due process clause in Texas

2019Thus, a due process violation occurs “if a prosecutor: (1) fails to disclose evidence, (2) favorable to the accused, (3) which creates a probability of a different outcome.” Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 27 (citing Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim.

2010Thus, a due process violation occurs “if a prosecutor: (1) fails to disclose evidence, (2) favorable to the accused, (3) which creates a probability of a different outcome.” Id. (citing Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)).

2024“When conduct can, at worst, be described as negligent, the failure to preserve evidence does not rise to the level of a due process violation.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).

2023When the State fails to preserve material, exculpatory evidence, the State commits a due process violation, see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 57–58 (1988); Zapata v. State, 449 S.W.3d 220 , 228–29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.), and its good or bad faith in doing so is not relevant.

2025The due process clause “merely guards against the risk of unfair dismissal or suspension if that may be accomplished without prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process.” Id.

2025As in Than, where the Court found a due process violation when the plaintiff "was excluded from a portion of the evidentiary proceedings" and "was given neither a contemporaneous nor an after-the-fact opportunity to respond," Wagner's case presents an even starker denial of basic procedural fairness. 901 S.W.2d at 932 .

2025App. 2012) (“To constitute a due-process violation, the record must show that the testimony was material, namely, that there is ‘a reasonable likelihood’ that the false testimony affected the judgment of the jury.” (citing Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. Crim.

2022Accordingly, to constitute a due process violation, the testimony used by the State must have been false, and it must have been material to the defendant’s conviction, meaning “there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 103–04 (1976), and Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. Crim.

2023Applicant did not contend that the State knowingly used false evidence but relied upon Texas caselaw, based on Chabot, holding that a due-process violation could be based on the State’s unknowing use of false evidence. 5 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 6 See TEX.

2021Here, Appellant contends that the State, acting through the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office, discarded or destroyed the placenta and biological 6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) (dealing with the due process violation that occurs whenever the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence). 6 evidence from the unborn child.

2024Nussbaum v. Builders Bank, 478 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); see Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that a bill-of-review plaintiff claiming a due-process violation for no service or notice is relieved of proving the first two elements and the third element—lack of negligence—“is conclusively established if the bill-of-review plaintiff can prove it was never served with process” (emphasis added)).

2024“But when a bill-of-review plaintiff claims a due process violation for no service or notice, it is relieved of proving the first two elements[,] . . . [a]nd the third element, lack of negligence, is conclusively established if the bill-of-review plaintiff can prove it was never served with process.” Id. (citations omitted); Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93 , 96–97 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam).

2026The court of criminal appeals “has further limited the reading of Article 2.01 to permit the trial court to disqualify the district attorney only when the conflict of interest rises to the level of a due process violation.” Id. (citing Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 304 (Tex. Crim.

2024The record shows that Tyeskie failed to lodge any objection or request in the trial court relating to withdrawal or waiver.1 Also, “[a] trial court may not disqualify a district attorney on the basis of a conflict of interest unless that conflict rises to the level of a due-process violation.” In re Cox, 481 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, orig. proceeding) (en banc) (citing Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 304 (Tex. Crim.

2025A two-part test governs a due-process claim: this court must determine whether petitioners “(1) ha[ve] a liberty or property interest that is entitled to procedural due process protection; and (2) if so, we must determine what process is due.” Included among the protected liberty interests is the right “to engage in any of the common occupations of life.” (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

2025A two-part test governs a due-process claim: this court must determine whether petitioners “(1) ha[ve] a liberty or property interest that is entitled to procedural due process protection; and (2) if so, we must determine what process is due.” Included among the protected liberty interests is the right “to engage in any of the common occupations of life.” (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

2020The court then stated, “This is not to say that the State must lay out its case in the indictment, only that the defendant must be informed of the specific transactions that allegedly violate the statute.” Id.; see also Kellar, 108 S.W.3d at 313 (stating that criminal defendant has “a constitutional right to sufficient notice so as to enable him to prepare a defense,” but this due process requirement “may be satisfied by means other than the language in the charging instrument”).

2016Though an indictment provides a defendant notice of the charges against him, Cook, 902 S.W.2d at 475 , it is not the only means of satisfying this due process requirement, Kellar, 108 S.W.3d at 313–14.

2015CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996).

2006Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 413 , 104 S. Ct. 1868 , 1871–72 (1984) ; CSR Ltd. v. Link , 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).

2019Thus, a due process violation occurs “if a prosecutor: (1) fails to disclose evidence, (2) favorable to the accused, (3) which creates a probability of a different outcome.” Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 27 (citing Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim.

2012Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 27 (Tex. Crim.

2020The court has consistently held that the testimony “need not be perjured to constitute a due process violation; rather it is sufficient that the testimony was false.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tex. Crim.

2020The court has consistently held that the testimony “need not be perjured to constitute a due process violation; rather it is sufficient that the testimony was false.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tex. Crim.

