due process clause in New York

2013Any exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of state law must comport with the due process requirement that there be sufficient “minimum contacts” between the foreign corporation and the forum State such that the forum State’s assertion of jurisdiction will not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ ” (International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945], quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 [1940]).

2013Any exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of state law must comport with the due process requirement that there be sufficient “minimum contacts” between the foreign corporation and the forum State such that the forum State’s assertion of jurisdiction will not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ ” (International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945], quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 [1940]).

2024CPLR article 63-A provides for a civil remedy ( see People v A.O. , ___ Misc 3d ___, ___, 2023 NY Slip Op 23356 , *1 [Erie County Ct]; J.P. v W.M. , 79 Misc 3d 643 [Sup Ct, Franklin County]). "[C]ivil as well as penal statutes can be tested for vagueness under the due process clause," but abstract words which convey a sufficiently accurate concept may be used in a civil statute ( Montgomery v Daniels , 38 NY2d 41, 58 ; see Matter of Independent Ins.

2020The standard of review for violations of an enumerated constitutional right is heightened, unlike review of an economic regulation under the due process clause, which must satisfy only rational basis scrutiny (see Carolene Products, 304 US at 152 n 4; Federal Communications Commission v Beach Communications Inc., 508 US 307, 313 [1993]). - 27 - - 28 - Nos. 1-4 68 [2009]; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 54 [1975]).

2026Prosecutors may not needlessly delay without an acceptable excuse or justification, and a sufficiently lengthy unexplained delay may require [a court] to dismiss the indictment altogether" (<i>Regan</i>, 39 NY3d at 466 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).</p> <p>Applying these legal principles here, we conclude that the three-year delay to retry defendant a fourth time was unjustified and violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.^FN1 "[W]hile the <span>[*3]</span>greater the delay, the more likely the harm to the defendant, there is no specific length of time

2024The Extent of the Delay As to the first factor, the extent or duration of the delay, although "there is no specific length of time that automatically results in a due process violation," longer delays are more likely to inflict greater harm ( People v. Johnson, 39 NY3d 92 , 97 [2022], citing Taranovich, supra ).

2026Corp. , 15 NY3d 235, 256 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations [*9] omitted], cert denied 562 US 1108 [2010]; see e.g.

2013Corp., 15 NY3d 235, 260 [2010] [finding sufficient due process]; Matter of State of New York v Farnsworth, 75 AD3d 14, 20 [4th Dept 2010] [same].) The due process analysis is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.

1994A public employee is entitled to a due process hearing to clear his or her name only when dissemination of the charges has implicated the employee’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity, thereby foreclosing the employee’s freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities (see, Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 ; Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 NY2d 874 ).

1992In view of this determination, the court need not take a position on the remaining constitutional claims raised by the plaintiffs other than noting that the due process claim is without merit (see, Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 ; see also, Matter of Deas v Levitt, 73 NY2d 525 ).

1998To so treat the due process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts — state and federal— from making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice” (Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 251 [1949], reh denied 337 US 961 [1949], 338 US 841 [1949]).

1991So to treat the due process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts—state and federal— from making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice” (Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 251 [1949], reh denied 337 US 961 [1949], 338 US 841 [1949]).

2024Cooke once instructed, "independent construction finds its genesis specifically in the unique language of the due process clause of the New York Constitution as well as the long history of due process protections afforded the citizens of this State and, more generally, in fundamental principles of federalism." [ Sharrock v. Dell Buick- Cadillac, Inc. , 45 NY2d 152, 159-60 (1978)].

2024Cooke once instructed, "independent construction finds its genesis specifically in the unique language of the due process clause of the New York Constitution as well as the long history of due process protections afforded the citizens of this State and, more generally, in fundamental principles of federalism." [ Sharrock v. Dell Buick- Cadillac, Inc. , 45 NY2d 152, 159-60 (1978)].

2012In short, the regulation at issue here inexcusably deprived petitioner of the opportunity to be heard (see Morrissey, 408 US at 488 ; cf. People v David W., 95 NY2d 130 [2000] [holding that the failure to provide the defendant an opportunity to contest an administrative classification that he was a sexually violent predator amounted to a due process violation]; For the People Theatres of N.Y.

2011In the absence of such a specific finding, a due process violation must be presumed (see Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US at 486-487 ; People ex rel.

2015And, in that circumstance, the failure to seek to withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment does not preclude appellate review of the due process claim” (People v Turner, 24 NY3d 254, 258 [2014]).

2015And, in that circumstance, the failure to seek to withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment does not preclude appellate review of the due process claim” (People v Turner, 24 NY3d 254, 258 [2014]).

2013It is well settled that claims for property loss of this nature “will not support a due process claim redressable under [section] 1983 if ‘adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available,’ ” such as a Court of Claims action (Davis v New York, 311 Fed Appx 397 , 400 [2d Cir 2009], quoting Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 533 [1984]; see Bellezza v Holland, 730 F Supp 2d 311, 316 [SD NY 2010]).

2013It is well settled that claims for property loss of this nature “will not support a due process claim redressable under [section] 1983 if ‘adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available,’ ” such as a Court of Claims action (Davis v New York, 311 Fed Appx 397 , 400 [2d Cir 2009], quoting Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 533 [1984]; see Bellezza v Holland, 730 F Supp 2d 311, 316 [SD NY 2010]).

2024The Court has explained that “[m]easures enacted in the exercise of the taxing power for the purpose of raising revenues violate the due process clause ‘only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power” (Ames v Volkswagen, Ltd. v State Tax Commn., 47 NY2d 345, 348-349 [1979], quoting Mangano Co. v Hamilton, 292 US 40, 44 [1934]).

