenge, we do not consider whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); Sims v. State, 260 Ga. 782, 782-783 (399 SE2d 924) (1991) (“To successfully launch an equal protection attack on a statutory provision, a claimant must initially show that he is similarly situated to members of the class

2008"When considering an equal protection challenge in criminal matters, individuals are `similarly situated' only if they are charged with the same crime or crimes." Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317 (3), 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998) (1995 amendment to Child Hearsay Statute unconstitutional because it created disparate categories of identically situated defendants charged with molestation, some of whom must defend against more evidence than others).

2008"When considering an equal protection challenge in criminal matters, individuals are `similarly situated' only if they are charged with the same crime or crimes." Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317 (3), 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998) (1995 amendment to Child Hearsay Statute unconstitutional because it created disparate categories of identically situated defendants charged with molestation, some of whom must defend against more evidence than others).

2011These cases do not concern the right of individual voters to cast a ballot, and we do not find them persuasive in this context. [11] We also acknowledge this Court's statement in Grissom, 262 Ga. at 376, n. 1 , 418 S.E.2d 27 : "We do not foreclose the possibility that this court may interpret the equal protection clause in the Georgia Constitution to offer greater rights than the federal equal protection clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court"; however, we decline to do so here. [12] See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669 , 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990) (freedom of expression); Green v. St

2011These cases do not concern the right of individual voters to cast a ballot, and we do not find them persuasive in this context. [11] We also acknowledge this Court's statement in Grissom, 262 Ga. at 376, n. 1 , 418 S.E.2d 27 : "We do not foreclose the possibility that this court may interpret the equal protection clause in the Georgia Constitution to offer greater rights than the federal equal protection clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court"; however, we decline to do so here. [12] See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669 , 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990) (freedom of expression); Green v. St

2010To make a prima facie claim directly under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant was required to demonstrate that African-American persons were a recognizable, distinct class of persons, that they were under-represented over a significant period of time or under other circumstances which raised an inference of discrimination, and that the selection procedure employed was susceptible of abuse or was not racially neutral such that any presumption of discrimination raised by the statistics was supported. [Cits.] Ramirez v. State, supra, 276 Ga. at 159 (1) (b).

2010A fair cross-section claim is “almost identical” to a claim raised directly under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “with the one prominent exception being that the claimant need not demonstrate any intent to under-represent a cognizable group. [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Ramirez v. State, supra, 276 Ga. at 161-162 (1) (c).

1989The burden of proof rests upon the claimant because the statute is presumptively valid. “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to states the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 75 (92 SC 251, 153, 30 LE2d 225) (1971).

1979A classification by gender "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation...” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (92 SC 251, 30 LE2d 225) (1971).

1976The legislature may classify litigation and adopt one type of procedure for one class and a different type for another.” Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369 (1930).

1965The legislature may classify litigation and adopt one type of procedure for one class and a different type for another.” Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (50 SC 299, 74 LE 904).

1993The equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitution [2] is "substantially equivalent" to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. [3] McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 638 ( 285 SE2d 156 ) (1981); Suber v. Bulloch County Bd. of Educ., 722 FSupp. 736 (S.D.

1993The equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitution [2] is "substantially equivalent" to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. [3] McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 638 ( 285 SE2d 156 ) (1981); Suber v. Bulloch County Bd. of Educ., 722 FSupp. 736 (S.D.

2021The 8 509 U. S. 579 ( 113 SCt 2786 , 125 LEd2d 469 ) (1993). 9 522 U. S. 136 ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LEd2d 508 ) (1997). 10 526 U. S. 137 ( 119 SCt 1167 , 143 LEd2d 238 ) (1999). 11 Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) ( 658 SE2d 603 ) (2008). 6 legislature may classify litigation and adopt one type of procedure for one class and a different type for another.”12 Applying this principle, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A. held that, for purposes of evidentiary standards, “parties to civil cases are not similarly situated to those engaged in criminal prosecutions.

2021The 8 509 U. S. 579 ( 113 SCt 2786 , 125 LEd2d 469 ) (1993). 9 522 U. S. 136 ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LEd2d 508 ) (1997). 10 526 U. S. 137 ( 119 SCt 1167 , 143 LEd2d 238 ) (1999). 11 Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) ( 658 SE2d 603 ) (2008). 6 legislature may classify litigation and adopt one type of procedure for one class and a different type for another.”12 Applying this principle, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A. held that, for purposes of evidentiary standards, “parties to civil cases are not similarly situated to those engaged in criminal prosecutions.

2010Accord Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 12 , 694 S.E.2d 75 (reiterating that the party raising an equal protection challenge must show that "the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker." (quoting City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 188 , 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996) (punctuation omitted)).

2010Accord Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 12 , 694 S.E.2d 75 (reiterating that the party raising an equal protection challenge must show that "the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker." (quoting City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 188 , 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996) (punctuation omitted)).

2006The trial court’s allegedly erroneous action occurred when it previously rejected Allen’s defense of his peremptory strike as non-r acial, and the merits of his objection to that action on the part of the trial court were preserved for appeal. (b) In McCollum , the Supreme Court of the United States held that the equal protection clause prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. [Cit.] To evaluate claims that the . . . defendant used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the trial

2006The trial court’s allegedly erroneous action occurred when it previously rejected Allen’s defense of his peremptory strike as non-r acial, and the merits of his objection to that action on the part of the trial court were preserved for appeal. (b) In McCollum , the Supreme Court of the United States held that the equal protection clause prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. [Cit.] To evaluate claims that the . . . defendant used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the trial

1994The protection of the equal protection clause in the State Constitution is similar to the protection provided in the Federal Constitution. [2] Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 407 ( 383 SE2d 555 ) (1989).

