due process clause in Idaho

2020See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 53–54, 57 (explaining that the police’s failure to put the clothing of a sexual assault victim in a refrigerator to preserve sensitive biological evidence was not a due process violation because the police had not acted in 8 bad faith).

2014On appeal, Nelson argues he alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim pursuant to section 19-4901(a)(l), which allows for relief where “the conviction ... was in violation of constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state.” He contends that his allegations of tampering could lead to various claims, including: (1) a due process violation under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), 5 based on witnesses testifying falsely at trial regarding evidence in the rape kit; (2) a violation pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U

2025“The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239 , 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).

2022“The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Meister, 148 Idaho at 239 , 220 P.3d at 1058 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).

2025In State v. Rogers, this Court considered whether “a defendant who pleads guilty in return for admission into a diversionary program [is] entitled to due process of law when the State seeks to terminate him from that program, and if so, what process is due?” 144 Idaho 738, 740 , 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007).

2025In State v. Rogers, this Court considered whether “a defendant who pleads guilty in return for admission into a diversionary program [is] entitled to due process of law when the State seeks to terminate him from that program, and if so, what process is due?” 144 Idaho 738, 740 , 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007).

2010See, e.g., State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 842 , 118 P.3d 160, 174 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that absent a due process violation it was proper to dismiss the case, which involved a felony offense, without prejudice pursuant to I.C. § 19-3506, and rejecting the argument that dismissing the case without prejudice allowed the state to intentionally circumvent the appellant’s right to a speedy trial).

2010See, e.g., State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 842 , 118 P.3d 160, 174 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that absent a due process violation it was proper to dismiss the case, which involved a felony offense, without prejudice pursuant to I.C. § 19-3506, and rejecting the argument that dismissing the case without prejudice allowed the state to intentionally circumvent the appellant’s right to a speedy trial).

1998Although the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution is interpreted independently, the Idaho Supreme Court is not necessarily bound by the federal interpretation of due process, this Court "consider[s] the rationale used by the United States Supreme Court in deciding Fourteenth Amendment due process cases." Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577 , 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996); see, e.g., Cootz, 117 Idaho at 41 , 785 P.2d at 166 .

1998Although the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution is interpreted independently, the Idaho Supreme Court is not necessarily bound by the federal interpretation of due process, this Court "consider[s] the rationale used by the United States Supreme Court in deciding Fourteenth Amendment due process cases." Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577 , 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996); see, e.g., Cootz, 117 Idaho at 41 , 785 P.2d at 166 .

2005State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 879 , 606 P.2d 981, 983 (1980); State v. Burchard, 123 Idaho 382, 386 , 848 P.2d 440, 444 (Ct.App.1993). *843 Davis attempts to equate the absence of good cause for the delay in her original prosecution with the type of conduct that would support a due process claim.

2005State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 879 , 606 P.2d 981, 983 (1980); State v. Burchard, 123 Idaho 382, 386 , 848 P.2d 440, 444 (Ct.App.1993). *843 Davis attempts to equate the absence of good cause for the delay in her original prosecution with the type of conduct that would support a due process claim.

2018"It is axiomatic that preservation of the family unit is a right protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a familial relationship with his or her child." In Interest of Baby Doe , 130 Idaho 47 , 50, 936 P.2d 690 , 693 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott , 434 U.S. 246 , 98 S.Ct. 549 , 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) ).

2018"It is axiomatic that preservation of the family unit is a right protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a familial relationship with his or her child." In Interest of Baby Doe , 130 Idaho 47 , 50, 936 P.2d 690 , 693 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott , 434 U.S. 246 , 98 S.Ct. 549 , 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) ).

2014We said, “The due process clause of the United States Constitution does not require that a defendant be provided notice at the time of sentencing that his conviction may be used for sentencing enhancement at a later date should the defendant be convicted of another crime.” Id. at 879, 993 P.2d at 1210 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 , 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 , 128 L.

