due process clause in Massachusetts

2008“Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution, and arts. 1, 10 and 12 of its Declaration of Rights are the provisions in our Constitution comparable to the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.” Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1 , 14 n.8 (1971).

2008“Part n, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution, and arts. 1, 10 and 12 of its Declaration of Rights, are the provisions in our Constitution comparable to the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.” Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1 , 14 n.8 (1971).

2014The Due Process Clause Allows Jurisdiction over the Defendants A court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment such that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

2014A court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment such that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

2016A property right protected by the due process clause arises from “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law— rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

2009Without a property interest in her participation in extracurricular, interscholastic athletics, the plaintiff has no right to the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 See Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra at 569 .

2014See Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 372 (1979), citing McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 365-366 (1937) (“the right to engage in any lawful occupation is an aspect of the liberty and property interests protected by the substantive reach of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and analogous provisions of our State Constitution”); Walden v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 395 Mass. 263, 271 (1985) (“right to work as a nurse is protected against deprivation without due process of

2002“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution demands that a [regulation] bear a ‘reason- . able relation to a permissible legislative objective.’ ” Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 373 (1979), quoting Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 14 (1971).

2023The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, "requires the Commonwealth to prove every essential element of the offense 39 beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 815 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

2001Omitting an essential element of the crime charged, as occurred here, is an error of constitutional dimension that violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

2012The plurality opinion in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 37 (2002) (Mc-Kune), quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), concluded that incriminating statements by a prisoner are not “compelled” where the penalties for refusal to self-incriminate do not constitute “atypical and significant hardships on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion did not agree that the standard for compulsion is the same as the due process standard established in Sandin v. Conner, supra, and “[found] the plurality’s failure to set forth a com

2012The plurality opinion in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 37 (2002) (Mc-Kune), quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), concluded that incriminating statements by a prisoner are not “compelled” where the penalties for refusal to self-incriminate do not constitute “atypical and significant hardships on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion did not agree that the standard for compulsion is the same as the due process standard established in Sandin v. Conner, supra, and “[found] the plurality’s failure to set forth a com

2025See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 423 Mass. 6 1201, 1231 (1996) ("[T]he process due in a particular case is a function of the severity of the deprivation"); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990) ("The due process clause . . . requires that the Commonwealth provide probationers with certain protections at surrender hearings").

2020In Durling, 407 Mass. at 113 , we concluded that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required the following procedural protections at probation revocation hearings: "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 7 As the parties do not make any argument regarding substantive due process, see generally Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 124-125 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004) (discussing substantive

2015Alere must also show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Wallace and Stocksdale is consistent with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. “ ‘[T]he constitutional touchstone’ of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process ‘remains whether the defendant purposefully established ’’minimum contacts" in the forum state.’ “ Tatro , 416 Mass, at 772, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). ’’The due process analysis entails three requirements.

1996This “fair warning” required by the due process clause “that a particular activity may subject [an individual] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985), quoting from Stevens, J., concurring in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977), “is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum,” Burger King, supra, quoting from Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).

2012Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,794 (1969).

2009See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787, 794 (1969).

1999Under the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, legislation must bear “a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare.” Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, supra, quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418 (1940).

1989In cases such as this, where the right infringed on is not a “fundamental” right, we have stated that the question under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution is “whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective,” Pinnick v. Cleary, supra at 14 , and, under the analogous provisions of the State Constitution as whether the statute “bears real and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare.” Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, supra at 373, qu

2007As such, the exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute comports with the due process requirement of the United States Constitution as MSA has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Massachusetts].” Tatro, 416 Mass. at 772 ; Stanton , 50 Mass.App.Ct at 121.

2002Because the Massachusetts long-arm statute has been construed to “function[] as an assertion of jurisdiction over the person to the limits allowed by the [Federal] Constitution,” (citation omitted), Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 771 (1994), in the final analysis, the question is whether subjecting Milbank to jurisdiction is permissible under the relatedness factor of the due process analysis described in Saw- tell v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1389 (1st Cir. 1995).

2020"In substantive due process analysis, the nature of the individual interest at stake determines the standard of review that courts apply when deciding whether a challenged statute meets the requirements of the due process clause." Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993).

2018See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 751-752, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (upholding Federal Bail Reform Act, which also requires adversary hearing using clear and convincing evidence standard, and provides for expedited appeal); Aime , 414 Mass. at 680 , 611 N.E.2d 204 , quoting Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 , 83, 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (Federal Bail Reform Act represents "one of those carefully limited exceptions [to pretrial freedom] permitted by the due process clause").

2022The defendant argues that the trial judge, by instructing the jury that "[m]alice . . . is implied Page 312 to every cruel act," [Note 6] established a mandatory presumption of malice in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as construed in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-524 . [Note 7] "A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985).

2013A jury instruction creating a permissive presumption violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution “only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.” Id. at 314-315 .

2024In deciding that the five-sixths requirement applies to § 9 petitions, the Supreme Judicial Court, using the due process framework provided in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), directly considered whether a unanimous jury verdict was necessary to protect petitioners' fundamental liberty interest 3 and concluded that unanimity was not required.

