due process clause in Alabama

2016United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 811 , 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954).

2016United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 811 , 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954).

2011Instead, the relevant facts and attendant circumstances must be examined and the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation analyzed to determine if the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” so that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington.’ ” [ (Emphasis added.) ] “ ‘ “A relevant factor in a due process analysis is whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that he would be sued in the forum state. [ (Emphasis added.) ] In Dillon Equities [v. Palmer &

2003Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).... [[Image here]] “ ‘ “A relevant factor in a due process analysis is whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that he would be sued in the forum state. [(Emphasis added.)] In Dillon Equities [v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 501 So.2d 459, 462 (Ala.1986)], this Court, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), noted: “ ‘ “ ‘ “The foreseeability that is critical to due

2011Instead, the relevant facts and attendant circumstances must be examined and the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation analyzed to determine if the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” so that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington.’ ” [ (Emphasis added.) ] “ ‘ “A relevant factor in a due process analysis is whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that he would be sued in the forum state. [ (Emphasis added.) ] In Dillon Equities [v. Palmer &

2003Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).... [[Image here]] “ ‘ “A relevant factor in a due process analysis is whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that he would be sued in the forum state. [(Emphasis added.)] In Dillon Equities [v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 501 So.2d 459, 462 (Ala.1986)], this Court, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), noted: “ ‘ “ ‘ “The foreseeability that is critical to due

2008Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472 , 486 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) ("We hold that Conner's discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest."); Summerford v. State , 466 So.2d 182 , 185 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985) ("[W]e do not believe petitioner had a `liberty interest' protected under the due process clause in maintaining his store privileges or in being unburdened by an extra work detail."); Zamudio v. State , 615 So.2d 156 , 157 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) ("Store and telephone pri

2008Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“We hold that Conner’s discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Summerford v. State, 466 So.2d 182, 185 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) (“[W]e do not believe petitioner had a ‘liberty interest’ protected under the due process clause in maintaining his store privileges or in being unburdened by an extra work detail.”); Zamudio v. State, 615 So.2d 156, 157 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (“Store and telephone privileges

2011In State v. Sealy, 728 So.2d 657 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), this Court held: “ ‘The law is well-settled that in order to establish a due process violation due to preindictment delay, a defendant must show “(1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the conduct of his defense, and (2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage.” United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Waites v. United States, 479 U.S. 933 , 107 S.Ct. 407 , 93 L.Ed.2d 3

2003In order to establish a due process violation due to preindictment delay, a defendant must show "(1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the conduct of his defense, and (2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage.” United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir.1983).’ Prince, 581 So.2d at 878 .

2011To establish a due-process violation resulting from a preindictment delay, the defendant must show that the delay caused “actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice, and that the delay caused substantial prejudice to [the defendant’s] rights to a fair trial.” Id. at 180 .

2003A defendant seeking to establish the first prong necessary to show a due process violation from the delay 'must show "actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice, and that the delay caused substantial prejudice to [the defendant's] rights to a fair trial.” Id., quoting Stoner, 418 So.2d at 180. [Passage of time per se is not a constitutional violation.’ Stoner, 418 So.2d at 180, quoting Lovasco, supra.” R.D.H. v. State, 775 So.2d 248, 250-51 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).

2012Quoting Justice Stevens’ special concurrence in Youngblood , our Supreme.Court further observed: “ ‘Although to show bad faith, for the purpose of showing a due process violation, the defendant must show that the State had knowledge of the exculpatory value of the destroyed evidence, “there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 67 , 109 S.Ct. at 342 (Stevens, J., concurring i

2012Quoting Justice Stevens’ special concurrence in Youngblood , our Supreme.Court further observed: “ ‘Although to show bad faith, for the purpose of showing a due process violation, the defendant must show that the State had knowledge of the exculpatory value of the destroyed evidence, “there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 67 , 109 S.Ct. at 342 (Stevens, J., concurring i

