205 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1914–2026 35 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estep v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024There, we reiterated that “[t]he purpose of a ‘missing evidence’ instruction is to cure any Due Process violation attributable to the loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence by a less onerous remedy than dismissal or the suppression of relevant evidence.” Id. at 810 . 2021Regarding Simpson’s alleged Brady violation, the law is clear that the intentional destruction of exculpatory evidence by the Commonwealth is a Due Process violation requiring “(1) dismissal, (2) exclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, or (3) an instruction permitting the jury to infer that the missing evidence, if available, would be adverse to the Commonwealth and favorable to the defendant.” Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Ky. 2002). | 5 | 7 |
Wilson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2020In Biggers, supra, the United States Supreme Court established a two- part test for determining if there is a due process violation, which the Supreme Court of Kentucky summarized in Wilson v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1985). 2020We review a trial judge’s ruling on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.27 The trial judge abuses their discretion if the decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”28 The United States Supreme Court has established that there is a two-part analysis used when determining if the due process clause may have been violated by impermissibly suggestive evidence.29 This two-pronged analysis has been adopted in Kentucky, and the first prong requires this Court to “determine whether the confrontation procedures employed by the police were ‘ | 4 | 5 |
McPherson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022McPherson v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 207, 217 (Ky. 2012). 2016In McPherson v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2012), we identified three elements that must be proven to establish a due process violation with respect to missing evidence, which if preserved and subjected to testing, might have produced results that exonerated the defendant. | 3 | 4 |
Tamme v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016According to Lanham, "[t]he entire case rested on the credibility of the girls, and mainly that of [Amy]." Due Process "In order to establish a due process violation, the evidence must either be intentionally destroyed, or destroyed inadvertently outside normal practices." Tamme v. Commonwealth, 759 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. 1988). 2016According to Lanham, "[t]he entire case rested on the credibility of the girls, and mainly that of [Amy]." Due Process "In order to establish a due process violation, the evidence must either be intentionally destroyed, or destroyed inadvertently outside normal practices." Tamme v. Commonwealth, 759 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. 1988). | 3 | 4 |
John Fairley III v. Commonwealth of Kentuckygreen2 sentences2023“In Biggers, the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong due process test for considering an identification by a witness following impermissible suggestive pretrial procedures such as a photo array or line-up.” Id. at 797-98 . 2017Id. at 798 , “In Biggers, the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong due process test for considering an identification by a witness following impermissible suggestive pretrial procedures such as a photo array or line-up.” Id. at 797-98 . | 3 | 3 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2012Alleged Exculpatory Evidence After trial, Appellant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial arguing, among other things, a due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 2012Alleged Exculpatory Evidence After trial, Appellant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial arguing, among other things, a due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). | 2 | 8 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2026This standard, perhaps with minor modification, reflects the due-process standard -14- established in Arizona v. Youngblood, [ 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S. Ct. 333 , 102 L. 2026This standard, perhaps with minor modification, reflects the due-process standard -14- established in Arizona v. Youngblood, [ 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S. Ct. 333 , 102 L. | 2 | 6 |
California v. Trombettagreen2 sentences2016"Furthermore, the lost evidence must 'possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed."' Id. (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). 2016"Furthermore, the lost evidence must 'possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed."' Id. (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). | 2 | 5 |
Mahoney v. Cartergreen2 sentences2022Ed. 2d 356 -9- (1985). “[S]o long as the conditions or the degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected do not exceed the sentence which was imposed and are not otherwise in violation of the Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Mahoney v. Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1997). 2011Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 , 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773 , 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); see also Webb, 223 S.W.3d at 117-18 . “[SJo long as the conditions or the degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected do not exceed the sentence which was imposed and are not otherwise in violation of the Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Mahoney v. Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky.1997); see also McMillen, 233 S.W.3d at 205 . (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) | 2 | 4 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen2 sentences2012Rather, the due process inquiry focuses only on the opportunity to be heard, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ; that right, however, may be waived. 2012Rather, the due process inquiry focuses only on the opportunity to be heard, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ; that right, however, may be waived. | 2 | 3 |
R v. v. Commonwealth, Department for Health & Family Servicesgreen2 sentences2025Moreover, this Court has long clearly held that: “pursuant to both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and KRS 625.080(3) and 620.100(1), that the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings.” R.V. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t for Health and Family Services, 242 S.W.3d 669, 672-73 (Ky. App. 2007). 2020During those hearings, the trial court entered erroneous factual findings regarding the 30 See Cleveland Bd of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (“[T]he right to due process is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee”). 31 242 S.W.3d 669, 672-73 (Ky. App. 2007). 13 length of time the child had been in foster care and the Cabinet changed its goal from returning the child to permanent foster care placement. | 2 | 2 |
McMillen v. Kentucky Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2022McMillen v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., 233 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. App. 2007). 2011Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 , 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773 , 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); see also Webb, 223 S.W.3d at 117-18 . “[SJo long as the conditions or the degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected do not exceed the sentence which was imposed and are not otherwise in violation of the Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Mahoney v. Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky.1997); see also McMillen, 233 S.W.3d at 205 . (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) | 2 | 2 |
