due process clause in Indiana

2020“When determining whether a defendant suffered a due process violation based on an incorrect jury instruction, we look not to the erroneous instruction in isolation, but in the context of all relevant information given to the jury, including closing argument, and other instructions.” Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

2019"When determining whether a defendant suffered a due process violation based on an incorrect jury instruction, we look not to the erroneous instruction in isolation, but in the context of all relevant information given to the jury, including closing argument, and other instructions." Boesch v. State , 778 N.E.2d 1276 , 1279 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

2020For example, in In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832 , 834 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), this Court determined that a mother had waived her claim that the trial court had violated her due process rights because she raised the constitutional claim for the first time on appeal. [44] Parents in this case did not object to any alleged deficiencies in the CHINS process during the CHINS proceedings, nor did they argue during the termination proceedings that those alleged deficiencies constituted a due process violation.

2020See In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832 , 834 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the mother waived the issue concerning the alleged due process violation because the issue was raised for the first time on appeal); see also Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Gurtner, 27 N.E.3d 306, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2019“When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of the due process clause.” Id. [11] We have long recognized, however, that the inability to provide services to an incarcerated parent does not amount to a denial of due process.

2015Office of Family & Children, 845 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that constitutional claims, including due process claims, may be waived when raised for the first time on appeal). [8] Waiver notwithstanding, Father has fallen far short of establishing a due process violation.

2019J.T. v. Marion County Office of Family and Children, 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

2006J.T. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied, abrogated on other grounds by Baker v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind.2004). 'We have held that "[the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Thompson v. Clark County Div. of Family & Children, 791 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)), trans. denied.

2002In Hardin v. State, 611 N.E.2d 123, 127-28 (Ind.1993), the court explained that the rationale for the rule prohibiting the admission ' of bad act and character evidence to prove guilt "is predicated upon our fundamental precept that every defendant should only be required to defend against the specific charges filed." When this kind of evidence is admitted at trial as proof of guilt, "a defendant would be forced to refute these allegations as well as defend against the crime specifically charged," and "the burden on the defense would be intolerably enlarged and the court would effectively nega

2002In Hardin v. State, 611 N.E.2d 123, 127-28 (Ind.1993), the court explained that the rationale for the rule prohibiting the admission ' of bad act and character evidence to prove guilt "is predicated upon our fundamental precept that every defendant should only be required to defend against the specific charges filed." When this kind of evidence is admitted at trial as proof of guilt, "a defendant would be forced to refute these allegations as well as defend against the crime specifically charged," and "the burden on the defense would be intolerably enlarged and the court would effectively nega

2019And “a parent may waive a due-process claim in a CHINS or termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on appeal.” S.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 37, 43-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; see also McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 194 (affirming termination of parental rights and concluding that mother waived claim that her due process rights were violated by numerous alleged deficiencies in the CHINS proceedings because she did not raise the issue to the trial court); In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832 , 834 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming termination of parental right

2014Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (a parent waives a due process claim by raising it for the first time on appeal).

1990The majority quotes with approval the statement in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), that the due process claim for destruction of exeulpatory evidence cannot be successfully maintained except upon proof by the accused of bad faith on the part of the police.

1990The majority quotes with approval the statement in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), that the due process claim for destruction of exeulpatory evidence cannot be successfully maintained except upon proof by the accused of bad faith on the part of the police.

2020Off. of Family & Children (In re A.I.), 825 N.E.2d 798, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that one procedural deficiency alone may not result in a due process violation), trans. denied).

2019Off. of Family & Children ( In re A.I. ), 825 N.E.2d 798 , 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that one procedural deficiency alone may not result in a due process violation), trans. denied ). [33] We must also consider the general proposition that, "if the State imparts *589 a due process right, then it must give that right." In re C.G. , 954 N.E.2d at 918 (citing In re A.P. , 734 N.E.2d at 1112 ).

2020A due process analysis in a CHINS adjudication turns on the balancing of three factors: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the States chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012).

2016Indeed, “due process protections at all stages of CHINS proceedings are ‘vital’ because ‘[e]very CHINS proceeding “has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of their children.”’” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re K.D. & K.S., S.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012)). [16] Nevertheless, a parent may waive a due-process claim in a CHINS or termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on appeal.

2025However, it is well-settled that because “[b]oth the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by [TPR] proceeding[s][,]” the determinative Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JT-3052 | December 8, 2025 Page 14 of 35 factor in whether a due process violation occurred is “the risk of error created by DCS’s actions and the trial court’s actions.” C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917-18 . [24] In looking at the risk of error created by the actions of DCS or the trial court, “we keep in mind that ‘due process protections at all stages of [the] proceedings are vital because every CHINS [and

2016Indeed, “due process protections at all stages of CHINS proceedings are ‘vital’ because ‘[e]very CHINS proceeding “has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of their children.”’” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re K.D. & K.S., S.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012)). [16] Nevertheless, a parent may waive a due-process claim in a CHINS or termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on appeal.

2016See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.2003); see also McIntosh v. McIroe Co., 729 N.E.2d, 972, 976 (Ind.2000). [14] “A due process claim requires the consideration of two factors: first, there must be the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and second, a determination of what procedural safeguards are then required.” Ross v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 790 N.E.2d 110, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 , 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“Once it is determined that the Due Proce

2016Although the analysis of claims under the due process clause of the federal constitution and Indiana’s due course of law clause have been conflated in the past, recent cases note the significant differences between them, McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 975-76 (Ind.2000).

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JT-1375 | November 21, 2025 Page 8 of 10 issue here is whether the trial court’s denial of the Motion—that is, its decision to hold the factfinding hearing in Mother’s absence—created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred. [14] A parent does not have an “absolute constitutional right . . . to be present at a termination hearing,” K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 248 (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 921 ), but the parent “does have the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” id. at 249 (quoting Tillotson v. Clay Cnty.

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JT-1375 | November 21, 2025 Page 8 of 10 issue here is whether the trial court’s denial of the Motion—that is, its decision to hold the factfinding hearing in Mother’s absence—created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred. [14] A parent does not have an “absolute constitutional right . . . to be present at a termination hearing,” K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 248 (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 921 ), but the parent “does have the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” id. at 249 (quoting Tillotson v. Clay Cnty.

2014We first address whether the due process clause applies to the Hains who, obviously, are not a governmental entity.7 See Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (holding that “Fourteenth Amendment protects [property interests], however, only from a deprivation by state action”).

1993After Tulsa Professional Collections Services, Inc. v. Pope (1988), 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S.Ct. 1340 , 99 L.Ed.2d 565 , notice solely by publication alone to creditors could not satisfy the due process test.

1994See id. at 1293 (Since applicant has no recognized liberty interest, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require that a hearing be held to consider his petition for shock probation).

1984Since he has no recognized liberty interest, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require that a hearing be held to consider his petition for shock probation." 422 N.E.2d at 1293 (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, *331 (1981) 452 U.S. 458 , 101 S.Ct. 2460 , 69 L.Ed.2d 158 ).

1995If a court were to indiscriminately admit proof of criminal activity beyond that specifically charged, then the burden on the defense would be intolerably enlarged and the court would effectively negate the due process presumption of innocence that our system of justice accords to every accused.” 611 N.E.2d at 127 -28 (citing Malone, supra, 441 N.E.2d at 1345-46 ).

1995If a court were to indiscriminately admit proof of criminal activity beyond that specifically charged, then the burden on the defense would be intolerably enlarged and the court would effectively negate the due process presumption of innocence that our system of justice accords to every accused.” 611 N.E.2d at 127 -28 (citing Malone, supra, 441 N.E.2d at 1345-46 ).

2003Id. [9] However, in light of our supreme court's recent decision in Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003), we find such analysis unnecessary, and, rather than strike down Indiana Code section 36-7-4-918.6 as unconstitutional, we somewhat awkwardly adopt the due process analysis that Indiana courts have applied to Indiana's other ninety counties in BZAs cases.

2003Id. 9 However, in light of our supreme court's recent decision in Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind.2003), we find such analysis unnecessary, and, rather than strike down Indiana Code section 36-7-4-918.6 as unconstitutional, we somewhat awkwardly adopt the due process analysis that Indiana courts have applied to Indiana's other ninety counties in BZAs cases.

