due process clause in New Mexico

2026See State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (holding that to establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 , 275 P.3d 110 .5 {49} Fourth, we agree with the district court that Defendant’s complaints about the prison and his counsel are properly addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.

2026See State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (holding that to establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 , 275 P.3d 110 .5 {49} Fourth, we agree with the district court that Defendant’s complaints about the prison and his counsel are properly addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.

2002See, e.g., Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 88 N.M. 532, 534 , 543 P.2d 825, 827 (1975) ("We have repeatedly equated the `transaction of business' ... with the due process standard of `minimum contacts'...."); Tarango, 94 N.M. at 728 , 616 P.2d at 441 (meaning of terms "transaction of *55 any business" and "commission of a tortious act" to be equated with minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process). {9} We note that any actions by the Diocese after the alleged abuse of Tercero, such as paying for Bissonnette's additional stay and treatment at Via Coeli, does not impact our analysis of wh

2002See, e.g., Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 88 N.M. 532, 534 , 543 P.2d 825, 827 (1975) ("We have repeatedly equated the `transaction of business' ... with the due process standard of `minimum contacts'...."); Tarango, 94 N.M. at 728 , 616 P.2d at 441 (meaning of terms "transaction of *55 any business" and "commission of a tortious act" to be equated with minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process). {9} We note that any actions by the Diocese after the alleged abuse of Tercero, such as paying for Bissonnette's additional stay and treatment at Via Coeli, does not impact our analysis of wh

2016See 479 U.S. at 165 12 (stating that “mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude 13 the due process inquiry”).

2016The Court noted that although “mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.” Id. at 165 .

2015I 8 begin with a review of the key United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 9 the liberty interest protected by the federal due process clause. 10 A. Federal Due Process Precedents 11 {79} Long before it decided Glucksberg, the United States Supreme Court 12 interpreted the substantive component of the due process clause to protect aspects of 13 personal autonomy as “fundamental rights,” notwithstanding that they are not 14 mentioned in the text of the Bill of Rights, with which the government may not 15 interfere unless it meets its burden under the strict scrutiny standard to prove

2002We understand Mother’s first argument to be a contention that the due process requirement of clear and convincing evidence established by Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), is violated.

2013This is the same analysis that we performed above under Plaintiffs equal protection argument, and “}s]ince no clear due process argument is raised, we will simply restate the idea that analysis under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is identical to that used under the due process clauses.” Marrujo, 118 N.M. at 760 , 887 P.2d at 754 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93 (noting that “equal protection arguments largely track and duplicate those made in support of the due process claim”).

2013This is the same analysis that we performed above under Plaintiff’s equal protection argument, and “[s]ince no clear due process argument is raised, we will simply restate the idea that analysis under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is identical to that used under the due process clauses.” Marrujo, 118 N.M. at 760 , 887 P.2d at 754 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93 (noting that “equal protection arguments largely track and duplicate those made in support of the due process claim”).

2025We have previously explained that, although “the statutes of limitation provide the primary protection against delay-induced prejudice, the United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment provides additional, albeit limited, protection against improper preaccusation delay.” Gonzales v. State, 1991-NMSC-015 , ¶ 4, 111 N.M. 363 , 805 P.2d 630 .

2025We have previously explained that, although “the statutes of limitation provide the primary protection against delay-induced prejudice, the United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment provides additional, albeit limited, protection against improper preaccusation delay.” Gonzales v. State, 1991-NMSC-015 , ¶ 4, 111 N.M. 363 , 805 P.2d 630 .

2026See State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (holding that to establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 , 275 P.3d 110 .5 {49} Fourth, we agree with the district court that Defendant’s complaints about the prison and his counsel are properly addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.

2024See generally State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (“[T]o establish a due process violation, and thus reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice.”), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , 275 P.3d 110 . {6} Finally, Defendant renews his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. [MIO 18-20] However, the officer’s testimony describing his observations, including Defendant’s spe

2026See State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (holding that to establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 , 275 P.3d 110 .5 {49} Fourth, we agree with the district court that Defendant’s complaints about the prison and his counsel are properly addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.

2024See generally State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (“[T]o establish a due process violation, and thus reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice.”), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , 275 P.3d 110 . {6} Finally, Defendant renews his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. [MIO 18-20] However, the officer’s testimony describing his observations, including Defendant’s spe

2017Other jurisdictions, including Montana and the Federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have rejected the Barker factors and instead have looked to the due process analysis set out in United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), to address " '[a]ny undue delay' before or after the period protected by the Sixth Amendment," which would include delays in sentencing as well as delays in the imposition of a sentence.

2017Other jurisdictions, including Montana and the Federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have rejected the Barker factors and instead have looked to the due process analysis set out in United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), to address " '[a]ny undue delay' before or after the period protected by the Sixth Amendment," which would include delays in sentencing as well as delays in the imposition of a sentence.

2023Regardless of whether voluntariness is examined within the context of the Fifth Amendment, for Miranda waivers, or within the context of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for confessions, “the benchmark is the absence of governmental coercion or police overreaching.” State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-049 , ¶ 48, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. ¶¶ 33, 50 (equating the inquiry of whether there was governmental coercion or police overreaching under the Fifth Amendment and the due process clause, notwithstanding the fact that “[a

2023Regardless of whether voluntariness is examined within the context of the Fifth Amendment, for Miranda waivers, or within the context of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for confessions, “the benchmark is the absence of governmental coercion or police overreaching.” State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-049 , ¶ 48, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. ¶¶ 33, 50 (equating the inquiry of whether there was governmental coercion or police overreaching under the Fifth Amendment and the due process clause, notwithstanding the fact that “[a

2022Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 2, 12 , 135 N.M. 152 , 85 P.3d 276 (concluding that MVD lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the notice provided pursuant to an enactment), aff’d, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 1 , 136 N.M. 161 , 96 P.3d 286 ; Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 1989-NMCA-060 , ¶ 7, 108 N.M. 752 , 779 P.2d 129 (“An administrative agency does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of a statutory enactment.”).