2024The Court has explained that “[m]easures enacted in the exercise of the taxing power for the purpose of raising revenues violate the due process clause ‘only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power” (Ames v Volkswagen, Ltd. v State Tax Commn., 47 NY2d 345, 348-349 [1979], quoting Mangano Co. v Hamilton, 292 US 40, 44 [1934]).

2011Nonetheless, if this court were to reach the issue, the matter also would have to be dismissed because any determination that respondent is a sex offender in need of civil management years before he can be either civilly confined or released subject to SIST violates respondent’s due process rights under both the State and Federal Constitutions. “(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334 [1976], quoting Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 481 [1972].) A due process analysis requires consideration of

2010Whether there has been a due process violation requires analysis of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail (see Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 [1976]).

2004The due process requirement of an "opportunity to be heard" which must be "tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard" demands no less. ( See Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 268-269 [1970].) It is readily apparent from the subject decision that the hearing officer used the exhibits submitted by ACS, which were never shown, explained, translated (in whole or in relevant part), nor fully identified to petitioner, as the entire basis for her adverse decision; the hearing officer makes clear that she discounted {** 4 Misc 3d at 343 }petitioner's unrebutted testimony an

1974Petitioners contend that, under the doctrine of Goldberg v. Kelly ( 397 U. S. 254 [1970]), the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 'States Constitution required that prior notice and opportunity to be heard be afforded before any regular assistance entitlements were reduced in the January, 1974 Federal changeover.

2016Both Matter of Fosmire and Storar relied on the common law, although Rivers noted that the “common-law right is coextensive with the patient’s liberty interest protected by the due process clause of our State Constitution” ( 67 NY2d at 493 ).

2012The Court of Appeals in its 1986 seminal decision in Rivers v Katz ( 67 NY2d 485, 495 [1986]), declared that mentally ill individuals have a “fundamental liberty interest to reject anti-psychotic medication,” and if these individuals are involuntarily committed psychiatric patients, they do not “lose their liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication.” Thus the Court concluded in its landmark holding that “the due process clause of the New York State Constitution (art I, § 6) affords involuntarily committed mental patients a fundamental right to refuse a

2013Any exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of state law must comport with the due process requirement that there be sufficient “minimum contacts” between the foreign corporation and the forum State such that the forum State’s assertion of jurisdiction will not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ ” (International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945], quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 [1940]).

2013Any exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of state law must comport with the due process requirement that there be sufficient “minimum contacts” between the foreign corporation and the forum State such that the forum State’s assertion of jurisdiction will not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ ” (International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945], quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 [1940]).

1987On our review of the record, we conclude that petitioner has failed to show entitlement to a destigmatization hearing. "[A] discharged employee’s entitlement to a due process hearing to clear his or her name accrues only when there has been a 'public disclosure’ by the employer of stigmatizing reasons for the discharge (Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341, 348 ; see also, Matter of Petix v Connelie, 47 NY2d 457 ), thereby foreclosing the employee’s freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities (Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 573 )” (Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 NY2d 874, 876 ).

1985That decision, and a line of similar cases from the Federal courts and the courts of this State, have held that public employees, like plaintiff, who lack tenured status conferred either by formal statutes or rules, or by informal agency-wide policies, may be terminated from their positions without the procedural protections associated with the due process clause, namely, a statement of reasons and a prior hearing (see Bishop v Wood, supra; Longarzo v Anker, 578 F2d 469; Matter of Bergamini v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr.

1999(US Const 5th, 14th Amends; United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 [1977]; United States v Marion, 404 US 307 [1971].) To establish a due process violation stemming from preindictment delay, a defendant bears a heavy burden of demonstrating “actual prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial and unjustifiable Government conduct.” (United States v Elsbery, 602 F2d 1054, 1059 [2d Cir 1979]; see, United States v Lovasco, 431 US, supra, at 789-790; United States v Marion, 404 US, supra, at 324-325; United States v Romero, 54 F3d 56, 62 [2d Cir 1995] [stating that a defendant must show “th

1994In the seminal pronouncement on the issue of delay in prosecution, the Court of Appeals in People v Singer ( 44 NY2d 241 , 252) held that "[p]reindictment delay * * * is governed by the due process clause which generally requires a showing of actual prejudice before dismissal would be warranted” (see, United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783 ; United States v Marion, 404 US 307 ).

2017Hentz & Co. ( 301 NY 164 [1950])], or the less stringent 'reasonableness' standard articulated in [Robinson v Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. ( 238 NY 271 [1924])], govern the merits of a due process challenge under the New York State Constitution to a claim-revival statute?" (In re World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 846 F3d 58, 70 [2d Cir 2017]) I write separately to expand on the majority's answer to the first certified question, and to explain why, in our answer to the second question, we should expressly adopt the - 1 - - 2 - No. 119 federal rule, according to which clai

1988Thus, it has been stated by Judge (then Justice) Titone that: "The retrospective application of new legislation may offend the due process clause if, upon balancing the considerations on both sides, it appears that retrospective application would be unreasonable (see Chase Securities Corp. v Donaldson, 325 US 304 ).

2010“Addington teaches that, in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants” (Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 755 [1982]).

1985Such a procedure would fail to meet the due process standard envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v Kramer ( 455 US 745 [1982]), which, among other things, requires a finding against the parents by clear and convincing evidence, a high standard of proof.

1980In Goss v Lopez ( 419 US 565 ), the Supreme Court held that students facing a temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that a student may not be expelled from a State school for misconduct unless he is accorded the minimum requirements of due process.

1979Concededly, although the right to an education is not guaranteed by the United States Constitution (San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1 ), where a State or subdivision thereof undertakes to provide a free education to all students, it must recognize an individual student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest protected by the due process clause (Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 574 ), and it may not discriminate against handicapped children (cf. Reid v Board of Educ., 453 F2d 238).