due process clause in Maine

2010Personal Iurisdiction Maine's long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents with "certain significant minimal contacts with this State ... to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, 14th amendment." 14 M.R.S.A. § 704­ A(l).4 The Law Court has interpreted this statute in light of the due process clause as 4 Maine's "long-arm" statute states, in relevant part: 3 requiring the following three elements before Maine's courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: "(1) Maine [must] have a legitimate interest in th

2010"Maine's jurisdictional reach is coextensive with the due process clause of the United States Constitution." Id. citing Murphy v. Keenan, 667 A.2d 591,593 (Me. 1995).

2020Three factors must be considered in determining whether a due process violation occurred: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ; accord In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15 , 55 A.3d

2020Three factors must be considered in determining whether a due process violation occurred: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ; accord In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15 , 55 A.3d

2010If that analysis were considered, under this third part of the due process test, "[t]he determination of fairness depends upon the facts of each case." Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1038 .

1987Under the Maine long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980), “the jurisdictional reach of Maine courts is coextensive with the permissible exercise of personal jurisdiction under the due process clause of the federal constitution.” Harriman v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., 518 A.2d 1035, 1036 (Me.1986).

2018Under the due process analysis, a "confession is voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair." State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983). "[T]he voluntariness requirement gives effect to three overlapping but conceptually distinct values: (I) it discourages objectionable police practices; (2) it protects the I tt mental freedom of the individual; and (3) it preserves a quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system." Id.

2018Under the due process analysis, a "confession is voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair." State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983). "[T]he voluntariness requirement gives effect to three overlapping but conceptually distinct values: (I) it discourages objectionable police practices; (2) it protects the I tt mental freedom of the individual; and (3) it preserves a quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system." Id.

2020Three factors must be considered in determining whether a due process violation occurred: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ; accord In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15 , 55 A.3d

2017Further, regardless of whether a parent’s failure to appear at a termination hearing is voluntary, a court does not deprive the absent parent of due process by terminating her parental rights if that parent fails to make an offer of proof, see M.R, Evid. 103(a)(2), through a timely post-judgment motion, “indicating what additional relevant information might be provided to the court by her presence or her testimony.” In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶¶ 18, 23 , 55 A.3d 463 ; see also In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d 450, 453 (Me. 1986) (rejecting a parent’s due process challenge when he “failed to show a

2026Setting aside the fact that, unlike here, consent was required in Stade to obtain the draw, in Stade, 683 A.2d at 166 n.4, we cited Mackey, a pre-Graham decision in which the Supreme Court applied a due process analysis when reviewing incentives to take a breath test.

2026Setting aside the fact that, unlike here, consent was required in Stade to obtain the draw, in Stade, 683 A.2d at 166 n.4, we cited Mackey, a pre-Graham decision in which the Supreme Court applied a due process analysis when reviewing incentives to take a breath test.

2022Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1, 4 (Me. 1979).

2022Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1, 4 (Me. 1979).

2019See In re Child of James R. , 2018 ME 50 , ¶ 16, 182 A.3d 1252 ("The father did not raise these issues below and thereby deprived the trial court of an opportunity to address any challenge of merit, and therefore he has not preserved a due process challenge for appellate review except, at most, for obvious error."). [¶12] "As applied to a termination hearing, balancing the interests, where significant rights are at stake, due process requires[ ] notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence,

2019See In re Child of James R. , 2018 ME 50 , ¶ 16, 182 A.3d 1252 ("The father did not raise these issues below and thereby deprived the trial court of an opportunity to address any challenge of merit, and therefore he has not preserved a due process challenge for appellate review except, at most, for obvious error."). [¶12] "As applied to a termination hearing, balancing the interests, where significant rights are at stake, due process requires[ ] notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence,

2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app

2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app

2017See Hopkins v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2002 ME 129, ¶ 13 , 802 A.2d 999 (holding that a party raising a due process challenge based on defective notice must show how he or she was prejudiced by the error); cf. Daud v. Abdullahi, 2015 ME 48, ¶ 6 , 115 A.3d 77 (concluding that a defendant’s failure to retain an attorney when he had sufficient time to do so was “not a substantial reason that would compel the court to grant a continuance”). [¶ 4] Therefore, contrary to Knoblach’s argument, the court did not err or abuse its discretion by proceeding with the hearing without objection on the schedule

2017See Hopkins v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2002 ME 129, ¶ 13 , 802 A.2d 999 (holding that a party raising a due process challenge based on defective notice must show how he or she was prejudiced by the error); cf. Daud v. Abdullahi, 2015 ME 48, ¶ 6 , 115 A.3d 77 (concluding that a defendant’s failure to retain an attorney when he had sufficient time to do so was “not a substantial reason that would compel the court to grant a continuance”). [¶ 4] Therefore, contrary to Knoblach’s argument, the court did not err or abuse its discretion by proceeding with the hearing without objection on the schedule

2026Requirements of Due Process Satisfied10 [¶23] Courts have wide discretion in determining what information to consider in sentencing, “limited only by the due process requirement that such information must be factually reliable and relevant.” State v. Witmer, 2011 ME 7, ¶ 20 , 10 A.3d 728 (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Seamon, 2017 ME 123, ¶ 24 , 165 A.3d 342 ; State v. Rosa, 575 A.2d 727, 730 (Me. 1990); State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164, 166-67 (Me. 1986); see also United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 1991) (“It is well settled . . . that a defendant has a due process right

2026Requirements of Due Process Satisfied10 [¶23] Courts have wide discretion in determining what information to consider in sentencing, “limited only by the due process requirement that such information must be factually reliable and relevant.” State v. Witmer, 2011 ME 7, ¶ 20 , 10 A.3d 728 (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Seamon, 2017 ME 123, ¶ 24 , 165 A.3d 342 ; State v. Rosa, 575 A.2d 727, 730 (Me. 1990); State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164, 166-67 (Me. 1986); see also United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 1991) (“It is well settled . . . that a defendant has a due process right

2010Specifically, 'the nature and purpose of defendant's contacts with the forum state, the connection between the contacts and the cause of action, the number of contacts, the interest of the forum state in the controversy, and the convenience and fairness to both parties.' Id. (quoting Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564,570 (Me. 1979».

