due process violation in Ohio

2024Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0059 7 {¶21} Appellant herein argues that his sentence is contrary to law because it was longer than that offered to him in the plea deal. {¶22} “[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to a trial and should never be punished for exercising that right or for refusing to enter a plea agreement * * *.” State v. O'Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140 , 543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due pro

2024Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0059 7 {¶21} Appellant herein argues that his sentence is contrary to law because it was longer than that offered to him in the plea deal. {¶22} “[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to a trial and should never be punished for exercising that right or for refusing to enter a plea agreement * * *.” State v. O'Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140 , 543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due pro

2026However, “a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial claiming a Brady violation should be reviewed using ‘a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].’” Smith at ¶ 24 , quoting State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 (1988).

2025However, “a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial claiming a Brady violation should be reviewed using ‘a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].”’ Id., quoting State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 (1988).

2026“When the State fails to preserve evidence that is merely ‘potentially useful,’ a defendant must demonstrate that the [S]tate acted in bad faith.” (Emphasis added.) Id., quoting Youngblood at 58 ; See also State v. Geeslin, 2007-Ohio-5239 , ¶ 9-10. {¶36} “Specific tests are applied to determine whether the state’s failure to preserve evidence rises to the level of a due process violation.

2022Rejecting this negligence standard, the Supreme Court held that “when the claim is based on loss of evidence attributable to the Government,” the due-process inquiry centers on “good or bad faith on the part of the Government.” Id., citing Marion and Lovasco. {¶ 71} Building on Luck’s miscomprehension of the applicable standard, this court has settled on a burden-shifting framework under which if the defendant demonstrates “actual prejudice,” then the state must affirmatively justify its delay.

2020Since prosecutorial misconduct may violate a defendant’s due process rights, “the touchstone of a due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” York at ¶ 23, citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

2020Since prosecutorial misconduct may violate a defendant’s due process rights, “the touchstone of a due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” York at ¶ 23, citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

2024In drawing the distinction between “materially exculpatory” and “potentially useful,” the Ohio Supreme Court determined that “[i]f the evidence in question is not materially exculpatory, but only potentially useful, the defendant must show bad faith on the part of the state in order to demonstrate a due process violation.” State v. Geeslin, 116 Ohio St.3d 252, 254 , 2007-Ohio-5239 , 878 N.E.2d 1 , ¶ 10, citing Youngblood.

2023However, where the evidence is not material “but only potentially useful, the defendant must show bad faith on the part of the state in order to demonstrate a due process violation.” State v. Geeslin, 116 Ohio St.3d 252 , 2007- Ohio-5239, 878 N.E.2d 1 , ¶ 10.

2023Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). {¶ 45} Under the due process clause, a court obtains either specific or general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

2023Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). {¶ 45} Under the due process clause, a court obtains either specific or general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

2015It has, however, been held that the philosophical underpinnings of Brady support the conclusion that even disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence during trial may constitute a due process violation if the late timing of the disclosure significantly impairs the fairness of the trial. [But] [e]ven where information may be exculpatory, “[n]o due process violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial.” United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc. (C.A.4, 1985), 760 F.2d 527, 532 .

2014Even where information may be exculpatory, “[n]o due process violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial.” State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 , 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001), quoting United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 532 (4th Cir.1985). {¶ 102} The defendant has the burden to prove a Brady violation rising to the level of a due-process violation.

2022The court clarified that “the proven unavailability of specific evidence or testimony that would attack the credibility or weight of the state’s evidence against a defendant and thereby aid in establishing a defense may satisfy the due-process requirement of actual prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 14} Near the conclusion of its analysis in Jones, the court succinctly stated its key holding: “Actual prejudice exists when missing evidence or 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO unavailable testimony, identified by the defendant and relevant to the defense, would minimize or eliminate the impact of the state’s evi

2022The court clarified that “the proven unavailability of specific evidence or testimony that would attack the credibility or weight of the state’s evidence against a defendant and thereby aid in establishing a defense may satisfy the due-process requirement of actual prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 14} Near the conclusion of its analysis in Jones, the court succinctly stated its key holding: “Actual prejudice exists when missing evidence or 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO unavailable testimony, identified by the defendant and relevant to the defense, would minimize or eliminate the impact of the state’s evi

2026Speculative claims or vague assertions of prejudice are insufficient; rather, the due-process requirement of actual prejudice may be satisfied only when it is proven that the “‘unavailability of specific evidence or testimony . . . would attack the credibility or weight of the state’s evidence against a defendant and thereby aid in establishing a defense.’” Jones, 2024-Ohio-1588, at ¶ 44, quoting Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, at ¶ 25.

