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220 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Goregreen2 sentences2014A. Punitive Damage Awards Must Be Reviewed for Due Process Violations Laboring under the misapprehension that a due process challenge is not before this Court with respect to the punitive damages verdict, the majority has chosen to disregard the United States Supreme Court’s recent directives set forth in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). 2014A. Punitive Damage Awards Must Be Reviewed for Due Process Violations Laboring under the misapprehension that a due process challenge is not before this Court with respect to the punitive damages verdict, the majority has chosen to disregard the United States Supreme Court’s recent directives set forth in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). | 3 | 5 |
State v. Hatfieldgreen2 sentences2023To establish a due process violation under Brady and this State’s counterpart to Brady, State v. Hatfield, 169 W. 2021Va. 191 , 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982), this Court held that the Brady principle is based not only on the due process clause of the United States Constitution but also on article three, section fourteen of the West Virginia Constitution. | 2 | 9 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2010The components of a due process violation under Brady were articulated as follows in syllabus point two of Youngblood : There are three components of a constitutional due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191 , 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982):(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must have been material, i.e., it must have prejudiced the 2010The components of a due process violation under Brady were articulated as follows in syllabus point two of Youngblood : There are three components of a constitutional due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191 , 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982):(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must have been material, i.e., it must have prejudiced the | 2 | 7 |
State Ex Rel . Harris v. Calendinegreen2 sentences2020Va. 172, 179 , 233 S.E.2d 318, 324 (1977) (“Inherent in the due process clause of the State Constitution are both the concept of substantive due process and the concept of equal protection of the laws. 1995Harris v. *191 Calendine, 160 W.Va. 172 , 233 S.E.2d 318 (1977): Inherent in the due process clause of the State Constitution are both the concept of substantive due process and the concept of equal protection of the laws. | 2 | 5 |
United States v. Lovascogreen2 sentences2009Rather than establishing a black-letter test for determining unconstitutional preindictment delay, the Court examined the facts in conjunction with the basic due process inquiry: “whether the action complained of ... violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’... and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2048 (citations omitted). 2009Rather than establishing a black-letter test for determining unconstitutional preindictment delay, the Court examined the facts in conjunction with the basic due process inquiry: “whether the action complained of ... violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’... and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2048 (citations omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Benjamin Henderson Jones v. Ronald J. Angelone, Director, Department of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2009Our holding in Hey is called into question by the Fourth Circuit’s recognition that “[t]he Due Process Clause has never been interpreted so as to impose a presumption of prejudice in the event of a lengthy preindictment delay----” Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 906 (4th Cir.1996); accord U.S. v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting contention that delay was presumptively prejudicial, holding that “a defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a claim of preindictment delay under the due process clause”); State v. Collins, 118 Ohio App.3d 73 , 691 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (1997) ( 2009Our holding in Hey is called into question by the Fourth Circuit’s recognition that “[t]he Due Process Clause has never been interpreted so as to impose a presumption of prejudice in the event of a lengthy preindictment delay----” Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 906 (4th Cir.1996); accord U.S. v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting contention that delay was presumptively prejudicial, holding that “a defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a claim of preindictment delay under the due process clause”); State v. Collins, 118 Ohio App.3d 73 , 691 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (1997) ( | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Beszborngreen | 2 | 2 |
| Addington v. Texasgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Clarke v. West Virginia Board of Regentsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Millergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hospitalgreen | 2 | 2 |
| West Virginia Citizens Action Group, Inc. v. Daleygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Gotkin v. Millergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Pauley v. Kellygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Thorne v. Roushgreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2017Va. 620 , 466 S.E.2d 471 (1995) (holding that “a trial judge may not make an evidentiary ruling which deprives a criminal defendant of certain rights, such as the right . . . to offer testimony in support of his or her defense . . . which [is] essential for a fair trial pursuant to the due process clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article III, § 14 of the West Virginia Constitution.”). 3 [o]nly rarely and in extraordinary circumstances will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a circuit court’s on-the-spot judgment concernin 2017Va. 620 , 466 S.E.2d 471 (1995) (holding that “a trial judge may not make an evidentiary ruling which deprives a criminal defendant of certain rights, such as the right ... to offer testimony in support of his or her defense ..., which [is] essential for a fair trial pursuant to the due-process clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article III, § 14 of the West Virginia Constitution.”). | 1 | 7 |
United States v. Mariongreen2 sentences2009Further recapping, the Fourth Circuit observed that the United States Supreme Court “specifically rejected the argument that the ‘potential prejudice and passage of time’ is sufficient to sustain a due process claim.” Jones, 94 F.3d at 906 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 323 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ). 2009Further recapping, the Fourth Circuit observed that the United States Supreme Court “specifically rejected the argument that the ‘potential prejudice and passage of time’ is sufficient to sustain a due process claim.” Jones, 94 F.3d at 906 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 323 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ). | 1 | 4 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.green2 sentences1998This means that “at a minimum [the due process clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57 , 94 L.Ed. 865 , 873 (1950). 1998This means that “at a minimum [the due process clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57 , 94 L.Ed. 865 , 873 (1950). | 1 | 4 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences1998Goff contends that this finding presents a due process violation under Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663, 668 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). 1998Goff contends that this finding presents a due process violation under Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663, 668 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). | 1 | 4 |
Hundley v. Ashworthgreen2 sentences2009In addressing whether that delay constituted a due process violation, we recognized that the United States Supreme Court had apparently “settled on a due process test for preaccusation delay.” Id. at 381 , 382 S.E.2d at 575 . 2009In addressing whether that delay constituted a due process violation, we recognized that the United States Supreme Court had apparently “settled on a due process test for preaccusation delay.” Id. at 381 , 382 S.E.2d at 575 . | 1 | 3 |
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.green2 sentences2004To overcome this deferential review, "the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." Verizon, 214 W.Va. at 121 , 586 S.E.2d at 196 ( quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 , 96 S.Ct. 2882 , 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)). 2004To overcome this deferential review, "the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." Verizon, 214 W.Va. at 121 , 586 S.E.2d at 196 ( quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 , 96 S.Ct. 2882 , 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)). | 1 | 3 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences1986In Syllabus Point 12 of Louk v. Haynes, 159 W.Va. 482 , 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976), we held, in reliance upon the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973): The final revocation proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and necessitated by W.Va. 1986In Syllabus Point 12 of Louk v. Haynes, 159 W.Va. 482 , 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976), we held, in reliance upon the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973): The final revocation proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and necessitated by W.Va. | 1 | 3 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences1947The Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing and applying the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, has, in numerous cases, held action of a State to be violative of that requirement when it offends “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , 78 L. ed. 674; or “certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.” Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 , 18 S. Ct. 383 , 42 L. 1947The Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing and applying the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, has, in numerous cases, held action of a State to be violative of that requirement when it offends “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , 78 L. ed. 674; or “certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.” Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 , 18 S. Ct. 383 , 42 L. | 1 | 2 |
| Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Jordan v. Robertsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Bell v. Wolfishgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Loan Assn. v. Topekagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smithgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Paul v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Warrick v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Paul C. \Paulie\" Villano"green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Billy Ray Huffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gagnongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Louk v. Haynes
green
2 sentences2025Va. 482 , 223 S.E.2d 780 (“The final revocation proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and necessitated by W. 2020Accordingly, we decline to address petitioner’s argument regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of his counsel on appeal. 4 “[t]he final revocation proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and necessitated by W.Va.Code, 62-12-10, as amended, must accord an accused with the following requisite minimal procedural protections: (1) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (2) disclosure to the probationer of evidence against him; (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront an | 9 | 1979–2025 |
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
green
2 sentences1998The due process clause protects only those property interests already acquired as a result of "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state lawrules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Gotkin v. Miller, 514 F.2d 125, 128 (2nd Cir.1975), quoting, in part, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (citation omitted). 1998The due process clause protects only those property interests already acquired as a result of "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state lawrules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Gotkin v. Miller, 514 F.2d 125, 128 (2nd Cir.1975), quoting, in part, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (citation omitted). | 5 | 1977–1998 |
State v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences2013As to the merits of this claim, the State argues that the facts in this case do not square with the elements constituting a due process violation pursuant to Brady and its progeny. 2 The three components of a constitutional due process violation under Brady and Hatfield as set forth in syllabus point two of State v. Youngblood, 221 W.Va. 20 , 650 S.E.2d 119 (2007), are: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must have bee 2013As to the merits of this claim, the State argues that the facts in this case do not square with the elements constituting a due process violation pursuant to Brady and its progeny. 2 The three components of a constitutional due process violation under Brady and Hatfield as set forth in syllabus point two of State v. Youngblood, 221 W.Va. 20 , 650 S.E.2d 119 (2007), are: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must have bee | 4 | 2010–2022 |
Waite v. Civil Service Commission
green
2 sentences1983We have traditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety.” 443 U.S. at 17 , 99 S.Ct. at 2620 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 334 . *513 We touched on the due process exception for a prehearing which is grounded on overriding public health and safety concerns or emergency conditions in North v. Board of Regents, 160 W.Va. 248 , 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977), where we stated in Syllabus Point 2 that “due process [procedures] must generally be given before the deprivation occurs unless a compelling public policy dictates otherwise.” This same principle was 1983We have traditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety.” 443 U.S. at 17 , 99 S.Ct. at 2620 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 334 . *513 We touched on the due process exception for a prehearing which is grounded on overriding public health and safety concerns or emergency conditions in North v. Board of Regents, 160 W.Va. 248 , 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977), where we stated in Syllabus Point 2 that “due process [procedures] must generally be given before the deprivation occurs unless a compelling public policy dictates otherwise.” This same principle was | 4 | 1980–1997 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1995In Jackson , the United States Supreme Court posed this question, which it answered in the affirmative: “This is the first of our cases to expressly consider the question whether the due process standard recognized in [In re] Winship [, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)] constitutionally protects an accused against conviction except upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 313-14 , 99 S.Ct. at 2786 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 570 . 1995In Jackson , the United States Supreme Court posed this question, which it answered in the affirmative: “This is the first of our cases to expressly consider the question whether the due process standard recognized in [In re] Winship [, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)] constitutionally protects an accused against conviction except upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 313-14 , 99 S.Ct. at 2786 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 570 . | 4 | 1975–1995 |
In Re Willis
green
2 sentences1999In In re: Willis, 157 W.Va. 225 , 207 S.E.2d 129 (1974), this Court also recognized that a natural parent's right to the custody of his infant child is a substantial interest that is constitutionally protected, not only by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, but also by the due process clause of the West Virginia Constitution. 1999In In re: Willis, 157 W.Va. 225 , 207 S.E.2d 129 (1974), this Court also recognized that a natural parent’s right to the custody of his infant child is a substantial interest that is constitutionally protected, not only by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, but also by the due process clause of the West Virginia Constitution. | 3 | 1977–1999 |
In re Willis
green
2 sentences1999In In re: Willis, 157 W.Va. 225 , 207 S.E.2d 129 (1974), this Court also recognized that a natural parent's right to the custody of his infant child is a substantial interest that is constitutionally protected, not only by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, but also by the due process clause of the West Virginia Constitution. 1999In In re: Willis, 157 W.Va. 225 , 207 S.E.2d 129 (1974), this Court also recognized that a natural parent’s right to the custody of his infant child is a substantial interest that is constitutionally protected, not only by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, but also by the due process clause of the West Virginia Constitution. | 3 | 1977–1999 |
Pushinsky v. West Virginia Board of Law Examiners
green
2 sentences1998Based on the principle that "`[t]he provisions of the Constitution of the State of West Virginia may, in certain instances, require higher standards of protection than afforded by the Federal Constitution[,]' Syllabus Point 2, Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672 , 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) ..." we ruled in Bonham , that this state's due process clause affords a criminal defendant greater protections than the federal counterpart... (holding that imposition of more severe sentence following trial de novo does violate defendant's due process rights); see also West Virginia Citizens Action Group v. Daley, 1998Based on the principle that "`[t]he provisions of the Constitution of the State of West Virginia may, in certain instances, require higher standards of protection than afforded by the Federal Constitution[,]' Syllabus Point 2, Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672 , 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) ..." we ruled in Bonham , that this state's due process clause affords a criminal defendant greater protections than the federal counterpart... (holding that imposition of more severe sentence following trial de novo does violate defendant's due process rights); see also West Virginia Citizens Action Group v. Daley, | 3 | 1982–1998 |
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
2 sentences1998The appellants claim that this policy directive meets the requirements set forth by the circuit court in its Memorandum Order which states that the disciplinary hearing “shall be before an impartial hearing panel or officer not previously involved in the matter.” Further, it meets the due process requirement for disciplinary hearings in state prisons established by this Court in Syllabus Point 2 of Harrah, supra. Finally, it meets the minimum due process requirement for disciplinary hearings articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 1998The appellants claim that this policy directive meets the requirements set forth by the circuit court in its Memorandum Order which states that the disciplinary hearing “shall be before an impartial hearing panel or officer not previously involved in the matter.” Further, it meets the due process requirement for disciplinary hearings in state prisons established by this Court in Syllabus Point 2 of Harrah, supra. Finally, it meets the minimum due process requirement for disciplinary hearings articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 | 3 | 1980–1998 |
Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., City and County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences1988The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment serves as a limit on a state court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. 1 This issue was addressed in Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 , 98 S.Ct. 1690 , 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978), where the United States Supreme Court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by California courts over the appellant-father, a resident of New York, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1988The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment serves as a limit on a state court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. 1 This issue was addressed in Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 , 98 S.Ct. 1690 , 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978), where the United States Supreme Court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by California courts over the appellant-father, a resident of New York, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | 3 | 1980–1988 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1986In Syllabus Point 12 of Louk v. Haynes, 159 W.Va. 482 , 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976), we held, in reliance upon the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973): The final revocation proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and necessitated by W.Va. 1986In Syllabus Point 12 of Louk v. Haynes, 159 W.Va. 482 , 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976), we held, in reliance upon the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973): The final revocation proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and necessitated by W.Va. | 3 | 1979–1987 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1974From Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 93 A.L.R. 2d 733 (1963), the recognition by the courts of the right of an indigent to counsel whenever his liberty is in jeopardy has become increasingly apparent. 1974From Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 93 A.L.R. 2d 733 (1963), the recognition by the courts of the right of an indigent to counsel whenever his liberty is in jeopardy has become increasingly apparent. | 3 | 1964–1974 |
State Ex Rel. May v. Boles
green
2 sentences1965May v. Boles, 149 W.Va. 155 , 139 S.E.2d 177 , that the right to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and is essential to a fair trial; that the safeguard of counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is made obligatory upon the States under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that such right will not be presumed to have been waived by the entry of a plea of guilty by the accused where the record is silent as to such waiver by the failure of the accused to request counsel or by reason of a record silent on the matter of the assi 1965May v. Boles, 149 W.Va. 155 , 139 S.E.2d 177 , that the right to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and is essential to a fair trial; that the safeguard of counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is made obligatory upon the States under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that such right will not be presumed to have been waived by the entry of a plea of guilty by the accused where the record is silent as to such waiver by the failure of the accused to request counsel or by reason of a record silent on the matter of the assi | 3 | 1965–1965 |
Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson
green
2 sentences1962Legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the judicial determination of issues involving fife, liberty or property.” Western and Atlantic Railroad Company v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639 , 49 S. Ct. 445 , 73 L. 1962Legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the judicial determination of issues involving fife, liberty or property.” Western and Atlantic Railroad Company v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639 , 49 S. Ct. 445 , 73 L. | 3 | 1954–1962 |
State v. Boyd
green
2 sentences2022Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 , that a “defendant has a 9 right to be present pursuant to the due process clause under Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution 13 and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.14 As with Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution, we have similarly held that “[d]ue process of law as guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions requires that a party be accorded the right to be present in person or by counsel during all trial proceedings.” 15 Syl. pt. 2, Sisler v. Hawkins, 158 W. 1988We held in State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977), in reliance on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), that it is a due process violation to impeach a defendant with his pretrial silence. | 2 | 1988–2022 |
State Ex Rel. Williams v. Department of Military Affairs & Public Safety, Division of Corrections
green
2 sentences2021Va. 407 , 573 S.E.2d 1 (2002) (“‘Good time credit is a valuable liberty interest protected by the due process clause, W. 2021Va. 407 , 573 S.E.2d 1 (2002) (“‘Good time credit is a valuable liberty interest protected by the due process clause, W. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| State Ex Rel. Appleby v. Recht green | 2 | 2014–2020 |
| In Re Center Wholesale, Inc. green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip green | 2 | 1991–2014 |
| Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc. green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| State Ex Rel. Knotts v. Facemire green | 2 | 2010–2011 |
| United States v. Gouveia green | 2 | 1989–2009 |
| Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams green | 2 | 1990–2009 |
| Goldberg v. Kelly green | 2 | 1971–2002 |
| Israel Ex Rel. Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission green | 2 | 1991–1997 |
| State v. Pendry green | 2 | 1980–1995 |
| Marco Dental Products, Inc. v. Austin green | 2 | 1982–1982 |
| Kirkland v. United States green | 2 | 1982–1982 |
| Munn v. Illinois green | 2 | 1980–1980 |
| Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. green | 2 | 1980–1980 |
| Mullaney v. Wilbur green | 2 | 1976–1978 |
| Gideon v. Wainwright green | 2 | 1964–1974 |
| Powell v. Alabama green | 2 | 1964–1974 |
| State Ex Rel. Moats v. Janco green | 2 | 1973–1973 |
| Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. green | 2 | 1958–1967 |
| State v. Blankenship green | 2 | 1966–1966 |
| A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton green | 2 | 1957–1957 |
| State v. Guthrie green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.