1979(Emphasis added) The preamble affirms the legislature’s intention that section 704^-A be liberally construed “to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause.” 5 See Labbe v. Nissen Corp., Me., 404 A.2d 564, 569 (1979).

2002To do so, the defendant "must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable,” so that litigation here would be "so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [she] would be at a severe disadvantage in comparison to [plaintiff]." Caluri v. Rypkema, 570 A.2d 830, 833 (Me. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). 12 In the court's view, the defendant has not made a showing that satisfies this test.

1999He contends, however, that other than a nondisclosure agreement with BTI, signed to explore the possibility of a future business relationship, and a few telephone calls and e-mails with Dorf, neither he nor Complastik had any contact with Maine. *988 [¶ 8] Dorf contends that when the court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based solely on affidavits, without the benefit of an evidentia-ry hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss. [¶ 9] “The jurisdictional reach of Maine’s lon

2022Interstate Food Processing Corp. v. Pellerito Foods, Inc., 622 A.2d 1189, 1191 (Me. 1993).

1999He contends, however, that other than a nondisclosure agreement with BTI, signed to explore the possibility of a future business relationship, and a few telephone calls and e-mails with Dorf, neither he nor Complastik had any contact with Maine. *988 [¶ 8] Dorf contends that when the court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based solely on affidavits, without the benefit of an evidentia-ry hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss. [¶ 9] “The jurisdictional reach of Maine’s lon

2022See Bickford, 2004 ME 111 , 'l[ 10, 855 A.2d 1150 .

2022See Bickford, 2004 ME 111 , 'l[ 10, 855 A.2d 1150 .

2019Additionally, 4 "an employment contract that is signed in a state, by a person living in that state, even if it is to be performed elsewhere, puts the obligations of the contract within the reach of the power that the state of residence may constitutionally exercise without violating the due process clause." Cavers, 2008 ME 164 , ! 26, 958 A.2d 905 .

2019Additionally, 4 "an employment contract that is signed in a state, by a person living in that state, even if it is to be performed elsewhere, puts the obligations of the contract within the reach of the power that the state of residence may constitutionally exercise without violating the due process clause." Cavers, 2008 ME 164 , ! 26, 958 A.2d 905 .

2010See Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, ¶ 17 , 752 A.2d 183, 187 (holding that a regulatory standard that is “an unmeasurable quality, totally lacking in cognizable, quantitative stan *691 dards” renders that standard “an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and violative of the due process clause”); see also City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 649 (Me.1985) (holding a regulatory requirement improperly vague when it was stated “in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must guess at its meaning”); Me.

2010See Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, ¶ 17 , 752 A.2d 183, 187 (holding that a regulatory standard that is “an unmeasurable quality, totally lacking in cognizable, quantitative stan *691 dards” renders that standard “an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and violative of the due process clause”); see also City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 649 (Me.1985) (holding a regulatory requirement improperly vague when it was stated “in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must guess at its meaning”); Me.

2026The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose a discovery sanction. [¶39] Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “a due process violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence that is favorable to an accused and material either to guilt or to punishment.” State v. Wai Chan, 2020 ME 91 , ¶ 15 n.8, 236 A.3d 471 (quotation marks omitted).

2020In the particular circumstances of this case, that finding was 8 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the United States Supreme Court established that a due process violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence that is “favorable to an accused” and “material either to guilt or to punishment.” 10 supported by the suppression record.

2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app

2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app

2022In State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172,119 , 151 A.3d 911 , the Law Court clarified the "distinction between those statements that must be excluded pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because they are the product of compulsion, and those statements that must be excluded because their admission would otherwise create an injustice." The latter situation employs a due process analysis and seeks to address the question of whether a defendant's "statements were free and voluntary or whether, considering the totality ofthe circumstances under which the statements were made, their admission would be fundamentally

2022In State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172,119 , 151 A.3d 911 , the Law Court clarified the "distinction between those statements that must be excluded pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because they are the product of compulsion, and those statements that must be excluded because their admission would otherwise create an injustice." The latter situation employs a due process analysis and seeks to address the question of whether a defendant's "statements were free and voluntary or whether, considering the totality ofthe circumstances under which the statements were made, their admission would be fundamentally

2017"The due process clause of the United States Constitution has been held to protect a criminal defendant from the use against him at trial of an out-of-court identification that is 'conducive to an irreparable mistaken identification,"' State v. True, 464 A.2d 946, 949 (Me. 1983) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)), "or 'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of ineparable misidentification."' True, 464 A.2d at 949 -950 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).

1988The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects criminal defendants from the use of evidence derived from suggestive out-of-court identifications that are “ ‘conducive to an irreparable mistaken identification.’ ” State v. True, 464 A.2d 946, 949 (Me.1983) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)).