due process clause in Virginia

2025“The amount of coercion necessary to trigger the due process clause may be lower if the defendant’s ability to withstand the coercion is reduced by intoxication, drugs, or pain, but some level of coercive police activity must occur before a statement or confession can be said to be involuntary.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App. 486, 488 (1992).

2025However, “[t]he amount of coercion necessary to trigger the due process clause may be lower if the defendant’s ability to withstand the coercion is reduced by intoxication, drugs, or pain, but some level of coercive police activity must occur before a statement or confession can be said to be involuntary.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App. 486, 488 (1992).

1996The Supreme Court of Virginia, in construing the extent of in personam jurisdiction under Virginia’s Long Arm Statute, opined that the purpose of the statute “is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this State to the extent permissible under the due process clause.” Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 740 (1971).

1991The Virginia Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is manifest that the purpose of Virginia’s long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this State to the extent permissible under the due process clause." Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern, Inc., 211 Va. 736, 740 (1971).

2023In Miller v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 727, 732 (1997), this Court established a due process defense for an individual “who takes measures to learn what conduct the government has proscribed, but is misadvised by the government itself.” Colton Allen King now argues that Miller’s due process defense applies to bar a conviction for possession of a firearm in Virginia where King relied upon advice from his Pennsylvania probation officer regarding King’s right to possess and use firearms in Pennsylvania.

2023A due process defense exists “where a defendant has reasonably relied upon affirmative assurances that certain conduct is lawful, when those assurances are given by a public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for defining permissible conduct with respect to the offense at issue.” Id. at 735 .

2020Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides that, “no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” “The requirements of the due process clause are satisfied if a party ‘has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it.’” Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 763 (1991) (quoting Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930)).

2018“The requirements of the due process clause are satisfied if a party ‘has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it.’” Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 763 , 406 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1991) (quoting Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930)).

2013Second, Burger King only addressed the due-process analysis of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).

2013“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to require that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant be based on “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

2018Citing Miller, this Court articulated the three requirements to successfully raise a due process defense in Branch v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 665 , 593 S.E.2d 835 (2004).

2018Citing Miller, this Court articulated the three requirements to successfully raise a due process defense in Branch v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 665 , 593 S.E.2d 835 (2004).

2007When an accused claims a due process violation, “[w]e are to determine only whether the action complained of . . . violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base -4- of our civil and political institutions,’ and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’” United States v. Lovesco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (citations omitted).

2006When an accused claims a due process violation, “[w]e are to determine only whether the action complained of . . . violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,’ and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’” United States v. Lovesco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (citations omitted).

2020Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides that, “no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” “The requirements of the due process clause are satisfied if a party ‘has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it.’” Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 763 (1991) (quoting Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930)).

2018“The requirements of the due process clause are satisfied if a party ‘has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it.’” Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 763 , 406 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1991) (quoting Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930)).

2013See Lovitt v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 266 Va. 216, 245 , 585 S.E.2d 801, 818 (2003) (“A prosecutor’s suppression of impeachment evidence creates a due process violation only if the suppression deprives the defendant of a fair trial under the Brady standard of materiality.” (emphasis added) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 ; McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1988))).

2013See Lovitt v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 266 Va. 216, 245 , 585 S.E.2d 801, 818 (2003) (“A prosecutor’s suppression of impeachment evidence creates a due process violation only if the suppression deprives the defendant of a fair trial under the Brady standard of materiality.” (emphasis added) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 ; McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1988))).

2013See, e.g., Peninsula Cruise, Inc. v. New River Yacht Sales, Inc., 257 Va. 315, 319 (1999) (“The purpose of Virginia’s long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this state to the extent permissible under the due process clause.”); Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. DeSantis, 237 Va. 255, 259-60 (1989); I.

2010The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that “it is manifest that the purpose of Virginia’s long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this State to the extent permissible under the due process clause.” Peninsula Cruise, Inc. v. New River Yacht Sales, Inc., 257 Va. 315, 319 , 512 S.E.2d 560 (1999) (quoting John G.

2013See Lovitt v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 266 Va. 216, 245 , 585 S.E.2d 801, 818 (2003) (“A prosecutor’s suppression of impeachment evidence creates a due process violation only if the suppression deprives the defendant of a fair trial under the Brady standard of materiality.” (emphasis added) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 ; McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1988))).

2012See Lovitt v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 266 Va. 216, 245 , 585 S.E.2d 801, 818 (2003) ("A prosecutor's suppression of impeachment evidence creates a due process violation only if the suppression deprives the defendant of a fair trial under the Brady standard of materiality." (emphasis added) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 , 105 S.Ct. at 3381 ; McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1988))).

2019See United States v. Verduzco, 330 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A due process violation at a revocation proceeding is subject to harmless error analysis.” (quoting United States v. Daniel, 209 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir.), amended by 216 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2000))).

2019See, e.g. , United States v. Verduzco , 330 F.3d 1182 , 1184 (9th Cir. 2003) ("A due process violation at a revocation proceeding is subject to harmless error analysis.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2005Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 501-02 , 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983).

