due process clause in Louisiana

1993In 1970, the high court explicitly held that the due process clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

1993In 1970, the high court explicitly held that the due process clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

2013In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.” But in the “give-and-take” of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecutor’s offer.

2013In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.” But in the “give-and-take” of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecutor’s offer.

1992In reaching its decision the Alexander court recognized that, although the habitual offender proceeding is in the nature of an enhancement of penalty, rather than a prosecution, State v. Stott 395 So.2d 714 (La.1981) principles of fundamental fairness dictated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit inordinate delays; State v. Duncan, 396 So.2d 297 (La.1981).

1989The court in Milson, supra, cited State v. Duncan, supra , for the rule that the principles of fundamental fairness dictated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit inordinate delays in post-conviction hearings when the defendant is prejudiced by those delays.

2006Ruckstuhl v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corporation, supra. In the de Reyes case, the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the types of personal jurisdiction: In interpreting the due process clause, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between two types of personal jurisdiction — "general" and "specific" jurisdiction.

2006In Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 98-1126, pp. 6-7 (La.4/13/99), 731 So.2d 881, 885-86 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 , 120 S.Ct. 526 , 145 L.Ed.2d 407 (1999), the supreme court summarized the test for constitutional due process as follows: The due process test first enunciated in International Shoe [ Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)] requires that in order to subject a nonresident defendant to a personal judgment, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend t

2009The Supreme Court of the United States has observed: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 395 U.S., [711] at 738, 89 S.Ct., [2072] at 2082[, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) ] (opinion of Black, J.), and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action *235 whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.” Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, 412 U.S., [17] at 32-33, n. 20, 93 S.Ct., [1977] at 1986[, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ].

2002In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated as follows regarding the issue of vindictiveness in the context of plea negotiations: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, [ 395 U.S. 711 ] at 738[, 89 S.Ct. 2072 , *207 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)] (opinion of Black, J.), and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal righ

2022“A due process claim in the context of civil service employment depends upon an employee having a property right in continued comparable employment.” Moore, 2001-3341, p. 12, 839 So.2d at 948 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)).

2022“A due process claim in the context of civil service employment depends upon an employee having a property right in continued comparable employment.” Moore, 2001-3341, p. 12, 839 So.2d at 948 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)).

2017However, “Brady is not a rule of discovery designed to help defendants decide tactical questions. . .The purpose of the Brady rule is to insure that defendants receive their constitutional right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause, a trial in which the trier of fact has before it all available material exculpatory evidence.” State v. Bazile, 2012-2243, p. 18-19 (La. 5/7/13), 144 So.3d 719, 733 (Emphasis added.) “[EJvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been dif

2017However, “Brady is not a rule of discovery designed to help defendants decide tactical questions. . .The purpose of the Brady rule is to insure that defendants receive their constitutional right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause, a trial in which the trier of fact has before it all available material exculpatory evidence.” State v. Bazile, 2012-2243, p. 18-19 (La. 5/7/13), 144 So.3d 719, 733 (Emphasis added.) “[EJvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been dif

1992The defendant objected to the instruction and relies on Cage v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) in which the jury instruction on reasonable doubt violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1992The defendant objected to the instruction and relies on Cage v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) in which the jury instruction on reasonable doubt violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2013The Fourth Circuit explained in Broussard v. Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc., supra: The minimum contacts prong of the two-part due process test is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 00-3255, p. 5 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1271, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022 , 122 S.Ct. 550 , 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001) (citations omitted).

2012The minimum contacts prong of the two-part due process test is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Broussard, 65 So.3d at 190 (quoting A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 2000-3255 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1271, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022 , 122 S.Ct. 550 , 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001) (citations omitted)).

2013The Fourth Circuit explained in Broussard v. Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc., supra: The minimum contacts prong of the two-part due process test is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 00-3255, p. 5 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1271, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022 , 122 S.Ct. 550 , 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001) (citations omitted).

2012The minimum contacts prong of the two-part due process test is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Broussard, 65 So.3d at 190 (quoting A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 2000-3255 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1271, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022 , 122 S.Ct. 550 , 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001) (citations omitted)).

2013The Fourth Circuit explained in Broussard v. Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc., supra: The minimum contacts prong of the two-part due process test is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 00-3255, p. 5 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1271, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022 , 122 S.Ct. 550 , 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001) (citations omitted).

2012The minimum contacts prong of the two-part due process test is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Broussard, 65 So.3d at 190 (quoting A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 2000-3255 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1271, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022 , 122 S.Ct. 550 , 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001) (citations omitted)).

2008Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

2008Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

2003Clay v. Clay, 389 So.2d at 37 .

1992DISCUSSION The Long Arm Statute was adopted in this State “... to permit the courts of Louisiana to tap the full potential of in personam jurisdiction over non-residents consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.” Clay v. Clay, 389 So.2d 31 (La.1979) at page 37, and citations therein.

2002The due process test first enunciated in International Shoe has evolved into a two-part *221 test, the first part being the "minimum contacts" prong, which is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

2002The due process test first enunciated in International Shoe has evolved into a two-part *221 test, the first part being the "minimum contacts" prong, which is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

2002The majority opinion in its analysis of the due process claim cites the case of Roth, 92 S.Ct. 2701 , but omits any reference to the rejection of "the wooden distinction between `rights' and `privileges.'" The Supreme Court opinion in Roth provides an answer for both a property right analysis and a mere privilege analysis when it says: "The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Roth, 92 S.Ct. at 2708 .

2002The majority opinion in its analysis of the due process claim cites the case of Roth, 92 S.Ct. 2701 , but omits any reference to the rejection of "the wooden distinction between `rights' and `privileges.'" The Supreme Court opinion in Roth provides an answer for both a property right analysis and a mere privilege analysis when it says: "The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Roth, 92 S.Ct. at 2708 .