due process clause in South Carolina

2026See State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526 , 538-39, 552 S.E.2d 300, 307 (2001) ("To establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith, or (2) that the evidence possessed an exculpatory value apparent before the evidence was destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other evidence of comparable value by other means.").

2026See State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526 , 538-39, 552 S.E.2d 300, 307 (2001) ("To establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith, or (2) that the evidence possessed an exculpatory value apparent before the evidence was destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other evidence of comparable value by other means.").

2026See Bakala v. Bakala, 352 S.C. 612, 625 , 576 S.E.2d 156, 163 (2003) ("A due process claim raised for the first time on appeal is not preserved.").

2026See Bakala v. Bakala, 352 S.C. 612, 625 , 576 S.E.2d 156, 163 (2003) ("A due process claim raised for the first time on appeal is not preserved.").

2024See Coggeshall, 376 S.C. at 20 , 655 S.E.2d at 480 ("As noted in subsection (B)[ of section 36-2-803], jurisdiction under this section is limited to a cause of action arising from a specific activity within this State."); id. at 16 , 655 S.E.2d at 478 ("The exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . must comport with due process requirements and must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."); id. ("Due process requires some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state."); Cockrell, 363 S.C. at 4

2024See Coggeshall, 376 S.C. at 20 , 655 S.E.2d at 480 ("As noted in subsection (B)[ of section 36-2-803], jurisdiction under this section is limited to a cause of action arising from a specific activity within this State."); id. at 16 , 655 S.E.2d at 478 ("The exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . must comport with due process requirements and must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."); id. ("Due process requires some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state."); Cockrell, 363 S.C. at 4

2019Procurement Review Panel, 294 S.C. 225, 233 , 363 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1987) ("A demonstration of substantial prejudice is required to establish a due process claim.").

2019Procurement Review Panel, 294 S.C. 225, 233 , 363 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1987) ("A demonstration of substantial prejudice is required to establish a due process claim.").

2023Rather, the error requires reversal unless the State "prove[s] 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. (first alteration added) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967)).

2023Rather, the error requires reversal unless the State "prove[s] 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. (first alteration added) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967)).

2025Co. v. Kozma, 379 S.C. 423, 431 , 665 S.E.2d 660, 664 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding "the due process requirement mandates the defendant possess sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there").

2025Co. v. Kozma, 379 S.C. 423, 431 , 665 S.E.2d 660, 664 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding "the due process requirement mandates the defendant possess sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there").

2024"The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness." State v. Liverman, 398 S.C. 130, 140 , 727 S.E.2d 422, 427 (2012) (quoting Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012)).

2014PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authority: Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) ("The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness."); id. at 730 ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumsta

2016PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48 , 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 538 , 552 S.E.2d 300, 307 (2001) ("The State does not have an absolute duty to preserve potentially useful evidence that might exonerate a defendant."); id. at 538-39 , 552 S.E.2d at 307 ("To establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith, or (2) that the evidence pos

2016PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48 , 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 538 , 552 S.E.2d 300, 307 (2001) ("The State does not have an absolute duty to preserve potentially useful evidence that might exonerate a defendant."); id. at 538-39 , 552 S.E.2d at 307 ("To establish a due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith, or (2) that the evidence pos

2023Visible shackles on a defendant, however, are "inherently prejudicial," and thus, when "a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation." Deck, 544 U.S. at 635 , 125 S. Ct. at 2015 , 161 L. Ed. 2d at 966 (first quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568 , 106 S. Ct. at 1345 , 89 L. Ed. 2d at 534 ).

2023Visible shackles on a defendant, however, are "inherently prejudicial," and thus, when "a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation." Deck, 544 U.S. at 635 , 125 S. Ct. at 2015 , 161 L. Ed. 2d at 966 (first quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568 , 106 S. Ct. at 1345 , 89 L. Ed. 2d at 534 ).

