due process clause in Iowa

2026“The initial requirement for a due process claim based on prosecutorial misconduct is proof of misconduct.” State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003).

2025Defense counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s statements about his dishonesty, which Levy argues amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. “[T[o establish a due process violation based upon prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must first establish proof of misconduct.” State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 754 (Iowa 2006). “[I]t is improper for a prosecutor to call the defendant a liar, to state the defendant is lying, or to make similar disparaging comments.” State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 876 (Iowa 2003).

2021In October 2018, Schondelmeyer amended the application to add a due- process claim, alleging the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing the written reports summarizing the girls’ medical examinations at Project Harmony.

2020He also alleges a due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 86–87 (1963).

2017Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 2010) (“Because Reilly has not advanced a standard for interpreting the due process clause under the Iowa Constitution different from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general principles as outlined by the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (applying Federal Eighth Amendment framework because defendant “has not advanced a standard for interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the Iowa Constitution differently”); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 , 280 n.1 (Iowa 2000) (r

2017Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 2010) (“Because Reilly has not advanced a standard for interpreting the due process clause under the Iowa Constitution different from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general principles as outlined by the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (applying Federal Eighth Amendment framework because defendant “has not advanced a standard for interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the Iowa Constitution differently”); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 , 280 n.1 (Iowa 2000) (r

2024Even if the statutory implied consent procedure was the exclusive means of criminal investigation allowed in OWI cases, which it is not, “[t]he government’s failure to comply with a statute or ordinance does not necessarily establish a due process violation.” Stogdill v. City of Windsor Heights, 991 N.W.2d 719 , 731 (Iowa, 2023); see also Womack v. Carroll County, 840 F. App’x 404 , 407 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“[T]he mere violation of a state statute outlining a required procedure does not necessarily equate to a due process violation.”); Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 56

2024Even if the statutory implied consent procedure was the exclusive means of criminal investigation allowed in OWI cases, which it is not, “[t]he government’s failure to comply with a statute or ordinance does not necessarily establish a due process violation.” Stogdill v. City of Windsor Heights, 991 N.W.2d 719 , 731 (Iowa, 2023); see also Womack v. Carroll County, 840 F. App’x 404 , 407 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“[T]he mere violation of a state statute outlining a required procedure does not necessarily equate to a due process violation.”); Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 56

2020We considered a due process challenge to the admission of evidence under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution in State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 2010).

2020Doolin’s trial counsel did not object to Brkovic’s identification under Iowa rule 5.403, nor does his appellate counsel cite or rely on that evidentiary rule. 5Doolin does not argue Perry is inconsistent with our earlier due process analysis in State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 769 (Iowa 2010) (holding “Iowa Code section 701.11 violates the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution as applied in this case because it permits admission of prior bad acts against an individual other than the victim in this case to demonstrate general propensity”).

1986A state may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment only if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945).

1986A state may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment only if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945).

2022United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 310 (1971); Beszborn, 21 F.3d at 67 (“Vague assertions of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient to establish a due process violation from pre-indictment delay.”).

2022United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 310 (1971); Beszborn, 21 F.3d at 67 (“Vague assertions of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient to establish a due process violation from pre-indictment delay.”).

2017Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 2010) (“Because Reilly has not advanced a standard for interpreting the due process clause under the Iowa Constitution different from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general principles as outlined by the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (applying Federal Eighth Amendment framework because defendant “has not advanced a standard for interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the Iowa Constitution differently”); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 , 280 n.1 (Iowa 2000) (r

2017Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 2010) (“Because Reilly has not advanced a standard for interpreting the due process clause under the Iowa Constitution different from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general principles as outlined by the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (applying Federal Eighth Amendment framework because defendant “has not advanced a standard for interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the Iowa Constitution differently”); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 , 280 n.1 (Iowa 2000) (r

2017Id. at 896-910, Because of the reliability issues, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed limitations on the admission of eyewitness testimony in New Jersey courts under the due process clause of the New Jersey Constitution.

2016Ed. 2d 1149, 1158 (1967) (noting challenges of obtaining reliable eye witness identification); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 , 919–21 (N.J. 2011) (revising procedures for eyewitness identification evidence in light of advancing science under the due process clause of the New Jersey Constitution). 7See Kevin C.

