due process clause in New Jersey

2009When the evidence withheld is no longer available, to establish a due process violation a defendant may show that the evidence had "an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed" *457 and that "the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. at 2534 , 81 L.Ed. 2d at 422 ; see Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 108-09 , 586 A. 2d 85 .

2009When the evidence withheld is no longer available, to establish a due process violation a defendant may show that the evidence had "an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed" *457 and that "the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. at 2534 , 81 L.Ed. 2d at 422 ; see Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 108-09 , 586 A. 2d 85 .

2024A-1955-23 12 "When the evidence withheld is no longer available, to establish a due process violation a defendant may show that the evidence had 'an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed' and that 'the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.'" State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J.

2019A-5683-16T4 8 In order to establish a due process violation, if evidence is simply no longer available, a defendant must prove it had "an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed" and that "the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J.

2026To determine whether a due process violation has occurred, New Jersey courts apply the Mathews test, which considers (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of any additional safeguards, and (3) the value of the government interest and any fiscal or administrative burdens that additional procedures would require. 424 U.S. at 335 .

2021Analysis of the due process claim requires consideration of the three factors in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." See also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 9-

2024"When there has been 'suppression, loss, or destruction of physical evidence,' our courts focus on three factors to determine whether a due process violation has occurred." Ibid. (quoting State v. Dreher, 302 N.J.

2022Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988); see also State v. Reynolds, 124 N.J. 559, 569 (1991) (adopting this standard in New Jersey).

2006That is, a due process violation occurs if the delay in prosecution violates those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, ... and which define the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Id. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2049 , 52 L.Ed.2d at 752 (citations omitted). “[T]he Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage and that it caused the defend

2006That is, a due process violation occurs if the delay in prosecution violates those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, ... and which define the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Id. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2049 , 52 L.Ed.2d at 752 (citations omitted). “[T]he Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage and that it caused the defend

2006That is, a due process violation occurs if the delay in prosecution violates those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, ... and which define the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Id. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2049 , 52 L.Ed.2d at 752 (citations omitted). “[T]he Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage and that it caused the defend

2006That is, a due process violation occurs if the delay in prosecution violates those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, ... and which define the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Id. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2049 , 52 L.Ed.2d at 752 (citations omitted). “[T]he Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage and that it caused the defend

2026In P.Z., the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that although "Miranda established a per se rule to counteract the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogations by law enforcement[,] it did not eliminate the due process requirement that all statements given during an interrogation must be voluntary." 152 N.J. at 113 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985)).

2025In P.Z., our Supreme A-1416-23 35 Court recognized that while "Miranda established a per se rule to counteract the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogations by law enforcement[,] it did not eliminate the due process requirement that all statements given during an interrogation must be voluntary." 152 N.J. at 113 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985)).

2019Quill, thus, is the controlling standard, wherein the United States Supreme Court held that for purposes of the DPC nexus analysis, the inquiry is in terms of “purposeful avail[ment]” of a State’s economic market, which in turn would be “notice” or “fair warning” of susceptibility to that State’s taxing jurisdiction. 504 U.S. at 308, 312-13 . 3 3 For this reason, the court does not need to analyze whether the trial court’s holding in Lanco as to the DPC violation is non-binding dicta since this portion of the court’s ruling was not appealed, and therefore, the Appellate Division observed that

2014Thus, the critical issue is whether the taxpayer must have a physical presence in the state in order to constitute the required “substantial nexus” necessary to satisfy the Commerce Clause under Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), which applied that test and held physical presence was necessary in the context of a sales and use tax. [Id. at 563-64, 879 A.2d 1234 .] The holding of the Appellate Division was also clear: We agree with the Director that Quill does not apply to taxes other than sales and use taxes, Quill, supra, 504 U.S. at 314 , 112

2020"Vague assertions of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient to establish A-3585-19T4 6 a due process violation from pre-indictment delay." Ibid. (quoting United States v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1994)).

2005"Vague assertions of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient to establish a due process violation from pre-indictment delay." United States v. Beszborn, 21 F. 3d 62, 67 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 934 , 115 S.Ct. 330 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 288 (1994).

2019However, our Supreme Court followed the Youngblood standard in State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 109 (1991), without any indication that a different test A-3169-16T4 17 would govern a due process claim under our State's Constitution.

2009When the evidence withheld is no longer available, to establish a due process violation a defendant may show that the evidence had "an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed" *457 and that "the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. at 2534 , 81 L.Ed. 2d at 422 ; see Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 108-09 , 586 A. 2d 85 .

1982The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

1982The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

2020"The due process test takes into A-1350-17T1 43 consideration 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.'" Ibid. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973))).

