due process clause in Oklahoma

2020What process is due "must be determined on a case-by-case basis because the due process clause does not by itself mandate any particular form of procedure." Id. ¶ 9.

2018This question "must be determined on a case-by-case basis because the due process clause does not by itself mandate any particular form of procedure," but instead calls for such procedural protection "as the particular situation demands." In re A.M. , 2000 OK 82 , ¶ 9, 13 P.3d 484 (citing McLin v. Trimble , 1990 OK 74 , 795 P.2d 1035 , and Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 322 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)).

2025See , e.g. , Dutton v. City of Midwest City , 2015 OK 51 353 P.3d 532 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services , 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (discussing loss of parental rights that are not mere property rights, and noting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and elements to be evaluated for a due process claim).

2025See , e.g. , Dutton v. City of Midwest City , 2015 OK 51 353 P.3d 532 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services , 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (discussing loss of parental rights that are not mere property rights, and noting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and elements to be evaluated for a due process claim).

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800 , n. 29, 805, cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7.").

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800 , n. 29, 805, cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7.").

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800 , n. 29, 805, cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7.").

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800, n. 29, 805 , cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7."). 119 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , ¶32, & n.2, 373 P.3d 1057, 1074 . 120 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶32, 373 P.3d at 1074 . 121 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶¶ 26, 32. 122 Matter of Adoption of M.A.S. , 2

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800 , n. 29, 805, cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7.").

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800, n. 29, 805 , cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7."). 119 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , ¶32, & n.2, 373 P.3d 1057, 1074 . 120 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶32, 373 P.3d at 1074 . 121 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶¶ 26, 32. 122 Matter of Adoption of M.A.S. , 2

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800 , n. 29, 805, cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7.").

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800, n. 29, 805 , cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7."). 119 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , ¶32, & n.2, 373 P.3d 1057, 1074 . 120 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶32, 373 P.3d at 1074 . 121 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶¶ 26, 32. 122 Matter of Adoption of M.A.S. , 2

2011Although the due process clause does not mandate inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation, the due process clauses of both the federal and Oklahoma constitutions require at a minimum notice and a hearing prior to the issuance of the permit in the case of mineral interest owners. [emphasis added]. 868 P.2d at 681, n. 17 . ¶ 18 This Court noted in DuLaney that the statutes had been amended to allow notice to mineral interest owners and landowners in adjacent counties, but that the claim had arisen under the previous statute which did not provide for such notice.

2011Although the due process clause does not mandate inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation, the due process clauses of both the federal and Oklahoma constitutions require at a minimum notice and a hearing prior to the issuance of the permit in the case of mineral interest owners. [emphasis added]. 868 P.2d at 681, n. 17 . 1] 18 This Court noted in DuLaney that the statutes had been amended to allow notice to mineral interest owners and landowners in adjacent counties, but that the claim had arisen under the previous statute which did not provide for such notice

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800, n. 29, 805 , cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7."). 119 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , ¶32, & n.2, 373 P.3d 1057, 1074 . 120 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶32, 373 P.3d at 1074 . 121 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶¶ 26, 32. 122 Matter of Adoption of M.A.S. , 2

2019Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City , 1995 OK 62 , 901 P.2d 800, n. 29, 805 , cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 674 , 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) ("The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7."). 119 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , ¶32, & n.2, 373 P.3d 1057, 1074 . 120 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶32, 373 P.3d at 1074 . 121 Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC , 2016 OK 20 , at ¶¶ 26, 32. 122 Matter of Adoption of M.A.S. , 2

2016A. More Than a Mere Lack of Due Care ¶ 30 We emphasize that the due process clause does not protect a child from mere lack of due care on the pari of government employees, nor does it serve to supplant the GTCA or traditional tort law generally. “[T]he Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government[.]” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016A. More Than a Mere Lack of Due Care ¶ 30 We emphasize that the due process clause does not protect a child from mere lack of due care on the pari of government employees, nor does it serve to supplant the GTCA or traditional tort law generally. “[T]he Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government[.]” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2018Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10 , n. 26, 954 P.2d 1219 ; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 332, 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

2018Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10 , n. 26, 954 P.2d 1219 ; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 332, 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

2023In In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., we noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that only "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child' [does] his interest in personal contact with his child acquire substantial protection under the due process clause." In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., 1999 OK 74, ¶10 , at 1272, quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983).

2023In In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., we noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that only "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child' [does] his interest in personal contact with his child acquire substantial protection under the due process clause." In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., 1999 OK 74, ¶10, at 1272, quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983).

2018Maxwell v. Sprint PCS , 2016 OK 41 , ¶ 22, 369 P.3d 1079 , 1091 ("The due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects citizens from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the state.") quoting City of Edmond v. Wakefield , 1975 OK 96 , ¶ 6, 537 P.2d 1211 , 1213.