1994The protection of the equal protection clause in the State Constitution is similar to the protection provided in the Federal Constitution. [2] Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 407 ( 383 SE2d 555 ) (1989).

2025See also Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 12 (2010) (holding that the burden on a plaintiff in an equal protection challenge is to show that “the 9 legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker.” (cleaned up)).

2010Accord Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 12 , 694 S.E.2d 75 (reiterating that the party raising an equal protection challenge must show that "the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker." (quoting City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 188 , 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996) (punctuation omitted)).

2024And although the Supreme Court has said, in the context of an equal-protection challenge, that “[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statues,” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 ( 103 SCt 1997 , 76 LE2d 129) (1983), I am not convinced that this statement means that a legislature’s discretion is so broad that taxes that expressly impose burdens on expression but are not subject to strict scrutiny because they are content-neutral somehow evade judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment altogether an

2024And although the Supreme Court has said, in the context of an equal-protection challenge, that “[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statues,” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 ( 103 SCt 1997 , 76 LE2d 129) (1983), I am not convinced that this statement means that a legislature’s discretion is so broad that taxes that expressly impose burdens on expression but are not subject to strict scrutiny because they are content-neutral somehow evade judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment altogether an

2023See Mack Trucks, 263 Ga. at 541 (applying “the rational basis test, which the parties concede is applicable here,” to an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 51- 12-5.1 (e) (2), which requires that 75 percent of a punitive damages award in a product liability action be paid into the state treasury); 51 We note that in Harvey, as in many of our cases, we treated the equal protection afforded by the Georgia Constitution as coextensive with that provided by the federal Constitution—in large part because the parties did not ask us to do otherwise.

1995In Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 541 (2a), 543, 436 S.E.2d 635 , supra, the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 51-12-5.1(e)(2), holding that under the statute similarly situated parties would be treated equally.

2023See, e.g., Stuart-James Co. v. Tanner, 259 Ga. 289, 290 (380 SE2d 257) (1989) (citing Price v. Tanner, 855 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that an equal protection claim is analyzed under a “two- prong” test which requires “as a ‘preliminary step’ a determination of ‘whether persons who are similarly situated are subject to disparate treatment” and holding that the claimants had not met their “threshold obligation” to show they are similarly situated to the comparator group (citations omitted)).

2023See, e.g., Stuart-James Co. v. Tanner, 259 Ga. 289, 290 (380 SE2d 257) (1989) (citing Price v. Tanner, 855 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that an equal protection claim is analyzed under a “two- prong” test which requires “as a ‘preliminary step’ a determination of ‘whether persons who are similarly situated are subject to disparate treatment” and holding that the claimants had not met their “threshold obligation” to show they are similarly situated to the comparator group (citations omitted)).

2023Accord Jones v. State, 307 Ga. 505, 507-508 (837 SE2d 288) (2019) (analyzing only the “first prong” of the equal protection analysis); Reed v. State, 264 Ga. 466, 466-467 (488 SE2d 189) (1998) (“Since Reed failed to satisfy the threshold obligation in his equal protection challenge, we do not consider whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); Sims v. State, 260 Ga. 782, 782-783 (399 SE2d 924) (1991) (“To successfully launch an equal protection attack on a statutory provision, a claimant must initially show that he is similarly situated to members of the class

2023Accord Jones v. State, 307 Ga. 505, 507-508 (837 SE2d 288) (2019) (analyzing only the “first prong” of the equal protection analysis); Reed v. State, 264 Ga. 466, 466-467 (488 SE2d 189) (1998) (“Since Reed failed to satisfy the threshold obligation in his equal protection challenge, we do not consider whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); Sims v. State, 260 Ga. 782, 782-783 (399 SE2d 924) (1991) (“To successfully launch an equal protection attack on a statutory provision, a claimant must initially show that he is similarly situated to members of the class

2023Dept. of Agric., 553 U. S. 591, 601 (II) (B) (128 SCt 2146, 170 LEd2d 975) (2008) (explaining that, when an equal-protection challenger is not a member of a suspect class, his claim nevertheless may be sustained where he has been “irrationally singled out as a so-called ‘class of one’”); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 124-25 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2198, 60 LEd2d 755) (1979) (holding that, absent evidence of selective enforcement based on a prohibited classification, defendant’s right to equal protection was not violated where he was prosecuted under a law with harsher penalties than an

2023Dept. of Agric., 553 U. S. 591, 601 (II) (B) (128 SCt 2146, 170 LEd2d 975) (2008) (explaining that, when an equal-protection challenger is not a member of a suspect class, his claim nevertheless may be sustained where he has been “irrationally singled out as a so-called ‘class of one’”); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 124-25 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2198, 60 LEd2d 755) (1979) (holding that, absent evidence of selective enforcement based on a prohibited classification, defendant’s right to equal protection was not violated where he was prosecuted under a law with harsher penalties than an

1990Reliance by the majority on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986) for such a proposition is misplaced since I read Batson as not requiring group correlation as a prerequisite for mounting an Equal Protection challenge to the state's use of its peremptory challenges.

1990Reliance by the majority on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986) for such a proposition is misplaced since I read Batson as not requiring group correlation as a prerequisite for mounting an Equal Protection challenge to the state's use of its peremptory challenges.

2005“An equal protection challenge is assessed under the ‘rational relationship’ test when neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is affected by the challenged statute. [Cit.]” Love, supra, 271 Ga. at 400 (2).

2005“An equal protection challenge is assessed under the ‘rational relationship’ test when neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is affected by the challenged statute. [Cit.]” Love, supra, 271 Ga. at 400 (2).

2023See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 LE2d 313) (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 LE2d 786) (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”).

2023See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 LE2d 313) (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 LE2d 786) (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”).