due process clause in Pennsylvania

2026Before delving into the specifics of Appellant’s argument, I note that “[a] question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 161 A.3d 313, 317 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 472 (Pa. 2015)).

2026“A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 161 A.3d 313, 317 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2026To the extent that Mother asserts the trial court violated her due process rights because it failed to entertain her request for summary judgment, we find Mother’s understanding of the law, as it pertains to custody ____________________________________________ 8 “A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which [our] standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” S.T. v. R.W., 192 A.3d 1155, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). 9 Mother did not challenge the adequacy of the notice of the custody hearing at the start of the c

2026“A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” S.T. v. R.W., 192 A.3d 1155, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and emphasis omitted).

2021The court reasoned: [Appellant] couches his request as a petition for post conviction collateral relief, but such a request is not cognizable under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).4 Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 889-80 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“This claim [that the DOC ‘miscalculated the credit for time served awarded by the trial court’] is not cognizable under the PCRA.”); Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392 [, 395] (Pa. Super. 2014) [(“It is only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court’s alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in impos

2020Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2018). “[W]hen the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court's alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in imposing sentence, that challenge [is] deemed cognizable as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 395 (Pa. Super. 2014). -4- Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), the court must appoint counsel to represent an indigent petitioner in litigating his first petition for post- conviction collateral relief, “regardless of the merits of his claim.” Commonwealth v. Linds

2023Accord Commonwealth v. Monaco, 869 A.2d 1026 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding there was no merit to due process claim raised in connection with adult prosecution for offenses committed by juvenile where there was no improper motivation for the delay);1 ____________________________________________ 1 This Court in Commonwealth v. Monaco, 869 A.2d 1026 (Pa.Super. 2005), analyzed the due process claim without expressly applying the framework for pre-arrest delay discussed in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Wright, 865 A.2d 894 (Pa.Super. 2004), namely determining whet

2023Accord Commonwealth v. Monaco, 869 A.2d 1026 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding there was no merit to due process claim raised in connection with adult prosecution for offenses committed by juvenile where there was no improper motivation for the delay);1 ____________________________________________ 1 This Court in Commonwealth v. Monaco, 869 A.2d 1026 (Pa.Super. 2005), analyzed the due process claim without expressly applying the framework for pre-arrest delay discussed in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Wright, 865 A.2d 894 (Pa.Super. 2004), namely determining whet

2021“To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Cox, supra at 685 (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 , (1987)).

2021“To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id. at 685 (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2023To maintain a due process challenge, a party must initially “establish the deprivation of a protected liberty or property 3 interest.” Miller v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pavex, Inc.), 918 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

2020See Miller v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pavex, Inc.), 918 A.2d 809, 812-13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (concluding that where a statute does not grant an individual “an actual entitlement” or “an unqualified right to receive the benefit,” the individual has nothing “more than a mere expectation” of the benefit and, therefore, is not entitled to protection under 12 the due process clause).

2026It is well-established that “[a] question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 161 A.3d 313, 317 (Pa. Super. 2017), quoting Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 472 (Pa. 2015).

2026Before delving into the specifics of Appellant’s argument, I note that “[a] question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 161 A.3d 313, 317 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 472 (Pa. 2015)).

2026Commonwealth v. Donoughe, 243 A.3d 980, 985 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating, “when the Commonwealth fails to preserve evidence that is ‘potentially useful,’ there is no federal due process violation unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police” (original quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 402 (Pa. 2011)); see also Hill, 384 A.3d at 284 (requiring a showing of “bad faith” in the destruction of “potentially useful” evidence before finding a due process violation). -7- The police are required “to preserve evidence in tha

2018Id. at 404 (stating that “bad faith is required for a due process violation where merely potentially useful evidence is destroyed, no matter how useful to the prosecution”).

2023It [is] only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court's alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in imposing sentence, that a challenge to the sentence [is] deemed cognizable as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.[4] Id. (citations and emphasis omitted) (footnote added).

2021“It was only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court’s alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in imposing sentence, that a challenge to the sentence was deemed cognizable as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.” Id.

