due process clause in Vermont

2016Thus, we applied the due process analysis in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982), where the United States Supreme Court held a state could not obtain an order terminating parental rights unless it proves by clear and convincing evidence that such termination was in the best interest of the child.

2014Weighing the due process factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the Court in Santosky emphasized the finality of the threatened loss in state-initiated termination proceedings. 455 U.S. at 758-59 .

2001Guardianship of H.L., 143 Vt. 62, 65 , 460 A.2d 478, 479 (1983) (“Both the right of a parent to custody and the liberty interest of parents and children to relate to one another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference, are basic rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Rutherford v. Best, 139 Vt. 56, 60 , 421 A.2d 1303, 1306 (1980)).

2001Guardianship of H.L., 143 Vt. 62, 65 , 460 A.2d 478, 479 (1983) (“Both the right of a parent to custody and the liberty interest of parents and children to relate to one another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference, are basic rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Rutherford v. Best, 139 Vt. 56, 60 , 421 A.2d 1303, 1306 (1980)).

2026Under the due process clause, a state may assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant to the extent that the defendant has had minimum contacts with the state and that assertion of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

2024See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 .

2016See, e.g., Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789 (“[P]roof of actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication.”); United States v. Automated Med.

2016The Supreme Court disagreed, noting “that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.” Id. at 789 .

2014“Both the right of a parent to custody and the liberty interest of parents and children to relate to one another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference, are basic rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Guardianship of H.L., 143 Vt. 62, 65 (1983).

2001Guardianship of H.L., 143 Vt. 62, 65 , 460 A.2d 478, 479 (1983) (“Both the right of a parent to custody and the liberty interest of parents and children to relate to one another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference, are basic rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Rutherford v. Best, 139 Vt. 56, 60 , 421 A.2d 1303, 1306 (1980)).

2016These are, of course, the characteristics that form the bases of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that many of the constitutional protections required in a criminal proceeding also apply in a delinquency action.

2011It violates due process to shift the burden of proof on an essential element from the state to the defendant.” (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977))).

2011See State v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 293-94 , 658 A.2d 54, 64 (1995) (noting that police may use some psychological tactics in eliciting statements from suspects so long as suspect’s decision to confess results from suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations). 7 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that “while mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). ¶ 34.

2011See State v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 293-94 , 658 A.2d 54, 64 (1995) (noting that police may use some psychological tactics in eliciting statements from suspects so long as suspect's decision to confess results from suspect's own balancing of competing considerations). [7] Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that "while mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).

2011It violates due process to shift the burden of proof on an essential element from the state to the defendant.” (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977))).

1990Recent United States Supreme Court decisions make it clear, however, that the burden may be placed on a defendant to prove affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence provided that the affirmative defense “does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233 (1987); State v. Messier, 145 Vt. at 626-27 , 497 A.2d at 744 (decided under Federal and State Constitution). *415 In the present case, defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicl

2009Generally, this means notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation, although the Supreme Court has recognized that “the necessity of quick action by the State[,] . . . when *513 coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.” Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 2006 VT 115 , ¶ 28, 181 Vt. 309 , 917 A.2d 508 (recogni

2009Generally, this means notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation, although the Supreme Court has recognized that “the necessity of quick action by the State[,] . . . when *513 coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.” Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 2006 VT 115 , ¶ 28, 181 Vt. 309 , 917 A.2d 508 (recogni

2019See, e.g., Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 2006 VT 115 , ¶¶ 27-35, 181 Vt. 309 (holding that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim that there was a taking without due process, but that there was a taking without just compensation).

2009Generally, this means notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation, although the Supreme Court has recognized that “the necessity of quick action by the State[,] . . . when *513 coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.” Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 2006 VT 115 , ¶ 28, 181 Vt. 309 , 917 A.2d 508 (recogni

2015See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 342-43 (Cal. 2002) (holding that due process clause is self-executing because “[i]t is clear that . . . even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are required to comply with its terms”); In re Wretlind, 32 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1948) (stating that “prohibitive clauses of the constitution such as the due process clause are self-executing and require no legislation for their enforcement”); Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, ¶20 , 58 P.3d 128 (recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clau

2015See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 58 P.3d 339, 342-43 (Cal. 2002) (holding that due process clause is self-executing because “[i]t is clear that . . . even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are required to comply with its terms”); In re Wretlind , 32 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1948) (stating that “prohibitive clauses of the constitution such as the due process clause are self-executing and require no legislation for their enforcement”); Dorwart v. Caraway , 2002 MT 240, ¶ 20 , 58 P.3d 128 (recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process

2015See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 342-43 (Cal. 2002) (holding that due process clause is self-executing because “[i]t is clear that . . . even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are required to comply with its terms”); In re Wretlind, 32 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1948) (stating that “prohibitive clauses of the constitution such as the due process clause are self-executing and require no legislation for their enforcement”); Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, ¶20 , 58 P.3d 128 (recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clau

2015See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 58 P.3d 339, 342-43 (Cal. 2002) (holding that due process clause is self-executing because “[i]t is clear that . . . even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are required to comply with its terms”); In re Wretlind , 32 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1948) (stating that “prohibitive clauses of the constitution such as the due process clause are self-executing and require no legislation for their enforcement”); Dorwart v. Caraway , 2002 MT 240, ¶ 20 , 58 P.3d 128 (recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process

2013State v. Dean, 148 Vt. 510, 514 (1987) (recognizing possibility of due process violation but rejecting as speculative defendant’s claim that he suffered prejudice from trial court’s twenty-month delay in ruling on his motion for sentence reconsideration); State v. Hall, 145 Vt. 299, 307-08 (1984) (finding that defendant failed to show any substantial prejudice resulting from seventeen-month delay in producing transcript of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence, and thus concluding that he had not been denied due process of law); see also Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-90 (recognizing that “the Du

2013Not unlike the Ray court, we have held that “[t]he major element of due process delay is ‘substantial prejudice’ caused by the delay,” and “[t]he showing of prejudice must be based on ‘concrete, practical considerations, rather than vague speculation unsupported by facts.’ ” Dean, 148 Vt. at 514 (citation omitted); see also Ray, 578 F.3d at 200 (“To prove a due process violation as a result of a sentencing delay, the prejudice claimed by the defendant, absent extraordinary circumstances, must be substantial and demonstrable.”).

2013State v. Dean, 148 Vt. 510, 514 (1987) (recognizing possibility of due process violation but rejecting as speculative defendant’s claim that he suffered prejudice from trial court’s twenty-month delay in ruling on his motion for sentence reconsideration); State v. Hall, 145 Vt. 299, 307-08 (1984) (finding that defendant failed to show any substantial prejudice resulting from seventeen-month delay in producing transcript of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence, and thus concluding that he had not been denied due process of law); see also Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-90 (recognizing that “the Du

1988In order to establish that excessive appellate delay amounts to a due process violation requiring reversal “defendant must establish . . . that he has been unable to present an adequate appeal because of the delay, or that he will be unable to defend adequately in the event a retrial is ordered.” State v. Hall, 145 Vt. 299, 307 , 487 A.2d 166, 171 (1984).

2012If plaintiff is to recover damages based on emotional distress, he must prove that "such injury actually was caused." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 , 98 S.Ct. 1042 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (discussing emotional distress damages based on a claim of a due process violation).

2012If plaintiff is to recover damages based on emotional distress, he must prove that "such injury actually was caused." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 , 98 S.Ct. 1042 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (discussing emotional distress damages based on a claim of a due process violation).

2011See State v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 293-94 , 658 A.2d 54, 64 (1995) (noting that police may use some psychological tactics in eliciting statements from suspects so long as suspect’s decision to confess results from suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations). 7 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that “while mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). ¶ 34.

2011See State v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 293-94 , 658 A.2d 54, 64 (1995) (noting that police may use some psychological tactics in eliciting statements from suspects so long as suspect’s decision to confess results from suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations). 7 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that “while mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). ¶ 34.

2015In reaching its conclusion, the Court added that, although the presence of both investigative and adjudicative functions “does not, without more, constitute a due process violation,” a court might conclude that “special facts and circumstances present in the case before it [make] the risk of unfairness . . . intolerably high.” Id. at 58 . ¶ 25.

1993Further, the established legal doctrine governing this issue is that “the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975).

1993In that case, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Constitution protected the liberty interest of a person on parole. 408 U.S. at 482 .

1993In that case, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Constitution protected the liberty interest of a person on parole. 408 U.S. at 482 .

2024We have recognized “intermixing of roles” is “a hallmark of a due process violation” in administrative adjudications, Crushed Rock, 150 Vt. at 621 , 557 A.2d at 89 , and “[d]ue process generally does not tolerate multiplicity of functions by a single individual in an adjudicative proceeding.” Burch-Clay, 2015 VT 110, ¶ 34 .

2024We have recognized “intermixing of roles” is “a hallmark of a due process violation” in administrative adjudications, Crushed Rock, 150 Vt. at 621 , 557 A.2d at 89 , and “[d]ue process generally does not tolerate multiplicity of functions by a single individual in an adjudicative proceeding.” Burch-Clay, 2015 VT 110, ¶ 34 .

2023See State v. Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 53, 61 (1994) (holding that defendant’s mention of notice of fair notice in pretrial motion lacked sufficient specificity and clarity to preserve due-process claim for appellate review). 5

2010Ben-Mont, 163 Vt. at 61 , 652 A.2d at 1009 .

2016Mullin, 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 .

2016Mullin, 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 .

2016In fact, petitioner is raising just such a procedural due process deficiency, based on the due process holding in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), in bringing his PCR. ¶ 26.

2005See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 242–43 (1969); In re Dunham, 144 1 Even if defense counsel’s statement provides a factual basis regarding Petitioner’s intent, it was not offered as a stipulation and the court never questioned Petitioner about it. 5 Vt. 444 , 449 (1984).

2015In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a three-part due process test that looks at the following factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 6 The court notes the irony contained in the present situation.

2014Weighing the due process factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the Court in Santosky emphasized the finality of the threatened loss in state-initiated termination proceedings. 455 U.S. at 758-59 .

2011The liberty interests of a prisoner, protected by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, are limited to freedom from restraints imposing “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Conway, 171 Vt. at 377 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 at 484 (1995)).

2000In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the United States Supreme Court ruled that prisoners’ liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the United States Constitution would be limited to freedom from restraints imposing “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 .