2014We said, “The due process clause of the United States Constitution does not require that a defendant be provided notice at the time of sentencing that his conviction may be used for sentencing enhancement at a later date should the defendant be convicted of another crime.” Id. at 879, 993 P.2d at 1210 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 , 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 , 128 L.

2013Id., citing Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir.1966).

2013Id., citing Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir.1966).

2000Although the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution is interpreted independently, this Court “considerfs] the rationale used by the Urnted States Supreme Court in deciding Fourteenth Amendment due process cases.” Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577 , 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996).

2000Although the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution is interpreted independently, this Court “considerfs] the rationale used by the Urnted States Supreme Court in deciding Fourteenth Amendment due process cases.” Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577 , 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996).

2018"The Supreme Court has reasoned that '[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort. ...' " Id . (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes , 434 U.S. 357 , 363, 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) ).

2018"The Supreme Court has reasoned that '[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort. ...' " Id . (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes , 434 U.S. 357 , 363, 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) ).

2010See Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162 , 657 P.2d at 26 .

2010See Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162 , 657 P.2d at 26 .

2025Later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court held that these same constitutional baselines apply to the revocation of probation as well. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); see also State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314 , 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (“Our statutes and cases require that a probationer be given a due process hearing before his probation can be revoked.”).

2025Later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court held that these same constitutional baselines apply to the revocation of probation as well. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); see also State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314 , 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (“Our statutes and cases require that a probationer be given a due process hearing before his probation can be revoked.”).

2025“The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239 , 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).

2025“The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239 , 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).

2023“To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). “[I]t is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023“To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). “[I]t is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021In International Shoe, the seminal case for modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether, within the limitations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” a Delaware corporation had “by its activities in the State of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that state . . .” 326 U.S. at 311 .

1979When, as in this case, the cause of action arose here out of an activity carried on here at a time when defendant was domiciled here, ‘the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure’ (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 160 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ) fully justifies subjecting defendant to the jurisdiction of *640 our courts.

1994United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). (“[T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request.”) In tandem with this constitutional obligation stemming from the due process clause, the Idaho Criminal Rules require the prosecuting attorney to disclose “as soon as practicable following the filing of charges,” any evidence which “tends to negate

1994United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). (“[T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request.”) In tandem with this constitutional obligation stemming from the due process clause, the Idaho Criminal Rules require the prosecuting attorney to disclose “as soon as practicable following the filing of charges,” any evidence which “tends to negate

2025Later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court held that these same constitutional baselines apply to the revocation of probation as well. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); see also State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314 , 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (“Our statutes and cases require that a probationer be given a due process hearing before his probation can be revoked.”).

2025Later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court held that these same constitutional baselines apply to the revocation of probation as well. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); see also State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314 , 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (“Our statutes and cases require that a probationer be given a due process hearing before his probation can be revoked.”).

2020The erroneous admission of evidence in this case does not rise to the level of a due process violation such that it can transform the violation of a rule or statute (expressly excluded from the fundamental error analysis in Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 , 245 P.3d at 978 ) into a fundamental error claim.

2020The erroneous admission of evidence in this case does not rise to the level of a due process violation such that it can transform the violation of a rule or statute (expressly excluded from the fundamental error analysis in Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 , 245 P.3d at 978 ) into a fundamental error claim.

2017IV.Standard op Review “It is well settled that, in a proceeding to terminate a parent-child relationship, the due process clause mandates that the grounds for termination must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.” Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 246 , 220 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2009) (internal citations omitted). ‘When the trial court finds that the grounds as defined by statute, which are alleged for termination, are established by clear and convincing evidence, those findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they ai’e clearly erroneous.” Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 900 , 71 P.3d 1040, 104

2017IV.Standard op Review “It is well settled that, in a proceeding to terminate a parent-child relationship, the due process clause mandates that the grounds for termination must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.” Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 246 , 220 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2009) (internal citations omitted). ‘When the trial court finds that the grounds as defined by statute, which are alleged for termination, are established by clear and convincing evidence, those findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they ai’e clearly erroneous.” Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 900 , 71 P.3d 1040, 104