2025Consequently, the Ohio Supreme Court has “firmly established a burden-shifting framework for analyzing a due process claim based on preindictment delay.” Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105 , at ¶ 13.

2025“This due process test takes into consideration the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id.

2024“This due process test takes into consideration the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id.

2019“Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether preindictment delay constitutes a due process violation.” State v. Dixon, 2015-Ohio-3144 , 40 N.E.3d 601 , ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). {¶12} First, the defendant bears the initial burden to “produce evidence demonstrating that the delay has caused actual prejudice to his [or her] defense.” State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 , 702 N.E.2d 1199 , 1201 (1998).

2018The court also reaffirmed its firmly established "burden-shifting framework for analyzing a due-process claim based on preindictment delay [which states that] [o]nce a defendant presents evidence of actual prejudice, the burden shifts to the state to produce evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay." Id. at ¶ 13, citing State v. Whiting , 84 Ohio St.3d 215 , 217, 702 N.E.2d 1199 (1998) ; State v. Adams , 144 Ohio St.3d 429 , 2015-Ohio-3954 , 45 N.E.3d 127 , ¶ 99.

2022See also Perez v. Cleveland, 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 , 678 N.E.2d 537 (1997) (“when a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) 19 Case No. 2021-L-051 contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbitrariness or discrimination in its enforcement”). {¶59} In State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), the Ohio Supreme Court found a sex offender classification statute was not vague where it did not prohibit specific conduct but establishe

2022See also Perez v. Cleveland, 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 , 678 N.E.2d 537 (1997) (“when a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) 19 Case No. 2021-L-051 contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbitrariness or discrimination in its enforcement”). {¶59} In State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), the Ohio Supreme Court found a sex offender classification statute was not vague where it did not prohibit specific conduct but establishe

2025The Supreme Court has further explained: Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48 , 52 L.E.2d 752 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending. ...

2025The Supreme Court has further explained: Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48 , 52 L.E.2d 752 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending. ...

2023But the Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial claiming that the state suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant and material to the issue of guilt, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), should be reviewed using “a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].” State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 , 529 N.E.2d 8

2023But the Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial claiming that the state suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant and material to the issue of guilt, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), should be reviewed using “a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].” State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 , 529 N.E.2d 8

2021He argues he was offered a sentence of 27 years before trial in exchange for a guilty plea. {¶66} “To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2021He argues he was offered a sentence of 27 years before trial in exchange for a guilty plea. {¶66} “To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2022The quintessential impermissible delay is that taken “for the purpose of rendering unavailable evidence favorable to the defense or which would tend to undercut the government’s case.” United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 , 1514 (5th Cir.1996), fn. 23 (en banc). {¶ 64} Thus, to sustain a Due Process Clause claim for preindictment delay, Marion and Lovasco require that a defendant show (1) “actual prejudice” to the fair-trial right and (2) deliberate action on the part of the government to “gain tactical advantage.” Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 ; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at

2022The quintessential impermissible delay is that taken “for the purpose of rendering unavailable evidence favorable to the defense or which would tend to undercut the government’s case.” United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 , 1514 (5th Cir.1996), fn. 23 (en banc). {¶ 64} Thus, to sustain a Due Process Clause claim for preindictment delay, Marion and Lovasco require that a defendant show (1) “actual prejudice” to the fair-trial right and (2) deliberate action on the part of the government to “gain tactical advantage.” Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 ; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at

2016As we have said: “There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. ‘The problem,’ we have stressed, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.’ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436-1437 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

2016As we have said: “There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. ‘The problem,’ we have stressed, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.’ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436-1437 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

2002See State v. Estep (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 609 , 598 N.E.2d 96 (rejecting a due process challenge to the state’s failure to retain a urine sample used in a BAC test where similar arguments were presented), relying on California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 ; State v. Purdon (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 217 , 24 OBR 395, 494 N.E.2d 1154 .

