due process clause in Montana

2025State v. Jackson, 2007 MT 186, ¶ 14 , 338 Mont. 344 , 165 P.3d 321 (“A court denies a defendant’s due process rights by imposing a heavier sentence . . . as punishment for setting aside [the defendant’s] original sentence.”); State v. Baldwin, 192 Mont. 521, 525 , 629 P.2d 222, 225 (1981) (“To punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is a basic due process violation.”) (citations omitted).

2025State v. Jackson, 2007 MT 186, ¶ 14 , 338 Mont. 344 , 165 P.3d 321 (“A court denies a defendant’s due process rights by imposing a heavier sentence . . . as punishment for setting aside [the defendant’s] original sentence.”); State v. Baldwin, 192 Mont. 521, 525 , 629 P.2d 222, 225 (1981) (“To punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is a basic due process violation.”) (citations omitted).

1973While the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 , 87 S.Ct. 988 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1 ; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 , 89 S.Ct. 575 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607 ; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 , 90 S.Ct. 1564 , 26 L.Ed.2d 26 ) it was not until Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116, 117 , that it set out the criteria by which the right to a speedy trial is to

1973While the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 , 87 S.Ct. 988 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1 ; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 , 89 S.Ct. 575 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607 ; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 , 90 S.Ct. 1564 , 26 L.Ed.2d 26 ) it was not until Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116, 117 , that it set out the criteria by which the right to a speedy trial is to

2016If it does, we next determine “whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the due process clause.” Simmons Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 244 Mont. 75, 83 , 796 P.2d 189, 193 (1990). ¶26 Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific.

2016If it does, we next determine “whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the due process clause.” Simmons Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 244 Mont. 75, 83 , 796 P.2d 189, 193 (1990). ¶26 Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific.

2014Police officers have no duty to take initiative or even assist in procuring evidence on behalf of a defendant, State v. Brown, 1999 MT 133, ¶ 24 , 294 Mont. 509 , 982 P.2d 468 (citation omitted), “but they must avoid interference with the efforts on the part of the accused to obtain such evidence.” State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 74, 76 , 315 Mont. 395 , 68 P.3d 768 .

2014Police officers have no duty to take initiative or even assist in procuring evidence on behalf of a defendant, State v. Brown, 1999 MT 133, ¶ 24 , 294 Mont. 509 , 982 P.2d 468 (citation omitted), “but they must avoid interference with the efforts on the part of the accused to obtain such evidence.” State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 74, 76 , 315 Mont. 395 , 68 P.3d 768 .

2010Gunderson argues that this Court should reject the rule set forth in State v. Swanson, 222 Mont. 357, 360-62 , 722 P.2d 1155, 1157-58 (1986), that police officers have no duty to procure evidence on behalf of a defendant, as well as the standard set forth in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), that a defendant must show bad faith to prove a due process violation when lost evidence is only potentially exculpatory. ¶81 The State contends that we should decline to consider Gunderson’s arguments on this issue because Gunderson has changed his theory on appeal regarding why

2010Gunderson argues that this Court should reject the rule set forth in State v. Swanson, 222 Mont. 357, 360-62 , 722 P.2d 1155, 1157-58 (1986), that police officers have no duty to procure evidence on behalf of a defendant, as well as the standard set forth in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), that a defendant must show bad faith to prove a due process violation when lost evidence is only potentially exculpatory. ¶81 The State contends that we should decline to consider Gunderson’s arguments on this issue because Gunderson has changed his theory on appeal regarding why

2024See Worden v. Montana Bd. ofPardons & Parole, 1998 MT 168, ¶¶ 41-42 , 289 Mont. 459 , 962 P.2d 1157 (1998) (noting that prior to 1989, inmates had a liberty interest in parole protected by the due process clause of the federal constitution, due to the mandatory language in § 46-23-201, MCA, which the Montana Legislature later amended).

2024See Worden v. Montana Bd. ofPardons & Parole, 1998 MT 168, ¶¶ 41-42 , 289 Mont. 459 , 962 P.2d 1157 (1998) (noting that prior to 1989, inmates had a liberty interest in parole protected by the due process clause of the federal constitution, due to the mandatory language in § 46-23-201, MCA, which the Montana Legislature later amended).

2015See also Ray, 578 F.3d at 199-200 ; Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (when considering sentencing delay, the pertinent “factors are to be balanced in light of the facts and circumstances of the case”); cf. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S. Ct. 2193 (the factors relevant to a “finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial . . . are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant”); United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A court must . . . weigh the actual prejudice to the defendant against the re

2015See also Ray, 578 F.3d at 199-200 ; Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (when considering sentencing delay, the pertinent “factors are to be balanced in light of the facts and circumstances of the case”); cf. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S. Ct. 2193 (the factors relevant to a “finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial ... are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant”); United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A court must... weigh the actual prejudice to the defendant against the reasons

2020McDermott, ¶ 8 (citing Board ofPardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377 , 107 S. Ct. 2415, 2420 (1987)).

2020McDermott, ¶ 8 (citing Board ofPardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377 , 107 S. Ct. 2415, 2420 (1987)).