2015“It is a due process violation to punish a person for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 259-60 , 471 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ct.App.1996) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)); see also United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir.2001) (stating if a prosecutor “responds to a defendant’s successful exercise of his right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him, he acts unconstitutionally”); United States v. Lanoue, 137 F.3d 656, 664-65 (1st Cir.1998) (stating that suc

2015“It is a due process violation to punish a person for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 259-60 , 471 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ct.App.1996) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)); see also United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir.2001) (stating if a prosecutor “responds to a defendant’s successful exercise of his right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him, he acts unconstitutionally”); United States v. Lanoue, 137 F.3d 656, 664-65 (1st Cir.1998) (stating that suc

2022Co. v. Kozma, 379 S.C. 423, 432 , 665 S.E. 2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The court must (1) find that the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with the forum, without which, the court does not have the 'power' to adjudicate the action and (2) find the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or fair."); S. Plastics Co. v. S. Commerce Bank, 310 S.C. 256 , 260–61, 423 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1992) ("A minimum contacts analysis requires a court to find that the defendant directed its activities to a resident of this State and that the cause of action arises out of or relates to those activities.

2022Co. v. Kozma, 379 S.C. 423, 432 , 665 S.E. 2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The court must (1) find that the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with the forum, without which, the court does not have the 'power' to adjudicate the action and (2) find the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or fair."); S. Plastics Co. v. S. Commerce Bank, 310 S.C. 256 , 260–61, 423 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1992) ("A minimum contacts analysis requires a court to find that the defendant directed its activities to a resident of this State and that the cause of action arises out of or relates to those activities.

2019While the fundamental fairness standard requires criminal defendants to be given a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, to set forth a due process violation, a criminal defendant "must demonstrate either that the state destroyed evidence in bad faith, or that the state destroyed evidence that possessed an exculpatory value that is apparent before the evidence was destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other evidence of comparable value by other means." State v. Mabe, 306 S.C. 355 , 358-59, 412 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1991); see also State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526 , 538-39, 552

2019While the fundamental fairness standard requires criminal defendants to be given a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, to set forth a due process violation, a criminal defendant "must demonstrate either that the state destroyed evidence in bad faith, or that the state destroyed evidence that possessed an exculpatory value that is apparent before the evidence was destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other evidence of comparable value by other means." State v. Mabe, 306 S.C. 355 , 358-59, 412 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1991); see also State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526 , 538-39, 552

2017See § 16-3-25(0(1) (stating in the case of a death sentence imposition, this Court “shall consider the punishment” and determine “whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, ...” (emphasis supplied)); Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d at 1062 ; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 , 111 S.Ct. at 2608 (finding a victim impact statement that is “unduly prejudicial” is a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (holding, to be effective

2017See § 16-3-25(0(1) (stating in the case of a death sentence imposition, this Court “shall consider the punishment” and determine “whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, ...” (emphasis supplied)); Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d at 1062 ; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 , 111 S.Ct. at 2608 (finding a victim impact statement that is “unduly prejudicial” is a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (holding, to be effective

2017The prejudicial impact of the widow’s suicide testimony results, inter alia, by imparting to the jury: (1) pressure to resentence petitioner to death lest his widow endure additional unbearable suffering as a result of their decision; see § 16-3-25(C)(1); (2) raises the specter of appellate review into the deliberation; see Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (“[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriat

2017The prejudicial impact of the widow’s suicide testimony results, inter alia, by imparting to the jury: (1) pressure to resentence petitioner to death lest his widow endure additional unbearable suffering as a result of their decision; see § 16-3-25(C)(1); (2) raises the specter of appellate review into the deliberation; see Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (“[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriat

2017See § 16-3-25(0(1) (stating in the case of a death sentence imposition, this Court “shall consider the punishment” and determine “whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, ...” (emphasis supplied)); Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d at 1062 ; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 , 111 S.Ct. at 2608 (finding a victim impact statement that is “unduly prejudicial” is a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (holding, to be effective