1994Questions related to the standard of proof in care and protectian proceedings are tested by reference to the due process analysis contained in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which requires the balancing of three factors, “(1) ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards’; and (3) ‘the Government’s interest, including the function in-valved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that t

2022The defendant argues that the trial judge, by instructing the jury that "[m]alice . . . is implied Page 312 to every cruel act," [Note 6] established a mandatory presumption of malice in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as construed in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-524 . [Note 7] "A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985).

2022"It is well established that language in jury instructions of any presumption, whether conclusive or rebuttable, that has the effect of shifting from the prosecution to a defendant the burden of proof on an essential element of the crime charged offends the defendant's Federal constitutional right to due process." Commonwealth v. Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 802 (2000), citing Sandstrom, supra at 519-520, 523-524 .

2017It started its analysis by affirming its prior holdings that “[p]arents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody of their children, which is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,” and that “[d]ue process requirements must be met where a parent is deprived of the right to raise his or her child.” Id. at 570-71 (citing Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 58 (1990), and the cases cited therein).

2005“Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody of their children, which is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 570 (2005), citing Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 58, 60 (1990).

1998See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, requires the State to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (substantive component of Fourteenth Amendment due process clause requires the State to provide involuntarily committed mental patients with services necessary to ensure their “reasonable safety” from themselves and others).

1993In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Federal Constitution requires that “minimally adequate care and treatment” be provided for persons held involuntarily by the State, and required that decisions about the care of involuntary inpatients be made according to “accepted professional judgment.” Id. at 323 .

2024A person's reputation does not rise to the level of a liberty or property interest protected by the due process clause, however, "unless the circumstances involve something more, such as a change in the person's rights or status protected by State law." See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 143 (1997).

2003“The due process test requires a balancing of the individual interest at stake and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty or property under the procedures that the State seeks to use against the governmental interest in achieving its goals.” Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 140 (1997), citing Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 675 (1993).

2023Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 14 253 (1958).

2011In conducting the due process inquiry, the court must first determine whether “the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

2020"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against deprivations of interests in 'life, liberty or property, without due process of law."' Hoffer v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 454 (2012). "'Procedural due process protections,' such as the right to a hearing, 'are only triggered when a liberty or property interest is at issue.'" Id. (quoting Hudson v. Commissioner of Corr., 431 Mass. 1, 7 (2000)).

2015The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against deprivations of interests in “life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” 2 Hudson v. Comm’r of Corr., 431 Mass. 1, 7 (2000).

2020In Durling, 407 Mass. at 113 , we concluded that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required the following procedural protections at probation revocation hearings: "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 7 As the parties do not make any argument regarding substantive due process, see generally Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 124-125 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004) (discussing substantive

2009While the probationer was entitled to due process protections in connection with the revocation proceeding, id. at 112-113 , including a “right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,” id. at 113 , quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973), we held that due process is a “flexible concept,” Durling, supra at 113 , that the “touchstone” of due process requirements is to provide in the context “an accurate and reliable determination” whether revocation is proper, id. at 117 , and the due process clause does not prohibit the use of hearsay evidence where there is “a showing th

2018"Article 12 and the Sixth Amendment, applied to the States through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantee the right of a criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury." Commonwealth v. Long , 419 Mass. 798 , 802 (1995).

2014“Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the States through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantee the right of a criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury.” Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 494 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 802 (1995).

2018See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 751-752, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (upholding Federal Bail Reform Act, which also requires adversary hearing using clear and convincing evidence standard, and provides for expedited appeal); Aime , 414 Mass. at 680 , 611 N.E.2d 204 , quoting Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 , 83, 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (Federal Bail Reform Act represents "one of those carefully limited exceptions [to pretrial freedom] permitted by the due process clause").

2018See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 751-752, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (upholding Federal Bail Reform Act, which also requires adversary hearing using clear and convincing evidence standard, and provides for expedited appeal); Aime , 414 Mass. at 680 , 611 N.E.2d 204 , quoting Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 , 83, 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (Federal Bail Reform Act represents "one of those carefully limited exceptions [to pretrial freedom] permitted by the due process clause").

2018In Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610 , 619 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits impeachment on the basis of a defendant's silence following Miranda warnings.

2016In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits impeachment on the basis of a defendant’s silence following Miranda warnings. 3 The Court held that such impeachment was fundamentally unfair because Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him.

2009If the latter, the due process clause mandates that “confinement must cease.” Commonwealth v. Travis, supra at 247 , quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

2009Of course, if the fact finder has determined that the person is not sexually dangerous, the due process clause mandates that “confinement must cease.” Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 Mass. 238, 247 (1977), quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

1995“To hold otherwise,” the court in Maldonado Santiago recognized, i.e. to find no cognizable due process deprivation in the lateness of Ms. Maldonado’s rule 22 hearing, would be to assume that the Supreme court has sub silentio overruled a long line of precedent culminating in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 , 103 S.Ct. 864 , 74 L.Ed. 675 (1983), which established the principle that the due process clause prohibits state prison officers from arbitrarily withholding state-created process rights.

1995“To hold otherwise,” the court in Maldonado Santiago recognized, i.e. to find no cognizable due process deprivation in the lateness of Ms. Maldonado’s rule 22 hearing, would be to assume that the Supreme court has sub silentio overruled a long line of precedent culminating in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 , 103 S.Ct. 864 , 74 L.Ed. 675 (1983), which established the principle that the due process clause prohibits state prison officers from arbitrarily withholding state-created process rights.