Watkins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2021The right is further rooted in the due process clause “when a defendant is not actually being confronted by witnesses or evidence against him.” Watkins v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 449, 452 (Ky. 2003) (citing United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 , 105 S. Ct. 1482 , 84 L. 2013The United States Supreme Court has explained that a defendant has a right to be present “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge ... [and it] is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” 105 S.W.3d 449, 452-53 (Ky.2003) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , | 2 | 2 |
| Davis H. Elliot Co. Inc. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., Ltd.green | 2 | 2 |
| Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
City of Louisville v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences1978See American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Com’n, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450 (1964); Morris v. City of Catlettsburg, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 753 (1969); City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173 (1971). 1977American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville, etc., Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450 (1964); City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173 (1971). | 1 | 4 |
Sanborn v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2002The genesis of the “missing evidence” instruction is the per curiam opinion (three justices concurring, two justices concurring in result only without separate opinion) in Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988), wherein it was stated that the intentional destruction of exculpatory evidence by the Commonwealth is a Due Process violation per Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), requiring (1) dismissal, (2) exclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, or (3) an instruction permitting the jury to infer that the missing evidence, if available, would be a 2002The genesis of the “missing evidence” instruction is the per curiam opinion (three justices concurring, two justices concurring in result only without separate opinion) in Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988), wherein it was stated that the intentional destruction of exculpatory evidence by the Commonwealth is a Due Process violation per Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), requiring (1) dismissal, (2) exclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, or (3) an instruction permitting the jury to infer that the missing evidence, if available, would be a | 1 | 3 |
Wolff v. McDonnellgreen2 sentences2026To satisfy the minimal due process requirement, the prison must provide: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in [the inmate’s] defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 , 105 S.Ct. at 2773 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. 563 -67, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-80 ). 2009See Wolff v. *263 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (U.S.Neb.1974); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). | 1 | 2 |
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Goregreen2 sentences2024A punitive damages award violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is “grossly excessive.” Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 , 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 , 134 L. 2024A punitive damages award violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is “grossly excessive.” Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 , 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 , 134 L. | 1 | 2 |
| Illinois v. Fishergreen | 1 | 2 |
| Michael E. Valentine v. Khelleh Konteh, Wardengreen | 1 | 2 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpellired | 1 | 2 |
| Morris v. City of Catlettsburggreen | 1 | 2 |
| American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Commissiongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Dunn v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skilling v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kordenbrock v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. ANGEL T.green | 1 | 1 |
| Romans v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirk Bradley Bell v. Jack Duckworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robert T. Mathis v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Troxel v. Granvillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collins v. City of Harker Heightsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Millsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Satterwhite v. Public Service Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wassongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Blackwell's Adm'rgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDONALD'S CORP. v. Ogborn
green
2 sentences2026A punitive damages award violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is “grossly excessive.” McDonald’s Corp., 309 S.W.3d at 298 . 2024A punitive damages award violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is “grossly excessive.” Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 , 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 , 134 L. | 4 | 2018–2026 |
United States v. Agurs
green
2 sentences2020See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 2020See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). | 4 | 1982–2020 |
Neil v. Biggers
green
2 sentences2020We review a trial judge’s ruling on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.27 The trial judge abuses their discretion if the decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”28 The United States Supreme Court has established that there is a two-part analysis used when determining if the due process clause may have been violated by impermissibly suggestive evidence.29 This two-pronged analysis has been adopted in Kentucky, and the first prong requires this Court to “determine whether the confrontation procedures employed by the police were ‘ 2004The relevant United States Supreme Court precedent, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), establishes "a two-prong due process test," Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 854, 857 (1985), under which the court "must first determine whether the confrontation procedures employed by the police were `suggestive' [and then] [i]f [it] conclude[s] that they were suggestive, [it] then must assess the probability that the witness would make an irreparable misidentification, based on the totality of the circumstances[.]" Id. | 4 | 1985–2020 |
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill
green
2 sentences2026To satisfy the minimal due process requirement, the prison must provide: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in [the inmate’s] defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 , 105 S.Ct. at 2773 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. 563 -67, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-80 ). 2026To satisfy the minimal due process requirement, the prison must provide: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in [the inmate’s] defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 , 105 S.Ct. at 2773 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. 563 -67, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-80 ). | 3 | 2007–2026 |
Hewitt v. Helms
red
2 sentences2005Our Supreme Court has further held that “so long as the conditions or the degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected do not exceed the sentence which was imposed and are not otherwise in violation of the Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Mahoney v. Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky.1997), citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 869-70 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). 2005Our Supreme Court has further held that “so long as the conditions or the degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected do not exceed the sentence which was imposed and are not otherwise in violation of the Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Mahoney v. Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky.1997), citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 869-70 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). | 3 | 1997–2025 |
