due process clause in North Dakota

2020“To determine whether a prosecutor’s misconduct rises to a level of due process violation, we decide if the conduct, in the context of the entire trial, was sufficiently prejudicial to violate a defendant’s due process rights.” Id.

2013“To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id.

2025“Although prosecutorial misconduct may create unfairness amounting to a due process violation, not every assertion of prosecutorial misconduct automatically rises to an error of constitutional dimension.” State v. Hannesson, 2023 ND 80, ¶ 6 , 989 N.W.2d 501 (quotation marks omitted).

2025“Although prosecutorial misconduct may create unfairness amounting to a due process violation, not every assertion of prosecutorial misconduct automatically rises to an error of constitutional dimension.” State v. Hannesson, 2023 ND 80, ¶ 6 , 989 N.W.2d 501 (quotation marks omitted).

2019The order denying R.A.S.'s petition for discharge is reversed for lack of findings sufficient to conclude the due process requirement has been met under Kansas v. Crane , 534 U.S. 407 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002).

2019The order denying R.A.S.'s petition for discharge is reversed for lack of findings sufficient to conclude the due process requirement has been met under Kansas v. Crane , 534 U.S. 407 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002).

2019State v. Brickle-Hicks , 2018 ND 194 , ¶ 11, 916 N.W.2d 781 (citing State v. Webster , 2013 ND 119 , ¶¶ 20-21, 834 N.W.2d 283 ).

2019State v. Brickle-Hicks , 2018 ND 194 , ¶ 11, 916 N.W.2d 781 (citing State v. Webster , 2013 ND 119 , ¶¶ 20-21, 834 N.W.2d 283 ).

2017Dep’t of Transp. , 1999 ND 140, ¶ 9 , 598 N.W.2d 111 . “[D]ue process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by- case basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied.” Wahl v. Morton Cty.

2017Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ND 140, ¶ 9 , 598 N.W.2d 111 . “[D]ue process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by-oase basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement, of fairness has been satisfied.” Wahl v. Morton Cty.

2017Dep’t of Transp. , 1999 ND 140, ¶ 9 , 598 N.W.2d 111 . “[D]ue process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by- case basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied.” Wahl v. Morton Cty.

2017Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ND 140, ¶ 9 , 598 N.W.2d 111 . “[D]ue process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by-oase basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement, of fairness has been satisfied.” Wahl v. Morton Cty.

2014This Court concluded “there is no general constitutional prohibition against legislation limiting entry into occupations or professions,” and “[t]he only question is whether the regulation, as to entry into the occupation or profession or otherwise, is reasonable and, within constitutional limits, promotes the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society.” Id. at 130 . [¶ 29] In Hoff, 1999 ND 115, ¶¶ 8-18 , 595 N.W.2d 285 , in the context of addressing state and federal constitutional challenges to a grandparent visitation statute, this Court generally outlined the levels of sc

2014This Court concluded “there is no general constitutional prohibition against legislation limiting entry into occupations or professions,” and “[t]he only question is whether the regulation, as to entry into the occupation or profession or otherwise, is reasonable and, within constitutional limits, promotes the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society.” Id. at 130 . [¶ 29] In Hoff, 1999 ND 115, ¶¶ 8-18 , 595 N.W.2d 285 , in the context of addressing state and federal constitutional challenges to a grandparent visitation statute, this Court generally outlined the levels of sc

2012“To determine whether a prosecutor’s misconduct rises to a level of a due process violation, we decide if the conduct, in the context of the entire trial, was sufficiently prejudicial to violate a defendant’s due process rights.” Id. (quoting State v. Kruckenberg, 2008 ND 212, ¶ 20 , 758 N.W.2d 427 ). “[E]ven when a defendant’s objection to a prosecutor’s improper argument is sustained by the trial court, the failure to request a cautionary instruction waives the objection to the allegedly prejudicial statement.” State v. McKinney, 518 N.W.2d 696, 701 (N.D.1994).

2012“To determine whether a prosecutor’s misconduct rises to a level of a due process violation, we decide if the conduct, in the context of the entire trial, was sufficiently prejudicial to violate a defendant’s due process rights.” Id. (quoting State v. Kruckenberg , 2008 ND 212, ¶ 20 , 758 N.W.2d 427 ). “[E]ven when a defendant’s objection to a prosecutor’s improper argument is sustained by the trial court, the failure to request a cautionary instruction waives the objection to the allegedly prejudicial statement.” State v. McKinney , 518 N.W.2d 696, 701 (N.D. 1994).

