due process violation in Ohio

2026“When the State fails to preserve evidence that is merely ‘potentially useful,’ a defendant must demonstrate that the [S]tate acted in bad faith.” (Emphasis added.) Id., quoting Youngblood at 58 ; See also State v. Geeslin, 2007-Ohio-5239 , ¶ 9-10. {¶36} “Specific tests are applied to determine whether the state’s failure to preserve evidence rises to the level of a due process violation.

2025Law and Analysis {¶ 17} “‘[W]hen reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss arising from an alleged due process violation based on destroyed or missing evidence, we defer to the factual findings of the trial court while applying a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the facts to the law.’” State v. Urbanski, 2023-Ohio-3966, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Walker, 2022-Ohio-1684, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.). 8. {¶ 18} “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an accused from being convicted of a crime when the State eithe

2026“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.” Id., citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982).

2024Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0059 7 {¶21} Appellant herein argues that his sentence is contrary to law because it was longer than that offered to him in the plea deal. {¶22} “[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to a trial and should never be punished for exercising that right or for refusing to enter a plea agreement * * *.” State v. O'Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140 , 543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due pro

2026However, “a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial claiming a Brady violation should be reviewed using ‘a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].’” Smith at ¶ 24 , quoting State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 (1988).

2025However, “a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial claiming a Brady violation should be reviewed using ‘a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].”’ Id., quoting State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 (1988).

2026“When the State fails to preserve evidence that is merely ‘potentially useful,’ a defendant must demonstrate that the [S]tate acted in bad faith.” (Emphasis added.) Id., quoting Youngblood at 58 ; See also State v. Geeslin, 2007-Ohio-5239 , ¶ 9-10. {¶36} “Specific tests are applied to determine whether the state’s failure to preserve evidence rises to the level of a due process violation.

2025“Where the [S]tate’s failure to preserve concerns potentially useful evidence, a due process violation will only be found where the defendant demonstrates that the state acted in bad faith.” Sanders at ¶ 27 , citing State v. Geeslin, 2007-Ohio-5239 , ¶ 10.

2020Since prosecutorial misconduct may violate a defendant’s due process rights, “the touchstone of a due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” York at ¶ 23, citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

2020Since prosecutorial misconduct may violate a defendant’s due process rights, “the touchstone of a due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” York at ¶ 23, citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

2026In State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105 , the Ohio Supreme Court established a burden-shifting framework for analyzing a due process claim based on preindictment delay.

2026Speculative claims or vague assertions of prejudice are insufficient; rather, the due-process requirement of actual prejudice may be satisfied only when it is proven that the “‘unavailability of specific evidence or testimony . . . would attack the credibility or weight of the state’s evidence against a defendant and thereby aid in establishing a defense.’” Jones, 2024-Ohio-1588, at ¶ 44, quoting Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, at ¶ 25.

2023Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). {¶ 45} Under the due process clause, a court obtains either specific or general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

2023Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). {¶ 45} Under the due process clause, a court obtains either specific or general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

2025“This due process test takes into consideration the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id.

2024“This due process test takes into consideration the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id.

2015It has, however, been held that the philosophical underpinnings of Brady support the conclusion that even disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence during trial may constitute a due process violation if the late timing of the disclosure significantly impairs the fairness of the trial. [But] [e]ven where information may be exculpatory, “[n]o due process violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial.” United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc. (C.A.4, 1985), 760 F.2d 527, 532 .

2014Even where information may be exculpatory, “[n]o due process violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial.” State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 , 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001), quoting United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 532 (4th Cir.1985). {¶ 102} The defendant has the burden to prove a Brady violation rising to the level of a due-process violation.

2022The court clarified that “the proven unavailability of specific evidence or testimony that would attack the credibility or weight of the state’s evidence against a defendant and thereby aid in establishing a defense may satisfy the due-process requirement of actual prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 14} Near the conclusion of its analysis in Jones, the court succinctly stated its key holding: “Actual prejudice exists when missing evidence or 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO unavailable testimony, identified by the defendant and relevant to the defense, would minimize or eliminate the impact of the state’s evi

2022The court clarified that “the proven unavailability of specific evidence or testimony that would attack the credibility or weight of the state’s evidence against a defendant and thereby aid in establishing a defense may satisfy the due-process requirement of actual prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 14} Near the conclusion of its analysis in Jones, the court succinctly stated its key holding: “Actual prejudice exists when missing evidence or 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO unavailable testimony, identified by the defendant and relevant to the defense, would minimize or eliminate the impact of the state’s evi

2026The evidence must “possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed.” State v. Murphy, 2022-Ohio-4555, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.), quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, at 488-489 . {¶23} However, if the evidence destroyed or not preserved is only potentially useful, such that it could be helpful, a defendant must show bad faith on the part of the state to establish a due process violation.

2025Law and Analysis {¶ 17} “‘[W]hen reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss arising from an alleged due process violation based on destroyed or missing evidence, we defer to the factual findings of the trial court while applying a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the facts to the law.’” State v. Urbanski, 2023-Ohio-3966, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Walker, 2022-Ohio-1684, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.). 8. {¶ 18} “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an accused from being convicted of a crime when the State eithe

2019“Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether preindictment delay constitutes a due process violation.” State v. Dixon, 2015-Ohio-3144 , 40 N.E.3d 601 , ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). {¶12} First, the defendant bears the initial burden to “produce evidence demonstrating that the delay has caused actual prejudice to his [or her] defense.” State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 , 702 N.E.2d 1199 , 1201 (1998).

2019“Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether preindictment delay constitutes a due process violation.” State v. Dixon, 2015-Ohio-3144 , 40 N.E.3d 601 , ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). {¶12} First, the defendant bears the initial burden to “produce evidence demonstrating that the delay has caused actual prejudice to his [or her] defense.” State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 , 702 N.E.2d 1199 , 1201 (1998).

