due process clause in Nevada

2019See Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 , 488 (1972) (setting forth minimal due process for a parole revocation hearing); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778 , 790-91 (1973) (recognizing that whether counsel is required for a parole revocation proceeding would be decided on a case-by-case basis).

1995In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a parolee has a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, that the state must afford a parolee some opportunity to be heard before parole is revoked, and that the revocation must be supported by verified facts.

1991See Judas Priest v. District Court, 104 Nev. 424, 425 , 760 P.2d 137 , 138 (1988) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 , 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1478 , 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984)).

1991See Judas Priest v. District Court, 104 Nev. 424, 425 , 760 P.2d 137 , 138 (1988) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).

2022State v. Autry, 103 Nev. 552, 556 , 746 P.2d 637, 640 (1987) (holding that “proof of prejudice is generally a necessary .. . element of a due process claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022State v. Autry, 103 Nev. 552, 556 , 746 P.2d 637, 640 (1987) (holding that “proof of prejudice is generally a necessary .. . element of a due process claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015a protected property or liberty interest."); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) ("[D]iscipline in segregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest."); Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a prisoner does not have a property or liberty interest in prison employment under the due process clause).

2015See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) ("[D]iscipline in segregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.").

2014The district court abused its discretion in granting Banks' motion to dismiss This court has consistently held that in order to establish a due process violation resulting from the State's destruction of evidence, a defendant has the burden of establishing that (1) the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith, or (2) the defendant was prejudiced by the destruction of evidence.' Sheriff, Clark Cnty v. Warner, 112 Nev. 1234, 1239-40 , 926 P.2d 775, 778 (1996).

2014The district court abused its discretion in granting Banks' motion to dismiss This court has consistently held that in order to establish a due process violation resulting from the State's destruction of evidence, a defendant has the burden of establishing that (1) the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith, or (2) the defendant was prejudiced by the destruction of evidence.' Sheriff, Clark Cnty v. Warner, 112 Nev. 1234, 1239-40 , 926 P.2d 775, 778 (1996).

1997See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).

1989See also Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820-21 (1986) (general claim of hostility on part of state supreme court justice towards insurance companies that were dilatory in paying just claims fell “well below” level of claims constituting sufficient grounds establishing constitutional violation under due process clause); In re International Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923 , 931-32 n. 11 (2nd Cir. 1980) (where, under federal provision similar to Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, “occasional flareups toward counsel” were held insufficient to establish a judge’s pers

1986Odoms now contends that his conviction must be set aside because the photographic lineups were so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentifi-cation and deprive him of his right to a fair trial. *31 The applicable due process standard regarding photographic lineups as enunciated in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) is: “[CJonvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestiv

1982The applicable due process standard regarding photographic lineups was enunciated in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968), wherein the court held: “. . . [C]onvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” See also Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134 , 451 P.2d 704 (1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 893 (1969).

2019In Holbrook v. State , 90 Nev. 95 , 98, 518 P.2d 1242 , 1244 (1974), we recognized that a presumption of vindictiveness arises where a judge imposes a more severe sentence after a new trial.

2019In Holbrook v. State , 90 Nev. 95 , 98, 518 P.2d 1242 , 1244 (1974), we recognized that a presumption of vindictiveness arises where a judge imposes a more severe sentence after a new trial.

1993In State v. District Court, 100 Nev. 90, 97 , 677 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (1984), this court concluded: [N]ot every mistake or error which occurs during sentencing gives rise to a due process violation.

1993In State v. District Court, 100 Nev. 90, 97 , 677 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (1984), this court concluded: [N]ot every mistake or error which occurs during sentencing gives rise to a due process violation.

2022Op. 68 , 497 P.3d 1187, 1191-92 (2021) (rejecting a due process challenge to a criminal sentencing hearing held over Zoom due to the COVID-19 pandemic).

2022Op. 68 , 497 P.3d 1187, 1191-92 (2021) (rejecting a due process challenge to a criminal sentencing hearing held over Zoom due to the COVID-19 pandemic).

2021Nonetheless, as the district court chose to address Townco's due process argurnent when reviewing its petition, see Mason v. Cuisenaire, 122 Nev. 43 , 48 n.7, 128 P.3d 446 , 449 n.7 (2006) (recognizing that a court may, but is not required to, address constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal), we review and agree that the Board did not deprive Townco of due process, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (explaining that the due process requirement of a fair trial before an unbiased decisionmaker applies to administrative agencies).

2021Nonetheless, as the district court chose to address Townco's due process argurnent when reviewing its petition, see Mason v. Cuisenaire, 122 Nev. 43 , 48 n.7, 128 P.3d 446 , 449 n.7 (2006) (recognizing that a court may, but is not required to, address constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal), we review and agree that the Board did not deprive Townco of due process, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (explaining that the due process requirement of a fair trial before an unbiased decisionmaker applies to administrative agencies).

2021The record indicates that these photographs were taken with a film camera. 3Richardson also contends that counsel should have challenged the detectives narrative of how they observed the hat in a photograph at his 8 State, 114 Nev. 261, 267 , 956 P.2d 111, 115 (1998) (recognizing that the failure to gather evidence only amounts to a due process violation where the evidence is material and the failure to gather evidence was the result of gross negligence or bad faith).

2021The record indicates that these photographs were taken with a film camera. 3Richardson also contends that counsel should have challenged the detectives narrative of how they observed the hat in a photograph at his 8 State, 114 Nev. 261, 267 , 956 P.2d 111, 115 (1998) (recognizing that the failure to gather evidence only amounts to a due process violation where the evidence is material and the failure to gather evidence was the result of gross negligence or bad faith).