2014To determine whether a prosecutor’s misconduct rises to a level of a due process violation, we decide if the conduct, in the context of the entire trial, was sufficiently prejudicial to violate a defendant’s due process rights.” Id. (quoting State v. Duncan, 2011 ND 85, ¶ 12 , 796 N.W.2d 672 ).

2014To determine whether a prosecutor’s misconduct rises to a level of a due process violation, we decide if the conduct, in the context of the entire trial, was sufficiently prejudicial to violate a defendant’s due process rights.” Id. (quoting State v. Duncan , 2011 ND 85, ¶ 12 , 796 N.W.2d 672 ).

2012Sens., 1998 ND 48, ¶ 6 , 574 N.W.2d 859 . “[D]ue process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied.” Id.

2012Sens., 1998 ND 48, ¶ 6 , 574 N.W.2d 859 . “[D]ue process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied.” Id.

2012We also discussed Kelly v. Guy, 133 N.W.2d 853 (N.D.1965), and we said that case involved a federal constitutional challenge to a separate state constitutional provision under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2012We also discussed Kelly v. Guy , 133 N.W.2d 853 (N.D. 1965), and we said that case involved a federal constitutional challenge to a separate state constitutional provision under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2002Bureau, 1999 ND 174, ¶ 21 , 599 N.W.2d 280 (citations omitted), we said: The due process clause requires that the post-deprivation hearing be provided at a meaningful time.

2002Bureau, 1999 ND 174, ¶ 21 , 599 N.W.2d 280 (citations omitted), we said: The due process clause requires that the post-deprivation hearing be provided at a meaningful time.

2025II [¶6] Bibler claims the district court erred in reducing the length of the evidentiary hearing and the reduction was a due process violation. [¶7] “This Court applies a de novo standard of review when reviewing an alleged violation of a constitutional right.” State v. Sorenson, 2009 ND 147, ¶ 16 , 770 N.W.2d 701 .

2025II [¶6] Bibler claims the district court erred in reducing the length of the evidentiary hearing and the reduction was a due process violation. [¶7] “This Court applies a de novo standard of review when reviewing an alleged violation of a constitutional right.” State v. Sorenson, 2009 ND 147, ¶ 16 , 770 N.W.2d 701 .

2022C [¶17] In case 08-2021-CV-02236, Bridges argues new interpretations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) and Chisholm v. State, 2014 ND 125 , 848 N.W.2d 703 , resulted in a due process violation in his conviction for attempted murder.

2022C [¶17] In case 08-2021-CV-02236, Bridges argues new interpretations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) and Chisholm v. State, 2014 ND 125 , 848 N.W.2d 703 , resulted in a due process violation in his conviction for attempted murder.

2021Dist., 228 F.3d 897 , 902 (8th Cir. 2000); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)). “[P]rocedural due process requires fundamental fairness, which, at a minimum, necessitates notice and a meaningful opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Curtiss v. Curtiss, 2016 ND 197, ¶ 8 , 886 N.W.2d 565 (quoting St.

2021Dist., 228 F.3d 897 , 902 (8th Cir. 2000); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)). “[P]rocedural due process requires fundamental fairness, which, at a minimum, necessitates notice and a meaningful opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Curtiss v. Curtiss, 2016 ND 197, ¶ 8 , 886 N.W.2d 565 (quoting St.

2019State v. Brickle-Hicks , 2018 ND 194 , ¶ 11, 916 N.W.2d 781 (citing State v. Webster , 2013 ND 119 , ¶¶ 20-21, 834 N.W.2d 283 ).

2019State v. Brickle-Hicks , 2018 ND 194 , ¶ 11, 916 N.W.2d 781 (citing State v. Webster , 2013 ND 119 , ¶¶ 20-21, 834 N.W.2d 283 ).

2019State v. Loomer , 2008 ND 69 , ¶ 6, 747 N.W.2d 113 .

2019State v. Loomer , 2008 ND 69 , ¶ 6, 747 N.W.2d 113 .

2016II [¶ 5] Russell argues the exclusion of evidence about Bateman’s arrest was a due process violation requiring a new trial under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

2016II [¶ 5] Russell argues the exclusion of evidence about Bateman’s arrest was a due process violation requiring a new trial under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

2015J.G. contends there is not clear and convincing evidence to satisfy the requirement under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) that he is “likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others” and the due process requirement that he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. [¶8] The position of the experts in this case mirrors in many respects the positions they took in J.G. , 2013 ND 26 , 827 N.W.2d 341.

2015J.G. contends there is not clear and convincing evidence to satisfy the requirement under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) that he is “likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others” and the due process requirement that he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. [¶ 8] The position of the experts in this case mirrors in many respects the positions they took in J.G., 2013 ND 26 , 827 N.W.2d 341 .