2023See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i) (authorizing collateral relief where conviction or sentence results from violation of Pennsylvania Constitution or the Constitution or laws of the United States); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 879 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“It [is] only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court's alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in imposing sentence, that a challenge to the sentence [is] deemed cognizable as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.”) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (authorizing coll

2021The court reasoned: [Appellant] couches his request as a petition for post conviction collateral relief, but such a request is not cognizable under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).4 Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 889-80 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“This claim [that the DOC ‘miscalculated the credit for time served awarded by the trial court’] is not cognizable under the PCRA.”); Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392 [, 395] (Pa. Super. 2014) [(“It is only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court’s alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in impos

2018See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 [](1987) (“To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 [](1974) (“When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them.”).

2017See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (“To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 , 94 S.Ct. 1868 , 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (“When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them.”).

2025Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 83 (1963), exculpatory evidence not disclosed to the defense will give rise to a due process violation and will require a new trial if if the exculpatory evidence is "material" either to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87 ; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(l)(a) (specifying, as mandatory discovery, "[a]ny evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession or control of of the attorney for the Commonwealth").

2025Judgment of sentence affirmed. ____________________________________________ 1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), addresses the due process violation which would occur if evidence favorable to a defendant is improperly withheld by the prosecution prior to the defendant’s trial. -9- 10/22/2025 - 10 -

2026Gentilquore v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 326 A.3d 512 , 516-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024); Shore v. Department of Corrections, 168 A.3d 374, 386 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

2020See Shore v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 168 A.3d 374, 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (explaining that to maintain a due process challenge, a party must initially establish a deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest).

2024In holding for the apartment building owner, the Supreme Court concluded that “the tenor of [its prior] decisions [is] that the right of natural expansion is a constitutional right protected by the due process clause.” Id.

2022Accordingly, “[t]he right to expand a nonconforming use to provide for the natural expansion and accommodation of increased trade is a constitutional right protected by the due process clause.” Jenkintown Towing Serv[.] v. Zoning Hearing Bd., . . . 446 A.2d 716, 718 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1982)[] (quoting Silver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, . . . 255 A.2d 506, 507 ([Pa.] 1969)).

2024Although the doctrine earlier had been characterized with constitutional overtones, it was in Silver that our Supreme Court clarified that “the right of natural expansion is a constitutional right protected by the due process clause.” Id. 6 Dipal Corp. v. Chartiers Twp.

2022Accordingly, “[t]he right to expand a nonconforming use to provide for the natural expansion and accommodation of increased trade is a constitutional right protected by the due process clause.” Jenkintown Towing Serv[.] v. Zoning Hearing Bd., . . . 446 A.2d 716, 718 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1982)[] (quoting Silver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, . . . 255 A.2d 506, 507 ([Pa.] 1969)).

2004See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 788 , 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (Marion establishes that “proof of actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication”); Snyder, 552 Pa. at 54 , 713 A.2d at 601 (Marion and Lovasco stand for the proposition that to establish a due process violation for a delay in prosecution, a defendant must show that the passing of time caused actual prejudice and that the prosecution lacked sufficient and proper reasons for postponing the prosecution); Commonwealth v. Sneed, 514 Pa. 597 , 526 A.2d 749 (1987) (when a defendant

2004See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 788 , 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (Marion establishes that “proof of actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication”); Snyder, 552 Pa. at 54 , 713 A.2d at 601 (Marion and Lovasco stand for the proposition that to establish a due process violation for a delay in prosecution, a defendant must show that the passing of time caused actual prejudice and that the prosecution lacked sufficient and proper reasons for postponing the prosecution); Commonwealth v. Sneed, 514 Pa. 597 , 526 A.2d 749 (1987) (when a defendant

2019Further, a defendant may succeed on a Due Process claim based on an improper delay in arrest only where the delay causes the defendant prejudice and the delay “was the product of intentional, bad faith, or reckless conduct by the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Jette, -4- 818 A.2d 533, 536 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Scher, 803 A.2d 1204, 1221 (Pa. 2002)).