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2026“To prove a due process violation based on destruction of evidence, the defendant must show (1) a proper defense request for the evidence; (2) that the evidence was material; and (3) that the evidence would have been significantly favorable to the defendant.” State v. Craig, 490 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1992) (citation omitted).

2025“Where the lost evidence is only potentially exculpatory, where by its nature the lost evidence cannot be evaluated by a fact finder, a due process violation will not be found in the absence of a showing of bad faith.” State v. Craig, 490 N.W.2d 795 , 796–97 (Iowa 1992) (emphasis omitted).

2022In these cases, the defendant may establish a violation by showing “(1) the delay was unreasonable; and (2) the defendant’s defense was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1996).

2021The district court found a due process violation, reasoning that “the State’s actions in ‘[o]ffering to plea bargain the charge away, then holding it over the defendant’s head for three years, then charging him on his eighteenth birthday’ constituted ‘unjustifiable 10 government conduct’ or was based on an ‘illegitimate prosecutorial motive,’ and a violation of Trompeter’s due process rights.” Id. at 470 (alteration in original).

2022See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).

2021See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”).

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2021See 659 N.W.2d 509, 520-21 (Iowa 2003) (finding undisclosed police reports and recantation evidence, not discovered within the time for filing a PCR, qualify as material evidence that probably would have changed the trial outcome and support a due process violation).

2019To establish a due process violation, Pierce “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) 1 In its brief, the State acknowledges it provided this evidence to Pierce after the PCR hearing. 14 the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003)).

2026State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 2007).

2015Cf. State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 148 (Iowa 2012) (due process protects fundamental fairness in judicial proceedings); State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 2007) (same).

2020In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970), no one asked whether state action was involved in the due process challenge to a criminal conviction not based upon substantial evidence.

2020In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970), no one asked whether state action was involved in the due process challenge to a criminal conviction not based upon substantial evidence.

2002Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 561 ; Westphal, 275 N.W.2d at 445 .

2002Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 561 ; Westphal, 275 N.W.2d at 445 .

2026Due process under both the United States and Iowa Constitutions “requires fundamental fairness in a judicial proceeding.” More, 880 N.W.2d at 499 (quoting State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 148 (Iowa 2012), overruled on other grounds by, Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)).

2017Id. at 163 .

2025In Godfrey v. State, this court adopted a duty-based conception of the Iowa Constitution, held that the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution was self-executing, and held that the plaintiff could pursue a constitutional tort claim for alleged violations of the same. 898 N.W.2d at 871–72.

2025In Godfrey v. State, this court adopted a duty-based conception of the Iowa Constitution, held that the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution was self-executing, and held that the plaintiff could pursue a constitutional tort claim for alleged violations of the same. 898 N.W.2d at 871–72.

2017See id. (explaining the difference between a due process challenge to a guilty plea and a challenge to the adequacy of the plea proceeding).

2017See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 58 (Iowa 2013) (explaining the difference between a due process challenge to a guilty plea and a challenge to the adequacy of the plea proceeding).

2025Our error-preservation requirements apply with equal force to constitutional issues, which must still “be presented to and ruled upon by the district court in order to 4 preserve error for appeal.” In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a due-process claim based on ending a “hearing without allowing [the party] to present more evidence and to testify” was not preserved).

2025See id. at 490 (holding that certiorari plaintiffs failed to preserve error on constitutional claims); In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Iowa 1994) (declining to reach parent’s statutory and due-process arguments when parent failed to challenge the juvenile court’s order under now-rule 1.904(2) before appealing); In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a due-process claim based on ending a juvenile “hearing without allowing [the party] to present more evidence and to testify” was not preserved).

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2022Recently, in McQuistion v. City of Clinton, we noted that “the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.”409 Certainly, the ability of women to participate freely in society is dramatically 405State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (en banc). 406Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted)). 407State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 , 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1995)), s

2021By extension, in State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168 , 1171–73, 300 N.W. 275, 277 (1941), this court held the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution did not prohibit the state from using as substantive evidence of guilt the defendant’s pretrial refusal to take a blood test.

2021By extension, in State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168 , 1171–73, 300 N.W. 275, 277 (1941), this court held the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution did not prohibit the state from using as substantive evidence of guilt the defendant’s pretrial refusal to take a blood test.