2015He argues that “the jury is required to find the State proved more than just the victim was a peace officer; it must find the State proved the defendant was aware of that fact.” Carnes argues that the given instruction’s failure to require that the jury find he had acted purposely or knowingly with regard to the victim’s identity as a police officer violated his due process right under the United States and Montana Constitutions to have the State prove every element of the offense, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970) (“the Due Process clause protects the accus

2015He argues that “the jury is required to find the State proved more than just the victim was a peace officer; it must find the State proved the defendant was aware of that fact.” Carnes argues that the given instruction’s failure to require that the jury find he had acted purposely or knowingly with regard to the victim’s identity as a police officer violated his due process right under the United States and Montana Constitutions to have the State prove every element of the offense, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970) (“the Due Process clause protects the accus

2014Police officers have no duty to take initiative or even assist in procuring evidence on behalf of a defendant, State v. Brown, 1999 MT 133, ¶ 24 , 294 Mont. 509 , 982 P.2d 468 (citation omitted), “but they must avoid interference with the efforts on the part of the accused to obtain such evidence.” State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 74, 76 , 315 Mont. 395 , 68 P.3d 768 .

2014Police officers have no duty to take initiative or even assist in procuring evidence on behalf of a defendant, State v. Brown, 1999 MT 133, ¶ 24 , 294 Mont. 509 , 982 P.2d 468 (citation omitted), “but they must avoid interference with the efforts on the part of the accused to obtain such evidence.” State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 74, 76 , 315 Mont. 395 , 68 P.3d 768 .

2024State v. Reinert, 2018 MT 111, ¶ 17 , 391 Mont. 263 , 419 P.3d 662 (citations omitted). ¶63 Rossbach contends that Informant 1’s statements in a letter the State disclosed on the last day of trial could be used to impeach Informant 1’s testimony by demonstrating his lack of credibility and that the District Court erred when it denied Rossbach’s motion for a new trial based on the belated disclosure. ¶64 The letter contained Informant 1’s statements denying involvement in a burglary offense on which he had pending charges.

2024State v. Reinert, 2018 MT 111, ¶ 17 , 391 Mont. 263 , 419 P.3d 662 (citations omitted). ¶63 Rossbach contends that Informant 1’s statements in a letter the State disclosed on the last day of trial could be used to impeach Informant 1’s testimony by demonstrating his lack of credibility and that the District Court erred when it denied Rossbach’s motion for a new trial based on the belated disclosure. ¶64 The letter contained Informant 1’s statements denying involvement in a burglary offense on which he had pending charges.

1990The plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 4B and do not satisfy the three-part due process analysis of Simmons v. State (1983), 206 Mont. 264, 271 , 670 P.2d 1372, 1376 .

1990The plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 4B and do not satisfy the three-part due process analysis of Simmons v. State (1983), 206 Mont. 264, 271 , 670 P.2d 1372, 1376 .

2019Regarding the third and final prong, to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that the outcome would have ***381 been different, a defendant must establish that the favorable evidence "could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Weisbarth , 2016 MT 214 , ¶ 26, 384 Mont. 424 , 378 P.3d 1195 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 , 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ). ¶34 Robertson argues that the State suppressed evidence favorable to him because it allowed the Detention Center video to be ove

2019Regarding the third and final prong, to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that the outcome would have ***381 been different, a defendant must establish that the favorable evidence "could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Weisbarth , 2016 MT 214 , ¶ 26, 384 Mont. 424 , 378 P.3d 1195 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 , 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ). ¶34 Robertson argues that the State suppressed evidence favorable to him because it allowed the Detention Center video to be ove

2019Under the second prong, negligently suppressed evidence amounts to a due process violation only where the evidence "is material and of substantial use, vital to the defense, and exculpatory." McGarvey v. State , 2014 MT 189 , ¶ 17, 375 Mont. 495 , 329 P.3d 576 (quoting State v. Gollehon , 262 Mont. 1 , 13, 864 P.2d 249 , 257 (1993) ); see also State v. Seiffert , 2010 MT 169 , ¶ 16, 357 Mont. 188 , 237 P.3d 669 (citing State v. Herman , 2009 MT 101 , ¶ 31, 350 Mont. 109 , 204 P.3d 1254 ).

2014Negligently suppressed evidence is only a due process violation when it is “material and of substantial use, vital to defense, and exculpatory.” State v. Gollehon, 262 Mont. 1, 13 , 864 P.2d 249, 257 (1993) (citations omitted).

1997They include ... the rights of ... enjoying and defending their lives and liberties ....” Article II, Section 17, the due process clause, states: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” In Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 940 , we concluded: “Reading the preamble and these sections of our constitution together, we hold that under the Montana Constitution physical liberty is a fundamental right, without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.” We then analyzed the interplay between the guarantee of equal protection and

1997They include ... the rights of ... enjoying and defending their lives and liberties...." Article II, Section 17, the due process clause, states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." In Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 940 , we concluded: "Reading the preamble and these sections of our constitution together, we hold that under the Montana Constitution physical liberty is a fundamental right, without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning." We then analyzed the interplay between the guarantee of equal protection and

2010Accordingly, the State argues that the decision to increase the charge was an act of prosecutorial discretion and not vindictiveness, and that Knowles’ conviction should be affirmed. ¶28 In United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 , 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982), the United States Supreme Court stated the rule regarding “vindictive prosecution” as follows: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation “of the most basic sort.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 .

2005Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. at 667-68 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 610 .

2001Bouie v. Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347, 353 , 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 . ¶20 As explained by the Supreme Court in Bouie , if a state legislature is barred from passing an ex post facto law, then a state supreme court must be barred by the due process clause from achieving the same result by judicial construction.

2001Bouie v. Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347, 353 , 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 . ¶20 As explained by the Supreme Court in Bouie , if a state legislature is barred from passing an ex post facto law, then a state supreme court must be barred by the due process clause from achieving the same result by judicial construction.

2004There, we relied upon the United States Supreme Court's holding in Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 , in which the Court held that using a defendant's post- Miranda silence as evidence of guilt violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2004There, we relied upon the United States Supreme Court's holding in Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 , in which the Court held that using a defendant's post- Miranda silence as evidence of guilt violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.