2019Further, a defendant may succeed on a Due Process claim based on an improper delay in arrest only where the delay causes the defendant prejudice and the delay “was the product of intentional, bad faith, or reckless conduct by the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Jette, -4- 818 A.2d 533, 536 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Scher, 803 A.2d 1204, 1221 (Pa. 2002)).

2007Appellant relies on three late 1980’s panel decisions: Commonwealth v. Walker, 390 Pa.Super. 76 , 568 A.2d 201 (1989), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 645 , 593 A.2d 418 (Pa.1990); Commonwealth v. Maly, 384 Pa.Super. 369 , 558 A.2d 877 (1989); and Commonwealth v. Mikesell, 371 Pa.Super. 209 , 537 A.2d 1372 (1988), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 587 , 551 A.2d 214 (Pa.1988). 3 In Walker , this Court wrote in a footnote that “[a] claim that a court increased the punishment for a crime in violation of the due process clause as interpreted in [North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2

2007Appellant relies on three late 1980’s panel decisions: Commonwealth v. Walker, 390 Pa.Super. 76 , 568 A.2d 201 (1989), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 645 , 593 A.2d 418 (Pa.1990); Commonwealth v. Maly, 384 Pa.Super. 369 , 558 A.2d 877 (1989); and Commonwealth v. Mikesell, 371 Pa.Super. 209 , 537 A.2d 1372 (1988), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 587 , 551 A.2d 214 (Pa.1988). 3 In Walker , this Court wrote in a footnote that “[a] claim that a court increased the punishment for a crime in violation of the due process clause as interpreted in [North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2

2024Appellant fails to explain how “fair play” requires that he be allowed to retain the benefit of his plea bargain while negating its consequences. - 12 - Therefore, it is a due process violation and “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20 , 27 (Pa. 2008).

2021We have explained that review of a due process claim “entails an assessment as to whether the challenged proceeding or conduct offends some principle of justice so rooted in the [J-100-2020] - 58 traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental and that defines the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. 2001) (cleaned up).

2000But see Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 , 93 S.Ct. 80, 84 , 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (concluding that Ohio's trial court procedure would not be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because it eventually offered an impartial adjudication to the defendant, who had been convicted of a traffic violation by a village mayor with a pecuniary interest in the outcome, as the defendant was "entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance"); Lyness, 529 Pa. at 547 , 605 A.2d at 1210 (citing Ward for the proposition that "[t]he right to a fair and impartial tribunal in

2000But see Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 , 93 S.Ct. 80, 84 , 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (concluding that Ohio's trial court procedure would not be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because it eventually offered an impartial adjudication to the defendant, who had been convicted of a traffic violation by a village mayor with a pecuniary interest in the outcome, as the defendant was “entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance”); Lyness, 529 Pa. at 547 , 605 A.2d at 1210 (citing Ward for the proposition that "[t]he right to a fair and impartial tribunal in

1992But see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58-59 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337-338 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 290 (1988) (providing, in dicta, that the due process clause is not violated when the police fail to use a particular investigatory tool, such as a newer test, on semen samples).

1992But see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58-59 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337-338 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 290 (1988) (providing, in dicta, that the due process clause is not violated when the police fail to use a particular investigatory tool, such as a newer test, on semen samples).

2012In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Court specified that the due process standard it articulated previously in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which firmly established the principle that “the Due Process Clause ... protects [the accused] against conviction ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,’ ” was also the governing standard which a federal court was to apply in reviewing a state prisoner’s habeas corpus claim that the evide

2012In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Court specified that the due process standard it articulated previously in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which firmly established the principle that “the Due Process Clause ... protects [the accused] against conviction ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,’ ” was also the governing standard which a federal court was to apply in reviewing a state prisoner’s habeas corpus claim that the evide

2002I have filed a concurring opinion in Scher , addressing my view of the proper standard to be applied under the second part of the due process test set forth in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), which involves consideration of the reasons for the delay.

2002I have filed a concurring opinion in Scher , addressing my view of the proper standard to be applied under the second part of the due process test set forth in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), which involves consideration of the reasons for the delay.