2022See also Perez v. Cleveland, 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 , 678 N.E.2d 537 (1997) (“when a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbitrariness or discrimination in its enforcement”). {¶50} In State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), the Ohio Supreme Court found a sex offender classification statute was not vague where it did not 16 prohibit specific conduct but established remedial registrat

2022See also Perez v. Cleveland, 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 , 678 N.E.2d 537 (1997) (“when a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbitrariness or discrimination in its enforcement”). {¶50} In State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), the Ohio Supreme Court found a sex offender classification statute was not vague where it did not 16 prohibit specific conduct but established remedial registrat

2025The Supreme Court has further explained: Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48 , 52 L.E.2d 752 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending. ...

2025The Supreme Court has further explained: Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48 , 52 L.E.2d 752 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending. ...

2026Justice Blackmun argued that bad faith is not required to prove a due process violation and he reviewed the cases upon which the Majority based its decision in Youngblood, including Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), and Trombetta.

2024Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” “Therefore, in order to establish a due process violation under Brady, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently withheld by the state; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced thereby.” State

2021He argues he was offered a sentence of 27 years before trial in exchange for a guilty plea. {¶66} “To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2021He argues he was offered a sentence of 27 years before trial in exchange for a guilty plea. {¶66} “To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2022The quintessential impermissible delay is that taken “for the purpose of rendering unavailable evidence favorable to the defense or which would tend to undercut the government’s case.” United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1514 (5th Cir.1996), fn. 23 (en banc). {¶ 64} Thus, to sustain a Due Process Clause claim for preindictment delay, Marion and Lovasco require that a defendant show (1) “actual prejudice” to the fair-trial right and (2) deliberate action on the part of the government to “gain tactical advantage.” Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 ; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at

2022The quintessential impermissible delay is that taken “for the purpose of rendering unavailable evidence favorable to the defense or which would tend to undercut the government’s case.” United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1514 (5th Cir.1996), fn. 23 (en banc). {¶ 64} Thus, to sustain a Due Process Clause claim for preindictment delay, Marion and Lovasco require that a defendant show (1) “actual prejudice” to the fair-trial right and (2) deliberate action on the part of the government to “gain tactical advantage.” Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 ; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at

2016As we have said: “There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. ‘The problem,’ we have stressed, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.’ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436-1437 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

2016As we have said: “There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. ‘The problem,’ we have stressed, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.’ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436-1437 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

2023See, e.g., State v. Rahab, 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio- 1401, 80 N.E.3d 431, ¶ 8 (lead opinion), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“ ‘To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort’ ”).

2023See, e.g., State v. Rahab, 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio- 1401, 80 N.E.3d 431, ¶ 8 (lead opinion), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“ ‘To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort’ ”).

2023Consequently, since Doors On-Line failed to establish the requisite “minimum contacts” relevant to the contract for the garage door executed with Chandra, “we conclude that the due process clause preclude[s] the trial court from exercising personal jurisdiction over [Chandra] through specific jurisdiction.” Id.

2008Id. {¶ 13} “The due process clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to binding judgments of a forum with which that individual has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.” Multiform Plastics Inc. v. Thermo Plastics Display, Inc. (July 12, 1993), Clermont App. No. CA9301-004, 1993 WL 257232 , *1, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 471 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 .

2012The due process test takes into consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’ Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 , quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).

2007The test under this due process analysis is "`whether a defendant's will was overborne' by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. * * * [taking] into consideration `the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.'" Dickerson , 530 U.S. at 434 , quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218 , 226 .

2025State v. Marshall, 2021-Ohio-816, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116 (1990); see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating that Brady “arguably applies in . . . situations . . . involv[ing] the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”); but see State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 (2001) (“It has, however, been held that the philosophical underpinnings of Brady support the conclusion that even disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence during trial may constitute a due proces

2025However, the lead opinion in Iacona had “suggested that ‘the philosophical underpinnings of Brady support the conclusion that even disclosure of potential exculpatory evidence during trial may constitute a due process violation if the late timing of the disclosure significantly impairs the fairness of the trial.’” Id., quoting Iacona at 100 .

2017“Thereafter, the due process inquiry involves a balancing test by the court, weighing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice to the defendant in light of the length of the delay.” Bell at ¶ 32 , citing State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51. {¶16} Bell contends that the trial court erred in relying on this court’s decision on direct appeal to deny his claim that he was denied due process on the basis of preindictment delay.

2017“Thereafter, the due process inquiry involves a balancing test by the court, weighing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice to the defendant in light of the length of the delay.” Bell at ¶ 32 , citing State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51. {¶16} Bell contends that the trial court erred in relying on this court’s decision on direct appeal to deny his claim that he was denied due process on the basis of preindictment delay.

2014In State v. Watson, 117 Ohio App. 333 (9th Dist.1962), the court noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio had followed Lindway in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427 (1960), but that the United States Supreme Court, "in reversing the Supreme Court of Ohio, held, in effect, that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is, by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, inadmissible in a state court." (Emphasis sic.) Watson, at 338, citing Map

2014In State v. Watson, 117 Ohio App. 333 (9th Dist.1962), the court noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio had followed Lindway in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427 (1960), but that the United States Supreme Court, "in reversing the Supreme Court of Ohio, held, in effect, that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is, by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, inadmissible in a state court." (Emphasis sic.) Watson, at 338, citing Map

2011Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2701 . ‘[A] person’s reputation, good name, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’ However, defamation alone is not enough to invoke due process concerns.

2011Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2701 . ‘[A] person’s reputation, good name, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’ However, defamation alone is not enough to invoke due process concerns.