2003United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 , 92 S.Ct. 455, 459 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). “[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 320 , 92 S.Ct. at 463.’ ” Steeley v. City of Gadsden, 533 So.2d 671, 678 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), quoting Hayes v. State, 487 So.2d 987, 991 (Ala.Crim.App.1986). “ ‘Prearrest delay may give rise to a due process claim, but only delay following formal accusation or delay subse

2003United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 , 92 S.Ct. 455, 459 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). “[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 320 , 92 S.Ct. at 463.’ ” Steeley v. City of Gadsden, 533 So.2d 671, 678 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), quoting Hayes v. State, 487 So.2d 987, 991 (Ala.Crim.App.1986). “ ‘Prearrest delay may give rise to a due process claim, but only delay following formal accusation or delay subse

2025"Thus, something more than an isolated contact initiated by an in-state plaintiff is required to satisfy the 'purposeful-availment' prong of the due-process analysis. 'Something more' might involve 'prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with ... the parties' actual course of dealing.' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463 , 105 S. Ct. 2174 , 85 L.

2025"Thus, something more than an isolated contact initiated by an in-state plaintiff is required to satisfy the 'purposeful-availment' prong of the due-process analysis. 'Something more' might involve 'prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with ... the parties' actual course of dealing.' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463 , 105 S. Ct. 2174 , 85 L.

2011Instead, the relevant facts and attendant circumstances must be examined and the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation analyzed to determine if the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” so that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington.’ ” [ (Emphasis added.) ] “ ‘ “A relevant factor in a due process analysis is whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that he would be sued in the forum state. [ (Emphasis added.) ] In Dillon Equities [v. Palmer &

2003Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).... [[Image here]] “ ‘ “A relevant factor in a due process analysis is whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that he would be sued in the forum state. [(Emphasis added.)] In Dillon Equities [v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 501 So.2d 459, 462 (Ala.1986)], this Court, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), noted: “ ‘ “ ‘ “The foreseeability that is critical to due

2010If the elevation in seriousness is made to depend upon the use of an implement apart from the assailant’s own body, then there is a rational basis for this elevation and fan* notice to an assailant that the use of a weapon or injurious implement will increase the seriousness of his crime. “ ‘In enacting a criminal statute, there is an obligation on the State to so frame it that those who are to administer it and those to whom it is to be administered may know what standard of conduct is intended to be required and legislation may run afoul of the due process clause because of a failure to set

2010If the elevation in seriousness is made to depend upon the use of an implement apart from the assailant’s own body, then there is a rational basis for this elevation and fan* notice to an assailant that the use of a weapon or injurious implement will increase the seriousness of his crime. “ ‘In enacting a criminal statute, there is an obligation on the State to so frame it that those who are to administer it and those to whom it is to be administered may know what standard of conduct is intended to be required and legislation may run afoul of the due process clause because of a failure to set

2003In order to establish a due process violation due to preindictment delay, a defendant must show "(1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the conduct of his defense, and (2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage.” United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir.1983).’ Prince, 581 So.2d at 878 .

2003A defendant seeking to establish the first prong necessary to show a due process violation from the delay 'must show "actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice, and that the delay caused substantial prejudice to [the defendant's] rights to a fair trial.” Id., quoting Stoner, 418 So.2d at 180. [Passage of time per se is not a constitutional violation.’ Stoner, 418 So.2d at 180, quoting Lovasco, supra.” R.D.H. v. State, 775 So.2d 248, 250-51 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).

1982In White v. Maggio , 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977), it was noted: "`Critical evidence', for purposes of the due process clause, is evidence that, when developed by skilled counsel and experts, could induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction." 556 F.2d at 1357-8 .

1982In White v. Maggio , 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977), it was noted: "`Critical evidence', for purposes of the due process clause, is evidence that, when developed by skilled counsel and experts, could induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction." 556 F.2d at 1357-8 .

2004"Although Marion, supra, recognized a due process protection separate from the statute of limitations, the due process clause has a limited role against oppressive delay, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Chambliss v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 373 So.2d 1185 , cert. denied, Ala., 373 So.2d 1211 (1979), and mere passage of time per se is not a constitutional violation.