2005Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 501-02 , 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983).

2023In other words, “[i]t is manifest that the purpose of Virginia’s long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this State to the extent permissible under the due process clause.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting John G.

2013See, e.g., Peninsula Cruise, Inc. v. New River Yacht Sales, Inc., 257 Va. 315, 319 (1999) (“The purpose of Virginia’s long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this state to the extent permissible under the due process clause.”); Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. DeSantis, 237 Va. 255, 259-60 (1989); I.

1991Many disputes have arisen concerning the abstract words of the due process clause but "there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

1991Many disputes have arisen concerning the abstract words of the due process clause but "there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

2017See Gordon, 28 Va. App. at 147 , 502 S.E.2d at 704 (rejecting as speculative defendant’s assertion that decision by local department of social services that allegation of child sexual abuse was a “founded” complaint would disqualify him from future employment as a teacher); Jackson, 14 Va. App. at 410-11 , 419 S.E.2d at 396-97 (holding that defendant’s speculation that a “founded” complaint of child abuse would possibly damage his reputation and employment opportunities was “not sufficient to trigger due process”).

2017See Gordon, 28 Va. App. at 147 , 502 S.E.2d at 704 (rejecting as speculative defendant’s assertion that decision by local department of social services that allegation of child sexual abuse was a “founded” complaint would disqualify him from future employment as a teacher); Jackson, 14 Va. App. at 410-11 , 419 S.E.2d at 396-97 (holding that defendant’s speculation that a “founded” complaint of child abuse would possibly damage his reputation and employment opportunities was “not sufficient to trigger due process”).

2025Bd., 302 Va. 504 , 528 (2023) (quoting Reid, 229 Va. at 187 ). “[T]hose provisions,” in addition to restricting congressional action, likewise “bind the States under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Marshall, 81 Va. App. at 266 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)). “[T]he right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters ‘of faith and doctrine’ without government intrusion” is accordingly carefully protected.

2025Bd., 302 Va. 504 , 528 (2023) (quoting Reid, 229 Va. at 187 ). “[T]hose provisions,” in addition to restricting congressional action, likewise “bind the States under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Marshall, 81 Va. App. at 266 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)). “[T]he right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters ‘of faith and doctrine’ without government intrusion” is accordingly carefully protected.

2021In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87 ; see Commonwealth v. Tuma, 285 Va. 629 , 634 (2013) (“Under the Brady rule, the prosecution’s suppression of evidence favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment violates due process.”).4 To establish a due process violation under Brady (“a Brady violation”), a defendant must pr

2007“In Brady . . . , the Supreme Court held that a due process violation occurs when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to an accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective whether the prosecution acted in good faith or bad faith.” Id. (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2025“The due process clause applies as a check on eyewitness identifications where ‘the police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a crime.’” Id. at 305 (quoting Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 , 232 (2012)).

2022See Perry, 565 U.S. at 245 (“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.”).

2020“The amount of coercion necessary to trigger the due process clause may be lower if the defendant’s ability to withstand the coercion is reduced by intoxication, drugs, or pain, but some level of coercive police activity must occur before a statement or confession can be said to be involuntary.” Id.

2010“The amount of coercion necessary to trigger the due process clause may be lower if the defendant’s ability to withstand the coercion is reduced by intoxication, drugs, or pain, but some level of coercive police activity must occur before a statement or confession can be said to be involuntary.” Id. (citing United States v. Haddon, 927 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1991); McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 1988)).

2005The United States Supreme Court has recognized the proposition that, although it is usually the case that prejudice is necessary to establish a violation of due process, see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 , 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1632-33 , 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961), a claim of prejudice is not virtually identical to a claim of a due process violation.

2005The United States Supreme Court has recognized the proposition that, although it is usually the case that prejudice is necessary to establish a violation of due process, see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 , 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1632-33 , 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961), a claim of prejudice is not virtually identical to a claim of a due process violation.

2026Cooper, 205 Va. at 889, 891-92 ; Allen, 36 Va. App. at 341-42 ; Duck, 8 Va. App. at 571 . 9 We recognize that Cooper was decided before Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the denial of such a fundamental right itself constituted a miscarriage of justice warranting appellate review.

2004The Court of Appeals has already held that in such a case “a due process violation did not occur ... because the defendants did not face a more serious charge in the circuit court than they first encountered in the general district court.” Id. at 341 , (explaining Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 389 , 363 S.E.2d 440 (1991)).

2022We will consider a due process challenge that was not raised in the trial court if “under 3 Nor did any evidence at trial support such an argument, as it was not until sentencing that appellant introduced the DMV receipt purporting to show that the DMV issued him a license following his declaration as a habitual offender. -6- the facts and circumstances of [the] case, a manifest injustice has occurred.” Duck v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 567, 571 (1989).

2011We will consider a due process challenge that was not raised in the trial court if “under the facts and circumstances of [the] case, a manifest injustice has occurred.” Duck v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 567, 571 , 383 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1989).

2025See Etheridge, 237 Va. at 94 .

2000Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 98 (1989)).