due process clause in Utah

2018The due process clause of the Utah Constitution requires district courts to base sentencing decisions "on reasonably reliable and relevant information." Id.

2017The court stated, without further elaboration, that “there is a great deal of literature about the simple fact of not letting go, [and] continued efforts at control, however innocuous [that] may seem,” it is nonetheless “dangerous.” ¶9 “The due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.” State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985).

2020Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); and In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 , 1376–77 (Utah 1982). 11 In support of this view, S.A.S. also points to cases holding that an unwed father who “demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child . . . acquires substantial protection under the due process clause,” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (first alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and holding that “decrees forever terminating parental rights” fall within the “category of cases in

2015See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (explaining, in the course of upholding New York's adoption scheme, that "[the Constitution does not require ... a litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own rights"); Steve B.D., 730 P.2d at 946 (rejecting a due process challenge to the procedural requirements of Idaho's adoption act in light of the "essential fact" is that the father "failed to initiate ... any legal actions to establish his interest"); In re Adoption of A.A.T., 287 Kan

2014In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78 , ¶18, 298 P.3d 1251 ; Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, ¶28 , 163 P.3d 623 ("[Aln unwed father's opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his newborn [is] a 'provisional right' that is itself protected by the due process clause of the Utah Constitution."); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 ; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ("A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status" is a "commanding one."). .

2014In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78 , ¶18, 298 P.3d 1251 ; Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, ¶28 , 163 P.3d 623 ("[Aln unwed father's opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his newborn [is] a 'provisional right' that is itself protected by the due process clause of the Utah Constitution."); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 ; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ("A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status" is a "commanding one."). .

2017Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) ("[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing[.]”); Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980) (”[E]very significant deprivation, whether permanent or temporary, of an interest, which is qualified as 'property' under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of [the] case....”). 19 .

2010Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); see also Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 601-02 (Utah 1980) ("Under the due process clause, [a] plaintiff [is] entitled to have . . . essential information imparted to him. . . .") Mr. McBride claims the notices were insufficient.

2002Both the due process clause of article I, section 7 and the open courts provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that litigants will have this "day in court." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998) ("Even the most limited reading of [the open courts] provision guarantees a day in court to all parties ... in disputed insurance claims."); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) ("The clear language of the [open courts provision] guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." (emphasis

1997The Berry court further noted that the open courts provision and the due process clause of article I, section 7 are related “and even overlap, but they are not wholly duplicative.” Berry, 717 P.2d at 675 .

2014In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78 , ¶18, 298 P.3d 1251 ; Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, ¶28 , 163 P.3d 623 ("[Aln unwed father's opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his newborn [is] a 'provisional right' that is itself protected by the due process clause of the Utah Constitution."); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 ; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ("A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status" is a "commanding one."). .

2014In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78 , ¶18, 298 P.3d 1251 ; Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, ¶28 , 163 P.3d 623 ("[Aln unwed father's opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his newborn [is] a 'provisional right' that is itself protected by the due process clause of the Utah Constitution."); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 ; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ("A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status" is a "commanding one."). .

2020Ramirez identified five factors for courts to consider in assessing the reliability (and hence admissibility) of eyewitness identification testimony under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution: (1) the “opportunity” of the eyewitness to view the suspect; (2) the degree of attention paid to the suspect; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event; (4) the degree of “spontane[it]y” and “consisten[cy]” of the eyewitness testimony; and (5) “the nature of the event being observed.” 817 P.2d at 781 (citation omitted).

2020But we clarify that in the face of suggestive police activity the due process standard is still only a constitutional backstop to the threshold inquiry into reliability and admissibility under our rules of evidence. _____________________________________________________________ 3 Compare State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 , 780–81 (Utah 1991) (articulating specific factors for judicial assessment of the “required constitutional admissibility analysis”), with State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 27 , 48 P.3d 953 (explaining that the Ramirez factors are “not an exhaustive or exclusive list” for exami

2014In J.P., we cited Stamiley as establishing the unconstitutionality of an IHi-nois statute "presuming unwed fathers to be unfit [as] a violation of the due process clause." 648 P.2d at 1874 (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ).

2014In J.P., we cited Stamiley as establishing the unconstitutionality of an IHi-nois statute "presuming unwed fathers to be unfit [as] a violation of the due process clause." 648 P.2d at 1874 (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ).