2004"Although Marion, supra, recognized a due process protection separate from the statute of limitations, the due process clause has a limited role against oppressive delay, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Chambliss v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 373 So.2d 1185 , cert. denied, Ala., 373 So.2d 1211 (1979), and mere passage of time per se is not a constitutional violation.

1994We recognized in Gwin v. State , 425 So.2d 500 , 508 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), cert. quashed, 425 So.2d 510 (Ala. 1983), that before determining whether fundamental fairness requires that an accused be afforded the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing examine a piece of 'critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion,' it should first be determined that the evidence is 'critical.' Evidence is 'critical' for purposes of the due process clause if it could induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction when that evidence was developed by skil

1994We recognized in Gwin v. State, 425 So.2d 500, 508 (Ala. Cr.App.1982), cert. quashed, 425 So.2d 510 (Ala.1983), that before determining whether fundamental fairness requires that an accused be afforded the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing examine a piece of "critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion," it should first be determined that the evidence is "critical." Evidence is "critical" for purposes of the due process clause if it could induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction when that evidence was developed by skilled

2014“As the Supreme Court stated in World-Wide Volkswagen , the foreseeability crucial to a due-process analysis *648 is not the ‘mere likelihood’ that a product will find its way into the forum state but that a defendant’s conduct and its connection with the forum state ‘are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ 444 U.S. at 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 .

2014“As the Supreme Court stated in World-Wide Volkswagen , the foreseeability crucial to a due-process analysis *648 is not the ‘mere likelihood’ that a product will find its way into the forum state but that a defendant’s conduct and its connection with the forum state ‘are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ 444 U.S. at 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 .

2004As this Court noted in Williams v. State, 461 So.2d 1335, 1338 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), “[t]he loss of ‘good time’ is a sufficient deprivation of liberty to warrant a prior due process hearing before an impartial board composed of persons who were not directly involved in the incident.” In Ex parte Crear, 460 So.2d 1208 (Ala.1983), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed an issue similar to the one presented in this case, stating, in part: “The Court [in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974),] declined to rule that the Adjustment Committee which conducted the require

2004As this Court noted in Williams v. State, 461 So.2d 1335, 1338 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), “[t]he loss of ‘good time’ is a sufficient deprivation of liberty to warrant a prior due process hearing before an impartial board composed of persons who were not directly involved in the incident.” In Ex parte Crear, 460 So.2d 1208 (Ala.1983), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed an issue similar to the one presented in this case, stating, in part: “The Court [in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974),] declined to rule that the Adjustment Committee which conducted the require

2011Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).

2011Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (emphasis added).

2015Supreme Court has adopted in theory, if not in name, a multi-factor balancing. test similar, to the one used by the Delaware court in Hammond [v. Delaware, 569 A.2d 81 (Del.1989),] to determine whether the State’s loss or destruction of evidence constitutes a due process violation in any given case.

2005We stated: "We conclude that our Supreme Court has adopted in theory, if not in name, a multi-factor balancing test similar to the one used by the Delaware court in Hammond [ v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989),] to determine whether the State's loss or destruction of evidence constitutes a due process violation in any given case.

2014In Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178, 1194-96 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (quoted with approval in O’Callaghan v. State, 945 So.2d 467, 474-75 (Ala.Crim.App.2006)), this Court held: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness sim

2011In Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), this Court set forth the following guidelines for addressing constitutional challenges on vagueness grounds: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzaetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply me

2006Mgmt. v. Legal Environmental Assistance Fndn., Inc. , 922 So.2d 101 , 114 n. 3 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005). `A state's legislative enactment is void for vagueness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if it is inherently standardless, enforceable only in the exercise of an unlimited, and hence arbitrary, discretion vested in the state.' Margaret S. v. Edwards , 794 F.2d 994 , 999 (5th Cir.1986). `A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and the attendant dangers discriminatory application.' Mason v. Florida

1981The accused contended that this statute failed to pass the due process test of Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).