2017See § 16-3-25(0(1) (stating in the case of a death sentence imposition, this Court “shall consider the punishment” and determine “whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, ...” (emphasis supplied)); Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d at 1062 ; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 , 111 S.Ct. at 2608 (finding a victim impact statement that is “unduly prejudicial” is a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97 , 105 S.Ct. 830 , 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (holding, to be effective

2017The prejudicial impact of the widow’s suicide testimony results, inter alia, by imparting to the jury: (1) pressure to resentence petitioner to death lest his widow endure additional unbearable suffering as a result of their decision; see § 16-3-25(C)(1); (2) raises the specter of appellate review into the deliberation; see Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (“[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriat

2017The prejudicial impact of the widow’s suicide testimony results, inter alia, by imparting to the jury: (1) pressure to resentence petitioner to death lest his widow endure additional unbearable suffering as a result of their decision; see § 16-3-25(C)(1); (2) raises the specter of appellate review into the deliberation; see Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (“[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriat

2019Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 356 , 461 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1995) (finding the appellant's due process claim was not preserved when he raised the claim for the first time on appeal).

2019Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 356 , 461 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1995) (finding the appellant's due process claim was not preserved when he raised the claim for the first time on appeal).

2015“It is a due process violation to punish a person for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 259-60 , 471 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ct.App.1996) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)); see also United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir.2001) (stating if a prosecutor “responds to a defendant’s successful exercise of his right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him, he acts unconstitutionally”); United States v. Lanoue, 137 F.3d 656, 664-65 (1st Cir.1998) (stating that suc

2015“It is a due process violation to punish a person for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 259-60 , 471 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ct.App.1996) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)); see also United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir.2001) (stating if a prosecutor “responds to a defendant’s successful exercise of his right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him, he acts unconstitutionally”); United States v. Lanoue, 137 F.3d 656, 664-65 (1st Cir.1998) (stating that suc

2007The due process test takes into consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’ ” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (citations omitted); State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 30 , 538 S.E.2d 248, 253 (2000); State v. Linnen, 278 S.C. 175, 179 , 293 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1982); State v. Gillian, 360 S.C. 433, 458 , 602 S.E.2d 62, 76 (Ct.App.2004); see also State v. Myers, 359 S.C. 40, 47 , 596 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004) (“A determination whether a statement was

2007The due process test takes into consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’ ” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (citations omitted); State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 30 , 538 S.E.2d 248, 253 (2000); State v. Linnen, 278 S.C. 175, 179 , 293 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1982); State v. Gillian, 360 S.C. 433, 458 , 602 S.E.2d 62, 76 (Ct.App.2004); see also State v. Myers, 359 S.C. 40, 47 , 596 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004) (“A determination whether a statement was

2019PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Cottrell, 421 S.C. 622, 643 , 809 S.E.2d 423, 435 (2017) ("An appellate court will only reverse a trial court's decision regarding a jury charge if there is an abuse of discretion." (citing State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 570 , 647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (2007))); State v. Marin, 415 S.C. 475, 482 , 783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) ("[T]o warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant." (quoting State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 550 ,

2019PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Cottrell, 421 S.C. 622, 643 , 809 S.E.2d 423, 435 (2017) ("An appellate court will only reverse a trial court's decision regarding a jury charge if there is an abuse of discretion." (citing State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 570 , 647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (2007))); State v. Marin, 415 S.C. 475, 482 , 783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) ("[T]o warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant." (quoting State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 550 ,

2017As to the due process challenge, we followed our holding in Walls that the sex offender registry is non-punitive and did not implicate a liberty interest, and therefore held there was no due process violation. 353 S.C. at 552 , 579 S.E.2d at 325 (citing Walls, 348 S.C. at 31 , 558 S.E.2d at 526 ).

2017As to the due process challenge, we followed our holding in Walls that the sex offender registry is non-punitive and did not implicate a liberty interest, and therefore held there was no due process violation. 353 S.C. at 552 , 579 S.E.2d at 325 (citing Walls, 348 S.C. at 31 , 558 S.E.2d at 526 ).