due process clause in Tennessee

2020In order to show a due process violation pursuant to Brady, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he requested the information, unless it is obviously exculpatory, (2) the State must have suppressed the information, (3) the information must be favorable to the accused, and (4) the information must be material. -19- State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995).

2016For evaluating whether there is a due process violation under Brady, evidence is -6- considered material and its nondisclosure a violation of due process “„if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‟” [Edgin v. State, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995)] (opinion on petition for rehearing) (quoting [Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995)]).

2018The White court replaced the prior due process test articulated in Anthony with a sufficiency analysis. 362 S.W.3d at 578 .

2017The especially aggravated kidnapping conviction with respect to Mr. Gilman was dismissed by the trial court. -8- eliminated the need for a separate due process analysis on appellate review, and held that “[t]his inquiry . . . is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” Id. at 562 (overruling State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tenn. 1991)).

2025App. Mar. 29, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2023) (same). - 13 - 324 (1971)); see also State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tenn. 1997) (reiterating that “in other cases involving a pre-arrest delay, the due process inquiry continues to be guided by Marion”); Halquist v. State, 489 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tenn. Crim.

2021Our supreme court reaffirmed the applicability of the Marion–Dykes rule in State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1997), noting that in “cases involving a pre-arrest delay, the due process inquiry continues to be guided by Marion.” Id. at 495 .

2024State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tenn. 1997) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1971), and State v. Gray, 917 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tenn. 1996)); see also State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280 , 284- 85 (Tenn. 1998).

2015See, e.g., State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. 1998) (conducting a due process inquiry for a seven-year delay between offense and arrest); Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489 (five-year delay).

2019To establish a due process violation via the suppression of evidence, the defendant must establish that (1) he “requested the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the [S]tate is bound to release the information whether requested or not),” (2) “the State suppressed the information,” (3) “the information was favorable to” his case, and (4) “the information was material.” Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. 2001).

2018To establish a due process violation via the suppression of evidence, the defendant must establish that (1) he “requested the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the [S]tate is bound to release the information whether requested or not),” (2) “the State suppressed the information,” (3) “the information was favorable to” his case, and (4) “the information was material.” Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. 2001).

2024Id. (citing State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tenn. Crim.

2017State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 609 (Tenn. Crim.

2016In State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), also in the context of kidnapping, the supreme court replaced the essentially incidental test with a two-part due process analysis which examined whether the confinement went beyond that necessary to perpetrate the underlying felony and whether the kidnapping “(1) prevented the victim from summoning help; (2) lessened the defendant‟s risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim‟s risk of harm.” (citing Anthony, 817 S.W.2d at 306 ); see State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008) (“The Dixon two-par

2014See White, 362 S.W.3d at 578 (overruling State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d. 533 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991)).

2026Alleged Second Cellebrite Report and Chain-of-Custody Information The Defendant next raises a separate due process claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

2018See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 . -20- In order to show a due process violation pursuant to Brady, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he requested the information, unless it is obviously exculpatory, (2) the State must have suppressed the information, (3) the information must be favorable to the accused, and (4) the information must be material.

2015In order to establish a due process violation, the defendant must show that “(a) there was a delay, (b) the accused sustained actual prejudice as a direct and proximate result of the delay, and (c) the State caused the delay in order to gain tactical advantage over or to harass the accused.” State v. Gray, 917 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Dykes, 803 S.W.2d at 256 ).

1999See [United States v.] Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2048-49 (“proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, . . . the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused”). -7- Gray, 917 S.W.2d at 673 .

2016In State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), also in the context of kidnapping, the supreme court replaced the essentially incidental test with a two-part due process analysis which examined whether the confinement went beyond that necessary to perpetrate the underlying felony and whether the kidnapping “(1) prevented the victim from summoning help; (2) lessened the defendant‟s risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim‟s risk of harm.” (citing Anthony, 817 S.W.2d at 306 ); see State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008) (“The Dixon two-par

2015Dixon, 957 S.W.2d at 535 . -7- In 2012, in White, we determined that the Anthony/Dixon framework had proven unworkable and expressly overruled Anthony and the entire line of cases that included a separate due process analysis on appellate review.

1998In determining whether a due process violation has occurred when the State is aware that an offense has been committed, the test set forth in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), whether it is shown that the delay caused prejudice to the defendant’s rights to a fair trial and that the State caused the delay in order to obtain an advantage.

1998In determining whether a due process violation has occurred when the State is aware that an offense has been committed, the test set forth in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), whether it is shown that the delay caused prejudice to the defendant’s rights to a fair trial and that the State caused the delay in order to obtain an advantage.

2022“Although the complete non- disclosure of significant exculpatory evidence often makes an easy case for a due process violation, delayed disclosure requires an inquiry into whether the delay prevented the defense from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant’s case.” State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 548 (Tenn. 1993) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).