2022Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 2, 12 , 135 N.M. 152 , 85 P.3d 276 (concluding that MVD lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the notice provided pursuant to an enactment), aff’d, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 1 , 136 N.M. 161 , 96 P.3d 286 ; Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 1989-NMCA-060 , ¶ 7, 108 N.M. 752 , 779 P.2d 129 (“An administrative agency does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of a statutory enactment.”).

2025Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995) 9 (“Conspiracy as an independent basis for jurisdiction has been criticized as 10 distracting from the ultimate due process inquiry: whether the out-of-state 11 defendant’s contact with the forum was such that it should reasonably anticipate 12 being haled into a court in the forum state.”). 13 {31} Yet Walden and Bristol-Myers do not foreclose conspiracy jurisdiction.

2025Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995) (“Conspiracy as an independent basis for jurisdiction has been criticized as distracting from the ultimate due process inquiry: whether the out-of-state defendant’s contact with the forum was such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into a court in the forum state.”). {31} Yet Walden and Bristol-Myers do not foreclose conspiracy jurisdiction.

2007Rule 5-501(A)(3) and (6) require the State to disclose or make available to a defendant any documents or papers that are material to the preparation of the defense and “any material evidence favorable to the defendant which the [S]tate is required to produce under the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” See State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 50 , 131 N.M. 709 , 42 P.3d 814 (stating that under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the State has an affirmative duty to disclose that which is required to be disclosed under Rule 5 — 501(A)(6)).

2007Rule 5-501(A)(3) and (6) require the State to disclose or make available to a defendant any documents or papers that are material to the preparation of the defense and “any material evidence favorable to the defendant which the [S]tate is required to produce under the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” See State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 50 , 131 N.M. 709 , 42 P.3d 814 (stating that under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the State has an affirmative duty to disclose that which is required to be disclosed under Rule 5 — 501(A)(6)).

2022Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 2, 12 , 135 N.M. 152 , 85 P.3d 276 (concluding that MVD lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the notice provided pursuant to an enactment), aff’d, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 1 , 136 N.M. 161 , 96 P.3d 286 ; Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 1989-NMCA-060 , ¶ 7, 108 N.M. 752 , 779 P.2d 129 (“An administrative agency does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of a statutory enactment.”).

2022Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 2, 12 , 135 N.M. 152 , 85 P.3d 276 (concluding that MVD lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the notice provided pursuant to an enactment), aff’d, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 1 , 136 N.M. 161 , 96 P.3d 286 ; Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 1989-NMCA-060 , ¶ 7, 108 N.M. 752 , 779 P.2d 129 (“An administrative agency does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of a statutory enactment.”).

2021“To maintain a due process claim based on inability to cross-examine a witness, the party must ‘demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have been different.’” Id. (quoting In re Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {15} We believe that Respondent has failed to make such a showing.

2018To maintain a due process claim based on 2 inability to cross-examine a witness, the party must “demonstrate that there is a 3 reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have been different.” Id. ¶ 14 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2005See id. at 426 , 806 P.2d at 566 ; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). {11} The United States Supreme Court explained the difference in focus between the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982).

2005See id. at 426 , 806 P.2d at 566 ; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). {11} The United States Supreme Court explained the difference in focus between the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982).

2015See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (explaining that the United States Supreme Court has never accepted the view that “liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against [governmental] interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution”). {80} These previously recognized fundamental rights include the right to marry, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967), and aspects of parental autonomy, see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing the rights to the companionship, care, custody, and management

2015I 8 begin with a review of the key United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 9 the liberty interest protected by the federal due process clause. 10 A. Federal Due Process Precedents 11 {79} Long before it decided Glucksberg, the United States Supreme Court 12 interpreted the substantive component of the due process clause to protect aspects of 13 personal autonomy as “fundamental rights,” notwithstanding that they are not 14 mentioned in the text of the Bill of Rights, with which the government may not 15 interfere unless it meets its burden under the strict scrutiny standard to prove

2026See State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (holding that to establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 , 275 P.3d 110 .5 {49} Fourth, we agree with the district court that Defendant’s complaints about the prison and his counsel are properly addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.

2026See State v. Duran, 1988-NMSC-082 , ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 603 , 762 P.2d 890 (holding that to establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Gutierrez, 1998- NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366 , 969 P.2d 970 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 , 275 P.3d 110 .5 {49} Fourth, we agree with the district court that Defendant’s complaints about the prison and his counsel are properly addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.

2026State v Radosevich, 2018-NMSC-028, ¶ 14 , 419 P.3d 176 ; In 12 re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). “[T]he test to determine the sufficiency of 13 evidence in New Mexico . . . is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or 14 circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 15 with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Sutphin, 1988- 16 NMSC-031, ¶ 21, 107 N.M. 126 , 753 P.2d 1314 . “[S]ubstantial evidence means such 17 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 18 conclusion.” State v. Baca,

1991See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).