due process clause in Illinois

2026Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 101 First, defendant argues the State failed to prove that he committed the acts underlying his convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child for the purpose of sexual gratification beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 102 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a person may not be convicted in state court ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (quoting In re Winship,

2026Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 111 First, defendant argues the State failed to prove that he committed the acts underlying his convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child for the purpose of sexual gratification beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 112 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a person may not be convicted in state court ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (quoting In re Winship,

2026Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 101 First, defendant argues the State failed to prove that he committed the acts underlying his convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child for the purpose of sexual gratification beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 102 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a person may not be convicted in state court ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (quoting In re Winship,

2026Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 111 First, defendant argues the State failed to prove that he committed the acts underlying his convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child for the purpose of sexual gratification beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 112 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a person may not be convicted in state court ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (quoting In re Winship,

2025The defendant further maintains that the references to his incarceration were substantially prejudicial since this case hinged on witness credibility. ¶ 32 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards an accused from conviction in state court except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.” People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979)).

2023“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards an accused from conviction in state court except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.” People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1979)).

2026In particular, he asserts that Harris, Smith, and Cursey’s identifications fit the detectives’ “classic pattern and become highly untrustworthy” and, thus, his conviction violates due process. ¶ 71 “[T]he use of false testimony underlying a conviction is a due process violation.” Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 487 .

2025See People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 487 (1996) (“[T]he use of false testimony underlying a conviction is a due process violation.”).

2026The due process clause of the Illinois Constitution “affords postconviction petitioners the right to assert a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.” People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319 , 333 (2009).

2026The due process clause of the Illinois Constitution “affords postconviction petitioners the right to assert a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.” People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319 , 333 (2009).

2020Id. ¶ 69 “Under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), it is error to comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence or his request for counsel.” Banks, 2016 IL App (1st) 131009, ¶ 132 . “[A]fter a defendant has received his Miranda warnings, it is a due process violation for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's postarrest silence at trial for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony.” People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, ¶ 28 .

2020We will consider each prong in turn. ¶ 18 A. Deficient Performance ¶ 19 Defendant argues that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient where he failed to challenge the State’s use of his postarrest silence. “[T]he United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20 (1976), that it was a violation of the due process clause of the -7- fourteenth amendment for the State to impeach a defendant using evidence that defendant was silent following his arrest, after he was advised of his Miranda rights.

2026The defendant argued that the appropriate sanction was to bar Trooper King’s testimony. ¶ 10 On February 25, 2025, the State filed its response, arguing that its failure to preserve the video did not constitute a due-process violation because the defendant could not establish that the recording was exculpatory or that it was destroyed in bad faith, citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).

2026To do so disregards the rule of law and the constitutional protections afforded all defendants regardless of the State’s view of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 31. ¶ 58 Although we never explicitly stated that Vargas acted in bad faith, our conclusion that the destruction of his notes was a due process violation was made in the context of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).

2024As a result, “procedures involved in terminating parental rights must meet the requisites of the due process clause.” M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363. ¶ 36 This court will generally consider three factors in determining whether a parent’s due process rights have been infringed upon: “(1) the private interest implicated by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the proceedings - 14 - used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administr

2024In the alternative, the State argues that even if due process is at issue, review of the Mathews factors (see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)) fails to reveal a due process violation. ¶ 46 We find the State’s initial argument claiming due process is not at issue, unpersuasive.

2021The due process clause of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution “guarantees more than fair process; it offers heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 24 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997)).

2019The due process clause provides “ ‘heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ ” In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356 , 362 (2001) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).

2013App. 3d 564, 578 (2011). ¶ 117 “A vagueness challenge is a due process challenge, examining whether a statute ‘ “give[s] [a] person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” ’ ” Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 415 (quoting Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 442 (1998), quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).

2013App. 3d 564, 578 (2011). ¶ 117 “A vagueness challenge is a due process challenge, examining whether a statute ‘ “give[s] [a] person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” ’ ” Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 415 (quoting Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 442 (1998), quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).

2022A procedure “terminating parental rights must meet the requisites of the due process clause.” In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).

2019See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (it is well established that a parent’s interest in maintaining a parental relationship with her child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment).

2021We further note that, as a due process analysis focuses on the defendant’s conduct, the bases of jurisdiction argued under section 2-209(a) “provide the groundwork for our analysis.” Aasonn, LLC v. Delaney, 2011 IL App (2d) 101125, ¶ 12 . ¶ 23 Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state “ ‘such that maintenance of the suit there does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 34 (quoting Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co., 125 Ill. 2d 144, 150 (1988), quoting International Shoe Co. v

2020We further note that, as a due process analysis focuses on the defendant’s conduct, the bases of jurisdiction argued under section 2-209(a) “provide the groundwork for our analysis.” Aasonn, LLC v. Delaney, 2011 IL App (2d) 101125, ¶ 12 . ¶ 23 Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state “ ‘such that maintenance of the suit there does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 34 (quoting Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co., 125 Ill. 2d 144, 150 (1988), quoting International Shoe Co. v

2014The burden is on the party filing a petition under this Section to prove that the parent's actions and decisions regarding visitation - 18 - times are harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health." 750 ILCS 5/607(a-5)(3) (West 2010). ¶ 76 This statutory presumption reflects the United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000), which recognized "a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children." That presumption derives from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Co

2014The burden is on the party filing a petition under this Section to prove that the parent’s actions and decisions regarding visitation times are harmful to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health.” 750 ILCS 5/607(a-5)(3) (West 2010). ¶ 76 This statutory presumption reflects the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000), which recognized “a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.” That presumption derives from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., a

2021The defendant claims that this visit, along with the subsequent photo array procedure and Golab’s third visit, amounted to an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure that tainted Simpson’s identification of him. ¶ 48 “Only where a pretrial encounter resulting in an identification is ‘unnecessarily suggestive’ or ‘impermissibly suggestive’ so as to produce ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification’ is evidence of that and any subsequent identification excluded by law under the due process clause of the 14th amendment.” People v. Moore, 266 Ill. App. 3d 791, 796-9

2020Rather, show-ups implicate the due process clause only when they are so unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive that there exists “ ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ” Id. ¶ 27 (quoting People v. Moore, 266 Ill.

2023Defense counsel argued that the video of the parking lot would have shown what happened between the defendant and the “alleged victim.” He once again cited Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310 , for the “proposition that the loss or destruction of evidence by the police can be a basis for a due process violation.” Defense counsel reiterated that the video, which was the best evidence to support his client’s defense, was unavailable due to the inaction and negligence of the police.

2022The correct sanction under Rule 415(g)(i) “is a decision appropriately left to the discretion of the trial court, and its judgment is entitled to great weight.” Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 318 . ¶ 28 As the State points out on appeal, Newberry also contained a due process analysis. -9- In connection with that analysis, the court distinguished Youngblood and held that, even absent a finding of bad faith, a due process violation occurs when evidence that is lost or destroyed is evidence “essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case.” Id. at 315 .

2025See, e.g., People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 353 (2006) (“Thus, while defendant herein has proven a due process violation which amounted to error by showing that he was required to wear an electronic stun belt at trial without the court having first determined that it was necessary,” the defendant failed to demonstrate second-prong plain error); People v. Rathbone, 345 Ill.

2024The court held that “[a] trial court’s failure to follow the procedures set forth in Boose before ordering that defendant continue to wear an electronic stun belt during his trial constitutes a due process violation.” Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 349 .

2023See People v. Basile, 2022 IL App (2d) 210740, ¶ 16 , No. 129026 (Jan. 25, 2023) (pet. for leave to appeal allowed); Oliver, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 696 . ¶ 53 As the trial court properly found that Usry’s testimony that K.P. stayed at Hote Haus was false and deceptive, defendant established a due process violation.

2022App. 3d 690, 694-95 (2006). “[A] due process violation consisting of prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury is actually and substantially prejudicial only if without it the grand jury would not have indicted the defendant.” Id. at 696-97 . ¶ 17 Defendant has failed to make a substantial showing of a due process violation resulting from a factual misstatement that occurred during the initial grand jury proceedings.

2024Apprendi and Its Application - 12 - ¶ 55 In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.

2024Moreover, the Mata court emphasized that an individual’s due process rights are not subordinate to the Governor’s clemency power: “State courts have an obligation to enforce and protect every right granted by the Constitution of the United States whenever those rights are involved in a suit or proceeding before them. [Citation] Therefore, in the event of a conflict between the Governor’s clemency power granted by the Illinois Constitution and a defendant’s right guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the constitutional right to due process of law must prevail.” Id. a

2025The second amendment codifies a preexisting right, guaranteeing “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation” (District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)), and it is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010)). ¶ 19 In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court set forth what it deemed to be the proper analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of firearm regulations under the second amendment.

2018People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 17 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), for the proposition that the second amendment is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Coram v. State of Illinois, 2013 IL 113867, ¶ 49 (stating the same proposition); Wilson v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 11 (same).

2024The majority also correctly asserts that an indictment should be dismissed for a due process violation “ ‘only with certainty’ ” (emphasis omitted) (supra ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 457 (1977))) when the violation is “ ‘unequivocally clear’ ” and where defendant “suffered ‘actual and substantial’ prejudice” (supra ¶ 33 (citing People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 256 (1996)).

2020The supreme court has made clear that the trial court has “inherent authority to dismiss an indictment in a criminal case where there has been a clear denial of due process even though that is not a stated ground in section 114-1.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 455 (1977); see also People v. Stapinski, 2015 IL 118278, ¶ 33 (“[A] trial court has the inherent authority to dismiss an indictment in a criminal case for any reason given in section 114-1 *** or where there has been a clear denial of due process.”). ¶ 21 “To support a claim that an indictment should be dismissed

2016Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 415 (1997). ¶ 29 In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the United States Supreme Court discussed what interests are protected by the due process clause.

2014See Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“He must instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to [have a property interest]. *** It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.”); Bartlow v. Shannon, 399 Ill. App. 3d 560, 571 (2010) (“The due process analysis begins with a determination of whether a protectable interest—in life, liberty, or property—exists.”); see also Colquitt v. Rich Township High School District No. 227, 298 Ill. 2 No argument was made regarding a liberty interest,

2015One year later, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court held that the Constitution's due process clause does not require that a juvenile be afforded the right to a trial by jury, thus determining that the rights conferred in adult criminal proceedings are not perfectly congruent with those due to juveniles in delinquency proceedings.

2015One year later, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court held that the Constitution's due process clause does not require that a juvenile be afforded the right to a trial by jury, thus determining that the rights conferred in adult criminal proceedings are not perfectly congruent with those due to juveniles in delinquency proceedings.

2024I, § 2) both provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 13 . ¶ 32 “[T]he standard of a proper exercise of the police power is whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the - 12 - public health, safety and general welfare.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d at 417 ; see Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 45 (“[T]o pass muster under the due process clause, a penalty must be reasonably designed to remedy the particular evil th

2008To determine whether a statute violates the due process clause, the court must determine “ ‘ “whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare.” ’ ” Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 242 , 644 N.E.2d at 1143 , quoting People v. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d 410, 417 , 403 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (1980), quoting Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 159 , 128 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1955).