Bouie v. City of Columbia
green
2 sentences2016DPA argued that the new procedures accorded persons under supervision less protection against revocation (hence producing additional incarceration) than did the former procedures, such that application of the new procedures to the. defendants would amount to a due process violation, the sort of .“fair warning” violation- the United States Supreme Court addressed in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). 2016DPA argued that the new procedures accorded persons under supervision less protection against revocation (hence producing additional incarceration) than did the former procedures, such that application of the new procedures to the. defendants would amount to a due process violation, the sort of .“fair warning” violation- the United States Supreme Court addressed in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Fields v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2012The court held that the trial court had deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard and adopted the due process standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Silverman : although a lower standard of due process applies at sentencing, the facts relied on by the court must “have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” Id. at 917 (citing Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1504 ). 2011The court held that the trial court had deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard and adopted the due process standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Silverman : although a lower standard of due process applies at sentencing, the facts relied on by the court must “have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” Id. at 917 (citing Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1504 ). | 3 | 2010–2012 |
United States v. Ira Silverman (90-3205) Morris G. Woodard (90-5816) and Gary Caton (90-5733/91-6506)
green
2 sentences2012The court held that the trial court had deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard and adopted the due process standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Silverman : although a lower standard of due process applies at sentencing, the facts relied on by the court must “have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” Id. at 917 (citing Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1504 ). 2011The court held that the trial court had deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard and adopted the due process standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Silverman : although a lower standard of due process applies at sentencing, the facts relied on by the court must “have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” Id. at 917 (citing Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1504 ). | 3 | 2010–2012 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2008KRE 103(e); CR 61.02. *121 PUNITIVE DAMAGES In 2003, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-23 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), wherein it held that under the due process clause, out-of-state conduct of a defendant regarding a non-party cannot be used to award punitive damages. 2008KRE 103(e); CR 61.02. *121 PUNITIVE DAMAGES In 2003, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-23 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), wherein it held that under the due process clause, out-of-state conduct of a defendant regarding a non-party cannot be used to award punitive damages. | 2 | 2008–2026 |
Sandin v. Conner
green
2 sentences2025Under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 , 115 S. Ct. 2293 , 132 L. 2025Under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 , 115 S. Ct. 2293 , 132 L. | 2 | 2009–2025 |
Stanley v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2022We are not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court when deciding whether a state statute impermissibly infringes upon individual rights guaranteed in the State Constitution so long as state constitutional protection does not fall below the federal floor, meaning the minimum guarantee of individual rights under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” (internal citations omitted)). 66 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 . 33 “guarantees more than fair process.”67 The due process clause also has a substantive aspect, which protects “individual liberty 2003Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has jealously guarded this right, and has not encroached on it absent some compelling reason.” citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)); Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.App., 74 S.W.3d 777, 781-82 (2002); Greathouse v. Shreve, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 387 (1995). .Cf. | 2 | 2003–2022 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2022We are not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court when deciding whether a state statute impermissibly infringes upon individual rights guaranteed in the State Constitution so long as state constitutional protection does not fall below the federal floor, meaning the minimum guarantee of individual rights under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” (internal citations omitted)). 66 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 . 33 “guarantees more than fair process.”67 The due process clause also has a substantive aspect, which protects “individual liberty 2003Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has jealously guarded this right, and has not encroached on it absent some compelling reason.” citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)); Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.App., 74 S.W.3d 777, 781-82 (2002); Greathouse v. Shreve, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 387 (1995). .Cf. | 2 | 2003–2022 |
Withrow v. Larkin
green
2 sentences2020Both Nicholson and Alred cite Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that combination of these two functions “does not, without more, constitute a due process violation[.]” Id. at 58 . 2020Both Nicholson and Alred cite Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that combination of these two functions “does not, without more, constitute a due process violation[.]” Id. at 58 . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
| Planned Parenthood Of The Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition Of Life Activists green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Benton v. Maryland green | 2 | 1973–2012 |
| McKeiver v. Pennsylvania green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Franklin v. Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| Brewster v. Commonwealth green | 2 | 1992–1997 |
| World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson green | 2 | 1992–1995 |
| Warschauer Sick Support Soc. v. State of NY neutral | 2 | 1995–1995 |
| Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip green | 2 | 1992–1993 |
| Bell v. Burson green | 2 | 1971–1993 |
| Texas American Bank v. Sayers green | 2 | 1990–1992 |
| Sheppard v. Maxwell green | 2 | 1968–1978 |
| cluster 259249 green | 2 | 1972–1978 |
| Hess v. Pawloski green | 2 | 1965–1975 |
| Roberts v. Noel neutral | 2 | 1971–1973 |
| Premiertox 2.0 v. Miniard green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Jones v. Bailey green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Albarran green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Zt v. Mt green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Jackson v. Evans green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Rigdon v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Gaines v. Grimm green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Mathews v. Eldridge green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Ragan green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Dowling v. United States green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Reno v. Flores green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Washington v. Glucksberg green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Roe v. Lynch green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.