2017While the majority refrains from stating “any definite conclusions about this history without the benefit of adversarial briefing,” 20 it nevertheless appears to indicate a preferred 16 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). 17 Supra ¶ 60 (quoting Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908 ). 18 Infra ¶ 163 n.45. 19 I also would not seek further briefing on the question of the historical meaning of the due process clause because it is unnecessary to the resolution of this case. 20 Supra ¶ 70. 50 Cite as: 2017 UT 89 DURRANT, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result resolution of some key issues. 21 I understand t

2017Instead, "[d]ue process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation demands." Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons , 870 P.2d 902 , 911 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). ¶ 26 At the heart of the plaintiffs' due process claim is the constitutional adequacy of the notice that the plaintiffs received.

2017I ¶ 133 The due process clause does not confer on the judiciary a roving "duty to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice, with every modern improvement and with provision against every possible hardship that may befall." In re Discipline of Steffensen , 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7 n.2, 373 P.3d 186 (quoting Ownbey v. Morgan , 256 U.S. 94 , 110-11, 41 S.Ct. 433 , 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921) ).

2017I ¶ 133 The due process clause does not confer on the judiciary a roving "duty to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice, with every modern improvement and with provision against every possible hardship that may befall." In re Discipline of Steffensen , 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7 n.2, 373 P.3d 186 (quoting Ownbey v. Morgan , 256 U.S. 94 , 110-11, 41 S.Ct. 433 , 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921) ).

2017The due process clause “refers to certain fundamental rights which [our] system of jurisprudence . . . has always recognized.” In re Adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, ¶ 87 , 390 P.3d 278 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884)).

2017The due process clause "refers to certain fundamental rights which [our] system of jurisprudence ... has always recognized." In re Adoption of K.A.S. , 2016 UT 55 , ¶ 87, 390 P.3d 278 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Hurtado v. California , 110 U.S. 516 , 536, 4 S.Ct. 292 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) ).

2017Father asserts that he “should be viewed as having established an ‘exceptional circumstance,’ for not raising this issue at trial in.that the statutory scheme does not allow him to do so” and that, “[i]f all deprivations of rights under the initial Petition are silenced by [the] filing of a Petition to Terminate, no argument can be made about the deprivations of those rights.” ¶28 “The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a safety device, to assure that manifest' injustice does' not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.” State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 199

2008We will not expand the exceptional circumstances exception to include Candedo’s situation as it does not rise to the level of a “rare procedural anomal[y].” See Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n. 3); cf. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) (refusing to address the defendant’s due process claim on the ground that he failed to preserve it and rejecting his argument that exceptional circumstances existed where State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), decided after his trial, allegedly would have supported his due process claim); see also State v. Olsen, 860 P.

2017The due process clause “refers to certain fundamental rights which [our] system of jurisprudence . . . has always recognized.” In re Adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, ¶ 87 , 390 P.3d 278 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884)).

2017The due process clause "refers to certain fundamental rights which [our] system of jurisprudence ... has always recognized." In re Adoption of K.A.S. , 2016 UT 55 , ¶ 87, 390 P.3d 278 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Hurtado v. California , 110 U.S. 516 , 536, 4 S.Ct. 292 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) ).

2010Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 29 , 116 P.3d 295 (quoting Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989)) (alternation in original).

2005However, when a statute does not create a suspect classification and implicates neither a fundamental right nor a right protected by the open courts clause, we will subject that statute to a lower level of scrutiny, analyzing the statute to determine “ ‘(1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the two.’” Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ¶ 23 , 48 P.3d 941 (quoting *303 Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995)). ¶ 29 Similarly, under the due process

2002The 1942 case referred to in the footnote, Untermyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 214 , 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942), merely comments on the similarity in language between the state and federal provisions, and observes that therefore "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution are `highly persuasive' as to the application of that clause of our state constitution." That we will look to federal due process analysis, as well as to that of other states, in interpreting the due process clause of Utah's constitution, is axiomatic, but it

2002The 1942 case referred to in the footnote, Untermyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 214 , 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942), merely comments on the similarity in language between the state and federal provisions, and observes that therefore "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution are `highly persuasive' as to the application of that clause of our state constitution." That we will look to federal due process analysis, as well as to that of other states, in interpreting the due process clause of Utah's constitution, is axiomatic, but it

2020See also Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm’n, 949 P.2d 746, 755 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the employee must explain how the alleged “procedural errors were harmful” in order to establish a due process violation).