2012Under the “practicalities and peculiarities of the case,” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 , 70 S.Ct. at 657 , 94 L.Ed. at 873, we think the Auditor satisfied the due process requirement articulated in Mullane, Dusenbery, and Flowers .

2012Under the “practicalities and peculiarities of the case,” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 , 70 S.Ct. at 657 , 94 L.Ed. at 873, we think the Auditor satisfied the due process requirement articulated in Mullane, Dusenbery, and Flowers .

1994Reference to Post-Miranda Silence In Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 LEd.2d 91, the Supreme Court held that use of "evidence of a defendant's silence following arrest and Miranda warnings, either for substantive or impeachment purposes, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment" because "the Mirando warning carries with it an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty." Henson v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 .

1994Reference to Post-Miranda Silence In Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 LEd.2d 91, the Supreme Court held that use of "evidence of a defendant's silence following arrest and Miranda warnings, either for substantive or impeachment purposes, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment" because "the Mirando warning carries with it an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty." Henson v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 .

2006In Finch v. State, 454 N.E.2d 856 (Ind.1983), the Supreme Court held that the McGowan holding withstood a due process challenge on the basis of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). .

2006In Finch v. State, 454 N.E.2d 856 (Ind.1983), the Supreme Court held that the McGowan holding withstood a due process challenge on the basis of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). .

2020Garwood v. State, 77 N.E.3d 204, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. granted, aff’d in relevant part 84 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2017) (citing Charleston v. Bd. of Trustees, 741 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will be clear once more: a plaintiff does not have a federal constitutional right to state-mandated process.”); Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n error of state law is not a violation of due process.”)). 7 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

2016In determining whether a due process violation occurred in a CHINS proceeding, we balance the three factors laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Id. at 1165-66 (citations omitted).

2017See generally Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (no constitutional distinction between probation revocation and parole revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1972) (“We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. . . .

2003Though distinguished from criminal tribunals by their informality and flexibility, probation revocation hearings are nonetheless regulated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-ineluding the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. - Medicus v. State, 664 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Ind.1996); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 LEd.2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2598 , 33 L.E.d.2d 484 (1972) 4 An error inhibiting a defendant's federal constitutional rights triggers the federal harmless error test. 5 Thus, it is re

1987Although dealing with a holder of a liquor license, our court, quoting from Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates (N.D.Ind.1945) 61 F.Supp. 688 , stated: “ ‘On the other hand the use of the permit, once granted, has the elements of property irrespective of what the legislature may declare about the permit itself, and except for the omnipresent and unlimited power of the state to revoke or modify the terms of the permit in the interest of the public welfare, the use of such permit, if not the permit itself, is property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.’ ” 441 N.E

1987Although dealing with a holder of a liquor license, our court, quoting from Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates (N.D.Ind. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 688 , stated: "`On the other hand the use of the permit, once granted, has the elements of property irrespective of what the legislature may declare about the permit itself, and except for the omnipresent and unlimited power of the state to revoke or modify the terms of the permit in the interest of the public welfare, the use of such permit, if not the permit itself, is property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.'" 441 N.E

1997With regard to the length of the interviews and defendant’s asserted mental limitations, challenges of similar interviews of defendants who had mental limitations have not resulted in a finding that their confessions were involuntary. 12 In fact, the United States Supreme Court specifically held in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-66 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 520-21 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), that mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind, even where defendant is delusional, can never conclude the due process inquiry, and that, unless the police knew of defendant’s mental state and suscep

1997With regard to the length of the interviews and defendant’s asserted mental limitations, challenges of similar interviews of defendants who had mental limitations have not resulted in a finding that their confessions were involuntary. 12 In fact, the United States Supreme Court specifically held in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-66 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 520-21 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), that mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind, even where defendant is delusional, can never conclude the due process inquiry, and that, unless the police knew of defendant’s mental state and suscep

1995Fetner v. Maury Boyd & Associates, Inc. (1990), Ind.App., 563 N.E.2d 1334, 1336 , reh’g denied, trans. denied; Dura-Line Corporation v. Sloan (1986), Ind.App., 487 N.E.2d 469, 470 .

1994See Dura-Line Corp. v. Sloan (1986), Ind.App., 487 N.E.2d 469, 470 ; Radio Picture Show v. Exclusive Int'l Pictures, Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 , trans. denied.