due process clause in Minnesota

1996The Minnesota legislature intended the long-arm statute to have “the maximum extraterritorial effect allowed under the due process clause of the federal constitution.” Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d, 717, 719 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 , 106 S.Ct. 528 , 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985) (citing Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn.1982)).

1992The argument advanced by respondent, and adopted by the trial court and the court of appeals, is that Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subd. 3, should not be read so narrowly because under the cases of this court, the statute is to “have the maximum extraterritorial effect allowed under the due process clause of the federal constitution.” Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 , 106 S.Ct. 528 , 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985); see also Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn.1982) (long-arm statute was drafted to extend jurisdiction to the permissible limits allowed by c

2016A due-process violation “presents a question of constitutional law, which [is] review[ed] de novo.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012).

2015Poeschel also contends that the revocation of her driver’s license must be rescinded “because law enforcement violated [her] fundamental due process rights under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.” “Whether a due process violation has occurred presents a question of constitutional law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn.2012).

2026“Although the amount of process due in a particular case varies with the unique circumstances of that case, prejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted).

2025Although the amount of process due in a particular case can vary based on the circumstances, “prejudice as a result of the alleged violation[s] is an essential component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008).

2016A. Effect of Guilty Plea A counseled guilty plea traditionally operates “as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986).

2016The first three arguments fail because a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non- jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980)).

1989See, e.g., Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn.1982) (citing Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1269 (8th Cir.1978)); In re Shipowners Litigation, 361 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Minn.Ct.App.1985); Thompson v. First National Bank of St.

1986Midwest Medical, Inc. v. Kremmling Medical-Surgical Associates, 352 N.W.2d 59, 60 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (citing Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1269 (8th Cir.1978)).

1985“Minnesota interprets its long-arm statute * * * to extend personal jurisdiction in its courts to the limits of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Mid-West Medical, Inc. v. Kremmling Medical-Surgical Associates, P.C., 352 N.W.2d 59, 60 (Minn.Ct.App.1984).

1985“Minnesota interprets its long-arm statute * * * to extend personal jurisdiction in its courts to the limits of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Mid-West Medical, Inc. v. Kremmling Medical-Surgical Associates, 352 N.W.2d 59, 60 (Minn.Ct.App.1984).

2024See State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (“In certain cases the due process clause, the right to confront accusers, or the right to present evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by the rape shield law.”).

2016See State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (stating that “[i]n certain cases the due process clause, the right to confront accusers, or the right to present evidence will require [the] admission of evidence otherwise excluded by the rape shield law”).

1996The Minnesota legislature intended the long-arm statute to have “the maximum extraterritorial effect allowed under the due process clause of the federal constitution.” Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d, 717, 719 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 , 106 S.Ct. 528 , 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985) (citing Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn.1982)).

1992The argument advanced by respondent, and adopted by the trial court and the court of appeals, is that Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subd. 3, should not be read so narrowly because under the cases of this court, the statute is to “have the maximum extraterritorial effect allowed under the due process clause of the federal constitution.” Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 , 106 S.Ct. 528 , 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985); see also Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn.1982) (long-arm statute was drafted to extend jurisdiction to the permissible limits allowed by c

2016The first three arguments fail because a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non- jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980)).

2016Kidd’s first three arguments fail because a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non- jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980)).

2016Assuming, without deciding, that the due-process claim in McDonnell was substantive, McDonnell establishes substantive-due-process relief when an implied-consent advisory misinforms .a person subject to testing under Minnesota’s implied-consent law that she could be charged with the crime of test refusal when such a charge is impossible. 473 N.W.2d at 855 .

2015Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Minn. 1991) (holding that it was a due-process violation to threaten a driver with the crime of test refusal when the state was not authorized to impose such charges); Minn. Stat. 9 § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2012) (“It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine under section 169A.51 (chemical tests for intoxication), or 169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation of license).”).

2025And Martinek held that, “[o]nce a sentence has expired, the court no longer has jurisdiction to modify even what may be an unauthorized sentence,” ultimately ruling that “[t]he district court no longer ha[d] jurisdiction to modify [the defendant’s] sentence by adding a conditional release term.” 678 N.W.2d at 718–19 (citing Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498–99). 20 Without elaborating on how Calmes applies to a jurisdictional analysis, Franson characterizes Calmes as “recognizing that a due-process violation may occur when a ‘sentence is enhanced after the defendant has developed a crystallized expecta

2018See Martinek , 678 N.W.2d at 718 ; see also Calmes , 632 N.W.2d at 645 (recognizing that a due-process violation may occur when a "sentence is enhanced after the defendant has developed a crystallized expectation of finality" in the sentence).

1991See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 , 100 S.Ct. at 566 (exercise of personal jurisdiction over an automobile retailer and regional distributor, whose sole connection with the forum state was occurrence of the automobile-related injury, was incompatible with the due process clause).

1991See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 , 100 S.Ct. at 566 (exercise of personal jurisdiction over an automobile retailer and regional distributor, whose sole connection with the forum state was occurrence of the automobile-related injury, was incompatible with the due process clause).

2012I § 7. “[T]he concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the due-process requirement will prevent conviction of even a predisposed defendant if the conduct of the government in participating in or inducing the commission of the crime is sufficiently outrageous.” State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn.1978) (citing Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 , 96 S.Ct. 1646 , 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976)).

2012I § 7. “[T]he concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the due-process requirement will prevent conviction of even a predisposed defendant if the conduct of the government in participating in or inducing the commission of the crime is sufficiently outrageous.” State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn.1978) (citing Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 , 96 S.Ct. 1646 , 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976)).

2024“When assessing 5 a due process challenge, the analysis [appellate courts] apply depends on whether the statute implicates a fundamental right.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 773 (Minn. 2015).

2017Furthermore, “[t]o survive a due process challenge using rational basis review, the statute must not be arbitrary and capricious.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 773 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

2023Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).

2013See State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82, 110 (Minn.2011) (applying rationale from Youngblood); State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 235-37 (Minn.2010) (same); State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 393 (Minn.2004) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ).

2015“The applicable due-process standard in a [termination] proceeding resides in the guarantee of fundamental fairness.” 7 Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 , 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982)).

2015“The applicable due-process standard in a [termination] proceeding resides in the guarantee of fundamental fairness.” 7 Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 , 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982)).

2017Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 571–72, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1972) (“[P]roperty interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”).

2017Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 571–72, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1972) (“[P]roperty interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”).

2012When abusive executive action is challenged under the due-process clause, we consider whether the challenged action implicates a fundamental right and “shocks the conscience.” Id. at 846-47, 118 S.Ct. at 1716-17 ; Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178 , 1181-82 (8th Cir.2003); Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 487 (Minn.2006).

2012Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 , 118 S.Ct. at 1714 ; see also Dokman v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 637 N.W.2d 286, 295 (Minn.App.2001) (holding that the court need not address a due-process challenge because appellant’s challenge could be considered under the Fourth Amendment).