2024“A due-process violation occurs only when the defendant can establish ‘actual prejudice,’ not just the threat of possible prejudice to [his] rights.”2 Id. (quoting Landers, 256 S.W.3d at 304 ).

2016App. 1990). 40 See Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d at 927 (“A trial court may not disqualify a district attorney or his staff on the basis of a conflict of interest that does not rise to the level of a due process violation.”). 13 never held that an entire district attorney’s office must be disqualified under those circumstances.

2021When the State fails to preserve material, exculpatory evidence, the State commits a due process violation, see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 57–58 (1988); Zapata v. State, 449 S.W.3d 220 , 228–29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.), and its good or bad faith in doing so is not relevant, see Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (per curiam); Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202, 229 (Tex. Crim.

2020Snell v. State, 324 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); see Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-48 (requiring the defense to show that the State acted in bad faith with regard to an alleged due process violation based on the State’s loss or destruction of potentially useful evidence); see also Jackson v. State, 50 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (noting that when an accused complains of lost evidence, he must show that the evidence lost is both material and favorable to him and that the accused must also show that the State acted in bad faith by failing to preserv

2025Anderson, 302 S.W.3d at 280–81; see Blackshear, 385 S.W.3d at 591 (“In Anderson v. State, we explicitly refused to recognize a due process exception to the rule requiring motions for continuances to be written and sworn in order to be preserved on appeal.”).

2025We have also “explicitly refused to recognize a due process exception to the rule requiring motions for continuances to be written and sworn in order to be preserved on appeal.” Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim.

2022Even when a nonresident has established minimum contacts with a state, the second prong of the due process inquiry requires proof that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 55 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 ; Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 154 ).

2015Personal Mac's activities which were purposefully directed toward jurisdiction may only be exercised if it comports with Texas residents; the second prong of the due process inquiry traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice.” is satisfied; it is not unreasonable or unfair to Moki Mac International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320 .

2015The jury charge must not enlarge the offense alleged based upon the in dictment charge, thus, authorizing the jury to convict on a basis or theroy per- mited in accordance to law where it is clearly established that a person cannot act both "intentionally/knowingly," and "recklessly" at the same time in commit ting an alleged criminal offense1 "The due process clause protects an accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact ne cessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." [IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)].

2015The jury charge must not enlarge the offense alleged based upon the in dictment charge, thus, authorizing the jury to convict on a basis or theroy per- mited in accordance to law where it is clearly established that a person cannot act both "intentionally/knowingly," and "recklessly" at the same time in commit ting an alleged criminal offense1 "The due process clause protects an accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact ne cessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." [IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)].

2026In his first issue, Lancaster contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment based on a due process violation pursuant to the State’s delay of 30 years between the indictment and his arrest. 1 Lancaster cites to United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S. Ct. 2044 , 52 L.

2026In his first issue, Lancaster contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment based on a due process violation pursuant to the State’s delay of 30 years between the indictment and his arrest. 1 Lancaster cites to United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S. Ct. 2044 , 52 L.

2007App. 1981)) (quoting and adopting the due-process standard of Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

2005Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (quoting and adopting the due-process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). 5 .

2018The Blackshear Court reiterated the need for a written motion and "explicitly refused to recognize a due process exception to the rule requiring motions for continuances to be written and sworn in order to be preserved on appeal." Blackshear , 385 S.W.3d at 591 (citing Anderson v. State , 301 S.W.3d 276 , 280 (Tex. Crim.

2018As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Anderson: -3- 04-17-00533-CR We have construed these statutes to require a sworn written motion to preserve appellate review from a trial judge’s denial of a motion for a continuance. 301 S.W.3d at 279 ; accord Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (refusing to “recognize a due process exception” to requirement that motion for continuance be written and sworn).

2025“The due process requirement of notice must be provided ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 , 119–20 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2024“The due process requirement of notice must be provided ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 , 119–20 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2024Bad faith requires a showing of “some sort of improper motive, such as personal animus against the defendant or a desire to prevent the defendant from obtaining evidence that might be useful.” [Napper, 322 S.W.3d at 238 .] When conduct can, at worst, be described as negligent, the failure to preserve evidence does not rise to the level of a due process violation.

2024“When conduct can, at worst, be described as negligent, the failure to preserve evidence does not rise to the level of a due process violation.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).

2007Glattly, 177 S.W.3d at 447 ; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575-76 ; Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.1990) (explaining that United States Supreme Court has “refined the minimum contacts analysis by identifying recurring fact patterns and outlining guidelines for application of the due process test to these patterns” — i.e., specific and general jurisdiction).

2007Glattly , 177 S.W.3d at 447 ; Moki Mac , 221 S.W.3d at 575-76 ; Schlobohm v. Schapiro , 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990) (explaining that United States Supreme Court has "refined the minimum contacts analysis by identifying recurring fact patterns and outlining guidelines for application of the due process test to these patterns"-- i.e. , specific and general jurisdiction).