2019“The due process test takes into consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. 8 N.J.R.E. 104(c) provides that “[w]here by virtue of any rule of law a judge is required in a criminal action to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of a statement by the defendant, the judge shall hear and determine the question of its admissibility out of the presence of the jury.” 9 Under federal law, the government

2022We interpret subsection (5) so that it does not exceed the reach of the due process clause, see Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971), and, therefore, hold that subsection (5) does not extend to a New Jersey's resident's impregnation outside our borders by a nonresident.

2010Although we have long interpreted our long-arm jurisdiction to be consistent with “the uttermost limits permitted by the United States Constitution,” ibid, (quoting Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 , 277 A.2d 207 (1971)), the fundamental and unquestioned right of a foreign defendant to due process remains the essential touchstone of jurisdiction.

2005The standard they apply — the familiar “rational basis” test — is the same standard that is applied to legislation generally when challenged on due process grounds. [Id. at 542-43, 772 A.2d 368 (citation omitted).] Our Supreme Court relied on Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 2882 , 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976) for the principle that both the retroactive aspects and the prospective aspects of legislation must meet the due process test, and justifications for prospective application may not be sufficient to justify retroactive application.

2005The standard they apply — the familiar “rational basis” test — is the same standard that is applied to legislation generally when challenged on due process grounds. [Id. at 542-43, 772 A.2d 368 (citation omitted).] Our Supreme Court relied on Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 2882 , 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976) for the principle that both the retroactive aspects and the prospective aspects of legislation must meet the due process test, and justifications for prospective application may not be sufficient to justify retroactive application.

2024See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 481 (treating a forum selection clause as pertinent to the Due Process analysis).

2024See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 481 (treating a forum selection clause as pertinent to the Due Process analysis).

2022Stated another way, the due process clause requires that a nonresident's contacts with the forum be such that maintenance of the suit in the forum "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

2010The Court noted: [T]he burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate ease be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute!,] ... the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief!,] ■ • • the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies!,] and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies!.] [World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 292 , 100 S.Ct. at 564 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 49

2008Under the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution, when a cause of action is unrelated to a nonresident’s contacts with the forum state, as is the ease here, our jurisdiction is “general,” rather than “specific.” Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 322 , 558 A.2d 1252 (1989).

2008Under the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution, when a cause of action is unrelated to a nonresident’s contacts with the forum state, as is the ease here, our jurisdiction is “general,” rather than “specific.” Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 322 , 558 A.2d 1252 (1989).

1995A year later, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the Court again addressed “the nexus between reputation and the due process clause.” Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir.1987).

1995A year later, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the Court again addressed “the nexus between reputation and the due process clause.” Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir.1987).

2021In contrast to a due process claim, which a defendant must support with a showing of "actual prejudice, not possible or presumed prejudice," State v. Aguirre, 287 N.J.

2018Moreover, a defendant "must present concrete evidence showing material harm" because "actual prejudice, not possible or presumed prejudice, is required to support a due process claim." State v. Aguirre, 287 N.J.

2025"The due process test takes into consideration the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." Id. at 42 (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 ). "[T]he factors relevant to the voluntariness analysis include 'the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved,' as well as previous encounters with law enforcement." Id. at 43 (quotin

2025"The due process test takes into consideration the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." Id. at 42 (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 ). "[T]he factors relevant to the voluntariness analysis include 'the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved,' as well as previous encounters with law enforcement." Id. at 43 (quotin

2025In denying defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment based on the destruction of the surveillance footage, the trial court applied the three factors bearing upon whether the destruction of physical evidence amounts to a due process violation identified in State v. Hollander, 201 N.J.

2025Super. 453 , 479 A-3822-22 24 (App. Div. 1985), where we instructed courts to focus on "(1) whether there was bad faith or connivance on the part of the government; (2) whether the evidence . . . was sufficiently material to the defense; [and] (3) whether [the] defendant was prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the evidence." Ibid. (citations omitted).

2000On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that "an accused has a constitutional right under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to offer probative evidence tending to show that a third party committed the crime charged." Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 297 , 548 A. 2d 939 , citing, inter alia, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 297 (1973).

2000On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that "an accused has a constitutional right under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to offer probative evidence tending to show that a third party committed the crime charged." Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 297 , 548 A. 2d 939 , citing, inter alia, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 297 (1973).

2001To permit a charge to lessen the State’s burden in a criminal case is a violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and the long standing rule of law in New Jersey “that antedates any suggestion that the Constitution compels that burden.” Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 59 , 524 A.2d 130 .

2001To permit a charge to lessen the State’s burden in a criminal case is a violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and the long standing rule of law in New Jersey “that antedates any suggestion that the Constitution compels that burden.” Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 59 , 524 A.2d 130 .