2002See State v. Estep (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 609 , 598 N.E.2d 96 (rejecting a due process challenge to the state’s failure to retain a urine sample used in a BAC test where similar arguments were presented), relying on California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 ; State v. Purdon (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 217 , 24 OBR 395, 494 N.E.2d 1154 .

2023Consequently, since Doors On-Line failed to establish the requisite “minimum contacts” relevant to the contract for the garage door executed with Chandra, “we conclude that the due process clause preclude[s] the trial court from exercising personal jurisdiction over [Chandra] through specific jurisdiction.” Id.

2008Id. {¶ 13} “The due process clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to binding judgments of a forum with which that individual has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.” Multiform Plastics Inc. v. Thermo Plastics Display, Inc. (July 12, 1993), Clermont App. No. CA9301-004, 1993 WL 257232 , *1, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 471 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 .

2012The due process test takes into consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’ Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 , quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).

2007The test under this due process analysis is "`whether a defendant's will was overborne' by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. * * * [taking] into consideration `the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.'" Dickerson , 530 U.S. at 434 , quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218 , 226 .

2025However, the lead opinion in Iacona had “suggested that ‘the philosophical underpinnings of Brady support the conclusion that even disclosure of potential exculpatory evidence during trial may constitute a due process violation if the late timing of the disclosure significantly impairs the fairness of the trial.’” Id., quoting Iacona at 100 .

2025State v. Marshall, 2021-Ohio-816, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116 (1990); see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating that Brady “arguably applies in . . . situations . . . involv[ing] the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”); but see State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 (2001) (“It has, however, been held that the philosophical underpinnings of Brady support the conclusion that even disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence during trial may constitute a due proces

2022In Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d at 217, 702 N.E.2d 1199 , for instance, this court stated that “where a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment and presents evidence establishing substantial prejudice resulting from preindictment delay, the state bears the burden of producing evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay.” In Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , at ¶ 51, this court stated that “[t]o warrant dismissal on the basis of preindictment delay, a defendant must present evidence establishing substantial prejudice.” And in Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429 , 2015-Ohio-3954 ,

2017“Thereafter, the due process inquiry involves a balancing test by the court, weighing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice to the defendant in light of the length of the delay.” Bell at ¶ 32 , citing State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51. {¶16} Bell contends that the trial court erred in relying on this court’s decision on direct appeal to deny his claim that he was denied due process on the basis of preindictment delay.

2014In State v. Watson, 117 Ohio App. 333 (9th Dist.1962), the court noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio had followed Lindway in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427 (1960), but that the United States Supreme Court, "in reversing the Supreme Court of Ohio, held, in effect, that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is, by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, inadmissible in a state court." (Emphasis sic.) Watson, at 338, citing Map

2014In State v. Watson, 117 Ohio App. 333 (9th Dist.1962), the court noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio had followed Lindway in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427 (1960), but that the United States Supreme Court, "in reversing the Supreme Court of Ohio, held, in effect, that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is, by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, inadmissible in a state court." (Emphasis sic.) Watson, at 338, citing Map

2023See, e.g., State v. Rahab, 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio- 1401, 80 N.E.3d 431, ¶ 8 (lead opinion), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“ ‘To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort’ ”).

2023See, e.g., State v. Rahab, 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio- 1401, 80 N.E.3d 431, ¶ 8 (lead opinion), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“ ‘To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort’ ”).

2025Walls, 2002-Ohio-5059, at ¶ 51 .

2017“Thereafter, the due process inquiry involves a balancing test by the court, weighing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice to the defendant in light of the length of the delay.” Bell at ¶ 32 , citing State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51. {¶16} Bell contends that the trial court erred in relying on this court’s decision on direct appeal to deny his claim that he was denied due process on the basis of preindictment delay.

2011Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2701 . ‘[A] person’s reputation, good name, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’ However, defamation alone is not enough to invoke due process concerns.

2011Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2701 . ‘[A] person’s reputation, good name, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’ However, defamation alone is not enough to invoke due process concerns.