2018Maxwell v. Sprint PCS , 2016 OK 41 , ¶ 22, 369 P.3d 1079 , 1091 ("The due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects citizens from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the state.") quoting City of Edmond v. Wakefield , 1975 OK 96 , ¶ 6, 537 P.2d 1211 , 1213.

1983When the photographic identification procedure is “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the due process clause of the 14th amendment is violated.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).

1983When the photographic identification procedure is “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the due process clause of the 14th amendment is violated.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).

2018Maxwell v. Sprint PCS , 2016 OK 41 , ¶ 22, 369 P.3d 1079 , 1091 ("The due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects citizens from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the state.") quoting City of Edmond v. Wakefield , 1975 OK 96 , ¶ 6, 537 P.2d 1211 , 1213.

2018Maxwell v. Sprint PCS , 2016 OK 41 , ¶ 22, 369 P.3d 1079 , 1091 ("The due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects citizens from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the state.") quoting City of Edmond v. Wakefield , 1975 OK 96 , ¶ 6, 537 P.2d 1211 , 1213.

2014Whether sufficient minimum contacts exist, and due process is satisfied, depends upon the "quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to ensure." International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 .

2014Whether sufficient minimum contacts exist, and due process is satisfied, depends upon the "quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to ensure." International Shoe Co. , 326 U.S. at 319 .

2004This Court will do the same. ¶ 20 In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), the Supreme Court explained that a due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. 431 U.S. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2049 .

2004This Court will do the same. ¶ 20 In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), the Supreme Court explained that a due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. 431 U.S. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2049 .

2023In In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., we noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that only "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child' [does] his interest in personal contact with his child acquire substantial protection under the due process clause." In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., 1999 OK 74, ¶10 , at 1272, quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983).

2023In In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., we noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that only "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child' [does] his interest in personal contact with his child acquire substantial protection under the due process clause." In re Termination of the Parental Rights of the Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., 1999 OK 74, ¶10, at 1272, quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983).

2016Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 , 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914); Priest v. Board of Trustees of Town of Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 , 34 S.Ct. 443 , 58 L.Ed. 751 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 , 20 S.Ct. 410 , 44 L.Ed. 520 (1900).

2001The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the due process clause protects a non-resident defendant's liberty interest in not being subject to binding judgments in a state with which it has established no meaningful "contacts, ties or relations." Id. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160 . 111 In personam jurisdiction may be either general or specific.

2013It provides that "[al court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States." 2 In Fields v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 1976 OK 106 , 555 P.2d 48, 52 , we explained that the intent of the Oklahoma long-arm statute is to extend the jurisdiction of Oklahoma courts over non-residents to the outer limits permitted by the Oklahoma Constitution 3 and by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 4 1 11 CFI argues that it has not directed its activities in any way toward Oklahoma, and that it

2013It provides that "[al court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States." 2 In Fields v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 1976 OK 106 , 555 P.2d 48, 52 , we explained that the intent of the Oklahoma long-arm statute is to extend the jurisdiction of Oklahoma courts over non-residents to the outer limits permitted by the Oklahoma Constitution 3 and by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 4 1 11 CFI argues that it has not directed its activities in any way toward Oklahoma, and that it

1990Id. 452 U.S. at 31-32 , 101 S.Ct. at 2161-2162 , quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 , 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1762 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) We continue to adhere to the philosophy enunciated in Chad S. Although the federal constitution does not require that counsel be appointed in all termination proceedings, we believe that the rights at issue are those which are fundamental to the family unit and are protected by the due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2, § 7.

1990Id. 452 U.S. at 31-32 , 101 S.Ct. at 2161-2162 , quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 , 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1762 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) We continue to adhere to the philosophy enunciated in Chad S. Although the federal constitution does not require that counsel be appointed in all termination proceedings, we believe that the rights at issue are those which are fundamental to the family unit and are protected by the due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2, § 7.

2025See , e.g. , Dutton v. City of Midwest City , 2015 OK 51 353 P.3d 532 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services , 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (discussing loss of parental rights that are not mere property rights, and noting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and elements to be evaluated for a due process claim).

2025See , e.g. , Dutton v. City of Midwest City , 2015 OK 51 353 P.3d 532 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services , 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (discussing loss of parental rights that are not mere property rights, and noting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and elements to be evaluated for a due process claim).

2014The Court stated: [when an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com{[ing} forward to participate in the rearing of his child," Caban [v. Mohammed ], 441 U.S. [380], at 392, 99 S.Ct. [1760], at 1768 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ], his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.

1999The Lehr court drew a sharp distinction between a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship and a potential or opportunity interest, yet to be developed through the natural father’s acceptance of responsibility for the child’s future. 1 It held that only “[wjhen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child’ [does] his interest in personal contact with his child acquire substantial protection under the due process clause.” Id. at 261-262 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 4