2020“Although the complete non-disclosure of significant exculpatory evidence often makes an easy case for a due process violation, delayed disclosure requires an inquiry into whether the delay prevented the defense from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant’s case.” State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 548 (Tenn. 1993) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).

2017The especially aggravated kidnapping conviction with respect to Mr. Gilman was dismissed by the trial court. -8- eliminated the need for a separate due process analysis on appellate review, and held that “[t]his inquiry . . . is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” Id. at 562 (overruling State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tenn. 1991)).

2016In White, our supreme court overruled “[State v.] Anthony, [ 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991),] and the entire line of cases including a separate due process analysis in appellate review[,]” concluding that “whether the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, establishes each and every element of kidnapping, as defined by statute, is a question for the jury properly instructed under the law.” Id. at 577-78.

2019“Evidence ‘favorable to an accused’ includes evidence deemed to be exculpatory in nature and evidence that could be used to impeach the [S]tate’s witnesses.” Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 55 -56 (citing State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 389 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Copeland, 983 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tenn. Crim.

2011See, e.g., Copeland, 983 S.W.2d at 706 (holding that the State’s failure to disclose that one of its witnesses had been convicted of writing a worthless check and had been charged with writing several other worthless checks was favorable evidence that the defendant could have used to impeach the witness at the trial but was not material under Brady’s parameters for establishing a due process violation); Michael Eugene Sample v. State, No. W2008-02466-CCA-R3-PD, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim.

2019“Evidence ‘favorable to an accused’ includes evidence deemed to be exculpatory in nature and evidence that could be used to impeach the [S]tate’s witnesses.” Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 55 -56 (citing State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 389 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Copeland, 983 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tenn. Crim.

2018“Evidence ‘favorable to an accused’ includes evidence deemed to be exculpatory in nature and evidence that could be used to impeach the [S]tate’s witnesses.” Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 55 -56 (citing State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 389 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Copeland, 983 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tenn. Crim.

2016“The fair warning requirement embodied in the due process clause prohibits the states from holding an individual criminally responsible for conduct which he could not have reasonably understood to be proscribed.” State v. Thomas, 635 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tenn. 1982) (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).

2007The “fair warning requirement” embodied in the due process clause prohibits holding an individual “criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S. Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.

2026Compare State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 256 (Tenn. Crim.

2015In order to establish a due process violation, the defendant must show that “(a) there was a delay, (b) the accused sustained actual prejudice as a direct and proximate result of the delay, and (c) the State caused the delay in order to gain tactical advantage over or to harass the accused.” State v. Gray, 917 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Dykes, 803 S.W.2d at 256 ).

2022White, 362 S.W.3d. at 577-78; see State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 609 (Tenn. 2013) (“Only when the jury is properly instructed can appellate review of the sufficiency of the convicting evidence satisfy the due process safeguard.”).

2019Id. at 577-78 ; see State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 609 (Tenn. 2013) (“Only when the jury is properly instructed can appellate review of the sufficiency of the convicting evidence satisfy the due process safeguard.”).

2018Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tenn.1980).

1999Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779 at 786 (Tenn. 1980), “the right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” The purpose of notice under the due process clause is to apprise a party of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending hearing.

2014See White, 362 S.W.3d at 578 (overruling State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d. 533 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991)).

2012Because we adhered to the view that the due process analysis stemming from Anthony was "purely a question of law,” Cozart, 54 S.W.3d at 247 , we agreed with the trial court’s refusal to submit the requested instruction to the jury. 5 .

1997The United States Supreme Court, in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 , 111 S.Ct. 328, 329 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339, 341 (1990), held that “moral certainty” modified by the phrases "grave uncertainty" and "actual substantial doubt” did not meaningfully convey the definition of reasonable doubt, and, thus, violated the due process clause. .

1997The United States Supreme Court, in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 , 111 S.Ct. 328, 329 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339, 341 (1990), held that “moral certainty” modified by the phrases "grave uncertainty" and "actual substantial doubt” did not meaningfully convey the definition of reasonable doubt, and, thus, violated the due process clause. .

2022Upon determining that the due process clause under the Tennessee Constitution was broader than the due process clause under the United States Constitution, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the “bad faith” analysis adopted by the United States Supreme Court which provided that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. at 784-85 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).

2018Ferguson The Defendant also contends that the failure to obtain a medical examination of the victim amounted to a failure to preserve evidence under State v. Ferguson. 2 S.W.3d 912, 915-17 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the loss or destruction of evidence by the State must be analyzed to determine if it amounts to a due process violation).

2014See White, 362 S.W.3d at 578 (overruling State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d. 533 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991)).

2013See, e.g., State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242 (Tenn. 2001), State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. 2005), and State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008).