2019As to appellant's claim that his due process rights were violated by the district court's conclusion that the State's procedures satisfied Brady, to establish a due process violation pursuant to Brady, a defendant must show: (1) evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) was withheld, either intentionally or inadvertently, by the State; and (3) "prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." Mazzan v. Warden 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000).

2015But there is some indication that these documents were related to an alleged due process violation, see Mazzan v. Warden, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A Tie. 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000), and not one of his ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims.

2019See Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 , 488 (1972) (setting forth minimal due process for a parole revocation hearing); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778 , 790-91 (1973) (recognizing that whether counsel is required for a parole revocation proceeding would be decided on a case-by-case basis).

2019See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (setting forth minimal due process for a parole revocation hearing); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 790-91 1Having considered the pro se brief filed by appellant, we conclude that a response from the State is not necessary.

2018However, appellants received by certified mail actual notice of the special assessment delinquency sale, and "[h]aving received such notice, [appellants] ha [ve] clearly been accorded due process in the application of the statute as to [them] personally." Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If a party receives actual notice that apprises it of the pendency of the action and affords an opportunity to respond, the due process clause is not offended."); cf. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559

2018However, appellants received by certified mail actual notice of the special assessment delinquency sale, and "[h]aving received such notice, [appellants] ha[ve] clearly been accorded due process in the application of the statute as to [them] personally." Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757 , 762 (9th Cir. 1976) ; see also Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246 , 254 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If a party receives actual notice that apprises it of the pendency of the action and affords an opportunity to respond, the due process clause is not offended."); cf. United Student Aid Funds, Inc . v. Espinosa,

2018See Commonwealth v. One 1976 Ford Truck Van, 424 A.2d 1323, 1325 (Pa. 1981) ("Even if the forfeiture provisions of the Act were unconstitutional on their face, any violation of appellee's rights that would have resulted from strict compliance with the Act has been prevented by the actual notice and opportunity for hearing that appellee received.

2018See Commonwealth v. One 1976 Ford Truck Van, 424 A.2d 1323 , 1325 (Pa. 1981) ("Even if the forfeiture provisions of the Act were unconstitutional on their face, any violation of appellee's rights that would have resulted from strict compliance with the Act has been prevented by the actual notice and opportunity for hearing that appellee received.

2017See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (declining to find a due process violation in the defendant's exclusion from a brief in- chambers voir dire and noting, in a situation in which "the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him," the "presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only") (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); see also United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167

2017See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (declining to find a due process violation in the defendant's exclusion from a brief in- chambers voir dire and noting, in a situation in which "the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him," the "presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only") (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); see also United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167

2017See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (declining to find a due process violation in the defendant's exclusion from a brief in- chambers voir dire and noting, in a situation in which "the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him," the "presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only") (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); see also United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167

2017See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (declining to find a due process violation in the defendant's exclusion from a brief in- chambers voir dire and noting, in a situation in which "the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him," the "presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only") (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); see also United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167

2017See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (declining to find a due process violation in the defendant's exclusion from a brief in- chambers voir dire and noting, in a situation in which "the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him," the "presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only") (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); see also United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167

2017See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (declining to find a due process violation in the defendant's exclusion from a brief in- chambers voir dire and noting, in a situation in which "the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him," the "presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only") (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); see also United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167

2018However, revocation proceedings "may very well result in a loss of liberty, thereby triggering the flexible but fundamental protections of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

2018However, revocation proceedings "may very well result in a loss of liberty, thereby triggering the flexible but fundamental protections of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

2023Babayan, 106 Nev. at 173-74, 787 P.2d at 818.

2023Babayan, 106 Nev. at 173-74, 787 P.2d at 818.

2021Cf Walters v. Nat'l As.s'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985) ("[T]he very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case; rather, 'procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."' (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 )); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 ("Retrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed

2021Cf Walters v. Nat'l As.s'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985) ("[T]he very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case; rather, 'procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."' (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344)); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 ("Retrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed

2019See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).

1987Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

2018However, appellants received by certified mail actual notice of the special assessment delinquency sale, and "[h]aving received such notice, [appellants] ha [ve] clearly been accorded due process in the application of the statute as to [them] personally." Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If a party receives actual notice that apprises it of the pendency of the action and affords an opportunity to respond, the due process clause is not offended."); cf. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559

2018However, appellants received by certified mail actual notice of the special assessment delinquency sale, and "[h]aving received such notice, [appellants] ha[ve] clearly been accorded due process in the application of the statute as to [them] personally." Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757 , 762 (9th Cir. 1976) ; see also Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246 , 254 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If a party receives actual notice that apprises it of the pendency of the action and affords an opportunity to respond, the due process clause is not offended."); cf. United Student Aid Funds, Inc . v. Espinosa,

2018However, appellants received by certified mail actual notice of the special assessment delinquency sale, and "[h]aving received such notice, [appellants] ha [ve] clearly been accorded due process in the application of the statute as to [them] personally." Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If a party receives actual notice that apprises it of the pendency of the action and affords an opportunity to respond, the due process clause is not offended."); cf. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559

2018However, appellants received by certified mail actual notice of the special assessment delinquency sale, and "[h]aving received such notice, [appellants] ha[ve] clearly been accorded due process in the application of the statute as to [them] personally." Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757 , 762 (9th Cir. 1976) ; see also Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246 , 254 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If a party receives actual notice that apprises it of the pendency of the action and affords an opportunity to respond, the due process clause is not offended."); cf. United Student Aid Funds, Inc . v. Espinosa,