2015Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 755 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating that in order to establish a due process violation, an employee must explain how the alleged "procedural errors were harmful").

2025“Only after the defendant has established this point—and accordingly established that there 20230212-CA 19 2025 UT App 131 State v. Hamberlin was a due process violation resulting from the loss of evidence— should a court” move on to “balance the culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant in order to gauge the seriousness of the due process violation and to determine an appropriate remedy.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. ¶51 Hamberlin develops this argument under State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22 , 395 P.3d 111 , and State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 , 162 P.3d 1106 , the latter being the foundationa

2025“Only after the defendant has established this point—and accordingly established that there 20230212-CA 19 2025 UT App 131 State v. Hamberlin was a due process violation resulting from the loss of evidence— should a court” move on to “balance the culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant in order to gauge the seriousness of the due process violation and to determine an appropriate remedy.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. ¶51 Hamberlin develops this argument under State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22 , 395 P.3d 111 , and State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 , 162 P.3d 1106 , the latter being the foundationa

2025“Only after the defendant has established this point—and accordingly established that there 20230212-CA 19 2025 UT App 131 State v. Hamberlin was a due process violation resulting from the loss of evidence— should a court” move on to “balance the culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant in order to gauge the seriousness of the due process violation and to determine an appropriate remedy.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. ¶51 Hamberlin develops this argument under State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22 , 395 P.3d 111 , and State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 , 162 P.3d 1106 , the latter being the foundationa

2025“Only after the defendant has established this point—and accordingly established that there 20230212-CA 19 2025 UT App 131 State v. Hamberlin was a due process violation resulting from the loss of evidence— should a court” move on to “balance the culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant in order to gauge the seriousness of the due process violation and to determine an appropriate remedy.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. ¶51 Hamberlin develops this argument under State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22 , 395 P.3d 111 , and State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 , 162 P.3d 1106 , the latter being the foundationa

2016And our process for striking the best procedural balance—for affording a fair opportunity to be heard 2 See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 , 110–11 (1921) (“The due process clause does not impose upon the states a duty to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice, with every modern improvement and with provision against every possible hardship that may befall.”). 3 See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) (explaining that in order to determine whether due process is satisfied we “examine the constitution itself” and “look to those settled usages and modes of proc

2001This isgue turns, then, on whether Color Country received all the process it was due before the Commission deprived it of its property interest. 34 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 910 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the United States Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge brought by a recipient of social security disability benefits (SSDI) whose benefits had been terminated without a pre-termination hearing.

2024That is, notwithstanding that the Utah Constitution does not mention the right of a parent to maintain the parent-child relationship, we held that right to be both one of the unenumerated rights article I, section 25 refers to and one of the fundamental rights the state constitution’s due process clause protects. ¶100 We began our analysis by noting that the Utah Constitution instructs that “Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.” In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372 (quoting UTAH CONST. art.

2020Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); and In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 , 1376–77 (Utah 1982). 11 In support of this view, S.A.S. also points to cases holding that an unwed father who “demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child . . . acquires substantial protection under the due process clause,” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (first alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and holding that “decrees forever terminating parental rights” fall within the “category of cases in

2017Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) ("[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing[.]”); Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980) (”[E]very significant deprivation, whether permanent or temporary, of an interest, which is qualified as 'property' under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of [the] case....”). 19 .

2017Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) ("[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing[.]”); Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980) (”[E]very significant deprivation, whether permanent or temporary, of an interest, which is qualified as 'property' under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of [the] case....”). 19 .

2017When a due process question requires "application of facts in the record to the due process standard, we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations." Id. (quoting Chen , 2004 UT 82 , ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 1177 ).

2017When a due process question requires "application of facts in the record to the due process standard, we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations." Id. (quoting Chen , 2004 UT 82 , ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 1177 ).

2018Adopting that course here, we proceed directly to the due process analysis. ¶12 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a defendant to have " 'certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Pohl, Inc. of America v. Webelhuth , 2008 UT 89 , ¶ 23, 201 P.3d 944 (alteration in original) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ).

2018Adopting that course here, we proceed directly to the due process analysis. ¶12 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a defendant to have " 'certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Pohl, Inc. of America v. Webelhuth , 2008 UT 89 , ¶ 23, 201 P.3d 944 (alteration in original) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ).